Indian Philosophy

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/006972/1

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ESSAYS IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY By NAGIN J. SHAH SANSKRIT-SANSKRITI GRANTHAMALA 6 GENERAL EDITOR NAGIN J. SHAH

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ESSAYS IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY By NAGIN J. SHAH SANSKRIT-SANSKRITI GRANTHAMALA 6 GENERAL EDITOR NAGIN J. SHAH

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Printed by K. Bhikhalal Bhavsar Shree Swaminarayan Mudran Mandir 21, Purushottamnagar Nava Vadaj Ahmedabad-380 013 Published by Dr. Jagruti Dilip Sheth M.A. Ph.D. B-14, Dev-Darshan Flats Nehru Nagar Char Rasta Ahmedabad-380 015 1998 PRICE : Rs. 120/ This book can be ordered from : 1. Parshva Prakashan Nisha Pole, Relief Road, Ahmedabad-380 001 (India) 2. Saraswati Pustak Bhandar Hathi Khana, Ratan Pole, Ahmedabad-380 001 (India)

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CONTENTS Foreword Introduction 1 Nature of Time 2 Jaina Conception of Space 3 On Buddhist Nirvana 4 Conception of Isvara in Patanjala Yoga 5 Conception of Isyara in the Early Nyaya-Vaisesika School 59 6 On the Problem of Jnana-Darsana 7 Essentials of Dharmakirti's Theory of Knowledge 8 On Vyapti 9 Jainas on Testimony

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FOREWORD It is a matter of great pleasure for me to offer to the scholars of Indian philosophy the present work entitled 'Essays in Indian Philosophy' as the sixth book in the Sanskrit-Sanskriti Granthamala. As its title suggests, it examines certain issues of Indian philosophy. It deals with such topics as time, space, nirvana, Isvara, jnanadarsana, Dharmakirti's theory of knowledge, vyapti and testimony, . The work explains and analyses the relevant texts. Its exposition is text-based and authentic, interpretations though fresh are coherent, and conclusions are impartial and cogent. The work will be welcomed by all scholars and advanced students of Indian philosophy, embodying as it does a clear and lucid exposition of some of the important issues of Indian philosophy. TL Nagin J. Shah General Editor Sanskrit-Sanskriti Granthamala 23, Valkeshvar Society Ambawadi Ahmedabad-380 015 India March 15, 1998

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INTRODUCTION The present work is a study of some problems of Indian philosophy. The first essay gives an account of various Western and Indian views about the nature of time. Some comparisons have been suggested. The Jaina view is extensively dealt with. Some Jaina thinkers maintain that time is an independent substance while others contend that it is nothing but modes or changes of substances. It is argued that the former view is weak and unsound. The second essay studies the Jaina concept of space. Jainas hold that space is an independent substance existing in its own right. It is regarded as a universal container in which all other substances are contained. Some interesting questions are raised and answered. . . The third essay is devoted to the exposition of the Buddhist nirvana. According to the Buddhist there is no atman over and above citta. For them citta itself serves the purpose of atman. Citta soiled with adventitious impurities like attachment etc. is caught in the cycle of birth and death. When these impurities are removed from citta through spiritual practice, it attains nirvana which is nothing but extinction of personality (pudgala) - personality constitued of five personality factors (skandhas), viz. body and bodily traits, feelings, concepts and images, predispositions, sensory experiences or percepts, which all are due to impurities. In nirvana pure citta continuum without any personality exists. In this connection, the well-known analogy of extinguished fire is clearly explained in right textual context, and two kinds of nirvana viz. sopadhisesa and anupadhisesa are shown to correspond jivanmukti and videhamukti. Here it is brought to our notice that our philosophers are not exact in their use of terms. They do not employ them in their technical sense only. Jainas have used the term 'atman' for citta, thus creating an illusion or misunderstanding that they belong to atman tradition. In fact, they are as anatmavadin as the Buddhist. The terms atman', 'citta' and 'manas' are indiscriminately employed by our philosophers, using 'atman' for citta and 'citta' for atman as also 'citta' for manas and 'manas' for citta. And modern translators have made the situation worse by translating these three terms as mind, blurring all the difference. Lack of exactness in the use of terms has created so many problems which actually do not exist. " The fourth and fifth essays examine the Patanjala and early NyayaVaisesika conceptions of Isvara respectively. The relevant texts are analysed and explained independently, without being guided (misguided) by

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(7) the Sanskrit commentators and modern exponents. And it has been cogently * demonstrated that for Patanjali, Gautama and Vatsyayana Isvara is nothing but a jivanmukta who is a spiritual teacher (guru) or preacher (upadesta) par excellence. The sixth essay deals with the problem of jnana-darsana. One meaning of the term 'darsana' is sraddha. Another meaning of this term is a special type of cognition. It is this meaning that is intended when the terms 'jnana' and darsana' are used side by side. Jnana is a type of cognition and darsana is also a type of cognition. So naturally there arises a question as to what distinction between these two types of cognition is. To find answer to this question, the Sarkhya-Yoga, Buddhist and Jaina views on the problem of jnana-darsana are extensively and closely studied. That jnana and darsana are two fundamentally different faculties is accepted by the thinkers belonging to these three traditions. The Sarkhya-Yoga thinkers recognised two fundamentally different tattvas, viz. purusa (=atman) and citta. They attributed the faculty of darsana to purusa alone and the faculty of jnana to citta alone. The Buddhists rejected purusa (=atman) altogether and attributed the faculty of darsana to citta. Thus, the citta recognised by the Buddhists possesses both the faculties, viz. darsana and jnana. Those very reasons that urged the Buddhists to reject atman urged Jainas also to reject it. Jainas rejected atman, accepting citta alone. They too attributed both the faculties to citta. Great pains have been taken to bring out clearly the distinction between jnana and darsana. The seventh essay critically expounds Buddhist logician Dharmakirti's theory of knowledge. The metaphysics of momentarism could not but reject 'the validity of every cognition that grasps spatial and temporal extension and consequently in that metaphysics can fit only the theory that nothing but pure sensation gives us true knowledge of reality. So; for the Buddhist perception is equivalent to pure sensation which is by nature free from any thought. Thus, the most conspicuous and crucial feature of Dharmakirti's logic is the sharp distinction drawn between sensory experience and thought. Dharmakirti assigns an essentially negative rather than positive function to thought; in his eyes, thought is primarily meant to remove an illusion and only incidentally to produce a conviction. However here another line of thought has also been operative. For what thought reveals about an object is what is common to several objects; but Dharmakirti is of the view that each object has just got one positive nature which it does not share with any other; so according to him what several objects have in common is not any positive feature but just that feature which excludes them from a particular set of objects (i.e. what jars have in common is what excludes them from non-jars). In this way Dharmakirti also feels justified in maintaining that bare sensory experience reveals the total nature of an object while a piece of thought concerning it reveals only an aspect of this nature. For sensory experience reveals an object as a bare particular,

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(8) i.e. as something excluded from everything else, while a piece of thought reveals it as excluded from a particular set of objects; and Dharmakirti suggests that 'exclusion from everything else' constitutes the total nature of an object while 'exclusion from a particular set of objects' constitutes but an aspect of this nature. Certainly, Dharmakirti has put right things in odd manner. One can easily see that Dharmakirti has an almost correct understanding of the relative roles played in the knowledge-situation by bare sensory experience on the one hand and thought on the other, as also of the type of objective features - whether exclusively negative or otherwise - that thought manages to notice. The eighth essay mainly deals with the problem of the acquisition or grasping of a universal necessary relation obtaining between two things 'or two features. The Nyaya-Vaisesika, Buddhist and Jaina positions are explained. And various solutions offered by different thinkers to solve the problem of grasping the universal necessary relation (vyapti) are presented and their defects are pointed out The ninth and last essay expounds Jaina theory of testimony. Keeping in, view the main controversy regarding the question as to whether testimony is an independent pramand, the Nyaya, the Vaisesika, the Buddhist and the Jaina views are discussed. The Naiyayikas are of the opinion that words are directly connected with things, of course, through convention. They maintain that as soon as we understand the meaning of words we acquire the knowledge of facts and that the process of understanding the meaning of words is not inferential. So, they believe that the knowledge through testimony is not inferential. The Vaisesikas, on the other hand, maintain that the process of understanding the meaning of words is inferential. Moreover, though they, like the Naiyayikas, accept that the words are conventionally connected with things, they, unlike the Naiyayikas, are conscious of the implications of this conventional character of the relation. Words are symbols and not signs. Hence, they contend that words qua words enable us to infer only the intestion of the speaker and not the fact. But they state that words qua utterances of a reliable person enable us to infer facts. This view closely tallies with the view of Dharmakirti, except the fact that Dharmakirti goes even a step further and maintains that words are not in any way connected with things. The Jaina logicians refute Dharmakirti's position that words could not directly lead to the knowledge of things. Jainas also refute the view that testimony is a form of inference. It has been pointed out that all the differences shown by the Jaina logicians between inference and testimony are trivial and do not furnish a sufficient ground for their view that testimony is a source of knowledge independent of inference. I am sure this work will prove useful to all those interested in the study of Indian philosophy. Nagin J. Shah

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NATURE OF TIME "As I see it, we are unlikely to reach any definite conclusions on these questions (Determinism vs. Freewill and the problem of causation) until we have a better understanding of the true nature of time"! these are the words of Sir James Jean, a great scientist. How can it be possible for a person like me to determine the nature of time ? So, my task here is to study what the great masters have said about the nature of time. While doing so I shall make a special attempt to explain the Jaina view at length. Western Views : In the West, Aristotle maintains that time is closely connected with continuous movement. Time is the measure of this continuous movement. In other words, time is a breaking up of continuous movement (numerus motus). Movement presents two features : (i) Movement is an uninterrupted progress of the subject from potentiality to actuality. Thus movement bears the characteristic of unity. (ii) Movement, on the other hand, is also virtually multiple. One car divide it into an indefinite number of parts. "Movement, then, * subjected to a simple mental division becomes a number or a multitude." Thus time is looked upon as made up of two elements, the one formal namely number (numerus), and the other material namely movement (motus). In other words, we may say that according to Aristotle time is motion that admits of numeration. "In fact, concrete (not-abstracted, rather not subjected to mental divison) time and movement are identical. Continuous movement does not at once appear under the formal aspect of temporal order. It has first to submit itself to a process of mental division. This mental division gives rise to the notion of succession. Nevertheless, this .division is not a real one, but belongs to the mental order and makes no change in the objective reality of continuous movement. I would like to suggest the comparison of this view with the one held by Bergson.

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INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Descartes identified external reality with extension. Extension is not identical with any of the quantitative determinations like shape, size and figure. He, however, did not regard the quantitative differences of physical things as unreal. They are the modes of matter; they are due to the action of motion on matter. He thus came to admit the reality of motion. But for him who has identified external reality with extension it was logically impossible to derive it from external reality. So, he maintains that God originally imparted motion, to matter. Motion implies change and time. So, he has to admit the reality of time. Since time, like motion, is out of place in his conceptual world view he had no option but to regard time also as a miracle, pointing to the agency of God. Time, according to him, is an infinite atomistic series of moments. Why was he led to this atomic view of time ? "In his anxiety to show that God was the continuous support of the world of flux, Descartes was driven to the atomic view of Time. He felt that if the future of the world depended solely on its antecedent state, there would be nothing for God to do, once the world had been created. Every moment Time seemed to annihilate the world; therefore, continuous creative intervention of God alone could guarantee the conformity of the future to the past." According to Spinoza there is only one eternal universal substance 'God or Nature'. This substance possesses, among other infinite attributes, extension. Attributes appear in specific ways or modes. Motion, according to him, is the mode of extension since there can be no motion without extension. Logically we cannot deduce this mode from the substance or extension. Hence it is unreal. He seems to have been influenced by the method of geometry. This is the reason why he maintains that things eternally follow from the substance"; that causal relation is not temporal relation; that it is the relation between the constant and eternal things'.? This rules out all change and evolution and consequently makes time impossible, unwanted and unreal. Thus according to him temporal aspect of things is due to the modification of finite subjectivity. To reach truth means to escape this limitation and see things sub specie aeternitatis. In this sense time is unreal, it is the appearance which reflective knowledge eliminates. This trend could be traced back in Parmenides and Plato. 8 Descartes and Spinoza accepted only one ultimate substance and hence they had to maintain that extension (space) is one of the

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NATURE OF TIME attributes of the substance. Leibniz ruled out the possibility of this extension (space) by positing many atomic substances (monads) in place of one substance. Space and time, according to him, are confused ideas abstracted from our experience of things known independently of space and time.10 According to Newton, sensuous time and space are unreal. There are absolute space and time which are not determined by their relation to anything external. Space is characterised by reversibility; time is characterised by irreversibility. In other words, through an act of will we might change our motion through space, yet on the other hand the flowing of time transcends our act of will. Moreover, Newton's this concept of absolute time makes possible the case of absolute simultaneity." For Kant space, and time are neither confused perceptions nor absolutes. They are the necessary forms of perception. They are not realities or things existing for themselves, nor are they qualities or relations belonging to things as such; they are forms or functions of the senses. We cannot think things without time, though we can think time without things; hence time is the necessary precondition of our perception of things, or of phenomenal world. Thus these forms are not derived from experience, they are a priori."2 Kant demonstrates that space and time are vitiated by 'antinomies'. This means that on the supposition of the reality of space and time, it is possible to prove, with equal cogency, several contradictory pairs of theses and countertheses, such as that space has boundaries and has not, time has beginning and has not, etc. '3 Bradley traces back all these paradoxes to the fundamental paradox in 'term' and 'relation'. All relations are unreal as they involve infinite regress. 4 According to him space and time are mere appearances and product of nescience, so to say.is A. E. Taylor, a follower of Bradley, distinguishes between perceptual space and time on the one hand and conceptual space and time on the other. Perceptual space and time we have in perception; and they have reference to here and now. Conceptual space and time are constructed from the perceptual data. Neither of them is real. Perceptual space and time are unreal because they involve reference to the here and now of a finite experience'; conceptual space and time are unreal because they contain no principle of internal distinction, and are thus not individual.'16

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4 . INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Time (durdee) assumes fundamental importance in Bergson. Space and time are, according to him, diametrically opposite in nature. Space is static, while time (duree) is the principle of creative evolution: Realtime, according to him, is duration and not the juxtaposition of discrete instants. Real time (duree reelle) is 'heterogeneous' and continuous'. The real temporal process is a multiplicity of 'interpenetration'. Real time flows in an indivisible. continuity. This real time we find in our experiences. It is Intellect that makes cuts in it, spatializes it and falsely represents it as a straight line with discrete moments as its points. Thus real time we. cannot think, 'we must live it because life transcends intellect.'!?. As against Bergson, Alexander maintains that space and time are so intimately interrelated that one cannot be understood without reference to the other. When viewed thus, the contradictions allegedly found in them would no longer remain. Space-Time, says Alexander, is the 'stuff of which things are fashioned. This is interpreted in the sense that Space-Time is identical with Pure Motion. This again amounts to saying that a thing is a complex of motions." A. N. Whitehead is a philosopher of change par excellence. He agrees with Bergson on the point that our experience is of duration and that instants are the abstractions made by science (i.e. intellect). But he differs from Bergson in not declaring that only duration is real and an 'instant' is a "fiction' or 'convention' because he feels that in doing so one cuts all connections between experience and science - which he is not prepared to do." Now let us see, in a general way, what Einstein has said about time. Wildon Carr writes : "The principle of relativity declares that there is no absolute magnitude, that there exists nothing whatever which can claim to be great or small in its own nature, also there is no absolute duration, nothing whatever which in its own nature is short or long. I co-ordinate my universe from my own standpoint of rest in a system of reference in relation to which all else is moving...Space and Time are not containers nor are they contents but variants.'20 'The chief novelty of Einstein's theory is the conception of the relativity of simultaneity... If we grasp the relativity of simultaneity, there is little difficulty in seeing that the measurable physical duration (or elapsed time) of any event depends upon the velocity of the centre from which it is measured...The theory of

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NATURE OF TIME relativity not only takes for granted the irrevocability of the past, that the status of events as past is unalterable but in making the velocity of light a maximum it makes vision or other communication with the past impossible. But it is at first surprising to learn that of two events in distant parts of space, one may precede the other in one physical system and follow it in the measurable determinations of another system that is moving relatively to the first. This seemingly paradoxical situation, that event A may as truly be said to precede B as to follow it, depending on the different referents, is limited by the finite velocity of light as a maximum.'21 Indian Views (except the Jaina): In the oldest times, we find the idea of Time as the highest principle and power governing all things. In the Atharvaveda (XIX. 53) we come across a hymn which extols Time as the basis of all things; it creates all things and it destroys all things. The idea of Time further asserted itself. We find discussed in philosophical works the doctrine of Time (Kalavada) which traces all things back to Time. In the mouth of the upholder of this doctrine the following words are put : "Time brings all creatures to ripeness. Time again destroys all things, Time keeps awake among the sleepy. It is hard to transgress Time. Without Time not even a bean is cooked, even when a man has placed the pot in fire; therefore a man knows that it has occurred through Time." (Sastravartasamuccaya, 166). Time creates all things, Time ripens all things and Time destroys all things. Time is all powerful. But in the days of philosophical systems the doctrine of Time (Kalavada) remains in the background and loses its importance as the prime ground of all things. Some philosophical systems altogether rejected Time and others that accepted it recognised it not as the prime ground of all things but merely as a condition of their temporal aspect. We undertake the exposition of the various conceptions of Time, found in the different systems of Indian philosophy. In the Samkhya-Yoga system one finds varied views expressed on the nature of time. Some maintain that time is altogether nonexistent22; some declare that it is an evolute (parinamah prthagbhavah) of Primordial Matter (Prakiti)23; some are of the opinion that Primordial Matter (Pradhana) itself is to be called time24; some expressly state that time is nothing but action. Some put forward the

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INDIAN PHILOSOPHY view that time is of two kinds - eternal (nitya) and fractional (khanda); that eternal time is no more than gunas of Prakrti, the fractional time, on the other hand, is produced from Ether (akasa) through various limiting adjuncts.26 Still some others hold that time is nothing over and above the objects spoken of as past, present and future.27 The view found in the Yogasutra of Patanjali is peculiar and explained clearly in the commentaries thereon. According to this view there is no time except moment. What is called time, rather duration, has no factual existence; it is only mental construction. Moment is real, duration is unreal. This has a striking similarity with the Buddhist view that moment is real, the continuum (santana) is unreal. Let us . study this view in the words of Sir. B. N. Seal. "Infinite time is a non-entity objectively considered, being only a construction of the understanding (buddhinirmana) based on the relation of antecedence and sequence, in which the members of the phenomenal series are intuited to stand to one another. These phenomenal changes as intuited by us in the empirical consciousness fall into a series, which the understanding conceives as order in Time. The Time-series, then, is a schema of the understanding for representing the course of Evolution. The schema of the understanding supervenes on the phenomenal world as order in Time, and hence in the empirical consciousness the Time-series appears to have an objective reality, and to form a continuum. As there is an ultimate and irreducible unit of extensive quantity (parimana) in the Gunas or infinitesimal Reals of Prakrti, which are without constituent parts, so the moment may be conceived as the ultimate and irreducible unit of this Timecontinuum as represented in the empirical cousciousness. A moment, therefore, cannot be thought of as containing any parts standing in the relation of antecedence and sequence. If change is represented by the Time-series, a moment as the unit of time may be supposed to represent the unit of change. Now all physical change may be reduced to the motion of atoms in space, and we may, therefore, define the moment as representing the ultimate unit of such change - viz., the (instantaneous) transit of an atom (or rather a Tanmatra) from one point in space to the next succeeding point. Even an atom has constituent parts (the Tanmatras), and hence an atom must take more than one moment to change its position. The motion of that which is absolutely simple and without parts from one point in space to the next must be instantenous, and conceived as the absolute unit of

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NATURE OF TIME change (and therefore of time, ksana). If this is held to be an irreducible absolute unit, it will follow that what we represent as the Time-continuum is really discrete. Time is of one dimension. Two moments cannot co-exist; neither does any series of moments exit in reality. Order in Time is nothing but the relation of antecedence and sequence, between the moment that is and the moment that just went before. But only one moment, the present, exists. The future and the past have no meaning apart from potential and sub-latent phenomena. One kind of transformation to which a thing is subject is that it changes from the potential to the actual, and from the actual to the sub-latent. This may be called the change of mark (laksana-parinama) as opposed to change of quality (dharmaparinama) and the change due to duration or lapse of time (avastha-parinama). The present is the mark of actuality, the future the mark of potentiality, and the past of sub-latency, in a phenomenon. Only one single moment is actual, and the whole universe evolves in that one single moment. The rest is but potential or sublatent. Vijnanabhiksu points out that this does not amount to a denial of Time. It means that Time has no real (or objective) existence apart from the moment. But the latter is real being identical with the unit of change in phenomena (gunaparinamasya ksanatvavacanat). But even this is real only for, our empirical (relative) consciousness (vyutthitadarsana), which intuits the relation of antecedence and sequence into the evolving Reals (Gunas), in the stage of "empirical intuition" (savicara nirvikalpaprajna). The "intellectual intuition" (nirvicara nirvikalpaprajna), on the other hand, apprehends the Reals as they are, without the imported empirical relations of Space, Time, and Causality."28 It is interesting to contrast this view with the one upheld by Bergson. According to this Samkhya view, the moment is real while the duration is mental construction. Bergson's view is quite opposite.. There moment is unreal and duration is real. Moreover, duration of the Samkhya seems to be a series of discrete moments; there is no real 'interpenetration between a moment that is and a moment that just went before; that is, one does not 'melt into the other, so to say. On the other hand in Bergson's duree moments are continuous forming one indivisible flow; its moments 'melt' into one another and form an organic whole. I feel that this Samkhya view of time is not in tune with their theory of change (parinamavada). They maintain

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INDIAN PHILOSOPHY that the states or moments of a particular thing are not discrete but continuous. According to this system, reality is neither a series of discrete momentary states (i.e. mere momentary modes) nor eternally static substance but persistence of an eternal substance through its various changing modes. So if they have declared unrelated solitary moment unreal and a contiunous flow of moments one melting into the other real, their view on the nature of time would have fitted well with their theory of change. This view of theirs seems to have been influenced by the Buddhist view that merely object moments are real and the continuum (santana) of these discrete object moments is mental construction.29 Nyaya-Vaisesika View : According to this system, Time is a substance. It is one, etemal and all-pervading. It causes movement and change. All perceptible things are perceived as moving, changing, coming into being and passing away. They are produced and destroyed. There must be some Force or Power which thus brings them into existence and moves them all. The things themselves cannot do it. There must, therefore, be something which makes this movement, origination and destruction of things possible. It is this something, this Power or Force, which is Time. As it moves and changes things it gives rise to in the percipient the notions, with regard to those things, of past, present and future, of old and new. This Time substance, though itself static, is the source of all changes and motions. It is devoid of specific physical qualities like colour etc. Hence it is not emanable to perceptual cognition. Nor could it be an object of mental perception because mind cannot function independently of external sense-organs in the case of external things. Its existence is inferred from the facts of consecution and simultaneity between phenomena. Had there been no Time we would have no knowledge of consecution or simultaneity and there would be nothing to account for our time-notions associated with all change.30 Time being one unique substance, name given to it is a proper name and not a general term. When Time is divided into many different times, it is a metaphor. 32 In other words, distinctions in time like a minute, an hour, a day and so on are apparent and due to certain conditions. Similar is the case with the division of Time into past, present and future. In accordance with the changes of things Time reveals itself as past, present and future. Time that is all-pervading partless substance appears as many in association with the changes related to

