Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge

SR No.: 001608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Y J Padmarajiah
Publisher: Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal
Publication Year: 1963
Total Pages: 444
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Epistemology, & Anekantvad
File Size: 23 MB

Page 166

CHAPTER V
147
arise from the Jaina belief in the manifold nature of all things (sarvasyānekāntātmakatve'rgikriyamāņe). If reality is of multiple nature, that is, if all natures or characters subsist in all things, then a person proceeding to get water (jala) may find himself getting fire (anala) and another person proceeding to get fire may find himself getting water.
10. Pratyakşādipramānabădhā is what is contrary to all experience of reality by perception and other means of valid knowledge. That is, the bhedābheda nature of reality, as conceived by the Jaina, is not borne out perceptually or inferentially or in any other manner.
11. Asambhava may be described as impossibility, resulting from the supposedly absurd view of reality held by the Jaina. Cf. TRD., p. 232.
12. Ubhayadoşa : In the bhedabheda structure of reality the abhedatva signifies unitariness or oneness (ekāntenaikātmatva) and the bhedatva signifies manyness or plurality such that there arises the twofold doşa of unity (ekasvabhāvaivam) subsisting in plurality (anekantatve) and vice versa (anekasvabhūvatvam ekāntatve). (PKM, p. 52, and SRK, p. 739.)
13. Abhāva: The nature of this dosa is not clearly indicated. Abhayadeva, however, seems to understand it as a doşa which is presumed to rest on the non-cognisability (apratibhāsatve) of the incongruous reality as supposed to be contemplated by the Jaina theory: An incongruous real is, as stated under doşa No. 10 in this f.n., what is contrary to experience and consequently what is contrary to experience is as good as being non-existent (abhāva, cf, TBV, p. 452).
It is not possible to demarcate clearly and severally the specific features of these doşas since they are highly over. lapping among themselves in their character. For instance ubhayadoşa which refers to ekatva or anekatva of the bhedabhcdātmakavastutya may, with a slight turn in the expression be easily included in, or identified with, vadhikaraṇatādosa which also refers to the need for more than one, instead of one abode or nature. Similarly there is very little or practically no significant difference between the doşas Nos. 7 and 8 on the one hand and those of Nos. 10, 11 and 13 on the other. Even“ tually all other dosas are derived from, and therefore traceable to, virodha, the supposedly root evil, against which the Jaina has to marshal out all his dialectical resources.