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NATURE OF TIME it. These different times are mere representations produced by one single object only. They, being mere representations, are unable to give rise to a general concept.33 From all this it becomes clear that this system considers Time as all-embracing receptacle containing the entire universe. It is interesting to note Raghunatha Siromani's view. According to him the essential nature of time is Divinity and nothing distinct from Divinity (Isvara).-4 Mimamsa View : The Bhattas mainly follow the Vaisesikas in this connection. The Bhattas too consider Time as a substance, allpervasive, eternal and deviod of physical qualities like colour etc.35 But as against the Vaisesikas they believe that Time is perceptible by all the six sense-organs. 36 One would ask as to how that which is devoid of physical qualities could be perceived by all the six senses. Sastradipika solves the difficulty in the following manner. Time is not perceived independently by the senses; but along with the perception of various objects Time is also perceived as their qualification by all the senses.37 On the authority of Ramanujacarya we can say that the Prabhakaras accept the Vaisesika view of Time in toto 38 Advaita Vedanta View : According to this system Time is nothing but nescience (avidya).39 Buddhist View : At a very early stage of Buddhism - when even the Pitakas were not compiled - a view that there is one unitary immutable Time along with the conditioned empirical time was prevalent, writes Ac. Narendradeva, among the Buddhists. He bases his inference on the fact that those early Buddhists accepted matter (rupa) only as impermanent and all other subtle elements like citta and vijnana as immutable. He further states that the conception of time as the cause of the production of impermanent things finds support in the early Buddhist literature. 40 ' Mahavibhasa refers to a view that regards time as immutable and samskrta dharmas as impermanent. Moreover, according to this view time is a receptacle with three divisions - future, present and past - organically continuous; samskrta dharmas move in this receptacle; they having come out of the future enter the present and having come out of the present enter the past. Later on the one immutable time seems to have been removed and there remained merely the three transitions' (adhva). The Vaibhasikas think that all the three transitions - future, past and present - exist. The distinction

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10 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY among them is based on the causal efficiency (karitra) of an element. Causal efficiency (karitra) is of two kinds - one that determines the general character of the remote fruit (phalaksepa) and the other that actually produces the fruit (phaladana). All the dharmas, when they are in a state of phalaksepa, are termed present. The states prior and posterior to this state are devoid of phalaksepa-sakti. Prior nonexistence of this power is termed future; and posterior non-existence of this power is termed past. The future and the past exist in the same sense as the present exists. All the three times, rather 'transitions', have the same nature always; merely their efficiency (karitra) differs. While discussing the doctrine of the existence of three times (adhva) it is said, in the Abhidharmakosa, that the future (effect) becomes present through desantarakarsana. In the Vaibhasika list of seventyfive dharmas Time finds no mention. But we may surmise that through the back door both the types of time - one unitary immutable and the other conditioned empirical - enter the Vaibhasika philosophy. One unitary immutable time is accepted under the name of Amrta dhatu (=Nirvana dhatu). The empirical time is accepted in the guise of samskyta laksanas which together, like Vaisesika time. constitute the general cause of change. 41 The Sautrantikas deny the objective reality of the samskrta laksanas viz. production etc. The notions of production etc., they say, refer not to a moment but to a series (of moments) which is a mental construction.42 Again, they believe in the present time only, while the other two divisions of time, namely, past and future, are regarded as non-existent. Neither the past nor the future exists. Even what is called present is nothing over and above an element (dharma). Hence here the moment becomes a synonym of an element. This is the reason why the author of Brahmavidyabharana writes as follows : In the opinion of the Buddhists Time does not exist. A jar etc. which is perishable by nature in the very act of emerging becomes the basis for the assumption of moment (ksana). They assert that moment is nothing over and above the objects such as a jar. There is no independent time such as a ksana.45 Nagasena maintains that time is a product of ignorance. For the enlightened there is no time. In the Abhidhammatthasamgaho we find stated that time is a subjective element, the concept (kalapannatti) by which we in our internal intuition distinguish our first and foremost

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NATURE OF TIME 11 states; that it is the sine qua non of the succession of mental states. 46 * The Madhyamikas maintain that even from the empirical point of view Time is unsubstantial. It is admittedly not an object of perception. They - past, present and future - appear to be existences due to our tendency to objectify concepts. It is impossible to conceive time either as a permanent immutable entity causing things or as an existent. The reasons given against the first view are as follows. It cannot be a cause. As the cause of the state of production (of a particular thing) is eternal, that state the thing will have eternally. Again, the thing whose cause is presumed immutable (Time) should really be uncaused or caused at random. It is so because a cause to produce an effect must transform itself into the effect and cease to exist. The arguments adduced against the second view are as follows. The divisions of Time into the Past, Present and Future are vital to its conception. The Present and the Future are what they are in relation to the Past; they should therefore exist in the past, for they are dependent on it. If so, they too would be included in the past, or the latter would be indistinguishable from the present and the future. If, to avoid this, it were held that the present and the future do not exist in the past, relative to what are they the present and the future ? A non-relative present or future is not possible; and without distinctions, time too is unavailable. The same arguments may be urged, mutatis mutandis, with regard to the existence of the past or the present in the present and the future, etc. Time might be thought to exist in relation to things that change. But as changing things (bhava) are untenable, the reality of Time too is not established.47 "Kamalasila shows the futility of time in the following manner. When the speaker addresses a person with the words 'this is prior', "this is posterior' with reference to objects or events taking place successively .a particular impression (abhoga) is formed in the mind of the latter. This impression gives rise to the knowledge that things thus referred to are prior or posterior. Thus temporal order being otherwise explainable time is not accepted by the Buddhists. Again, as Time is partless according to those who accept it as real, the concept of priority or posteriority is not applicable to it. If this priority or posteriority, as they say, primarily belongs to actions and objects, and only secondarily to time, then too, says Kamalasila, time is unnecessary.48

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12 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Grammarians' View : According to Patanjali, Time is the substratum of the world; it is an eternal (nitya), indivisible (akhanda), all-pervading ruling (vibhu) principle (padartha). We cannot trace its origin. Nor can we divide it into parts. The principle by which trees, grass, creepers and other corporeal (murtimat) substances (dravya) are seen sometimes to grow, sometimes to decline is called Time. In short, change is due to Time."' How partless Time possibly came to be divided ? Patanjali replies that although it knows no real differentiation yet through the difference of attributes, its differentiation is supposed (kalpana) as is also the case with allpervading Ether (akasa). Fractioness unitary time, when all the forms of action (kriya) are associated with it, seems to take different shapes. Associated to a particular form of action Time becomes, day; associated to another form of action it beomes night and so on. Associated to different motions of the sun, Time takes different shapes of day, night, etc.So Bharthari considers Eternal Verbum or Logos as the Absoute. He maintains that this Absolute has the fundamental Power, Time. The notion of temporal order could not be accounted for without this Power. According to him, thus, Time is not an independent and supersensible substance. It is a Power of the Absolute. But it is to be noted that the Power and the Powerful are essentially identical. This Power has two aspects-pratibandha (also called jara) and abhyanujna (also called krama). The first is the preventive aspect and the second is the permissive aspect. But for the first there would result chaos, all actions or effects being simultaneous. Thus a seed, a sprout, a stem and a stalk - all would emerge and exist simultaneously. The second makes possible the projection of the sequenceless Absolute into phenomenal sequence of priority and posteriority.S? These two aspects, namely, pratibandha and abhyanujna correspond more or less to the two aspects, namely viksepa and avarana ascribed to Avidya by the later writers on Advaita. Time (kalasakti) is looked upon as the efficient cause (nimitta-karana) or the causal agent (prayojaka-kartr) of the phenomenal world in its manifold phases of creation, preservation and dissolution. As Time, with the help of its two aspects, makes possible the temporal sequence in phenomenal world, we superimpose on the Time itself the temporal sequence. Succession or simultaneity are the attributes of actions or objects and not of Time

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NATURE OF TIME 13 but we superimpose them on Time because it is Time that presents actions or objects in succession or simultaneity:54 Again, though Time is unitary we wrongly describe it as manifold after having identified it with the actions and movements which it controls. Similarly, our description of Time as long or brief is not true. Though it is constant and changeless, it appears to be of greater or shorter duration according as the series of actions brought about by it is long drawn out or cut short. Moreover, Time, in reality, is not threefold - past, present and future. When an action ceases, Time is described as past, when it is about to happen, it is said to be future; and when it continues to flow on as a current, it is called present. Thus the distinctions into past, future and present naturally pertain to actions, while they are superimposed on Time. The two aspects pratibandha and abhyanujna are eternal.58 Hence they co-exist. Co-existence of these two mutually. opposite aspects would give rise to the contingency of conflict between the two. The grammarians solve the difficulty by stating that there is a chronological co-existence yet there is a logical sequence between the two and cite a case of three gunas of Samkhya Prakrti in their support.59 Astronomers' View : The view that Time is nothing but action is ascribed to astronomers by some modern scholars. But it seems that it is not their view. If at all it is their view, it is not the view of all the astronomers but only of the few. The Suryasidhanta states that Time is of two kinds - the one is rod-like indivisible and inflexible (akhandadandayamana) and without an end (aksayya), and the other is the one the nature of which is to measure (kalanatmaka). The partless rod-like Time is the cause of production, endurance and destruction of the changing world. The measurable Time can be demonstrated (nidrsya) and is an object of perception. This measurable Time is, again, of two kinds - tangible (murta) and intangible (amurta). The vital breath is taken as the unit of tangible Time. The time necessary in a healthy body for inspiration and expiration is called vital breath (prana). One vital breath takes about four seconds (of the Western division of time). The "time-atom', the 'truti', is the unit of intangible time. It is the 33,750th part of a second.61 Jaina View : A . 1. Time and Jaina Agamic Works In the Avasyaka Curni, three different views on the nature of time .

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14 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY are referred to. Some say that time is a quality62; some maintain that it is nothing but modes of the substance;63 still some others opine that it is an independent substance (dravya) in addition to the five, namely, Jiva (Soul Substance). Pudgala (Matter Substance), Akasa (Space Substance), Dharma and Adharma (substances serving as the media of motion and inertia respectively) 4. Out of these three views, the first is, to the best of my knowledge, neither referred to nor explained elsewhere in the whole of the Jaina literature. The last two views are considerably old and find mention in the Bhagavatisutrass. The Svetambara philosophers refer to both these views, though they favour either of them. Digambara thinkers state and explain their accepted view only according to which time is an independent substanice. 2. Arguments for the Time as an independent Substance, Now let us study the arguments put forward by the Svetambara and the Digambara thinkers to establish time as an independent substance. (1) The existence of real time is established by the incessant minute imperceptible changes (vartana) that go on in the five substances; without it these changes would not take place as it is their auxiliary cause. To give a concrete example, we might say that the stone under a potter's wheel assists in the movement of the wheel. The stone here does not impart motion to the wheel, but without this stone such a kind of motion would not have been possible. Similarly, time assists or works as an auxiliary cause in the changes produced in substances, though it does not work as a cause proper in their production(r)7. (2) Jainas should accept Time as an independent substance. Though spiritual and material sabstances are regarded capable by nature to move and to rest, yet they have posited two independent substances Dharma and Adharma serving as the media or auxiliary causes of motion and inertia respectively. Similarly, though the five substances are by nature capable of transforming themselves into their proper modes some auxiliary or general cause like Time should be posited to help them in their transformations. Were they to reject Time as an independent substance, they have no right to posit Dharma and Adharma. The case of Time is on par with that of Dharma and Adharma 68 (3) Though all the causal conditions are there, the mango-tree, etc. do not bear fruits all at once; this suggests that there is Time substance, with varied capacities, which the effects expect for their fruition". (4) Time

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NATURE.OF TIME 15 substance is a controlling principle. Without it temporal order could not be accounted for. Were it not an independent substance, all serial effects would take place simultaneously and thus there would ensue chaos instead of order." (5) Without Time substance, how can we have particular divisions of Time ? Divisions imply something of which they are the divisions." (6) Simple uncompounded word 'time' presupposes an independent entity, namely, Time.72 (7) Activities like cooking etc. are conventionally referred to as 'cooking time' etc. But in this conventional usage of 'cooking time and so on, the name of 'time' is superimposed on activity. The term 'time' really signifies the existence of real time which is the basis of this conventional time.73 (8) Those who maintain that time is nothing but movement of the sun and other luminaries are not right. Mere movement of the sun and stars could not account for the changes in substances. Even in regard to movement we say it is past', 'it is present, 'it is future'. Movements require the assistance of Time. Without it they are impossible. Minute changes constituting movements could not be explained if Time were not posited as an independent real substance.74 (9) It is untenable to maintain that Space (akasa) can very well perform the function assigned to Time. In other words, to reject Time as an independent sabstance we cannot legitimately maintain that Space serves as an auxiliary cause of the minute changes (vartana) in the five substances. Space merely contains or gives room to the substances. It cannot be a causal condition of the minute changes in other substances. For instance, a pot can at the most support or contain the rice but it cannot cook the rice; for that we need fire.75 (10) Some might even argue that 'Existence' (Satta) itself can perform the function of time; and hence there is no need of positing an independent substance called Time. But this view is not sound. Minute imperceptible changes themselves constitute the nature of 'Existence'. So, how could it be viewed as an auxiliary cause of minute changes. 76 (11) A theory is propounded by some that time is nothing but activity (kriya). Akalanka explains it as follows. Movement of an atom from one spacepoint to the next spacepoint is called an 'instant'. There is nothing like a minute Time over and above this movement to measure the span of this instant. The collection of these instantaneous activities is called avalika, the collection of these avalikas is called ucchvasa and so on. There is no entity called Time. In our every day usage we say 'he sits as long as the cows are milked.' Here the usage of time

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16 . INDIAN PHILOSOPHY is based on the activities. When one activity is circumscribed or limited by another activity, to the latter is applied the term 'time'. Thus time is nothing but activity.?? Akalanka refutes this view in the following manner. He admits that the usages like he did it within a wink of an eye', 'he did it within a breath are no doubt based on activities. But he points out that our application of the term 'time to activities of 'winking', 'breathing etc. could not be without any ground whatsover. Take an example of our application of the term dandi' ('staff-bearer') to Devadatta. This application of the dandi' to Devadatta could not be baseless. Its basis is the relation obtaining. between danda (staff) and Devadatta. Similarly, we should maintain that there is something like Time which, being in relation with activity, makes possible our application of the term "time' to activity.78 Moreover, if we were to consider time as identical with activity, the contingency of the absence or non-existence of the present would ensue. How ? In connection with activity there are only two alternative states, namely, activity either done or undone. There is no third state in its connection, namely, activity neither done nor undone. Thus activity is devoid of its present and hence it cannot provide the basis for the usage of present. And past and future being relative to present, in the absence of present they too would be non-existent.79 It might be suggested that the collection of activities from the beginning of the effect to its completion is called present. But this stand is very weak. The activities being momentary, how could there be any possibility of thier collection ?80 Again, if it were argued that time is not accepted independent of activities on the ground that it is not cognised as distinct from activities, Akalanka retorts that similar logic should be applied by the opponent to activities. When done so, even activities would suffer the same fate as that of time; they would be nothing over and above agents or substances as they are not cognised as distinct from them. The last argument adduced by: Akalanka against this theory is that an activity cannot limit or measure another activity. Only persistent or perdurable thing can measure another such thing. But activity being momentary how can it measure another such activity ? A thing which itself is momentary can never measure another momentary thing.82 We have already stated that all the Digambara thinkers and a section of Svatambara thinkers upheld the view that time is an

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NATURE OF TIME 17 independent substance. But we should see whether there is any difference of opinion between the Digambara thinkers on the one hand and the concerned Svetambara thinkers on the other. Scholars generally find differences between the two views.83 Let us see what is the real position. 3. Time substance according to Digambaras According to the Digambara thinkers, time is atomic. There are innumerable time-atoms. Each time-atom occupies one spacepoint of the cosmic space. Thus time-atoms are confined to cosmic space only. They are not present in the space beyond cosmos. They do not combine to form molecules as the material atoms do. Nor do they constitute one single whole as the spacepoints do. Thus they have no spatial extension (tiryakpracaya). Only those substances that have spatial extension are. termed astikaya. Hence time is not counted among astikaya.85 Time-atoms go on assuming different modes all the while. All these modes are not measurable. The smallest measurable mode of a time-atom is termed 'samaya' (instant) which is defined as the time taken by a material atom to traverse a unit of space by slow movement.86 Each time-atom has infinite such modes. 87 Though these modes are not simultaneous, a time-atom being a substance pervades all of them. That is, these modes are not discrete, without any permanent substance underlying them. This is the reason why time atoms are said to have temporal extension or monodimensional order . (udhvapracaya).88 Time-atoms are motionless89 and hence each of : them for ever occupy one particular space-point in cosmic space. They are-immobile entities arranged in close proximity to one another, each occupying one space-point in cosmic space. They are eternal as they are atomic and do not form aggregates. Origination, persistence and decay in their case are explained through the origination, persistence and decay of other things. It is also said that they are eternal in the sense that they never give up their own nature and that the origination and decay in their case is due to the rhythmic rise and fall of their agurulaghuguna (untranslatable term, lit. means neither-heavy-norlight-quality). Ac. Kundakunda maintains that a time-atom undergoes origination, persistence and decay at one and the same moment.93 T Time-atoms are devoid of physical qualities like colour, etc. and in this sense only they are called amurta.94 They are sublte and imperceptible.95 Though other substances require time as an auxiliary

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18 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY cause in the emergence of their modes, time-atoms do not require any other substance as an auxiliary cause in the production of their own modes. Digambara thinkers recognize two types of Time - Absolute (mukhya) and Conventional (vyavaharika). A time-atom with immeasurable minutest modes is Absolute time. In other words, a continuum of immeasurable minutest modes of a time-atam is Absolute time. But modes of a time-atom, that are measured' by motion of a material atom or a heavenly luminary constitute Conventional time. Absolute time has no reference to motion of a material atom or a heavenly luminary whereas Conventional time. has pointed reference to it. So, it is said that Absolute time does not requre motion of material atom or a heavenly luminary for its manifestation. Absolute time is the auxiliary cause of the immeasurable minutest modes of substances whereas Conventional time is the auxiliary cause of the measurable modes of substances. As time-atoms are spread over the entire cosmic space, Absolute time is present everywhere in the cosmic space. As the motion of a materal atom is available throughout the cosmic space, samaya division of Conventional time is also present in the entire cosmic space. But as the motion of the sun and other heavenly luminaries is not available outside the space inhabited by human beings, the divisions of Conventional Time having reference to this motion are confined only to this portion of cosmic space. Absolute time being what it is, usage or division of past, present and future is metaphorically or secondarily applicable to it; but it is primarily applicable to Conventional time.100 4. Time Substance according to Svetambaras A few out of these svetambara thinkers who recognise time as an independent substance favour the Digambara view. Ac. Hemacandra is the foremost among them. But others reject the Digambara view. According to them time is not atomic. It is not a manifold of atoms. It is one and pervades the entire cosmic space. Though it is one whole, it can be said to have spatial parts. It has extension over the cosmic space and the parts of this space covered by it are obviously understandable in terms of the parts of time substance. Consequently time substance is entitled to being characterised as an extensive substance (astikaya). Tradition however restricts the use of this notion to five substances, but this does not

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19 NATURE OF TIME annul its extensity (tiryakpracaya or astikayata).102 Though it pervades the entire cosmic space, its divisions, viz. day, month, year etc. which depend upon planetary movements are not possible outside human region because planetary movements are available in human region only.103 As it pervades the entire cosmic space, it is motionless. Time substance is constitutionally dynamic in the sense that it continuously undergoes changes by virtue of its intrinsic nature like other substances. Changeless time substance cannot assist changes in other substances. So, time substance is not changeless. Thus time qua substance is one, but time qua modes is many. Though time substance is changing, it never loses its identity. It permeates and pervades all its modes. Thus time qua substance has temporal extension (urdhvapracaya) also.104 The ultimate measurable unit of time is called samaya (instant). It is measured by the movement of a material atom over the spacepoint. Hence it is defined as the time taken by a material atom to traverse one space-point by slow movement. Time substance has infinite samayas. As a samaya is an ultimate measurable unit of time substance, it is devoid of temporal parts. A samaya is not bereft of time substance. But the time substance contained in it is indivisible. Hence a samaya is devoid of substantial parts also. But as a samaya * pervades the entire cosmic space of innumerable space-points, it may be conceived as possessed of spatial parts. As it is possessed of a plurality of spatial parts, it is capable of being characterised as an *astikaya. Again, it has manifold of capacities with which it assists various changes proper to infinite number of substances. These capacities may also be conceived as its parts. 105 All the samayas are not absolutely discrete; they are related to one another by an underlying time substance. 3.5. Relative Subtlety of Units of Time, Space and Matter It is interesting to have some idea of the relative subtlety of units of time, space and matter. A space-point (pradesa) is subtler than a time-point (samaya). It is contended that the number of space-points of a small space of one angula is equal to the number of time-points of a countless number of cycles of time. But an atom of matter is substler than even a space-point. An infinite number of atoms can be accommodated in one space-point. Thus a material atom is subtler than a space-point and a space-point is subtler than a time-point. 107

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INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 6. Time identical with Change ; We have studied the view that Time is an independent substance which assists changes in various substances. But according to the other view time is nothing but modes or changes of substances. In other words, Time is identical with change and nothing over and above change. The minute changes and gross changes are merely the modes of substances. And the Jainas being the upolders of the theory of nonabsolutism (Syadvada), believe that there obtains a relation of identity-cum-difference between a substance and its modes. In other words, according to them, modes are in a way identical with the substance. Hence the name 'substance' (dravya) is secondarily applied to them also. As a result of this, time which is nothing but modes of substances is also called substance. The statement, occurring, in the Bhagavatisutra, that Jiva and Ajiva substances themselves are called Time means that modes of these substances are called Time; Time is nothing over and above these modes.108 Substances undergo incessant minute changes by virture of their intrinsic nature. An independent time substance is not required to assist them in their modification or change. These minute changes or modes are not measureable. So, the Jainas seem to have conceived a mode sufficiently thick to be measured. This is called samaya or moment, the ultimate measurable mode of a substance.109 This mode is measured by the slow movement of a material atom over one space-point. Were the movement fast, the thickness of the mode would get reduced to such an extent that it would not remain amenable to measurement. What are called avalika, muhurta, etc. are merely the long and short series of the ultimate measurable modes. The agrument that the case of an independent Time substance is on par with Dharma and Adharma is not sound. Dharma and Adharma are, of course, posited to account for motion and inertia respectively. But motion and inertia of a substance are not eternal. Sometimes we find a substance in motion and sometimes we find it at rest. This suggests that there must be some condition of motion and inertia over and above the substance itself. And hence the Jainas posited Dharma and Adharma as conditions or media of motion and inertia. Those who posit Time as an independent substance do so to account for mainly the incessant minute changes. But according to the Jainas such changes are eternal - without beginning and end. Hence it is not

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NATURE OF TIME necessary to posit a causal condition to account for it. What is eternal - beginningless and endless has no cause whatsover. Again, the argument that without an independent Time substance the world could not be explained; that in its absence, the seed, the sprout and the fruit would emerge simultaneously - is also very weak. The order of the universe is firmly based on the principle of causality. The temporal order is reducible to causal order. Time as an independent substance is superfluous. The description of Time substance as atomic seems metaphorical. Each and every material atom could be called timeatom. And this very well explains the scriptural statements regarding the absence of its spatial extension (apradesi).'10 The conception of Time as an independent substance is vitiated by many contingencies. The main one is as follows: Time is posited to account for the incessant minute changes in other substances, but what would account for the changes in the Time substance itself ? If it be said that the modification of Time substance is natural and hence requires no other causal condition, the same logic should be applied to explain modification of other substances. If some other auxiliary cause is posited to explain changes in Time substance, it would involve infinite regress. Hence the view of an independent Time substance is weak and unsound.111 . . :7. Jaina Cycle of Time According to the Jainas, Cycle of Time ceaselessly and eternally moves on. It consists of two halves. One half represents the period i of progress (utsarpini) with the gradual increase in happiness. And the other half represents the period of decadence (avasarpini) with the gradual decrease in happiness. Each period is again divided into six parts (aras). The period of decadence has the following six parts : - (1) The part characterised by the greatest happiness (susama-susama) (2) The part characterised by some happiness but absolutely no misery (susama) (3) The part characterised by excess of happiness over misery (susama-dusama) (4) The part characterised by excess of misery over happiness (dusama-susama) (5) The part characterised by some misery but absolutely no happiness (dusama)

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INDIAN PHILOSOPHY (6) The part characterised by the greatest misery (dusama-dusama) It is noteworthy that the Jainas have not recognised the possibility of the following two parts: (1) the part characterised by absolute absence of both happiness and misery, (2) the part characterised by exactly equal quantities of both happiness and misery. The abovementioned six parts in the reverse order constitute the six parts of the period of progress. During the period of progress the bodily strength, bodily height and life-span gradually increase. During the period of decadence the living beings gradually lose their bodily strength, bodily height and life-span. Each such period of progress and decadence is ten crores of crores of ocean Time. The two periods together constitute one complete round of Time Cycle. This one round is called Kalpa: Notes 1. The Mysterious Universe, p. 20, 2. History of Westem Philosophy (Bertrand Russel), p. 229. 3. For details one may refer to A Manual of Modern Scholastici Philosophy (Cardinal Mercier), Vol. I, pp. 145-150. 4. History of Philosophy : Eastern and Western (Radhakrishnan), * Vol. II, p. 206. 5. Philosophy for Pleasure (Hector Hawton), p. 44. 6. A History of Philosophy (Thilly), pp. 324-326. 7. A History of Modern Philosophy (Hoffding), p. 305. 8. Present Philosophical Tendencies (Perry), p. 250. 9. History of Philosophy : Eastern and Western (Radhakrishnan), pp 215-216. 10. Ibid., p. 242. 11. The Evolution of Scientific Thought (d'Abro), p. 72.. 12. A History of Philosophy (Thilly), p. 421. . 13. Kant's first Critique (Cassirer), p. 267. 14. Appearance and Reality (Oxford, 1959), p. 18. 1959) D. 18. 15. Ibid., p. 36. 16. Elements of Metaphysics (Taylor), pp. 243-255. 17. Hundred Years of Philosophy (Passmore), pp. 106-107. 18. Ibid., p. 274. 19. Ibid., p. 341.

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NATURE OF TIME 20. The Principle of Relativity, p. 190. 21. Reason and Nature (Cohen), pp. 234-236. 22. Samkhyatattvakaumudi on karika 33. 23. Mrgendravrttidipika, 10.14. 24. pradhAnavAde paJcaviMzatitattvebhyo bahirbhUtasya kAlatattvasyAbhAvAt pradhAnameva kAlazabdena vyavahiyatAm / Parasarasamhitabhasya, I. 20. 25. na kAlo nAma kazcit padArtho'sti / kiM tarhi ? kriyAsu kAlasaMjJA / Yuktidipika ____ (Calcutta Sk. Series), p. 158. 26. nityau yau dikkAlau tAvAkAzaprakRtibhUtau prkRtergunnvishessaavev| ..yau tu khaNDadikkAlau tau . tattadupAdhisaMyogAd AkAzAdutpadyata ityarthaH / Samkhyapravacanabhasya (Chowkhamba), p. 82. 27. kAlazca bhUtaM bhavad bhaviSyaditi vyavahriyamANapadArthavyatirekeNa na svatantro'sti / ___Vrttanta, Manasollasa on Stotra-verse, 41. 28. The Positive Sciences of Ancient Hindus (Seal), pp. 19-21. This exposition is based on Vyasabhasya and Vijnanabhiksu's Vartika on III. 52. 29. santAnaH samudAyazca paGktisenAdivanmRSA / Bodhicaryavatara (Ed. Vaidya), _ p. 158. .. 30. Vaisesika Sutras II. ii. 6-9 with Upaskara and Vivrti thereon. .: 31. AkAzakAladizAmekaikatvAdaparajAtyabhAve pAribhASikyastisraH saMjJA bhvnti| Prasasta . . padabhasya (Vizianagaram Ed.), p. 58. * 32. aJjasA...kAlasyaikatve'pi siddhe naanaatvopcaarH| Kandali (Vizianagaram Ed.), . p. 66. .'33. AkAzasya kAlasya dizazcaikaikatvAdaparajAti sti tasya vyaktibhedAdhiSThAnatvAt / Ibid., . . . p. 59. 34. Journal of The Indian Society of Oriental Art, Vol. XI (1943), p. 35. kAlasyApi vibhutve'pyaupAdhiko bhedvyvhaaro'sti| Manameyodaya (Adyar Ed.), p. 191. kAlasya ca rUpAdihInasya mImAMsakAdibhiH......abhyupagamAt / Advaitasiddhi (Nirnaya. Ed.), p. 319. 36. sa ca kAlaH ssddindriygraahyH| Manameyodaya, p. 190. 37. kAlo na svAtaMtryeNendriyairgRhyate; atha ca viSayeSu sveSu gRhyamANeSu tadvizeSaNatayA sarvairapIndriyairgRhyate / Sastradipika, I. 1.5. .. 79..

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24 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 38. tatra cAbhyupagamasiddhAntanyAyena kaNAdatantrasiddha eva prameyavargo'GgIkriyate...... Tantra rahasya (G. O. S., Baroda), p. 17. 39. kAlastvavidyaiva...... | Siddhantabindu (G. O. S., Poona), p. 96. 40. Bauddha-Dharma-Darsana (Ac. Narendradeva), pp. 574-75.. 41. Ibid., pp. 575-582.. 42. Abhidharmakosabhasya, ii. 46 ab. 43. The Central Conception of Buddhism (Stcherbatsky), pp: 71-80. 44. Ibid., p. 36. . 45. bauddhAnAM mate kSaNapadena ghaTAdireva padArtho vyavahriyate, na tu tadatiriktaH kazcit kSaNo nAma ___ kAlo'sti...kSaNikaH padArtha iti vyavahArastu bhedklpnyaa| II. 2:20. . . . 46. The Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. IX (1933), p. 153... 47. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (Murti), pp. 198-200. 48. Tattvasangrahaparijika on karikas 629-630. . . .. 49. yena mUrtInAmupacayazcApacayazca lakSyante taM kaalmaahuH| mahAbhASya (Ed. Kielhorm), Vol. I, p. 409. 50. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 409. 51. Vakyapadiya (Banaras Sanskrit Series), I. 2. 52. kAlAtmApi bhAvAnAmAtmAnamanupravizya pratibandhAbhyanujJAbhyAM nimajjanonmajane kurvan krama paurvAparyalakSaNaM prakalpayati / Helaraja's comm. (Banaras Sk. Series), p. 357. 53. utpattau ca sthitau cApi vinAze cApi tadvatAm / nimittaM kAlamevAhurvibhaktenAtmanA sthitam // Vakyapadiya, III. 9.3. 54. tathA ca kAryanivezitaH kramaH kAle samAropyate na tvasau tatra bhAvika ityarthaH / Helaraja's comm., p. 352. evaM yaugapadyamapi...kAryagataM kAle samAropyate / Ibid, p. 353. 55. ...ekatve'pi vibhAvite nAnAtvamupAdhibhedanihitam... / Ibid., p. 344. 56. dUrAntikavyavasthAnamadhvAdhikaraNaM yathA / cirakSipravyavasthAnaM kAlAdhikaraNaM tathA / ____Vakyapadiya, III. 9.47. 57. kriyAvyuparame bhUtaH, sambhAvitAyAM kriyAyAM bhaviSyan, kSaNapravAharUpeNa vartamAnarUpAyAM __ tasyAM mukhya evAyam / Helaraja's comm., p. 350. 58. pratibandhAbhyanajJAbhyAM vattiryA tasya shaashvtii| Vakyapadiya, III. 9.30 59. Vakyapadiya, III. 9.52 and Helaraja's comm., p. 361. 60. lokAnAmantakRt kAlaH kAlo'nyaH kalanAtmakaH / sa dvidhA sthUlasUkSmatvAnmUrtazcAmUrta ucyte|| Suryasiddhanta (Kashi Sk. Series), S1. 10 and the comment thereon.

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NATURE OF TIME 61. prANAdiH kathito muurtstrttyaadyo'muurtsNjnykH| Ibid., S1. 11. * According to the commentator, Pt. Kapilesvara Chaudhary truti . 3240000 second 62. ...kAlo guNaH... Avasyaka curmi (Ratlam Ed.), 340. 63. ...puNa kAlo davvassa ceva pajjAo... Ibid., p. 340. 64. athavA 'kAlazcetyeke esa dvvkaalo| Ibid., p. 341. 65. kimidaM bhante ! kAlo tti pavaccai ? goyamA ! jIvA ceva ajIvA ceva tti / kai NaM bhante ! davvA patnattA ? goyamA ! cha davvA pannatA / taM jahA-dhammatthikAe, adhammatthikAe, AgAsaMtthikAe, puggalatthikAe, jIvatthikAe, addhAsamaye y| 66. dharmAdInAM dravyANAM svaparyAyanirvRttiM prati svAtmanaiva vartamAnAnAM bAhyopagrahAdvinA tadvRttyabhAvAt tatpravartanopalakSitaH kAla iti kRtvA vartanA kaalsyopkaarH| Sarvarthasiddhi ... (Ed. Pt. Phulacandra), p. 291. 67. svakIyopAdAnarUpeNa svayameva pariNamamAnAnAM padArthAnAM kumbhakAracakrasyAdhastana. zilAvat...padArthapariNateryat sahakAritvaM sA vartanA bhaNyate |...vrtnaalkssnnH kAlANudravyarUpo nizcayakAlaH / Dravyasamgrahavrtti on gatha 21. 68 tathA ca vartanAparyAyasya sAdhAraNApekSA na kathyate tadA tu sthityavagAhanApekSAsAdhAraNa kAraNatvena dharmAdharmAstikAyau siddhau jAtau tatrApyanAzvAsa aayaati| Dravyanuyoga tarkana (Nirnayasagar Ed.), p. 175. 69. cUtAdyAH zeSahetUnAM sattve'pi phlvnycitaaH| ... kAladravyamapekSante nAnAzaktisamanvitam // Lokaprakasa, xxVIII. 48. 70. asati hi niyAmakadravye kisalaya-kalikA-phalaprasavapariNatayaH sahakArataroyugapadA... . virbhaveyuH, kramabhAvinI caiSAM kisalayAdipariNatirupalabhyate, tataH zakyamanumAtum - yadanurodhAdetAH kAryavyaktayastAratamyenAtmAtizayamAsAdayanti so'styatra ko'pi kAlaH / .. Siddhasenagani-Tika on Tattvarthasutra. IV. 15. - 71. kAladravye cAMsati tadvizeSAH samayAdayaH / kathaM nu syurvizeSA hi sAmAnyAnucarAH khalu / / Lokaprakasa, XXVIII. 21. 72. yacchuddhapadavAcyaM tat sad itynumiterpi| .... SaSThaM dravyaM dadhat siddhiM kAlAkhyaM ko nivArayet // Ibid., XXVIII. 20. 73. samayAdInAM kriyAvizeSANAM samayAdibhirnirvaya'mAnAnAM ca pAkAdInAM 'samayaH pAka' ... ityevamAdi svasaMjJArUDhisadbhAve'pi samayaH kAlaH' 'odanapAkaH kAlaH' iti adhyAropyamANa: kAlavyapadezastavyapadezanimittasya kAlasyAstitvaM gamayati / Sarvarthasiddhi, p. 292.

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26 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 74. syAdetat - AdityagatinimittA dravyANAM vartaneti; tanna; kiM kAraNam ? tadgAtAvapi tatsadbhAvAt / saviturapi vrajyAyAM bhUtAdivyavahAraviSayabhUtAyAM kriyetyevaM rUDhAyAM vartanAdarzanAt taddhetunA'nyena kAlena bhavitavyam / Rajavartika (Ed.. Pt. .. Mahendrakumar), p. 477. 75. yathA bhAjanaM taNDulAnAmadhikaraNaM na tu tadeva pacati, tejaso hi sa vyApAraH, tathAkAzamapyAdityagatyAdivartanAyAmadhikaraNaM na tu tadeva nivartayati / kAlasya hi sa vyaapaarH| Ibid., p. 477. 76. kAlAnugRhItavartanA hi satteti tato'pyanyena kAlena bhavitavyam / Ibid., p. 477. 77. syAnmatam - kriyAmAtrameva kaalH| ...sarvo'yaM kAlavyavahAraH kriyAkRtaH / kriyA hi kriyAntaraparicchinnA anyakriyAparicchede vartamAnA kAlAMkhyA bhavati / yo'pi samayo nAma bhavadbhirucyate sa paramANuparivartanakriyAsamaya eva kAlasAmAnAdhikaraNyAt / na samayaparimANaparicchedako'nyaH tataH sUkSmataraH kazcidasti kAlaH / tatsamayakriyAkalApa AvalikA, tatpracaya ucchvAsa ityAdi samayakriyAkalApaparicchinnA 'AvalikA ucchvAsaparicchede vartamAnA kAlAkhyA ' / evamuttaratrApi yojyam / loke'pi tathaiva godohendhanapAkAdiranyo'nyaparicchede vartamAnaH kAlAkhya iti kriyaiva kAla iti......| Ibid., p. 482. 78. satyaM kriyAkRta evAyaM vyavahAraH sarvaH - ucchvAsamAtreNa kRtaM muhUrtena kRtamiti, kintu samaya ucchvAso nizvAso muhUrta iti svasaMjJAbhirnirUDhAnAM kAla ityabhidhAnamakasmAnna bhavati / yathA devadattasaMjJayA nirUDhe piNDe daNDyabhidhAnamakasmAnna bhavati iti daNDasambandha siddhiH tathA kaalsiddhirpi| Ibid., pp. 482-483. , 79. tasya vartamAnakAlAbhAvaH prasaktaH / katham ? Uyate paTa iti yaH prakSiptastantuH so'tikrAntaH, yaH prakSepsyate so'nAgataH, na ca tayorantare kAcidanyA anatikrAntA'nAgAminI kriyA'sti yA vartamAnatvena parigRhyate / vartamAnApekSau ca punaratItAnAgatAviSyete tadabhAve tayorapyabhAvaH syAt / Ibid., p. 483. 80. ArambhAdirapavargAntaH kriyAkalApo vartamAna iti |......tdpyyuktm; kuta: ?...... kSaNikAnAM kriyAvayavAnAM samUhAbhAvAcca / Ibid., p. 483. 81. yadi vyatirekeNAnupalabdheH kAlo nAsti ityucyate; nanu kriyAyAH kriyAsamUhasya cAbhAvaH / kAraNAnAM hi pravRttivizeSaH kriyA, na tebhyaH pravRttirvyatiriktA uplbhyte| Ibid., p. 483. 82. kiJca, kriyA kriyAntarasya paricchedikA kAlavyapadezabhAgityanupapannamanavasthAnAt / sthito hi loke prasthAdiH parimANavizeSaH vrIhyAdevasthitasya paricchedako dRSTaH / na ca tathA kriyA'vasthitA asti kssnnmaatraavlmbnaabhyupgmaat| na hi svayamanavasthitaH kazcidanavasthitasya paricchedako dRssttH| Ibid., p. 483.

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NATURE OF TIME .. 27 83. Darsana aur Cintana (Pt. Sukhlalji), p. 332. 84. loyAyAsapadese ikkakke je TThiyA hu ikkekkaa| rayaNANaM rAsImiva te kAlANU asaMkhadavvANi // Dravyasamgraha, gatha 22. 85. Sarvarthasiddhi, p. 312. Pravacansara-tattvadipika, II. 49. 86. apradeza eva samayo...ekai kamAkAzapradezamabhivyApya tasthuSaH pradezamAtrasya paramANostadabhivyAptamekamAkAzapradezaM mandagatyA vyatipatata eva vRttiH| Pravacanasaratattvadipika, II. 46. tatra paramasUkSmakriyasya sarvajaghanyagatipariNatasya paramANoH svAvagAhanakSetravyatikramakAla: samaya ityucyate / Tattvanha-bhasya, IV. 15. See also Vrtti on Dravyasangraha (Arrah Ed.), gathas 21-22. The Jainas maintain that as soon as the soul is liberated, it travels the whole universe and reaches the Abode of the Liberated within a samaya. Again, they believe that the sound-atoms travel the whole universe <Page #37
28 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 97. tatra vyAvahArikaH kAlavibhAgaH tatkRtaH samayAvalikAdivyAkhyAtaH kriyAvizeSaparicchinnaH anyasyAparicchinnasya paricchedahetuH / Rajavartika, p. 222. 98. tatra paramArthakAlaH...vartanAyA upakArakaH / Rajavartika, p. 482. 99. evaM savituranusamayagatipracayApekSayA AvalikocchvAsa-prANa-stoka-lava-nAlikA muhUrtAhorAtra-pakSa-mAsAyanAdisavitRgatiparivartanakAlavartanayA vyavahArakAlo manuSyakSetre sambhavatItyucyate tatra jyotiSAM gatipariNAmAt, na bahiH,. nivRttagativyApAratvAt jyotiSAm / Ibid., p. 482. 100. tatra paramArthakAle bhUtAdivyavahAro gauNaH, vyavahArakAle mukhyH| Ibid., p. 482. 101. Yogasastra-vrtti, I. 16. 102. vyavahArastu rUDhyA'stikAyaiH paJcabhireva pravacane, na caitAvataivAstikAyatA'pahrotuM shkyaa| Siddhasenagani-tattvarthatika, p. 434. 103. sUryAdikriyayA vyaktIkRto nRkssetrgocrH| Lokaprakasa, XXVIII. 105. 104. dravyArtharUpeNa pratiparyAyamutpAdavyayadharmA'pi svarUpAnanyabhUkramAkramabhAvyanAdyaparyava sAnAnantasaGkhyapariNAmaparyAyapravAhavyApinamekamevAtmAnamAtanoti, atItAnAgatavartamAnAvasthAsvapi kAla kAla ityavizeSazruteH / Siddhasenagani-tattvartha tika, pp. 430-431. 105. yathA kAlakRtadezairanavayava evaM dravyakRtadezairapi, kSetrato bhAvatazca sAvayava eva / Ibid., p. 434. 106. na punareka eva vicchinnamuktAvalImaNivad vidyamAnapUrvAparakoTirvartamAnaH samayo'bhyupeyate / Ibid., p. 434. 107. Avasyaka-Niryukti (Agamodaya Ed.), 37 108. atrAhuH ke'pi jIvAdiparyAyA vrtnaadyH| kAlamityucyate tajjJaiH pRthak dravyaM tu nAstyasau / / evaM ca dravyaparyAyA evAmI vartanAdayaH / sampannAH kAlazabdena vyapadezyA bhavanti ye / / paryAyAzca kathaJcit syurdravyAbhinnAstatazca te| dravyanAmnApi kathyante jAtu proktaM yadAgame / / Lokaprakasa, XXVIII. 5,11-13. 109. Siddhasenagani-tattvartha-tika, IV. 15 (p. 290) 110. Dravyanuyogatarkana, X. 18-19 111. Darsana Aur Cintana (Pt. Sukhlalji), p. 331-332.

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JAINA CONCEPTION OF SPACE 1. Introductory Regarding primary material elements (mahabhutas), there were two old views. One view recognized five mahabhutas and the other recognized four mahabhutas. The five mahabhutas recognized by the first view were akasa, vayu, tejas, ap and prthvi. They possessed the five special qualities -akasa sabda, vayu sparsa, tejas rupa, ap rasa and prthvi gandha. Those who followed this view counted akasa as a mahabhuta with a special quality sabda. The Sankhya-Yoga, the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Prabhakara Mimamsa accepted this view. The old form of this view of five mahabhutas was that the external material world, as also the human body, is composed of the five mahabhutas. The Sankhya adopted this old form of the view. That is, according to the Sankhya the five mahabhutas are the material causes of all the material effect-substances (bhautika karya-dravyas). So, for the Sankhya, akasa, along with other four mahabhutas, is the material cause of effect-substances. The Vaisesika differs from the Sankhya. The Vaisesika maintains that only four mahabhutas viz. Vayu, tejas, ap and prthvi are the material causes of material effectsubstances. Akasa is not a material cause of any material effectsubstance. It is simply the substratum (dravya) of the quality sabda. This view of the Vaisesika somewhat undermined the status of akasa as a mahabhuta. The Bhatta Mimamsa gave the status of independent substance to sabda, thus putting at stake further the existence of akasa as a mahabhuta. The four mahabhutas recognized by that other old view were vaya, tejas, ap and prthvi. Those who followed this view maintained either that akasa is a form of matter, produced from the four mahabhutas or that akasa is non-material non-spiritual substance. The Theravadi Buddhists accepted the first alternative. For them akasa is samsklta, it is produced from the four mahabhutas, thus it is a derived matter (upadaya rupa)'. But the Vaibhasika Buddhists, who too

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30. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY recognized the abovementioned four mahabhutas only raised akasa to the status of asanskrta (eternal) dharma (element), thus putting at stake its bhautikatva (materiality). So, for them, akasa is a nonmaterial non-spiritual (rather non-psychical) element. Jainas too follow this old tradition of four mahabhutas and hence maintain that akasa is not pudgala (matter), it is an independent substance. * The upholders of the view of four mahabhutas maintain that Sabda is not a quality; it is a mode or an aspect of these four mahabhutas. So, akasa was not needed as a substratum of sabdaguna. Hence, before these philosophers there arose a question as to what function the substance akasa is required to perform. All these philosophers declared that its function is to provide room to all other substances. It functions as a cotainer of all other substances. It offers obstruction to no substance. All bodies can move freely in it: The first group of philosophers thinks that the akasa-mahabhuta which is the substratum of sabda could not play the entirely different role, viz. to function as a condition of our cognitions of relative spatial positions of material bodies. They seized upon an old idea of dik found in the Rgveda and the Upanisads. In the Rgveda dik was regarded as that which made possible our knowledge of relative spatial positions of material bodies and gave rise to the notions of far and near. These philosophers accepted dik to account for our cognitions of relative spatial positions of material bodies. According to the Sankhya dik is produced from akasa etc. (i.e. five mahabhutas) along with the material bodies. In the absence of all the material bodies, there is no dik. In this sense, dik is dependent on material bodies. In other words, we may say that it is an aspect of material bodies. The Sankhya view of dik, understood and interpreted in this way, comes very near to the Theravada view of akasa. The Vaisesika view of dik differs from the Sankhya view of it in that the Vaisesika. dik is not produced from akasa etc.; it is an eternal independent nonmaterial substance, it exists even before the production of material bodies i.e. even in pralaya. The second group of philosophers maintains that their akasa which allows material bodies to occupy their positions in it can very well function as a condition of our cognitions of relative spatial positions of these bodies. So, they have not posited dik as an panisads upon an ol. which made

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JAINA CONCEPTION OF SPACE 31 independent substance besides akasa. For them the terms dik' and akasa' are synonyms referring to the same substance. 2. Jaina Description of Akasa As we have already remarked, Jainas do not regard it as a mode or an effect of mahabhutas. For them it is an indepedent fundamental substance. It is devoid of colour, odour, taste and touch. According to Jainas sabda is a mode of mahabhutas or matter (pudgala). Aggregates (skandhas) of atoms strike against one another and sabda is produced from them. Hence sabda is not the nature of akasa, nor is it its quality. If sabda were its quality, the quality of akasa being formless or nonphysical, it would not have been heard through the organ of hearing, say the Jainas.? Akasa is infinite in extent, it is present everywhere, it stretches not only over the universe but also far beyond it over the non-universe. All other substances are confined to the universe only. Thus no substance is so extensive as akasa is. The pervasiveness of akasa is infinite. Akasa is one in number. It is a onemembered class, so to say. There is no possibility of increase or decrease in its number. It is one and will remain one for ever. It is eternal in the sense that it never gives up its nature. As it is present everywhere in the universe, the possibility of movement from one place to another is rejected in its case.12 3. Function of Akasa * The function of akasa is to offer room to other substances.'' Other substances exist by their own nature. There is no doubt about it. But they require something to exist in. They do exist by themselves. But wherein do they exist ? They exist in akasa. Their existence is not the same as akasa. Nor is akasa an aspect of them. It is a fundamental substance different from them. Thus akasa is a universal container in which all other substances are contained. Some might argue against this Jaina position as follows : if a substance requires another substance to exist in, then akasa itself being a substance will also require some another substance and this substance in its turn will require the third substance to exist in and so on ad infinitum. If to avoid this contingency the Jain were to say that akasa does not require another substance to exist in, then they should apply the same logic in the case of other substances also. Thus

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32 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY the conception of akasa as a universal container is self-destructive. Again, the Jaina view that akasa contains itself is beset with another difficulty, viz kartrkarmavirodhadosa. It is a rule that in a particular act the subject and the object cannot be one and the same. However sharp a knife may be, it cannot cut itself. However expert an acrobat may be in the art of acrobatics he cannot climb his own shoulder. So, akasa cannot contain itself. The Jainas overcome these difficulties as follows : Not all substances require another substance to exist in. The less extensive substance is contained in the more extensive one. This is the special, relation that obtains between the container and the contained. Hence, if we conceive a substance infinite in extent and maintain that there is no substance more extensive than it - not even as extensive as it -,then this conception logically compels us to conceive this substance as requiring no other substance to contain it because there is 'no substance more extensive than it to contain it. Akasa is such a substance. Regarding kartrkarmavirodhadosa, it does not arise because the function of akasa to contain substances is really passive. 16 Moreover, that akasa contains itself is simply a positive statement of the fact that akasa being of the infinite and the highest extension cannot be contained in any other substance. Can akasa function as a condition of motion ? The Jaina answer to this question is emphatic 'no'. They contend that if it be also the condition of motion, then wherever there is akasa, there should be chance of motion; but neither a single Jiva, nor a single body nor a single atom could step beyond the limit of universe (loka), though there is akasa beyond the univere. If akasa were credited with the function of assisting motion, then it being present in aloka (nonUniverse) also the division of loka and aloka would disappear, the loka (Universe) would dissipate, the atoms would disperse in the infinite space, they would be very far from one another, they would hardly come in contact with one another to form material bodies.!? Regarding the capacity of akasa to contain substances or their instances, one should note that those that obstruct one another cannot be contained in the same portion of space whereas those that do not obstruct one another can be contained in the same portion of space. Though space gives room to all substances or their instances, it never contains the two mutually obstructing things in the same portion.

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JAINA CONCEPTION OF SPACE 33 4. Units of Space (akasa-pradesas) A primary indivisible atom of matter is the ultimate unit of matter. And the space occupied by a material atom is the ultimate unit of space. It is called pradesa (space-point).18 Though material atom is physically indivisible, it is amenable to mental division because it possesses ananta attributes or modes. As these modes or parts of a material atom are inseparable from it and can only be mentally abstracted from it, they are never found physically discrete in space. So, a part of a material atom cannot serve as the defining measure of the unit of space. The physically indivisible unit of matter, viz. atom being discrete and concrete (as opposed to its abstracted part) serves as a defining measure of the unit of space. Though akasa does never accommodate two material bodies in the same spacepoints at a time, it, under certain conditions, can accommodate two upto ananta material atoms in one and the same spacepoint at a time. This phenomenon becomes possible because material atoms in their subtle states, are conceived as mutually nonobstructive.20 Again, this phenomenon definitely proves the fact that a material atom is subtler than a spacepoint.21 Akasa has ananta spacepoints.22 But this number ananta is fixed in the sense that there is no possibility of increase or decrease of even a single spacepoint. The spacepoints are conceived as inseparable parts or avayavas of akasa. Thus akasa is an avayavi - astikaya?. Avayavas or parts (pradesas) 'of.akasa are as much objectively existent as akasa of which they are parts. Were it not so, the two cities, say, Ahmedabad and Poona which like the two mountains, the Himavat and the Vindhya, occupy different locations of space, would, the Jainas affirm, tend to be at one location, which is an absurd position.24 They maintain that the partless 'akasa can never be a favourable receptacle for the objects having parts. Thus they contend that akasa too must have parts; for, when the table exists in space, it does not cover the whole space, as in that case other things cannot exist at all anywhere; the table exists not in all space but in that part of space where it does actually exist, leaving room for the other objects to exist elsewhere; all this clearly imply that space too has parts; space is an avayavi. To be an avayavi does not necessarily mean that it should be produced from its avayavas put together at some point of time. .

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34 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 5 Divisions of akasa Akasa is ananta (infinite) in extension. That portion of it, which contains all substances is called Lokakasa (Universe-space) and that portion of akasa, which has no substance to accommodate in itself is called Alokakasa (Space-beyond-the-Universe). Akasa is one only. Lokakasa and Alokakasa are not two individual akasas. Thus this division is not in akasa itself but it is due to its relation with other substances.25 6. Lokakasa Lokakasa has asamkhyata (innumerable) space-points.26 This number is fixed. That is, there is no possibility of increase or decrease of the space-points of lokakasa. Though lokakasa has asarnkhyata spacepoints, it accommodates ananta material atoms. The number ananta is infinite times greater than the number asamkhyata. So there arises a question as to how the space of asamkhyata space-points can accommodate ananta material atoms. The answer to this question is there in the Jaina belief that, under certain conditions, one spacepoint can accommodate more than one material atoms.27 There is no possibility of expansion of lokakasa (universe-space). There are two reasons for this. First, the lokakasa has fixed number of spacepoints and these spacepoints cannot expand or contract. Secondly, lokakasa can expand provided loka (universe) expands, and loka can expand provided the bodies get exploded and thrown into akasa which was till then empty; but this possibility has no room in Jainism because according to this system the medium of motion is necessary for bodies to move from one place to another, and this medium of motion is not present in empty space, it is confined to the universe only. So no body crosses the limits of universe set up by the medium of motion. Thus universe is not expanding and hence universe-space is also not expanding. One may pose here another question - 'Does the universe as a whole move in the empty space with the result that though universespace is fixed in its extension this universe-space is not the same for ever ?' He may further ask that as dharma (medium of motion) and adharma (medium of rest) pervade the universe they cannot move in the Universe, nor do they as individuals peel themselves off the universe into the non-universe because they constitute the nature of

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JAINA CONCEPTION OF SPACE 35 the universe, but what prevents them from moving with the universe in the empty space ? These questions have not occurred to the Jaina thinkers and hence they have not answered them. The loka (Universe) is of the form of a standing human trunk with two feet apart and two hands on hips.28 So, secondarily the lokakasa (Universe-space) may also be said to possess this form. Usually the formless is said to assume the form of its container. But here the formless container is said to assume the form of its content. Of course, lokakasa cannot be said to assume this form at some point of time.29 Like the aras (divisions of Time Cycles, the different regions of lokakasa are characterised by the different degrees of pleasure or happiness. As we go higher from the lowest region of the lokakasa the degree of happiness increases: The degree of happiness in the lowest region of lokakasa is almost nil, whereas the degree of happiness in the highest region of lokakasa is the highest - ananta. A living being becomes more and more happy if he enters higher and higher regions of lokakasa, but for the entry he should earn the passport by his meritorious deeds. By good acts a living being earns the passport for the entry into higher regions and by bad acts a living being earns the passport for the entry into lower regions. 7. Alokakasa As we know, akasa as a whole has ananta pradesas (space-points). And alokakasa also has ananta pradesas. Having taken asamkhyata pradesas of lokakasa from ananta pradesas of akasa as a whole, the remaining pradesas of alokakasa are still ananta. Alokakasa is infinite (ananta) but this infinity is also fixed in the sense that increase or decrease of a single space-point is an impossibility. Again, no encroachment from loka on its infinity is possible. Has alokakasa any form ? No. it has no form. But it may be conceived as having the form of a parabola. Parabola is a symbol of spatial infinity. So, we may say that infinity of alokakasa is represented by a parabola put on the highest end of lokakasa. And we may further say that its emptiness is represented by a sunya put in the parabola. But we cannot say all this because the Jainas have included the parabola (with a sunya in it) in the loka putting a boundary line of loka over it.

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36 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 8. Application of Jaina Criterion of Reality As akasa is a real (sat), it must conform to the definition of reality. According to Jainism a real must possess a triple character of origination, persistence and decay. Ac. Kundakunda actually applied this criterion of reality to Jiva, Pudgalaand Kala. But Pujyapada, Akalanka and later logicians attempt to apply it even to Dharma, Adharma and Akasa. Of course, the parinamas or changes of these substances had to be.shown not directly but through those of living beings and matter. This difficulty is due to-tite peculiar nature of Dharma, Adharma and Akasa which are one each, without any movement and pervade the whole universe. Their association with the different moments of Time also makes possible their modes or changes running parallel to the moments of Time. A mode of the entire space at time moment tis different from the next mode of the entire space at time moment t, because they are associated with two different time-moments. Except this there is no other difference between two modes of space. Some might urge that as there is no substance - not even Time substance - in alokakasa, alokakasa should not undergo changes and consequently should not be regarded as a real. The Jainas contend that lokakasa and alokakasabeing not two akasa individuals, the effect of the time substance is present throughout the one akasa. Again, they maintain that entire akasa undergoes changes through the rhythmic rise and fall in its agurulaghuguna(untranslatable term, lit. neither-heavy-nor-light-quality)." * Notes 1. Introduction to Abhidharmadipa, p. 90 2. Ibid., p. 90. 3. Rgveda, I. 31.4, II. 27.11, X. 82.4; I 30.21; VII. 67.2 4. Fratehifeszt: Sarkhyasutra, II. 12 5. 345ftalari fauftorgyacie: 1 camfor i Tattvarthasutra, V. 1-2 6. HET H TM Perai Pravacanasara, II. 40 7. Pancastikaya-tatparyavitti, gatha 76 8. Haastai fa da Sarvarthasiddhi, V. 12. 9. 347 34410112 Soulfur I Tattvarthasutra, V. 6 10-11. AralafeR UT Ibid., V. 4 12. ATOALIPO 7 | Ibid., V. 7

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JAINA CONCEPTION OF SPACE 37 13. aakaashsyaavgaahH| Ibid., V. 18. 14. AkAzasya ke AdhAra iti ? AkAzasya nAstyanya AdhAraH / svapratiSThamAkAzam / yadyAkAzaM svapratiSTham, dharmAdInyapi svapratiSThAnyeva / atha dharmAdInAmanya AdhAra: kalpyate, AkAzasyApyanya AdhAraH kalpyaH / tathA satyanavasthAprasaGga iti cet / Sarvarthasiddhi, V. 12 15. naiSa doSaH, nAkAzAdanyadadhikaparimANaM dravyamasti yatrAkAzaM sthitamityucyeta / Ibid., V. 12. . 16. Tattvarthasara, 31. Reals in the Jaina Metaphysics (H. S. Bhattacharya), pp. 85-86 17. jadi havadi gamaNahedU AgAsaM ThANakAraNaM tesiM / pasajadi alogahANI logassa ya aMtaparivuDDi / / Paricastikaya, 14 . 18. vakSyamANalakSaNa: paramANuH, sa yAvati kSetre vyavatiSThate sa pradeza iti vyavahriyate / Sarvarthasiddhi, V. 8 .. 19. tasmAdekasminnapi pradeze anantAnantAnAmavasthAnaM na virudhyate / Ibid., V. 10. 20. Bhagavati, V. 7. 21. Avasyaka-Niryukti (Agamodaya Ed.), 37. 22. AkAzasyAnantAH / Tattvarthasutra, V. 9. 23. Tattvarthasutra, V. 1. 24. AkAzasya...sAvayavatvaM ghaTAderivopapannaM, sAvayabamAkAzaM himavavindhyAvaruddhavibhinna dezatvAt / * Sanmatitarkaprakarana-tika (Gujarat Vidyapith Ed.), p. 641. dravyANAM pratiniyatadezAvasthAnAt / ihAnyeSu AkAzapradezeSu pATaliputraM sthitam, anyeSu ca mathurA, ato nAnA AkAzapradezAH / yasyaikAntena apradezamAkAzaM tasya yaddezaM pATaliputraM taddezabhAvinyeva mathurApi syAt / Tattvartha-Rajavartitka, V. 8. 25. AkAzaM dvidhA vibhaktaM lokAkAzamalokAkAzaM ceti...| Sarvarthsiddhi, V. 12. dharmapudgalakAlajIvA yatra lokyante sa loka iti vaa|...bhiH smntaadnntmlokaakaashm| Rajavartika, V. 12. 26. Sarvarthasiddhi, V: 10. 27. syAdetadasaGkhyAtapradezo lokaH anantapradezasyAnantAnantapradezasya ca skandhasyAdhi karaNamiti virodhastato nAnantyamiti / naiSa doSaH / ... Sarvarthasiddhi, V. 10. 28. naraM vaizAkhasaMsthAnasthitapAdaM kttiittte| nyastahastadvayaM sarvadikSu loko'nugacchati // Lokaprakasa, XII. 3. 29. In the Bhagavatisutra Alokakasa is conceived as having the form of a hollow sphere. (11-10-420) 30. Sarvarthasiddhi, V. 7.

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ON BUDDHIST NIRVANA 1. Citta According to Buddhists there is no atman over and above citta. For them citta itself is atman. Their citta is momentary. A continuum of cittaksanas maintains its identity. In other words, one continuum remains always different from another; no cittaksana belonging to one continuum can become a member of another continuum. Moreover, there is a strict order of cittaksanas of one continuum. No cittaksanas belonging to one continuum can exchange their places or points. They are governed by the principle of dependent origination (pratityasamutpada), that is, causation. Thus, a continuum of cittaksanas closely resembles what the Jainas call. atmadravya and cittaksanas what they call atma-paryayas. As a matter of fact, even Jainas do not accept atma-dravya over and above citta-dravya. What they call atman is citta only. Their citta is parinaminitya? (variable constant). The classical Sankhya philosophy posited atman over and above citta, whereas the Jaina and the Buddhist philosophers did not. The Jaina gave the name 'atman' to citta while the Buddhist mostly did not give the name 'atman' to citta. This gave rise to the wrong belief that Buddhists are anatmavadins while Jainas are atmavadins. The Buddhist citta, like the Jaina atman, is prakasasvarupa. Again, like the Jaina atman, it is endowed with two faculties - jnana and darsana and hence two veils jneyavarana and klesavarana are recognised by them. These two faculties could be regarded as two aspects of its parkasarupata which Jainas call upayoga. To shine in its own light is natural to citta. But the defiling elements like attachment, hatred, etc. are adventitious. From the beginningless time these defiling elements are mixed with cittacontinuum blurring its nature. Buddha's preaching is centered on how to remove these defiling elements and establish citta in its pristir state. On the removal of defiling elements establishment of citta in its natural state is called moksa or Liberation. Buddhists employ the term nirvana for moksa.

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ON BUDDHIST NIRVANA 39 2. Description of Nirvana Nirvana is freedom from all misery. It is the highest peace.? On this account it is called the higest happiness. It is characterised by the destruction of all desires. Hence it is identical with the complete cessation of attachment (raga).This seems to be the reason why the citta attaining nirvana becomes 'cool'.11 Thus nirvana is unemotional state. It is deliverance from all ties. It is freedom from obsessions of senuality (kamasava), of renewed existence (bhavasava), of misconceptions about the world and about oneself (ditthasava) and of ignorance or nescience (avijjasava)'3. It is cessation of birth, old age and death. It is called purity (suddhi) and freedom from defilements (asamkilittha).16 This is the reason why it is identified with 'freedom from disease (abyadhi)'17 or health' (arogya) 8. Buddhism aims at purifying citta. As soon as the process of purifying citta attains its completion, citta attains nirvana i.e. pure state. This process consists of the cultivation of sila, samadhi and prajna. It would be interesting to compare this description of nirvana with that of santarasa given below. na yatra duhkham sukham na cinta na dvesa-ragau na ca kacid iccha / rasah sa santah kathito munindraih ... sarvesu bhavesu samapradhanah || 3. Nirvana is Extinction of Personality (Pudgala) All pure citta-continuums, emancipated from all adventitious defiling elements, are absolutely alike. They have no distinguishing traits. They have no personality or individuality. But when they are not pure, they do have personality which is imparted to them by external factors. These factors are called skandhas (personality factors). They are five, viz. rupa (body), vedana (feelings of pleasure or pain), sanjna (ideation, concepts, memory images, thoughts), samskaras (predispositions or tendencies generated by the impressio of past actions bodily, mental and vocal and experiences) and vijnana (experiences, sensations, percepts). The term 'pudgala' denotes personality. An impure citta-continuum does have personality so long as it is not purified. Nirvana being a pure state of citta-continuum, in it there are no personality factors and hence no personality. Jainacarya Akalanka defines nirvana as an absence of five personality factors. 19 Thus nirvana is an extinction of personality. Personality is a mask that

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40 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY a citta-continuum wears in a mundane state. Personality is not something over and above the personality factors. This is explained by that famous illustration of a chariot. All the parts of the chariot are taken one by one and it is asked whether they are the chariot. When all the parts are exhausted, there remains nothing that can be called chariot. This shows that there is nothing like chariot over and above the parts. Similarly, personality is not something over and above the five personality factors. Personality factors taken together are called personality.20 This Buddhist contention is in conformity with their doctrine that there is no avayavi over and above avayavas. But there flourished some Buddhist philosophers22 who maintained that personality is something above but not independent of the personality factors. The chariot is something above but not independent of the parts. It is above the parts because none of the parts, taken singly, can perform the function of the chariot, not even all the parts taken together can perform that function. Only when they are properly assembled, they can perform the function of the chariot. Though the chariot is something above the parts, its existence is not independent of the existence of its parts. In the absence of parts, there can never exist the chariot. Similarly, personality is somewhat above the personality factors because it is also not the body, not the feeling, not the concepts, etc. but the proper assemblage of them all. Though it is above the factors, its existence is not independent of their existence. It can never exist in the absence of the personality factors. In nirvana there is absence of all the five skandhas (personality factors) and hence there is absence of personality (pudgala).23 This does not mean that in nirvana there is annihilation of a citta-continuum. The pure citta-continuum without the mask of personality does exist in nirvana.24 4. Analogy of Extinguished Fire Explained In Majjhima Nikaya I, p. 486 a question is discussed as to what happens to Tathagata after his death. In this context Buddha compares Tathagata who has attained nirvana to fire that is extinguished when there is no more fuel. Buddha-O ! Vaccha, if somebody asks you in what direction the fire extinguished in front of you has gone from here - east, west, north or south, then what would you answer ? Vaccha - Dear Gotama ! this is a wrong question. For the fire

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ON BUDDHIST NIR YANA 41 that burned because of fuel consisting of straw and wood, has consumed this and not been given anything else is, therefore, called 'extinguished (nibbuto) through lack of fuel (upadana).' Buddha - Similarly, the form by which the Tathagata is being recognised (by the people as 'He is Gotama'), that recognisable (and hence name-bearing) form of Tathagata is annihilated, its roots cut off, uprooted, like a palm tree, from further growth and rebirth in future. Tathagata is free from form and name, he is deep, immeasurable, unfathomable just as a deep ocean. To understand the above discussion we should first study the Buddhist conception of matter. According to Buddhism, all material bodies consist of the same molecules (rupaparamanu). And a molecule (rupaparamanu) consists of eight atoms, four primary and four secondary. Primary atoms are the solid atom (prthivyanu), the liquid atom (jalanu), the hot atom (tejasanu) and the moving atom (vayvanu). The secondary are the atoms of colour, smell, taste and touch. Primary or secondary atoms are not found outside a molecule (rupaparamanu). This means that in their original state all rupaparamanus are absolutely alike. They are homogeneous; there is lack of differentiation. But the upadanas (conditions like fuel) impart them different forms, viz. fire-form, water-form, etc. So, when the upadanas are removed, destroyed or consumed the different forms disappear and rupaparamanus attain their homogeneous state. When the fire is extinguished, the fire-form imparted to rupaparamanus by the fuel (upadana) is annihilated and not the rupaparamanus. Thus the analogy is complete; the fuel corresponds to personality factors (skandhas), the fire-form to personality (pudgala), rupaparamanus divested of fire-form to the citta-continuum free from personality. As the fireform is annihilated in the event of its extinction, the question as to where the fireform goes is wrong; the fireform simply does not exist then. So there arises no question of its going to some place. This explanation is in harmony with the words of Buddha : "Similarly, the form by which the Tathagata is being recognised (by the people, say, as Gotama), that recognisable (and hence namebearing) form of Tathagata is annihilated, its roots cut off,.... Tathagata is free from form and name..." By the term 'form' is meant personality (pudgala), by the phrase 'its roots' the five personality factors (skandhas) which give rise to personality and by the phrase

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42 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 'Tathagata free from form and name the pure citta-continuum which is free from personality and hence has no name-label that is invariably associated with the personality. Thus the words of Buddha mean: On the death of the Tathagata, the citta-continuum becomes free from personality and also from the name associated with the personality because the personality is extinct. The personality has become extinct because its roots viz. five personality factors are cut off. The cittacontinuum is not annihilated with the annihilation of the personality. It continues to exist in its pure state. This pure citta-continuum is like a deep ocean. As there is no personality in the pure citta-continuum that continues to exist after the death of Tathagata, it is not possible to differentiate it from another pure citta-continuum, and hence there is impossiblity of designating it by the name. Names are given to personalities and not to pure citta-continuums which lack differentiating and distinguishing traits. Thus this passage undoubtedly proves that in nirvana pure citta-continuum does exist but has no personality that can differentiate it from another pure citta-continuum. Personality (pudgala) is annihilated on the cessation of personalty factors (skandhas), just as fire-form is annihitated on the consumption of fuel. The citta-continuum without personality continues to exist even after the annihilation of personality just as rupaparamanus (rather rupaparamanu-continuums) without fireform continue to exist even after the extinction of fireform. This is clearly accepted by Buddha when he declares: "Tathagata (after death) is deep like an ocean." Analogy of deep ocean is revealing. A deep ocean is calm, free from waves and agitation (ksobha). Similarly, the citta-continuum that attains nirvana becomes 'calm' i.e. free from agitations. Skandhas can easily be regarded as the agitating waves of citta-ocean. In nirvana they are completely niruddha (destroyed)26. Thus the analogy of deep ocean suggests not only cessation of personality factors entailing extinction of personality but also existence of citta-continuum free from personality factors and hence from personality also. When the fuel is consumed the fireform is extinguished. Similarly, when the five personality factors (of Tathagata Gotama) cease to exist the form or the personality which we recognise by the name Tathagata Gotama become extinct, it does not exist. But if we say, 'Tathagata Gotama is extinct', there is a danger of our giving rise to the

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ON BUDDHIST NIRVANA 43 misunderstanding that the pure citta continuum which was wearing before the death of Tathagata Gotama, the mask of personality designated by the name Tathagata Gotama is also extinct. And if we say, 'Tathagata Gotama is not extinct,' there is a danger of our giving rise to the misunderstanding that even after the death of Tathagata Gotama, in nirvana, the citta-continuum continues to wear the mask of personality which it was wearing before the death and which was on that account designated by the name 'Tathagata Gotama.' This is the reason why Buddha deemed it wise to observe silence when it was asked what happens to the Tathagata after his death.27 5. Two kinds of Nirvana Buddhism recognises two kinds of nirvana, viz. sopadhisesa and anupadhisesa.28 Sopadhisesa means that which is characterised by the upadhi (i.e. five skandhas) that continues to exist as residue (sesa). The term 'Sesa' suggests that the process of extinction has taken place and as a result something has become extinct. The question arises as to what has become extinct in this kind of nirvana. We are told that it is asavas (=kamasava, bhavasava, ditthasava, avijasava) that become extinct. So, it is better to designate this kind of nirvana by the term asava-nibhana." The person who attains it is called arahanta.31 He has his body and five sense-organs, experiences external objects or receives sensations, feels pleasures and pain, has impressions of past acts and experiences, and thinks or remembers, etc. Thus he is equipped with all the five personality factors and hence has his own distinct personality. But he being free from asavas, has no desires, no clinging to the world and to the renewed existence in it, no misconceptions about the world and himself, no ignorance and no immoral habits, thoughts and emotions. He is endowed with kindness. He is friendly and compassionate to all living beings and works for their good.32 He is imbued with the basic virtues, viz. ahimisa, staya, asteya, brahmacarya and aparigraha.33 He closely corresponds to the jivanmukta of the Sankhya-Yoga and the tirthankara (or arhat or sayoga-kevali) of the Jaina. The asavaksaya corresponds to the klesaksaya of the Sankhya-Yoga and the kasayaksaya (or ghatikarmaksaya) of the Jaina. The Buddhist have recognised the possibility of the existence of nirasrava skandhas, just as the SankhyaYoga have recognised the possibility of aklista cittavittis34 and the Jainas the niskasaya yoga (=activities of body, mind and speech).25

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44 INDIAN. PHILOSOPHY Thus the Buddhist conception of arhat, the Jaina conception of tirtharkara and the Sankhya-Yoga conception of jivanmukta provide us with the conception of Ideal Man. It is this asava-nibbana (=sopadhisesa-nirvana) that is emphasised in an old Buddhist verse quoted by Kamalasila in his Panjika Commentary on Tattvasangraha of Santaraksita (ka. 544). The verse in point is as follows: cittam eva hi samsaro ragadiklesavasitam! tad eva tair vinirmuktam bhavanta iti kathyate il : Anupadhisesa means that which is characterised by the absence of the upadhi (i.e. skandhas) that is still existing as residue. Here the five personality factors (=skandhas) become extinct. So it is better to call this kind of nirvana the skandha-nirvana or the pudgala-nirvana. It takes place only on the death of an arhat. Thus it. necessarily follows the sopadhisesa in due course. It is this nirvana that is. explained by the fire analogy. It corresponds to the vide'hamukti of the Sankhya-Yoga and the ayogakaivalya (or kitsnakarmaksayamukti) of the Jainas. Notes 1. Jaina Darsana (Hindi) by Pt. Mahendrakumar, p. 148 2. cittam cetana buddhi, tam jivatattvam eva / Dasakaliyasutta-curni by Agastyasimha, 4.4. It is very important to note, in this context, the frequent use of the terms 'sacitta', 'acitta', *pudhai-citta', etc., in the Jaina canonical literature. 3. Permanence (nityata) is twofold - the absolutely unchanging permanence (kutastha-nityata) and permanence amidst change (parinami-nityata). The former seems to be an abstraction, the latter to be concrete reality. According to the Jaina theoreticians, Reality is neither substance alone nor modes alone but is characterised by both. A substance and its modes are not absolutely different, nor are they absolutely identical. There obtains a relation of identity-cumdifference between them. They are identical in so far as one is not found without the other; they are different in the sense that they can be mentally differentiated. The previous mode is related with the posterior mode; between them there obtains a relation of

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ON BUDDHIST NIRVANA 45 relative identity as between the cause-continuum and the effectcontinuum. One mode cannot be absolutely different from another as there runs through them one and the same substance, a situation which makes possible the psychical phenomena of recognition and memory. There arises a question as to the precise sense in which a substance can be said to be permanent (dhruva), for we have been told that it itself changes in a way or that it is identical with its modes in a way. The Jaina thinkers say that a substance is permanent in the sense that it never loses its essence and not in the sense that it is absolutely static. It undergoes change no doubt but it retains its essential nature; it is in this sense that it can be said to be permanent - not in the senses of being absolutely changeless. From this it follows that reality is dynamic, it is always in motion, in flux, it always every moment transforms itself without giving up its essence. The process of transformation involves origination, decay and persistence. Hence reality is said to be of this triple nature. One may find hard to conceive a thing which is both permanent and changing. The idea seems to be that in an element there are two aspects - one static and the other dynamic. But how can it be visualized that some parts of an element remain static when others are changing ? For, certainly all these parts are organically related with one another and they form a unity. It is impossible to point out physically a static part in an element. To avoid this difficulty the Jaina thinkers might say that what is called a static part of an element is not really static but that the element undergoes "homogeneous change with respect to this part. But then we have to point out that the expression 'homegeneous change' involves a contradiction in terms. It seems that in Jaina philosophy permanence has negative connotation. It means 'not to cross certain limits in the course of change'. There are certain limits that an element can never transgress in the course of change. A thing, under appropriate conditions, can change itself into any other thing, provided the latter is not primarily and essentially of a different nature. That a material thing can change itself into any material thing through proper processes but it can never change itself into a conscious entity, is an illustration in point. Viewed in this way, the Jaina theory

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46 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY of parinamavada and Buddhist theory of ksanabhangavada are essentially identical. 4. klezajJeyAvaraNaprahANato hi sarvajJatvam / tatra klezA eva rAgAdayo bhUtadarzanapratibandhAbhAvAt klezAvaraNamucyate / dRSTasyApi heyopAdeyatattvasya yat sarvAkArAparijJAnaM pratipAdanAsAmarthya ca tajjJeyAvaraNam / Tattvasangraha-panjika, ka. 3337 . 5. prabhAvasvaramidaM cittaM prakRtyA''gantavo mlaaH| Pramana-vartika, I. 210 6. (nibbAnaM) sabbadukkhapamocanaM / SamyuttaN. PTS 2. 278 ... 7. ...paramA santi nibbaanN...| Itivuttaka PTS, 1.22 8. nibbAnaM paramaM sukhaM / Dhammapada, 203 nibbAnasukhA paraM ntthi| / _Therigatha, 476 Compare 'azAntasya kutaH sukham ?' : Bagavad-Gita 9. aniccho hoti nibbuto| Suttanipata, 707 10. sabbato taNhAnaM khayA asesavirAganirodho nibbAnaM / Nidana, 33 11. sItibhUto smi nibbuto| MajjhimaN., 1.171 12. nibbAnaM bhagavA Ahu sabbaganthappamocanaM / SamyuttaN., I. 210 13. paJcAparibhAvitaM cittaM sammad eva Asavehi vimuccati seyyathIdaM kAmAsavA bhavAsavA diTThAsavA avijjAsavA / DighaN., 2.81 14. bhavanirodho nibbAnaM / SamyuttaN., 2.117 jAtinirodhA jraamrnnnirodho| MajjhimaN., 1.49 15. SamyuttaN., 4.372 16-17. MajjhimaN, 1.173 18. idaM taM ArogyaM idaM taM nibbAnaM ti| Ibid, 1.511 19. rUpavedanAsaMjJAsaMskAravijJAnapaJcaskandhanirodhAd abhAvo mokssH| Tattvartha-Rajavar tika, p. 2 20. Tattvasangraha, with Panjika, ka. 336-349 Milindapanha, II, pp. 25-28 For denoting personality terms atta (atman), satto (sattva), puggala (pudgala), jiva, vedagu (vedaka) are employed in Buddhist Pali literature. 21. Pramana-vartika, I. 86-88, II. 150-153 22. These Buddhist thinkers are called Vatsiputriyas. 23. There was a view that personality (pudgala) of one citta continuum maintains its identity (of course through its own

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ON BUDDHIST NIRVANA 47 continuum which runs closely parallel to its citta-continuum) so long as the citta-continuum does not attain nirvana; as soon as it attains nirvana this identical personality (pudgala) gets totally extinguished. This idea of pudgala (personality) very well corresponds to the Jaina conception of karmana-sarira and Sankhya conception of lingasarira. 24. Jayanta maintains that there are two views about Buddhist nirvana. According to one view, in nirvana there is total destruction of the continuum. According to the other view there continues pure jnana-continuum in nirvana. nirvANAdipadAkhyeyamapavargaM tu saugatAH / santatyucchedamicchanti svacchAM vA jJAnasantatim / Nyayamanjari, IX Ahnika, L. D: Series No 115, p. 333 In fact, these are not two views about nirvana. One and the same state of nirvana is here, viewed from two different angles or described negatively and positively. When described negatively, it is the annihilation of the continuum of personality or pudgala. When described positively, it is the continuance of the continuum of pure-citta. Santaraksita in his Tattvasangraha (Ka. 543) clearly states that mukti (Ultimate Release, nirvana) is nothing but purity of citta (dhi). Muktir nirmalata dhiyah. 25. Buddhist Logic by Stcherbatsky, Vol. I, p. 101, 190-191 Mouton * & Co., 1958 apare (bauddhAH) AhuH-kakkhaDatAdInAM caturNAM bhUtAnAM bhautikAnAM ca varNAdInAM vilakSaNAnAM Aucun petit 144410g: 1 Tattvartha-Rajavartika, p. 17 26. There is close resemblance between citta-vittis of Patanjala Yoga and Buddhist skandhas. Yoga philosophy accepts purusa (soul) over and above and independent of citta. Purusa is absolutely changeless (kutasthanitya), while citta is variable constant (parinami-nitya). Vitti means mode, transformation, change which citta assumes or undergoes. Citta assumes the mode of happiness (sukhakara-vrtti), of unhappiness (duhkhakara-vrtti), mode of the form of external object (jnanavrtti, ghatajnana, patajnana, etc.), mode of concept (vikalpavitti), mode of memory (smrtivitti), and so on. And so long as there arise vrttis in citta, purusa who is closely associated with citta has to bear reflections of vittis. This is the bondage of purusa.

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do INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Citta without vittis can never be reflected in purusa. So, to establish purusa in its reflectionless pure state, one should effect complete cessation of all vittis (vittinirodha). When all the vittis completely cease to exist, citta becomes calm, unagitated, prasantavahi, and in the absence of vrttis purusa becomes free from reflections (pure, isolated, kevala), and citta also becomes pure and isolated having no relation whatsover with purusa. sattva-purusayoh suddhi-samye kaivalyam / Patanjala* Yogasutra 3.55. The Buddhists also talk of cessation (nirodha) of skandhas. They frequently use the terms vedana-nirodha, etc. They too maintain that when citta becomes free from skandhas, it becomes pure and is established in its pure and pristine state. As they do not accept purusa, further processes of reflection of skandhas in purusa and cessation of the reflection are not required in Buddhism and hence are totally absent. For the Buddhist cessation of skandhas resulting in the purity of citta is itself nirvana. 27. Majjhima-Nikaya, Cubamalumkya-Sutta. 28. The adjectives used to describe sopadhisesa-nirvana are note worthy. They are : sanditthika, ehipassika, veditabba. (Ang. N. I, 158f.) The term used for nirupadhisesa or anupadhisesa nirvana is pari nirvana. 29. Patanjali, the author of Yogasutra, recognises five klesas, viz. avidya, asmita, raga, dyesa and abhinivesa. Avidya corresponds to avijjasava, asmita to ditthasava, raga-dvesa to kamasava and abhinivesa to bhavasava. 30. dvividhaM nirvANamupavarNitam-sopadhizeSaM nirupadhizeSaM ca / tatra niravazeSasya avidyArAgAdikasya klezagaNasya prahANAt sopadhizeSaM nirvaannmissyte|...updhishbden... paJcopAdAnaskandhA ucyante |...sh upadhizeSeNa vartate iti sopadhizeSam / tacca skandhamAtrakameva kevalam... / yatra tu nirvANe skandhamAtrakamapi nAsti tannirupadhizeSaM Aafura i Madhyamika-vitti, p. 519 31. Itivuttaka. 32. AnguttaraN. I p. 211 33. Majjhiman. I p. 523 34. t4: 98424: PAMET 31 PATTET: | Yogasutra, I. 5 35. Haritsaaret: ATLYSabefcerent: 1 Tattvarthasutra; VI. 5.

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CONCEPTION OF ISVARA IN PATANJALA YOGA Yogasutra First we present before the scholars of Indian philosophy our explanation of Patanjali's three aphorisms on Isvara. While explaining these aphorisms we shall use only those concepts that are found in the Yogsutra. By doing so we intend to keep our explanation as free as possible from the later concepts. Let us take up the concerned aphorisms one by one for explanation. [1] klesa-karma-vipakasayair 'aparamrstah purusavisesah isvarah 1 I. 24. The extra-ordinary person who is untouched by klesas, karmas, vipaka and asaya is called Isvara. I. 24. We shall try to explain this aphorism on the basis of the concepts or ideas found in other aphorisms. Patanjali tells us that during the practice of samprajnata yoga if one does not desire anything (or any siddhi) he surely attains infallible perfect vivekakhyati, and as a result of this he attains Dharmamegha samadhi;' further he says that on the attainment of Dharmamegha samadhi follows the destruction of klesas and karmas. From this we deduce that a viveki who has attained Dharmamegha samadhi is always free from klesas and karmas. (Bhasyakara Vyasa calls this person a jivanmukta.") Patanjali. states that klesas are the root-cause of karmasaya'. He further declares that so long as the root (viz. klesas) exists, there will be vipaka. These two statements imply that in the absence of klesas, there cannot be karmasaya and vipaka. On the attainment of Dharmamegha samadhi a viveki becomes free from klesas and karmas, and as soon as he becomes free from klesas he becomes free from vipaka and asaya. From all this it naturally follows that a viveki who has attained Dharmamegha samadhi is untouhed by klesas, karmas, vipaka and asaya. Hence this viveki can legitimately be called extra-ordinary person. By Isvara

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u. 50 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Patanjali seems to mean this viveki. We are not warranted by the Yogasutra to go beyond this. (2] The next aphorism is - . tatra niratisayah sarvajnabijam | I. 25 In this (=isvara) there is infinite (=niratisayarananta) jnana which is the seed or germ of all-comprehending (=sarvajna) jnana. I. 25. Regarding ananta-jnana and sarvajna-jnana much confusion and misunderstanding prevails among scholars who wrongly identify ananta-jnana with sarvajna-jnana. This aphorism is very important as it removes the mist of misunderstanding and confusion. It clearly suggests that ananta-jnana is not identical wih sarvajna-jnana. We shall have to turn to other aphorisms for the clear understanding of the difference between the two as also for the full explanation of the aphorism on hand. Patanjali explicitly states that as soon as klesas and karmas get destroyed on the attainment of Dharmamegha samadhi, all the avaranas and malas get completely removed and jnana attains its infinity (=anantya). Thus ananta-jnana (or niratisaya-jnana) is nothing but niravarana-jnana. Jnana which is free from all obscuring veils and impurities is ananta-jnana. Ananta-jnana is not sarvajna-jnana. Patanjali says that all the objects taken together are alpa as compared to the anantya of jnana of the person who has attained Dharmamegha samadhi. What Patanjali wants to drive at is that however infinite all the objects taken together may be, their infinity can never coincide with the vast infinity of jnana. From what we studied above it naturally follows that those who say that jnana is infinite (=ananta) because it knows all things are committing a blunder. Again, our study shows that Patanjali does not want to attach much importance to sarvajna-jnana. As we shall see, he considers it to be simply a siddhi which a person who has attained ananta-jnana comes to acquire. And we all know Patanjali's attitude towards siddhis. Dharmamegha samadhi marks the perfection of vivekajnana. So, perfect vivekajnana can be regarded as identical with ananta-jnana. When all the avaranas and malas get removed the vivekajnana

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CONCEPTION OF ISVARA... 51 becomes automatically perfect and when vivekajnana becomes perfect there is removal of all the avaranas and malas. This means that (perfect) vivekajnana is nothing but ananta-jnana. Thus to say that niratisaya-jnana (=ananta-jnana) is the seed of sarvajna-jnana is the same thing as to say that sarvajna-jnana is vivekaja. Another name for sarvajna jnana is taraka-jnana. Patanjali explicitly states that taraka-jnana is vivekaja'. As he has placed it in his treatment of siddhis, it becomes quite clear that he considers it to be simply a siddhi. Why is ananta-jnana i.e. vivekajnana regarded as the seed of sarvajna-jnana ? There is a good reason for that. Patanjali wants to suggest that sarvajna-jnana does never automatically follow on the attainment of ananta jnana. As soon as one attains ananta-jnana one acquires the capacity (=labdhi) to know all, but he does not actually know all. He knows all provided he performs samyama (dharana, dhyana and samadhi) on ksana and ksanakramal. This means that the capacity to know all functions under a specific condition. If jnana were to become automatically sarvajna on its becoming ananta, then ananta jnana would not have been regarded as the seed of sarvajna jnana; in that case it would have been regarded as identical with sarvajna-jnana. But this being not the case, ananta jnana is regarded as the seed of sarvajna-jnana. . On the attainment of Dharmamegha samadhi all the klesas and karmas get completely destroyed, and as soon as all the klesas and karmas are destroyed the jnana becomes ananta because all the obscuring veils and impurities have already been destroyed. The person who has attained this ananta-jnana acquires the capacity to know all but this capacity functions only if he performs a special type of samyama. All this discussion clearly suggests that a viveki who has attained Dharmamegha samadhi is Isvara, and it is he who is described in the aphorism on hand. Thus Isvara is not necessarily sarvajna; he becomes sarvajna only when he performs that samyama. In other words, he has the capacity to know all, but this capacity functions provided certain conditions are fulfilled. This capacity to know all is a siddhi which is the result of his attainment of anantajnana. Thus he is invariably characterized by ananta-jnana but he is not invariably characterized by sarvajna-jnana.

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INDIAN PHILOSOPHY [3] The next aphorism is - purvesam api guruh kalenanavacchedat / I. 26 He (=Isvara) is the spiritual teacher of even the elderly persons because he is not limited by time. I. 26. (a) Here the role of Isvara as upadesta is suggested by the term . 'guru'. (b) The phrase 'purvesam api guruh reminds us of that-well known verse from the Daksinamurtistotra attributed to Ac. Sankara, viz. 'citram vatataror mule vTddhah sisyo gurur yuva' etc. This idea is very common in Brahmanic, Buddhist and Jaina religions. (c) What is it that qualifies him to be a spiritual teacher of even the elderly persons ? The answer to this question is provided in the remaining part of the aphorism viz. 'kalenanavacchedat which being in the fifth case-ending gives the reason for Isyara's being the spiritual teacher of even the elderly person. Let us try to understand the idea suggested by the term 'kalenanavaccheda' on the basis of another aphorism. Patanjali states that for that person whose klesas and karmas are destroyed on the attainment of Dharmamegha samadhi and as a result of this whose jnana has attained its infinity, gunas come to an end of the sequence of change." That is, gunas stop evolving citta, indriya, Sarira, etc. for that person. The series of round of rebirth ends for him. For him the cycle of birth and death ceases. He rises above time. Now he is not limited by time. He becomes kalanavacchinna. Thus we equate 'kalenanavaccheda' with 'gunanam parinamakrama-samaptih (IV. 32).13 Now what this aphorism means is this - 'As he (=Isvara) (having destroyed klesas and karmas] has risen above the cycle of birth and death, he is the spiritual teacher of even the elderly persons (who are caught up in the cycle).' The equation given above suggests that for Patanjali kala is nothing but parinamakrama. Hence one who is untouched by parinamakarama is untouched by kala or is not limited by kala. Kalanavaccheda or parinamakrama-samapti is the result of klesarahitya or vitaragata. Klesarahitya is nothing but supreme spirituality. So one who has attained supreme spirituality can be the spiritual teacher of even the elderly persons. It is this supreme

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CONCEPTION OF ISVARA... 53 spirituality suggested by kalanavaccheda or parinamakramasamapti that qualifies one to be the spiritual teacher of even the elderly persons. Only those who have crossed the ocean of samsara can show others how to cross it. Only those who have stopped the cycle of birth and death can show others how to stop it.'* On our interpretation Isvara according to Patanjali is identical with the viveki who has attained Dharmamegha samadhi, ananta-jnana and the capacity to know all and is free from the cycle of birth and death. As we have already seen, this viveki, according to Patanjali, is free from klesas, karmas, vipaka and asaya. Thus by Isvara Patanjali seems to mean that person whom Vyasa calls jivanmukta. We repeat again that we are not warranted by the Yogasutra to go beyond this. Elsewhere! we have shown that Nyayabhasyakara Vatsyayana's conception of isvara corresponds to that of jivanmukta viveki, and it is only Prasastapada, the author of the Padarthadharmasangraha, who introduced into the Nyaya-Vaisesika' system the conception of Isvara as nityamukta. Similarly, we feel that Patanjali's conception of Isvara is identical with that of jivanmukta viveki and it is only Bhasyakara Vyasa who introduced into the Yoga system the conception of Isvara as nitya mukta. Yogabhasya Vyasa, the author of Bhasya on the Yogasutra, introduces into the Patanjala Yoga philosophy the idea of nityamukta one isvara. Isvara is free from bondage in all the three divisions of time. He was not bound in the past, nor is he bound in the present, nor will he be bound in the future. This speciality differentiates him from kevalins (the ordinary liberated souls) who have attained freedom from bondage after having severed all bonds of bondage.16 Isvara is sadamukta. "7 . . Vyasa states that isvara's utkarsa is eternal. By utkarsa he means sarvajnatva (omniscience). Isvara is omniscient always in all the three divisions of time because he possesses always in all the three divisions of time the supremely pure citta without any coverings that obstruct knowledge. That he is omniscient is proved by scriptures. And scriptures are authoritative and valid because they are composed by the omniscient isvara. The interdependence of omniscience of isvara and authoritativeness of scriptures, being beginningless like the interdependence of a seed and a sprout, is not a logical defect.18

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54 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY The aisvarya (pre-eminence) of Isvara is supreme and hence matchless. By aisvarya the unfailing will is here meant. The aisvarya of any other being is not superior to his. Nor is the aisvarya of any other being equal to his." Why ? If the two persons' aisvaryas are equal then when at the same time and with respect to one and the same thing both the persons entertain two contradictory desires - as for example, 'let this be new' and 'let this be old' - one's desire will be fulfilled and the other's desire will remain unfulfilled: As a result of this the latter's aisvarya becomes inferior.20 So, it is impossible for two supreme aisvaryas to be equal. From this it naturally follows that Isvara is one only. In the world we observe that one person has a certain degree of knowledge, another person has a higher degree of knowledge, the third person has still a higher degree of knowledge, and so on. The progressive development must reach its completion' somewhere, because this is the way of all progression. He in whom knowledge which is subject to progressive development reaches the highest limit is omniscient. Isvara is omniscient.21 Vyasa maintains that Isvara who is perfect has no motive for doing anything for his own betterment leading to perfection. But he does have motive for undertaking activity for the betterment of living beings, which ultimately leads to perfection. He imparts instruction in knowledge and in right-living to living beings, with the sole intention of freeing them from the transmigratory wanderings and misery.22 According to Vyasa, isvara is the Teacher of the ancient sages also because he is not limited by time always - even in the past, while those sages were then limited by time.?? Thus Vyasa made isvara nityamukta and consequently lokottara. And on the basis of supreme aisvarya he established that he is one only. It is not necessary to make him nityamukta in order to differentiate him from other ordinary liberated souls (kevalins) because his difference from them is well established on the basis of the well recognised fundamental differentiating characteristic. The other ordinary liberated souls have no citta at all. So, how can they have supremely pure (prakrsta) citta and consequently the supreme aisvarya which necessarily depends on supremely pure citta ? But isvara does have supremely pure citta and consequently supreme aisvarya. It is accepted in the Patanjala Yoga philosophy that

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CONCEPTION OF ISVARA... 55 supremely pure citta without any obstructive veil is possible in more individuals than one, they being jivanmuktas. Then, what is the harm in accepting supreme aisvarya in them ? The acceptance of the supremely pure citta in jivanmuktas necessarily entails the acceptance of supreme aisvarya in them. Supreme aisvarya is not opposed to the concept of many Isvaras. It is noteworthy that Vyasa has not assigned the work of worldcreation to isvara. For him, isvara is not even the dispenser of the fruits of the past actions performed by living beings. According to him, isvara's sole function is to impart instructions of spiritual living which leads to the ultimate Release. Vacaspati and Vijnanabhiksu Now we try to show what new ideas regarding isvara Vacaspati, the author of the commentary Tattvavaisaradi on Yogabhasya, and Vijnanabhiksu, the author of Yogavartika, have introduced into the Patanjala Yoga philosophy. Vyasa is of the view that isvara is associated with supremely pure citta always at all time. But Vacaspati finds some difficulty i accepting this view. So he maintains that at the time of Dissolution the supremely pure citta of isvara gets dissolved into the primordial Matter (prakrti).24 The question arises as to how it again gets associated with isvara at the end of the period of Dissolution. What is it that associates it. with isvara ? The answer given by Vacaspati is as follows. li is isvara's resolve, before the commencement of Dissolution, that he must get associated with the citta at the end of Dissolution. Impression of this resolve is there in the citia during the entire period of Dissolution. On account of the nature of the resolve the impression is revived at the end of the period of Dissolution and as a result of it the citta gets associated with isvara.25 If isvara's citta does not get dissolved into prakti at any time, not even at the time of Dissolution, then it cannot be regarded as an evolute or an effect of prakrti and consequently cannot be included in the fundamental principle/real called prakti. And it is not the other fundamental principle/real purusa (sentient principle). Thus it will be neither prakrti nor purusa. This will give rise to the contingency of its being an independent third fundamental principle/real.26 Vijnanabhiksu refutes Vacaspati's view. He maintains that isvara's citta does not get dissolved into prakrti even at the time of

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56 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Dissolution. The reason given by him is as follows. If we accept that isvara's citta gets dissolved into prakrti at the time of Dissolution and remains dissolved into prakrti during the entire period of Dissolution then we shall have to accept its conjunction with isvara taking place at the end of the period of Dissolution. But the cause of the conjunction of prakrti and purusa is avidya (Nescience). Thus Vacaspati's view involves contingency of isvara's being infected with avidya. But Patanjala Yoga philosophy does not accept the possibility of klesas, viz. avidya etc. in isvara. Again, Vacaspati's attempt to explain the rejoining of the citta with isvara with the help of impression of the citta is also not proper because Patanjali has rejected the possibility of any impression (vasana, asaya) in isvara's citta.27. According to Vacaspati, isvara simply removes obstructions that are there in the process of proper fruits coming to living beings from their past actions at proper time 28 Even Vijnanabhiksu seems to agree with Vacaspati on this point. Moreover, Vijnanabhiksu believes that though isvara has strong desire to remove all miseries of all living beings, he has to take into account deserts or past karmas of living beings.29 Vacaspati introduces the idea of isvara as the creator and destroyer of the world.30 Vijnanabhiksu supports him.' Again, he clearly states that creative agitation (ksobha) - that is, breaking of prakti's state of homogeneous change (samyavasthabhanga) - takes place as a result of isvara's will. Someone may here raise a question as to how one can maintain that prakrti's independence is not at stake even though prakrti starts to evlove into the world at the will of isvara. In answer Vacaspati and Vijnanabhiksu both state that isvara simply removes obstacles that are there in the process of evolution. In other words, it is only prakrti that has the capacity to evolve into the world, and isvara simply awakens or activates this capacity by removing obstacles. On the removal of obstacles, there takes place heterogeneous change in place of homogeneous change in prakrti giving rise to diverse effects. 32 While presenting the Patanjala yoga conception of isvara, Vijnanabhiksu discusses the relation obtaining between isvara and jiva (individual ordinary soul). According to him, there obtains the relation of amsa-amsin (part-whole) between them. He gives an illustration of fire and sparks to explain the relation. Jivas are the parts of which isvara is the whole. Jivas are sparks of isvara. 33

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CONCEPTION OF ISVARA... 57 Under the influence of Vedanta and later Nyaya-Vaisesika thinkers, Vacaspati and Vijnanabhiksu have introduced into Patanjala Yoga philosophy some new ideas regarding isvara. These are the ideas of isvara as the world-creator, as the dispenser of the fruits of past actions and as the whole of which jivas are parts. These ideas are not present even in Vyasa's Yogabhasya. Notes 1. pratisaGkhyAne'pyakusIdasya sarvathA vivekkhyaatedhrmmeghsmaadhiH| Yogasutra, 4.29 2. tataH kleshkrmnivRttiH| Ibid, 4.30 3. klezakarmanivRttau jIvanneva vidvAn vimukto bhavati / Yoga-bhasya, 4.30 4. klezamUlaH karmAzayaH ... | Yogasutra, 2.12 . 5. sati mUle tadvipAkaH ... | Ibid, 2.13 . 6. Compare : adharma-mithyAjJAna-pramAdahAnyA dharmajJAnasamAdhisampadA ca viziSTa maatmaantrmiishvrH|' Nyaya-bhasya, 4.1.21 (adharma-adharmapravRtti = klezayuktapravRtti; dharma=dharmapravRtti klezarahitapravRtti ) 7. tadA sarvAvaraNamalApetasya jJAnasya AnantyAt jJeyamalpam / Yogasutra, 4.31 8. Ibid. 9. tArakaM sarvaviSayaM sarvathAviSayamakramaM ceti vivekajaM jJAnam / Ibid, 3.54 10. kSaNatatkramayoH saMyamAd vivekajaM jJAnam / Ibid, 3.52 11. tatra kRtArthAnAM pariNAmakramasamAptirguNAnAm / Ibid, 4.32 12. kuzalasya (= dharmameghasamAdhisampannasya vivekinaH) saMsAracakrasamAptirnetarasya / Yoga-bhasya, 4.33 13. 'gunanam. parinamakramasamaptih' is different from 'gunanam pratiprasavah' which takes place when the viveki's body falls. 14. jIvanmuktasyaivopadeSTutvasambhavAt / Sankhyapravacanabhasya, 3.79. 15. Study the next chapter of the present work. 16. kaivalyaM prAptAstarhi santi ca bahavaH kevalinaH / te hi trINi bandhanAni chittvA kaivalyaM / praaptaaH| Izvarasya ca tatsambandho na bhUto na bhaavii| Yogabhasya, 1.24 17. sa tu sadaiva muktaH sdaiveshvrH| Ibid, 1.24 18. yo'sau prakRSTasattvopAdAnAdIzvarasya zAzvatika utkarSaH sa kiM sanimitta Ahosvinirnimitta iti ? tasya zAstraM nimittam / zAstraM punaH kiMnimittam ? prakRSTasattvanimittam / etayoH zAstrotkarSayorIzvarasattve vrtmaanyornaadismbndhH| Ibid, 1.24

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58 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 19. tacca tasyaizvaryaM sAmyAtizayavinirmuktam / na tAvadaizvaryAntareNa tadatizayyate / yadevAtizAyi syAt tadeva tat syAt / tasmAt yatra kASThAprAptiraizvaryasya sa IzvaraH / na ca tatsamAnamaizvarya msti| Ibid, 1.24 20. kasmAt ? dvayostulyayorekasmin yugapat kAmite'rthe navamidamastu purANamidamastvityekasya kAmitArthaprApti styarthasya viruddhatvAt / Ibid, 1.24 21. Ibid, 1.25 22. tasyAtmAnugrahAbhAve'pi bhUtAnugrahaH prayojanam jJAnadharmopadezena kalpapralayamahApralayeSu ___saMsAriNaH purussaanuddhrissyaamiiti| Ibid, 1.25 23. Ibid, 1.26 24. na cezvarasya cittasattvaM mahApralaye'pi prakRtisAmyaM nopaitIti vaacym| Tattvavaisaradi, . 1.24 25. sargAntarasamutpannasaMjihIrSAvadhisamaye pUrNe mayA sattvaprakarSa upAdeya iti praNidhAnaM kRtvA bhagavAn jagat saMjahAra / tadA cezvaracittasattvaM praNidhAnavAsitaM pradhAnasAmyamupagatamapi paripUrNe mahApralayAvadhau praNidhAnavAsanAvazAt tathaivezvaracittaM sattvabhAvena prinnmte| Ibid, 1.24 26. yasya hi na kadAcidapi pradhAnasAmyaM na tat prAdhAnikam, nApi citizaktirajJatvA__dityarthAntaramaprAmANikamApadyeta / Ibid, 1.24 . 27. taccAyuktam / 'tasya heturavidyA' ityAgAmisUtreNAvidyAyA buddhipuruSasaMyogahetutva vacanenezvarasyApyavidvattvApatte...IzvaropAdhau saMskArasya pratiSiddhatvAt tadabhyupagamo'pi / teSAmapasiddhAnta eva / Yogavartika, 1.24 / 28. IzvarasyApi dharmAdhiSThAnArthaM pratibandhApanaye eva vyApAro veditvyH| TattvaV., 4.3 29. Izvarasya tu paraduHkhaprahANecchA vidyamAnA'pi bhaktavazatayA kuNThitA svakAryAya vilambata iti sarvaM samaJjasam, yacca sarvezvarasya karmasApekSatayA vaiSamyaM naipuNyaM ca brahmamImAMsAsUtreNApAkRtaM ttraapyymevaashyH| Yogavartika, 1.25 30. bhagavAn jagat saMjahAra / TattvaV., 1.24 31. prakRtervaiSamyahetuH kSobho'pIzvarecchAta eva / Yogavartika, 1.24 32. nanu prakRtizcet svatantrA kena prakAreNa tarhi dharmezvarayogisaGkalpAdInAM prakRtipariNAma hetutvamiti pRcchati - kathaM tIti / sUtrArdhenottaramAha-varaNabhedastu tataH kssetrikvditi|... tathaiva prakRtireva jagatkAraNaM kAlakarmezvarAdayastu prakRteH kAryajananazaktyubodhakAH Izvarastu sAmyapariNAmAdirUpAkhilAvaraNabhaGgenodbodhakaH... | Ibid, 4.3 . 33. atrocyate-jIvezvarayoraMzAzinostAvat...nyAyAnugraheNa balavadbhiragnisphuliGgAdibhiH saaNshdRssttaantaiH...| Ibid, 1.24

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CONCEPTION OF ISVARA IN THE EARLY NYAYA-VAISESIKA SCHOOL Does Kanada believe in the existence of Isvara (God) ?' There is no clear mention of Isvara in the Vaisesikasutras of Kanada?. Hence the author of Yuktidipika, a commentary on the Sankhyakarika, explicitly states that according to Kanada there is no Isvara (God). And Garbe, a well known modern scholar of Indian philosophy, maintains that the Vaisesikasutra originally did not accept the existence of God'. But keeping in view the important place accorded to God in the later Nyaya-Vaisesika school, the commentators wrongly try to find out in the Vaiseskasutra some implied acceptance of the existence of God. Take the following two sutras : yato'bhyudayanihsreyasasiddhih sa dharmah /* tadvacanad amnayasya pramanyam / V.S. 1.1.2-3. The straight and clear meaning.of these two sutras is : "That by which one attains prosperity and beatitude is Dharma. Because the Vedas deal with it (=Dharma), they are to be regarded as pramana (authority or valid)'. But the commentators explain the word 'tadvacanat as meaning because the Vedas are the Word of Mahesvara's. But this. interpretation seems unwarranted and farfetched. In this connection Prof. S. N. Dasgupta observes: : "The sutra 'tadvacanad amnayasya pramanyam (1.1.3.) has been explained by Upaskara as meaning 'The Veda being the Word of Isvara (= God) must be regarded as vilid,' but since there is no mention of 'Isvara' anywhere in the text this is simply reading the later Nyaya ideas into the Vaisesika".6 Prof, Erich Frauwallner is of the view that the first four extant aphorisms of the Vaisesikasutras are not original. Someone has composed them keeping in view the beginning of Prasastapada's Padarthadharmasangraha, and having removed the original ones placed them in their place. Prof. E. Frauwallner has restored the original aphorisms on the basis of Udayana's Kiranavali and Jaina Haribhadra's Nyaya-pravesakavrtti. In these restored original aphorisms there is nothing that can be interpreted in favour of the view that Kanada

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60 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY accepted the existence of Isvara. After quoting the beginning of Padarthadharmasangraha Prof. E. Frauwallner writes : "It has always been noticed that these words echo the beginning of the Sutras but it was seen as Prasastapada's dependence on the Sutras. Now we would rather judge the relation the other way round." There is another sutra, viz. 'sannakarma tv asmadvisistanam lingam' (2.1.18) where the commentators wrongly find the implied reference to Isvara (=God). They explain the term 'asmadvisistanam' as meaning "Mahesvarasya'. According to Upaskara the meaning of the sutra is : 'Name and effect are the mark of the existence of isvara (=God).' He explains how naming is a mark of the existence of Isvara as also how effect too is a mark of the existence of Isvara. Earth etc. must have a creator, because they are effects like a pot etc. Thus according to Upaskara, the sutra adduces two logical reasons to prove the existence of God. While criticising the above interpretation presented by Upaskara, Prof. S. N. Dasgupta writes : 'Upaskara's interpretation seems to be farfetched. He wants to twist it into an argument for the existence of God's According to Dasgupta the meaning of the sutra is : 'The existence of others different from us (asmadvisistanam) has to be admitted for accounting for the giving of names to things (sanjnakarma). Because we find that the giving of names is already in usage (and not invented by us)'.' The sutra has been explained by Candrananda as meaning 'creation of nine names only by Mahesvara serves as a mark of the existence of nine substances only? 10 Prof. Dasgupta's above criticism applies to this interpretation also. As matter of fact, the term 'asmadvisistanam' is to be understood in the sense of 'of those distinguished from us' or 'of those superior to us. In Prasastapadabhasya at one place we find the term 'asmadvisistanam used as an adjective qualifying "yoginani'." One important tenet upheld by the later NyayaVaisesika thinkers is that the initial motion of atoms is caused by Isvara (God)." But Kanada explicitly states that it is caused by adrsta (a special quality generated in souls by their own actions).'3 Another equally important tenet upheld by them is that God gives living beings the fruits of their merits and demerits in the shape of enjoyments and afflictions.!* But Kanada recognises no intermediary between merits and demerits on the one hand and their fruits on the other. Still another important tenet upheld by them is that the author of the Vedas is Isvara (God).But Kanada says only this much that creation of the Vedas presupposes Intellignce, that is, the Vedas are created by an intelligent

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CONCEPTION OF ISVARA 61 person or persons.16 Prof. Dasgupta observes : 'It is probable that Kanada believed that the Vedas were written by some persons superior to us (2.1.18, 6.1.1-2)'." It seems to us that Kanada shares the view that the Vedas have been composed by Rsis to whom Dharma was revealed (saksatkrtadharmanah). Prof. Dasgupta rightly concludes: 'As there is no reference to Isvara and as adrsta proceeding out of the performance of actions in accordance with Vedic injunctions is made the cause of all atomic movements, we can very well assume that Vaisesika was as atheist or non-theistic as the later Mimamsa philosophers. *18 What does Gautama, the author of the Nyayasutra,19 mean by 'Isvara' ? 'Gautama makes only a casual mention of God, and some have doubted whether the Nyaya was originally theistic.'20 In Gautama's Nyayasutras, we find three aphorisms dealing with Isvara. These three aphorisms?' explain the function of Isvara, regarding actions and their fruits. First two aphorisms present the views of the opponents while the third one presents Gautama's own view. Let us take them one by one, translate and explain them fully, taking the words in their natural meaning and disregarding the interpretations of the commentators.. Isvarah karanam purusakarmaphalyadarsanat / (4.1.19) 'Because we see the actions of living beings, bearing no fruits, it is Isvara that is to be regarded as the cause of fruits'.. The cause of fruits is not our actions, but Isvara. There is no necessary cause-effect relation between actions and fruits. Fruits do not depend on actions performed by living beings, but they depend on the will of Isvara. We should maintain this because we see that a human being does not attain fruits even though he performs respective actions. It is Isvara only who puts us in different situations and circumstances, and gives us pleasures and pains, keeps us bound or makes us free. These are not the fruits of our actions, but they are results of Isvara's will. Our actions have nothing to do with fruits we experience. The theory of Moral Causation (Karma siddhanta) is wrong and unfounded. Baliyasi kevalam isvareccha. 'Na, purusakarmabhave phalanispatteh / (4.1.20)

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INDIAN PHILOSOPHY "No, (Isvara is not the cause of fruits), because if a living being does not perform actions, it cannot attain fruits. The principle enunciated in the preceding aphorism is wrong, because if the cause of fruits were not actions, but Isvara, then we should attain fruits without performing actions. We never reach the desination, if we do not walk. We are not cured of the disease if we do not take medicine. So fruits depend on actions and not on Isvara. There is no need of Isvara. Actions done, fruits attained. If a seed of a banyan tree comes in contact of the soil, water, etc., it will definitely grow into a banyan tree; no agent is required. Depending on the cause, the effect comes into being. If a person takes deadly poison, he will certainly die, no agent is required to exert poison to do its work. If one performs an action, he will definitely attain its fruit: Where is the necessity for positing an agent Isvara? Tatkaritatvad ahetuh / (4.2.21) 'Because Isvara exhorts one to perform actions and attain their fruits, both the views enunciated in the preceding two aphorisms do not have the support of a logical reason.' This aphorism presents Gautama's own view. It is as follows: The two views which we have explained are wrong. One neglects and rejects the necessary relation obtaining between actions and fruits, another neglects and rejects Isvara. As a matter of fact, there does obtain a necessary relation between actions and fruits. If one performs an action, that action does give him its fruit. It is true that for fruition, action does not require Isvara. But one should know as to which action be performed to attain a desired fruit: A person desirous of a particular fruit should have the knowledge as to which action entails which fruit. It is true that deadly poison causes death. But one who wants to commit suicide by taking poison should have knowledge that a particular substance is highly poisonous. If he does not possess that knowledge, and as a result takes any substance, he will not die. A particular medicine is very effective on a particular disease. If with this knowledge a patient takes that medicine, it will cure him of the disease, and it will not require any doctor to exert it to work. The doctor is required only to impart knowledge to the patient as to which medicine he should take for the cure of the disease he is suffering from. The patient earnestly desires to get rid of the disease. But for that, what action is proper, that is, which medicine is to be taken, he does not know. That knowledge is

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CONCEPTION OF ISVARA 63 imparted to him by the doctor. Hence to attain a desired fruit, one should have the knowledge as to which action is proper for that desired fruit. Regarding worldly matters, this knowledge is imparted by the experts of the various subjects. But to become free from internal adventitious impurities, viz. attachment, aversion, etc., one should seek the knowledge as to what actions are to be performed at what stages, from the person who himself has become free from these impurities through spiritual discpline and attained inherent perfection, i.e. Isvara, also called jivanmukta. There is a necessary relation between certain actions and their fruit viz. mukti (freedom from impurities, liberation), but to know this necessary relation we require Isvara i.e. jivanmukta. Thus the only function of Isvarais to impart knowledge of this necessary relation obtaining between concerned actions and their fruit, viz. mukti. Thus Isvara is a preacher (upadesta), a guide to show the path of liberation. It is in this sense only that Isvara is regarded karmakarayita (causing one to perform actions). He never forcibly causes one to perform actions. A doctor simply shows the proper medicines, even then we say that the doctor cured us of the disease. Similarly, Isvara too simply shows the remedy (i.e. proper action) to get rid of the impurities, viz. attachment, aversion etc, yet we say that Esvara makes us free from impurities, he gives us fruits, he favours us with his grace. In this sense only, Isvara is phalakarayita. In the context, the desired fruit is moksa (freedom from impurities). Knowledge of what actions are proper for moksa is imparted by Isvara to those desirous of moksa (mumuksu). By doing so, Isvara makes the-sadhana of mumuksu fruitful. This is his grace. If he were not to impart this knowledge to mumuksu, the mumuksu will not be able to attain the desired fruit, viz. moksa. There is a necessary relation between actions and fruits. One desirous of a particular fruit should know the necessary relation obtaining between that fruit and the proper action. If he performs an action, with that knowledge, he will definitely attain the desired fruit. As for instance, there is a necessary cause-effect relation between smoke and fire. But so long as one does not know this necessary relation, one is not able to infer fire from smoke. Only after acquiring the knowledge of the necessary relation obtaining between smoke and fire, he can infer fire from smoke. Similarly, to attain the desired fruit, viz. moksa, it is absolutely necessary to acquire the knowledge of the necessary relation obtaining between the desired fruit, viz. moksa and the proper actions. This knowledge is imparted to living beings by Isvara.

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INDIAN PHILOSOPHY In the systems of Indian philosophy, the ultimate desired fruit is moska (freedom from impurities, viz. attachment. aversion, etc.). To attain moksa, the knowledge as to what actions one should perform at what stage is absolutely necessary; this knowledge is imparted by jivanmukta alone.?? Thus from the explanation of these three aphorisms it naturally follows that according to Gautama jivanmuka himself is isvara. . In the light of the above explanation, the meaning of the oftquoted following verse becomes very clear : Isvaraprerito gacchet svargam va svabhram eva va / Ajno jantur aniso'yam atmanah sukha-duhkhayoh 11 Mahabharata, Vanaparva . Translation : Impelled by Isvara, a soul moves to heaven or to hell. No ignorant living being is the master of its pleasure or pain. The verse is generally quoted in support of the view that God's will is supreme and all-powerful, our pleasure and pain depend on His will and not on our actions or efforts. But this is not the true import of the verse. The true import of the verse is as follows ; The adjective 'ajna' (=ignorant) qualifying 'jantu' (=a living being) is very imporant as it provides us a key to the true import of the verse. Pleasure and pain are fruits of actions performed by a living being. If one wants to attain pleasure, one should know the actions that cause pleasure. If one wants to attain (rather to avoid) pain one should know actions that cause pain. But a living being by itself does not possess the knowledge as to which actions lead to pleasure and which actions lead to pain. Therefore, it is believed that a living being by itself is incapable of attaining pleasure or pain, that is, it by itself is not the master of its pleasure or pain. It is Isvara who imparts this knowledge to it. Isvara preaches that these actions entail pleasure and these actions entail pain. This knowledge urges a living being to perform those actions that cause pleasure if it desires pleasure, or this knowledge urges it to perform those actions that cause pain if it desires pain. It is only by imparting this knowledge that Isvara impels a living being to move to heaven or to hell. Heaven signifies pleasure and hell signifies pain. III Nature of Isvara according to Vatsyayana, the author of the Bhasya" on the Nyayasutra. As we have seen, Gautama accepted Isvara as one who imparts

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CONCEPTION OF ISVARA 65 knowledge of the necessary relation obtaining between actions and fruits. Vatsyayana clearly describes the nature of Isvara (4.1.21). It is as follows: (a) gunavisistam atmantaram Isvarah/tasyatmakalpat kalpantaranupa pattih / adharma-mithyajnana-pramadahanya dharma-jnana-samadhisampada ca visistam atmantaram Isvarah | tasya ca dharmasamadhiphalan animadyastavidham aisvaryam / Explanation : Isvara is a soul. He is not an independent substance different from soul-substance. Isvara is like mundane souls. He possesses those very qualities which mundane souls possess, but his qualities have some speciality. In a mundane soul the qualities have become perverse and impure while in Isvara they are found in their pure, pristine state, that is, Isvara has destroyed impurities that perverted these qualities. Let us see how Vatsyayana puts this. <Page #75
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY In connection with this passage from the text of Vatsyayana-Bhasya, Prof. Ingalls observes ....one will grant that Vatsyayana's remarks are confusing. God has won his divinity through good works he has performed. We must therefore suppose that there was a time when he was not God'.24 The description of Isvara by Vatsyayana is regarded by Prof. Ingalls as confusing because it is not in harmony with other aspects of Isvara, as presented by later commentators in their explanation of the following (b) (c) (d) and (e) passages from the text of the 'Bhasya, but as we shall see in due course, the interpretation of the commentators is twisted in the light of the later Nyaya-Vaisesika idea of Isvara (God). (b) sankalpanuvidhayi casya dharmah pratyatmavrttin dharmadharma sancayan prthivyadini ca bhutani pravartayati/evam ca svakitabhyagamas yalopena nirmanaprakamyam isvarasya svakstakarmaphalam veditavyam Explanation : Commentators read in this passage later NyayaVaisesika idea of Isvara (God). That is why they interpret the term 'prati in the compound 'pratyatmavittin' as 'pratyeka' (=each one) as also the term 'nirmanaprakamyam' as 'jagannirmanaprakamyam' (unfailing will to create the world). So, according to them, the explanation of the passage is as follows: The creation starts as soon as he wills to create the world. When he wills to create the world, his merit following his will causes the accumulated merits and demerits in each soul to start giving their fruits as also causes the physical elements (atoms) to integrate and produce effects. His will to create the world is unfailing. This unfailing will of his is the fruit of his past good action. Prof. Ingalls also accepts this interpretation and hence explains the passage in the following words : 'God acts upon the karmic accumulation of each of us as well as upon the gross elements of the universe. Accordingly, his omnipotence is limited by the fact that each of us must receive the results of our former actions. Furthermore, this omnipotence [if one should really grant it such a title) is the result of the karma (that is, works) which God himself has accumulated. Finally it is said that all God's wishes are fulfilled...3 But Prof. Ingalls is puzzled as to how Isvara who causes the accumulated karmas in each living being to give their fruits as also creates the world, himself be bound by the Law of Karma, and his unfailing will to create the world, itself be the fruit of his past good

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CONCEPTION OF ISVARA 67 action. That is why he finds Vatsyayana's remarks confusing. He is at sea because he cannot understand how God be regarded as winning his divinity through the good works he performed in the past. This confusion is the result of the wrong interpretation of the abovementioned terms. It will be cleared off if we interpret these terms as follows: Here the tern parti' is employed in the sense of 'abhimukhya' or 'sannikrsta', as in "pratyaksa 26. So 'pratyatmavrttin' is equivalent to 'atmasannikrstan.' The meaning of the compound 'pratyatmavrttin' is 'atmanam prati abhimukhyena samavayasambandhena yesam vittih te, tan pratyatmavsttin.' Thus we explain 'pratyatmavsttin dharmadharmasancayan' as 'accumulations of merits and demerits residing in his soul by samavaya relation. The term 'nirmana-prakamyam' is to be regarded as equivalent to 'nirmanakaya-prakamyam' meaning 'unfailing will to create nirmanakaya - yogic bodies.' Thus in this passage two ideas which have reference to jivanmukta are presented. They are : (1) A jivanmukta causes all his accumulated karmas to give their fruits in the present birth which is his last birth. It is maintained that he should experience all the fruits of all his accumulated karmas in his last birth. Vatsyayana accepts the existence of a jivanmukta. He says : 'bahis ca viviktacitto viharanmukta ity ucyate / (4.2.2.). He accepts that a jivanmukta should experience all the fruits of all his accumulated past karmas. Study his words : 'sarvani purvakarmani hy ante janmani vipacyanta' iti / (4-1-64). (2) To experience all the fruits of all his accumulated karmas within a short period of time he is required to construct yogic bodies. Vatsyayana accepts this view. He says: yogi khalu rddhau pradurbhutayam vikaranadharma nirmaya sendriyani sarirantarani tesu yugapad jneyany upalabhatel (3.2.19) Also study Jayanta Bhatta's words: 'yogi hi yogarddhisiddhya vihitanikhilanijadharmadharmakarma nirmaya tadupabhogayogyani tesu tesupapattisthanesu tani tani sendriyani sarirani khandantahkaranani ca muktair atmabhir upeksitani grhitva sakalakarmaphalam anubhavati praptaisvarya itittham upabhogena karmanam ksayah/ (Nyayamanjari, Kashi Sanskrit Series, Vol. II, p. 88) Now we present our explanation of the passage. It is as follows: There inherently resides in him a special merit (dharma). He has acquired this merit through good action performed in the past. This merit has twofold fruit - 1) it causes all the accumulated merits and demerits inherently

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68 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY DI residing in his own soul to give their fruits and also 2) causes the plysical elements to construct yogic bodies. But when does it give its twofold fruit ? It gives its twofold fruit when he wills to experience all the fruits of all his accumulated merits and demerits and for that purpose also wills to construct yogic bodies. That is why it is said to follow his will. Thus his will to construct yogic bodies is unfailing, and this unfailing will of his is the fruit of some special good action he performed in the past. His unfailing will to construct yogic bodies should be regarded as the fruit of his past action because it is a rule that whatever karma one performs is never destroyed so long as he does not experience its fruit. (c) aptakalpas cayam / yatha pita apatyanam tatha pitrbhuta isvaro bhutanam / Explanation : Isvara is a reliable person (apta). One can trust him, put faith in him, consider him to be an authority. Just as father is an authority for his son, similarly Isvara is an authority for all living beings. Father guides his son. Isvara guides all living beings. Father advises his son as to what is good for him and how to attain it. Similarly, Isvara preaches all living beings as to what is the highest Good (Liberation) and how to attain it. Vatsyayana intends to show similarity obtaining between father-son-relation and isvara-jiva-relation with regard to aptata only. This analogy should not be stretched further. As for instance, just as father generates son, similarly isvara generates jivas, or just as son is an amsa of his father, similarly jiva is an aisa of Isvara. This is not intended by Vatsyayana. According to him, Isvara is such a person as one can easily and safely rely on him, especially in matters relating to the path leading to the highest Good. But how has Isvara gained this aptata ? He has gained it by destroying adharma, mithyajnana and pramada and thereby attaining dharma, jnana and sanadhi. Again this proves that Isvara is a jivanmukta who is an upadesta par excellence. Prof. Ingalls does not understand the intention of Vatsyayana. Hence he misses the point and criticises Vatayayana's this statement. His criticism is as follows: 'Again God is said to act like a father. But who ever heard of a father who in dealing with his children could not transcend their merits and demerits.226 Prof. Ingalls seems to be obsessed with the later Nyaya-Vaisesika idea of God who gives to a living being a proper fruit of its past action, who does not transgress the deserts of living beings.

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CONCEPTION OF ISVARA 69 (d) na catmakalpad anyah kalpah sambhavati/na tavad asya buddhim vina kascich Jharmo lingabhutah sakya upapadayitumsagamac ca drasta boddha sarvajnata isvara iti / buddhyadibhis catmalingair nirupakhyam isvararii pratyaksanumanagamavisayalitam kah sakta upapadayitum ? Explanation : Isvara is atman (soul) only. He is not an independent substance different from atman because he does not possess any such quality other than buddhi (intellect, knowledge) as could prove him an independent substance other than soul-substance. Isvara possesses buddhi and buddhi is a special quality (visesaguna) of atman. In scriptures too, buddhi has been given as a quality of Isvara. Scriptures describe him as drasta (seer), boddha (knower) and sarvajnata (omniscient). Thus even scriptures have not mentioned any such quality as could prove him an independent substance. If he were devoid of buddhi, etc. which serve as logical reason to prove soul, he will become unreal, non-existent, beyond the ken of perception, inference and scriptural testimony; as a result, who will be able to prove him ? Here Vatsyayana has accepted Isvara as sarvajna. So the question arises as to whether he regards jivamukta as sarvajna. The person who knows all substances with all their states - past, present and furure, is sarvajna. By 'sarvajna', generally what we mean is this. We cannot definitely say as to whether Vatsyayana has in mind this meaning of 'sarvajna' in this context. This much is certain that the meaning of the term 'sarvajna' is different in different contexts in Vatsyayana's Bhasya. "Sense-organs grasp their specific respective objects only, that is, eyes grasp rupa, tongue grasps rasa, so on and so forth. On the other hand, atman is sarvajna, that is, it grasps all the five objects, viz. rupa, rasa, gandha, sparsa and sabda. This is the reason why atman is different from sense-organs.' This has been said by Vatsyayana at one place.-8. Here the context is that of fruits and actions. Hence in this context the 'sarvajna may mean a person who knows the necessary relation obtaining between all karmas and their respective fruits' and in this sense a jivanmukta is definitely sarvajna. It may be noted that the meaning of the term 'sarvajna' as 'a person knowing all substances with all their states - past, present and future is contradictory to Karma theory which implies freedom of will. (e) svakitabhyagamalopena ca pravartamanasya yad uktarn pratise dhajatam akarmanimitte sarirasarge tatsarvar prasajyate iti/

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70 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Explanation : If we do not maintain that a person who constructs yogic bodies is able to do so on account of some good action performed by him in the past, then it means that past actions are without fruits, that is, no past action is the cause of the creation of yogic bodies. And if we accept that no past action is the cause of the creation of yogic bodies, then all those very defects that vitiate the view that no past action is the cause of the creation of an ordinary body will also vitiate the view that no past action is the cause of the creation of yogic bodies. Thus according to Vatsyayana, isvara is none but jivanmukta who has gained dharma, jnana and samadhiby destroying adharma, inithyajnana and pramada, who clearly knows as to which action entails which fruit, who himself has travelled the entire path leading to liberation and hence has direct knowledge of the path, who is an authority in matters relating to the path, who is an upadesta par excellence, who has risen above the cycle of birth and death, who is not to be born again, who by his unfailing will constructs yogic bodies in order to experience all the fruits of all his accumulated karmas and who by his unfailing will causes his accumulated karmas to give their fruits. IV 29Prasastapada's introduction of God (Mahesvara) into the Nyaya Vaisesika school In the Nyaya-Vaisesika school the idea of Isvara as nityamukta and creator of the world is for the first time found in Prasastapada's Padarthadharmasangraha. He uses the term 'mahesvara' for Isvara. There arises a desire in Mahesvara to create worlds so that mundane souls may experience fruits of their past actions. As a result of his desire, the adrstas (i.e. merits and demerits) of all mundane souls become prone to give their respective fruits and come in contact with air-atoms. Due to the contact of adrsta with air-atoms, there arises in air-atoms motion capable of producing effects. By such motion air-atoms come in contact with one another and dvyanukas are formed and then tryanukas are formed and thus vayumahabhuta originates. In this very manner, ap-mahabhuta, tejas-mahabhuta and then prthivimahabhuta originate. After the origination of these four mahabhutas, by the mere will of Mahesvara a Great Egg is created out of the tejas atoms associated with parthiva atoms. Then Mahesvara creates Brahma, the Great Grand Father of all living beings, along with all the worlds and allots him the task of creating praja

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71 CONCEPTION OF ISVARA (living beings of various classes). Brahma possesses jnana (knowledge), vairagya (non-attachment) and aisvarya (miraculous powers). Having known the fruits of the actions performed by each and every soul in the past, he creates prajapatis, manus, devarsis, pitrs, Brahmins, Ksatriyas, Vaisyas, Sudras and all other living beings - all possessing jnana, bhoga and ayus according to their past karmas. Having created them, Brahma joins them with dharma, jnana, variagya and aisvarya according to their past karmas. When there arrives the time for absolution (moksa) of Brahma, Mahesvara desires to destory the worlds in order that living beings tired of the transmigratory journey may take rest. As soon as he desires to destory the worlds, all the effects gradually in due order disintegrate into ultimate atoms. Thus pralaya (Dissolution) takes place. In pralaya there exist disintegrated and discrete atoms as also souls associated with merit, demerit and past impressions, Thus according to I rasastapada, Creation and Dissolution take place according to the will of Mahesvara. Mahesvara's will is not the direct cause of the initial effect-producing motion generated in atoms. His will simply causes adrstas to give their fruits, and it is these adrstas - when come in contact with atoms - that generate such motion. Again, Mahesvara having created all the worlds and Brahma, appoints Brahma to create living beings of all classes, to give them fruits according to their past karmas, thus to govern them and to dispense justice according to their desert. . By his will Mahesvara creates four Mahabhutas, the bhuvanas (worlds or dwelling-places) for the living beings to dwell in and Brahma. Brahma creates all the living beings of all the classes and it is Brahma only who allots jnana, dharma, vairagya, aisvarya, bhoga and ayus to these living beings according to their past karmas. That is why Brahma is called sarvalokapitamaha. After a definite period of time Brahma attains moksa. Thus Brahma is different with different Creation (sarga), while Mahesvara is one and nitya and hence common to all the Creations. Mahesvara possesses will only, while Brahma possesses knowledge (of the necessary relation obtaining between actions and their respective fruits), non-attachment and muraculous powers. Mahesvara does nothing during the long existence of Creation. Brahma governs the creation so long as it exists. In pralaya (Dissclution), tlie activity of giving fruits to living beings according to their past karmas stops. Hence there is no need of Brahma in pralaya. Neither Brahma nor Mahesvara is described as upadesta or as ledal arta.

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72 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Later Nyaya-Vaisesika thinkers having removed Brahma, allot Brahma's task also to Isvara (God). Again, they maintain that it is isvara (God) only who gives fruits to living beings in accordance with their past karmas. Moreover, in later Nyaya Vaisesika works it is established that Isvara (God) possesses will and knowledge both. From the above discussion we conclude that upto. Prasastapada, Nyaya-Vaisesika school was atheist and the term "Isvara was used in the sense of jivanmukta only and not in the sense of God. It is Prasastapada who for the first time introduced the concept of God into the Nyaya-Vaisesika school. There are scholars who agree with us on this point."? Perhaps to distinguish God from isvara (=jivanmukta) of the early Nyaya-Vaisesika school, Prasastapada employed the term 'mahesvara' for God, that is, for him jivanmuktas are isvaras while God is Mahesvara. . Notes 1. We possess the old aphorisms of the school : The Vaisesikasutras of Kanada. Their text or wording is not testified by any old commentary. Numerous quotations in the older philosophical literature testify to a good old kernel. But much old is lost and is also variously changed, new things have also been interpolated.' History of Indian Philosophy, Erich Frauwallner. Delhi, 1984; Part II, p. 4. The kernel seems to belong to c. 300 B.C., while much of the Vaisesikasutras as we have them seems to belong to c. 300 A.D. Generally scholars agree that the Vaisesikasutras are older than the Nyayasutras. 2. "There are no references to it (=idea of God) in the Sutra of Kanada, though commentators profess to find them there.' Outlines of Indian Philosophy, M. Hiriyanna, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1951, p. 242. 3. 3 RJT HT ERRi alfa $27: | Yuktidipika, ka. 5 4. Philosophy of Ancient India, p.23. 5. Upaskara, 1.1.3. Upaskara is a commentary on t e Vaisesikasutras, written by Sankara Misra (1425 A.D.) taditi hiraNyagarbhaparAmarzaH / hiraNyaM reto'syeti kRtvA bhagavAn mahezvara evocyate / Candranandavrtti, 1.1.3.

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CONCEPTION OF ISVARA 73 6. A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, S.N. Dasgupta, Cambridge, 1957, p. 282, fn. 3 7. Erich Frauwallner's Posthumous Essays, translated from German by Jayandra Soni, Pub. Aditya Prakashan, New Delhi, 1994, pp. 37-40 8. A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol I, S.N. Dasgupta, p. 288, fn. 1 9. Ibid, p. 287-288. 10. asmadAdInAMsakAzAdyo bhagavAn vijJAnAdibhirviziSTo mahezvarastadIyaM saMjJApraNayanaM navAnAmeva dravyANAM bhAve liGgam, dazamasya sNjnyaa'nbhidhaanaat| Candranandavrtti, Edited by Muni Shri Jambuvijayaji, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1961 11. TERTERI AMAI' Prasastapadabhasya, Sampurnananda Visva vidyalaya, Varananasi, 1977, p. 464 12. RYUCUTR Hissetta:yadat, aldrella, arendal Nyayakusu manjali, 5.4 13. ...370TI HEYET 7.4fg14 I V.S., 5.2.13 14. HP Hayfori 4414514614 41894 94r: Rufafa Hra: 1 Kandali, Ganganath Jha Granthamala 1, Varanaseya Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya, p. 133 15. gegyre: Pf...ISIRAHAT: R9:1 Nyayamanjari, Vol. I, Kashi Sanskrit Series p. 175 16. afecaf arrafada V.S, 6.1.1 17. A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, Dasgupta, p. 234 18. Ibid, p. 234 "The Sutras (=Vaisesikasutras) do not as yet recognise the concept of God, nor even Candramati's Dasapadarthasastram. And in his Nyaya-vartikam Uddyotakara still deals with the Vaisesika polemic against Isvara... That it was still known at that time that this was a later interpolation into the old system, is evident from the polemic in the commentary to the Sankhyakarika called Yuktidipika, which belongs more or less to the same period. After showing in detail that the author of the Vaisesikasutras does not recognise Isvara, the author concludes with the words : evam kanadanam Isvaro'stiti pasupatopajnam etat. According to him, then, the doctrine of the supreme God was introducd into the system by Siva devotees." Erich Frauwallner's Posthumous Essays, p. 36

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74 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 19. The Nyayasutras have different strata, the oldest belonging to c. 300 B.C. and the latest belonging to c. 400 A.D. Much of the Nyayasutras as we have them today belongs to c. 400 A.D. 20. Outlines of Indian Philosophy, M. Hiriyanna, p. 242. 21. These three Nyayasutras and the commentaries on them were critically examined by Dr. Hermann Jacobi in his Die Entwicklung der Gottesdee bei den Indern, Bonn u. Leipzig 1923. -, 22. jIvanmuktasyaiva upadeSTutvasambhavAt / Sankhyapravacanabhasya, 3.79. 23. 'This commentary presumably belongs to the first half of the fifth century.' History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, Erich Frauwallner, p. 8. 24. 'Human Effort versus God's Effort in the Early Nyaya (N.S. 4.1.19. 21)' by Prof. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Dr. S. K. Belvalkar Felicitation Volume, Motilal Banarasidas, Varanasi, 1957, p. 232 . 25. Ibid, p. 231 26. 'prati grahaNena cendriyArthasannikarSasUcanAt...| Sankhyatattvakaumudi, Ka. 5 pratirAbhimukhyena vrtte...| Nyayamanjari, Vol I, p. 103 27. Prof. Ingalls' paper in Dr. S. K. Belvalkar Felicitation Volume, p. 232 28. yasmAt tu vyavasthitaviSayANIndriyANi tasmAt tebhyo'nyazcetanaH sarvajJaH sarvaviSayagrAhI viSayavyavasthitimatIto'numIyate / Nyayabhasya, 3.1.3 29. '...and the final systematizer of the school, Prasastapada or Prasastadeva, sporadically also named Prasastakara, who lived about the second half of the sixth century.' A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, E. Frauwallner, p. 4. 30. tataH punaH prANinAM bhogabhUtaye mahezvarasisRkSAnantaraM sarvAtmagatavRttilabdhAdRSTApekSebhya statsaMyogebhya: pavanaparamANuSu karmotpattau teSAM parasparasaMyogebhyo vyaNukAdiprakrameNa mahAn vAyuH samutpanno nabhasi dodhUyamAnastiSThati |...evN samutpanneSu caturSu mahAbhUteSu mahezvarasyAbhidhyAnamAtrAt taijasebhyo'NubhyaH pArthivaparamANusahitebhyo mahadaNDamArabhyate / / tasmiMzcaturvadanakamalaM sarvalokapitAmahaM brahmANaM sakalabhuvanasahitamutpAdya prajAsarge viniyuGkte / sa ca mahezvareNa viniyukto brahmA atizayajJAnavairAgyaizvaryasampanna: prANinAM karmavipAkaM viditvA karmAnurUpajJAnabhogAyuSaH sutAn prajApatIn...sRSTvA AzayAnurUpairdharmajJAnavairAgyaizvaryaiH saMyojayati iti / Prasastapadabhasya, p. 127-131

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ICONCEPTION OF ISVARA 75 131....brahmaNo'pavargakAle saMsArakhinnAnAM sarvaprANinAM nizi vizrAmArthaM sakalabhuvanapatermahezvarasya saJjihIrSAsamakAlaM...AparamANvanto vinAzaH |...ttH pravibhaktAH paramANavo'vatiSThante dharmAdharmasaMskArAnuviddhA AtmAnastAvantameva kAlam / Prasastapadabhasya, p. 122-126 32. Bhumika (Introduction) by Durgadhar Jha to Prasastapadabhasya, Ganganath Jha Granthamala No. 1, Sampurnananda Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, Varanasi, 1977, p. 4. "Just as Prasastapada introduced Isvara into the system..." Erich Frauwal!ner's Posthumous Essays, p. 40.

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ON THE PROBLEM OF JNANA-DARSANA We want to understand as to what the Jaina theoreticians mean by the terms jnana and darsana when used side by side. To gain this understanding we should study at least four items - (1) Different meanings of the term 'darsana', (2) Sankhya-Yoga view of jnanadarsana, (3) Buddhist view of jnana-darsana and (4) Jaina authors on the problem of jnana-darsana. (1) Different Meanings of the Term 'Darsana' - (a) Darsana means sensory experience which is free from thoughits or concepts (= vikalparahita = akararahita). It involves no synthesis of the earlier experiences with the present one. Cognition involving thoughts or concepts (= savikalpaka = sakara = jnana) follows this sensory experience. Thus here jnana follows darsana. (b) Immediately after the sensory experience if we stop the operations of the concerned sense-organ and try to see the object of sensory experience through mind we have a clear vision of it before our 'mind's eye'. This vision is regarded as darsana so long as it remains free from thoughts or concepts. But as soon as thought enters into it, it no longer remains darsana but becomes jnana (cognition involving thought). Here too jnana follows darsana. (c) Vision that a yogi has in non-reflective (nirvikalpa) deep meditation is also regarded as darsana. This darsana is usually described as saksatkara. This non-reflective deep meditation invariably follows the reflective one (savikalpa dhyana), if it takes place. Vision that a yogi has in reflective meditation involves thoughts or concepts, hence it is to be regarded as jnana. Here darsana follows jnana because nonreflective meditation follows the reflective one. (d) In Upanisads' Jainism and Buddhism the term 'darsana' is also employed in the sense of sraddha. Darsana or sraddha means an attitude of the truth-seeker. It is natural inclination of citta towards truth. It is manifested on the removal of adventitious defilement of attachment which acts as a great and prime obstruction to the attainment of truth. Thus darsana or sraddha here means purity, clarity or transparency of

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ON THE PROBLEM OF JNANA-DARSANA 77 citta, resulted from renouncing the attachment to metaphysical views, preconceived notions and inherited doctrines. For the truth-seeker this is the must because only such a clear citta can grasp the truth when confronted in the search. In this sense of clarity of citta, we may describe this darsana as nirakara. It has no content. All the views, notions and doctrines, for the truth-seeker, fall in one category. They all are sadhya or pariksya, none of them is siddhanta (final truth). Let us remember here that it is very difficult to free oneself from the views and doctrines among which one has been brought up and which one has indiscriminately accepted, not only accepted but have been made so deeply rooted in one's being that they have become a part and parcel of one's personality. So, for truth-seeker the most difficult task is to free himself from them. After freeing himself from them he should examine them and accept them only if he finds them true. Regarding the doctrines and views of others he should not accept them on authority. That is, he should neither accept them nor reject them. He may accept them provisionally to test and verify them. This is the reason why our Acaryas appeal to us not to accept their statements on authority, they ask us to examine them and to accept them if they are found true and reject them if they are found false. This attitude that they demand from their hearers is nothing but samyag-darsana. Let me quote here the words of Ac. Haribhadra : paksapato na me vire na dvesah kapiladinu / yuktimadvacanam yasya tasya karyah parigrahah 115 In different words santideva has said the same thing. He says : 'yat kincin, Maitreya, subhasitam sarvam tad Buddhabhasitam After reasoning and logical thinking if the truth-seeker finds the doctrine or view to be most probably true, his darsana (= drsti = sraddha) becomes sakara. He is convinced of the truth, but does not see the truth. Mere reasoning and logic is not enough for seeing the truth of the doctrine. For that the truth-seeker should take recourse to meditation on that doctrine. When in meditation he sees the truth of the doctrine his citta becomes free from or clear of (samprasada) whatever doubts it had regarding the truth of the doctrine.? Thought (vitaraka-vicara) retires. This clarity, as it is, is free from thought. In this sense we may describe it as nirakara. Thus perfect drsti is nirakara, though it has full content (purmasatya). So long as truth-seeker has not seen the truth he has readiness-to

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78 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY accept-the-truth-when-confronted-in-the-search-for-truth (samyagdrsti), but as soon as he sees the truth directly in deep meditation at the end of his search his readiness-to-accept-the-truth-when-confronted takes leave off as it has fulfilled its mission. So, someone may opine that samyak-darsana in the sense of readiness-to-accept-the-truth-whenconfronted-in-the-search-for-the-truth ultimately becomes merged in darsana in the sense of seeing the truth in deep meditation. Or, one may say that it in the sense of samprasada (clarity due to removal of all doubts, resulted from seeing the truth) stays along with darsana (seeing the truth). On account of seeing the truth in meditation (purnasatyadarsana) this clarity (purmasamyagdrsti) is attained. Hence seeing-the-truth (purmasatyadarsana) takes place first and clarity (samprasada i.e. purmasamyagdrsti) follows it. This seems to be the natural order in their connection. This is one view. There is another one which is quite right as it stands. Let us see what this another view is. The attitude of the truth-seeker becomes perfect when it becomes completely free from attachment and aversion. It is raga and dvesa that come in the way of his disinterested, dispassionate and impartial search for the truth. Thinner or subtler his raga and dvesa become, more disinterested, dispassionate and impartial his search for truth becomes. Without attaining the perfection (=highest purity) of drsti (attitude) he cannot fully see truth even in meditation. When he attains this perfection of drsti he fully sees the truth or transcendental reality in trance or meditation. Truth-seeker first becomes vitaraga. And as soon as he becomes vitaraga he fully sees the truth. A man cannot assume the role of a truth-seeker unless and until he decides to be disinterested, dispassionate, unattached and calm. He becomes truth-seeker only if he determines to be vitaraga. To attain the perfection of drsti he strives for getting rid of attachment (raga). Gradually he progresses. He achieves perfection of drsti as soon as he completely destroys raga and becomes vitaraga. This is the reason why perfect drsti is equated with vitaragata. And vitaragata automatically gives rise to and co-exists with the seeing of the truth (darsana). According to this view, seeing-of-the-truth (purnadarsana) follows the perfection of drsti (purnadrsti). We shall have no occasion to deal with this darsana as there is no difference of opinion regarding it among the Jaina thinkers as also among the thinkers of the Jaina, the Buddhist and the Sankhya-Yoga philosophies. All consider this darsana to be the nature of citta

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ON THE PROBLEM OF JNANA-DARSANA 79 ('tattvapaksapato hi dhiyam (= cittasya) svabhavah-Yogavartika 1.8). It gets clouded by klesas or moha. Hence Sankhya-Yoga thinkers and Buddhists have recognised klesavarana, and Jainas have recognised mohaniya karma. All these three philosophies emphatically declare that sadhana is required for the destruction of this avarana, i.e., for the destruction of moha, the root-cause of all other klesas. On the destruction of moha, knowing of the truth and seeing of the truth automatically follow. (2) Sankhya-Yoga View of Jnana-Darsana According to Sankhya-Yoga citta gets transformed into the form of its object. This is called 'knowing by citta', in other words, cittavrtti. As soon as cittavrtti (= jnana) takes place it is reflected in the purusa (= Self). This is called 'seeing by purusa'. Purusa directly sees cittavittis and only indirectly sees external objects. (Hence sometimes in the first sense purusa is called saksi and in the second sense he is called drasta.)" Purusa is drasta (seer), whereas citta is jnata (knower). Purusa can see but can never know. Citta can know but can never see. Such a clear at dichotomy is found in this system. Though every cognition has both these aspects, viz. seeing and knowing, seeing is attributed to purusa alone and knowing is attributed to citta alone.l2 Knowing and seeing are always simultaneous because no cittavrtti remains unseen, even for a moment, by purusa."3 All the cittavrttis are seen by purusa as soon as they arise. Though there is no chronological order, logical order is there. From the point of view of logical order, first a cittavrtti (inana) takes place and then its darsana by purusa. As we have already said, the object of seeing is, truly speaking, the cittavrtti alone and not the external object. Hence with the complete cessation of all the cittavrttis, achieved by a yogi in the asamprajnatayoga, the seeing also ceases, and purusa remains as seer without seeing, he never ceases to be a seer (drasta). At this stage though he is drasta he does not see because there is no object of his seeing. On the basis of the absence of seeing, we should not think that purusa ceases to be drasta at this stage. The purusa of the yogi who has attained this stage is described as svarupamatrapratistha, kevala, mukta,is darsanasakti, 16 etc. From this exposition it follows that this yogi neither thinks nor speaks He has subtle bodily activites only. (Compare this yogi with the sayogi kevali in the third and fourth stages of sukla-dhyana, of the Jainas). Vivekajnana is the clear form of purusa (as distinct from sattva), pa.

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80 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY assumed by citta.7 Just as a citta assumes forms of the external objects, even so it assumes the form of purusa also.18 By assuming the form of an external object it does not become that external object; similarly, by assuming the form of purusa it does not become purusa. When does the citta assume the clear form of purusa ? When a yogi stops all the cittavittis pertaining to external objects as also when he makes his citta prasanna (pure) by removing all the cittamalas, then only his citta assumes the perfect form of purusa." And purusa sees this perfect form of his assumed by this citta. This is called purusadarsana, atmasaksatkara. This stage of yoga in which there is vivekajnana and purusa-darsana is called samprajnata-yoga because at this stage citta clearly knows the purusa and purusa clearly sees his own self through cittavitti. The yogi, in this stage, preaches the path of moksa. 20 From all this it follows that he has all the types of activities, viz. mental, vocal and bodily. (Compare this yogi with the chadmastha vitaraga of the Jainas). His'cittavrtti are aklista (pure).21 His citta knows external objects but all its knowledges (cittavittis) are permeated with vivekajnana or purusadarsana. In this sense only we should understand the statement of the Bhasyakara that there is a conitinuous flow of pure vivekajnana in the case of the yogi whose vivekajnana has become aviplava (firm and infallible).22 The citta that attains vivekajnana becomes capable of knowing all things with all their modes simultaneously, if it performs samyama (= dharana-dhyana-samadhi all the three) on ksanas and ksanakrama.23 That is, though viveki's citta attains the capacity (= labdhi, siddhi) to know all, this capacity functions only if it performs a special type of samyama. In other words, two things are necessary for citta to become sarvajna: (1) Vivekajnana which is regarded as the prime cause because it makes citta capable of knowing all. In this sense only sarvajnatva is described as vivekajajnana, (2) Special type of samyama. So, Vyasa, the author of the Yogabhasya, is absolutely correct when he says that viveki invariably becomes kevali irrespective of his citta being actually possessed of the aisvarya of sarvajnata.24 For that viveki who assumes the role of upadesta for loka-kalyana it is necessary to utilize this capacity in order to generate faith (visvasa) in the hearers. For other vivekis this is not necessary. (Compare the viveki who has assumed the role of upadesta and hence utilizes the capacity to know all through the performance of samyama of special type, with the tirthankara of the Jainas). Viveki's citta can know all, if it so desires, because it has attained its true nature of anantya on account of the destruction of all veils as

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ON THE PROBLEM OF JNANA-DARSANA 81 also because the jneyas are alpa as compared with citta's (or cittavitti's) anantya.25 When citta becomes free from all veils, it being vibhu26 (ananta) becomes capable of getting transformed into the forms of all objects, and if it so desires, it actually gets transformed into the forms of all objects simultaneously, that is, it knows all (sarvajnata) and hence the purusa sees all (sarvadarsana). Knowing-all (sarvajnata) and seeingall (sarvadarsana) have no chronological order but they do have logical order. From the point of view of logical order, knowing-all is prior to seeing-all. Again, knowing-all belongs to citta, while seeing-all belongs to purusa. We have already said that vivekajnana is the knowledge of atman alone. In Sanskrit we may say : kevalasya atmanah jnanam = kevalajnanam - vivekajnanam. And there arises kevaladarsana as soon as kevalajnana takes place. Kevalajnana and kevaladarsana arise first, and sarvajnata and sarvadarsana follow them if at all they take place. Once a person has attained aviplava vivekajnana his punarbhava automatically ceases.27 That is, even if he does not assume the role of upadesta and for that purpose does not become sarvajna-sarvadarsi as also even if he does not enter into the asamprajnata-yoga, he is bound to be videhamukta when his body falls in due course.28 This is the reason why vivekakhyati alone is regarded as hanopaya.29 Thus sarvajnata, sarvadarsana and asamprajnata-yoga are not absolutely necessary for the viveki to attain the state of videhamukta. Those vivekis alone who want to destroy the prarabdha karmas before their due time enter into asamprajnata-yoga. Yoga system has recognised the efficacy of asamprajnata-yoga to destroy the prarabdha-karmas, 30 . (3) Buddhist View of Jnana-Darsana In the Buddhist Pali Pitakas the occurrence of the phrase "janati passati' is frequent. "The knowing and seeing One' (janata-passata) is a remarkable and characteristic description of the Buddha. He himself claims that he both knows and sees (tam aham janami passami ti).32 And mostly Noble Truths and (Essence of) all things are given as the objects of his knowing and seeing. 33 This naturally suggests that in the case of the Buddha "knowing means "grasping by reasoning and thought' especially in what is called savitarkasavicaradhyana (= reflective meditation), and 'seeing' means the clear vision (of truth) which he gets in the following nirvitarkanirvicara dhyana (= non-reflective meditation) wherein, as its name

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82 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY suggests, freasoning and thought' are set at rest (upasanta). . The interpretation is corroborated by the statement of Abhidharmamrta (15.8) : samadhim bhavayato jnana-darsanalabhah (By the constant practice of meditation one attains jnana (knowledge) and darsana (vision, seeing). Thus knowing and seeing referred to here belong to the yogic state. In Suttanipata 229 we are told that he (Buddha) sees four noble Truths after having known them. Here it is suggested that knowing and seeing are not simultaneous but that first knowing occurs and then seeing follows. In the first dhyana (meditation) the object is known with the help of reasoning and thought. And in the following non-reflective types of meditation the object is directly seen. At the stage of sensory cognition, caksu (eye) sees whereas mind knows (Abhidharmakosabhasya 1.42-43). In fact, sensory cognition had through five sense-organs can be called darsana (seeing). Bhadanta Ghosaka in his Abhidharmamita says that five indriya-vijnanas (sensory cognitions) cannot discriminate or determine, whereas manovijnana (mental cognition) can do this. 34 According to Sthaviras functions of manovijnana are santirana (investigating) and votthapana (determining). (Abhidhammattha-samgaha 3.9-12). From this it follows that five sensory cognitions which are necessarily devoid of thought are darsana, while cognition involving thought is jnana. Later on the Buddhist logicians regarded even the sensations had through not only visual sense-organ but all the sense-organs (including even mind as mind also was recognised as a sense-organ) as darsana. They argue that as these cognitions are free from 'reasoning and thought (= vikalpa) they can legitimately be called . darsana. Even these cognitions grasp directly the thing-in-itself without the help of reasoning and thought'. (darsanam ca arthasaksatkaranakhyam pratyaksavyaparah'Dharmottaratka 1.21. 'pratyaksam kalpanapodham'-Pramanasamuccaya). In addition to darsana had in non-reflective meditation, which exactly corresponds to yogipratyaksa recognised by them, they accept indriyajapratyaksa (= indriyajadarsana),35 manasa pratyaksa (= manodarsana) and svasamvedanadarsana. 36 What is svasamvedana? Svasamvedana here means darsana of sva', and by 'sva' are meant 'citta and caittas'. We reserve the discussion on svasamvedana for the concluding portion of this section on Buddhism. Buddhist logicians are right in bringing under the head of darsana indriyajapratyaksa, manasa pratyaksa, svasamvedana and yogipratyaksa

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ON THE PROBLEM QF JNANA-DARSANA 83 on the ground of their being free from vikalpa (= reasoning and thought). But if we view them from another angle we find that only svasamvedana and yogipratyaksa can truly claim to be darsana because therein 'seeing' of the object takes place without the help of sense-organs and/or mind. This is not the case with other two pratyaksas, If we view the situation in this way the early Buddhists seem to be absolutely right in their stand that there is only one case of 'seeing' (darsana), and that is 'seeing' in non-reflective meditation which follows the reflective one. Objects of darsana mentioned in the Pitakas betray the correctness of this view. Again, the order of jnana and darsana, mentioned in the phrase "janati passati' clearly suggests the same thing, that is, that yogidarsana is the only case of darsana'. (We have kept svasamvedana out of the purview as it requires special treatment). Now let us take up the problem of knowing-all (sarvajnata) and seeing-all (sarvadarsana). Let us first study Buddha's two statements recorded in the MajjhimaNikaya. They are: (1) natthi so samano va brahmano va yo sakideva sabban nassati sabbam dakkhiti.....n'tan thanam vijjati. (II. 127) (Tr. There is no sramana or brahmana who knows all things simultaneously and sees all things simultaneously...for such a thing is impossible.) (2) ye te......evam ahamsu : samano Gotamo evam aha : natthi so samano va brahmano va yo sabbanna sabbadassavi aparisesam nanadassanam patijanissati, n'etam thanan viljati ti na me te vuttavadino abbhacikkhanti ca pana mam te asata abhutena ti (loc. cit.). (Tr. Those who say, "Sramana Gotama says thus : there is no sramana or brahmana who is all-knower, all-seer and having infinite knowledge and vision, for such a thing is impossible" are not reporting me rightly and are accusing me of saying what is untrue and false.) From these two statements it becomes quite clear that Buddha explicitly rejects knowing-all-simultaneously and seeing-all-simultaneously, but he accepts knowing-all and seeing-all in some another sense. He has not clearly stated as to in what sense he accepts them. But it is not very difficult to deduce from these two statements the exact sense in which he accepts them. If we keep before our mind's eye these two statements, we at once see that there are only two alternative senses in which he might be accepting them-(1) knowing all in succession and seeing all in succession (2) knowing and seeing whatever one wants to know and see, entering into the proper type of meditation. The first alternative is to be rejected because all objects, being infinite, 37 cannot be known or seen in succession one by one. So, it naturally follows that

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84 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Buddha accepts knowing-all and seeing-all in the second sense, that is, in the sense of knowing and seeing whatever one desires to know and see by undertaking proper type of meditation. This means that through specific spiritual discipline one develops a capacity (labdhi or siddhi) to know-all and see-all. But he never knows all things simultaneously, nor does he ever see all things simultaneously. He knows and sees that thing only which he desires to know at a particular time, and that too only if he enters into proper meditation. Like Patanjali and Vyasa Buddha accepts that one can attain the capacity (labdhi) to know all and see all, But he differs from them in holding that the person who has attained this capacity can neyer know all things simultaneously, nor can he see all things simultaneously, but he can know and see whatever he wants to know and see at that particular time. As we have already noted, Patanjali and Vyasa maintained that the person who has attained this capacity can actually know all things simultaneously and can actually see all things simultaneously. But there is one more point of agreement. According to Patanjali and Vyasa, the person who has attained this capacity knows all things simultaneously and sees all things simultaneously not always. but only if and when he performs a special type of samyama (= dharana, dhyana and samadhi all the three). Even Buddha seems to maination that the person who has attained this capacity can actually know and see whatever he wants to know and see at a particular time provided he performs proper meditations. Let us note one more point of agreement. All the three, viz. Patanjali, Vyasa and Buddha reject the possibility of actually knowing all things successively and actually seeing all things successively. This interpretation of ours is corroborated by the statements of later Buddhist authors. Nagasena in his Milindapanho says : bhante, buddho sabbannu'ti Il ama maharaja, bhagava sabbhanna, na ca bhagavato satatam samitam nanadassanam paccupatthitam, avajjanapatibaddham bhagavato sabbanutananam, avajjitva yad icchitam janati'ti 18 Again, study the following statement of Santaraksita : yad yad icchati boddhum va tat tad vetti niyogatah/ Saktir evamvidha hy asya prahinavarano hy asau II (Tattvasangraha, karika 3626). Buddha and Buddhism do not put undue emphasis on and do not attach undue importance to knowing-all and seeing-all though they accept them in the above sense. They, in opposition to Mimamsa, maintain that man is capable of knowing and seeing dharma - spiritual

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ON THE PROBLEM OF JNANA-DARSANA 85 matters. The Buddhists support their contention by the example of Buddha who knew and saw dharma as such in the form of four Noble Truths. Dharmakirti does not deny the possibility of knowing-all and seeing-all in the sense in which they have been accepted by the Buddha. But he lays emphasis on the need for knowing and seeing the essentials. He little cares whither a person knows-sees or does not know-see the things which are not connected with the religious pursuit.39 This attitude of Dharmakirti is exactly identical with the one adopted by Vyasa with regard to knowing-all and seeing-all. Vyasa explicitly declares that one can become kevali even without actually becoming all-knower and allseer. Now we take up the problem of simultaneity or succession of knowing (jnana) and seeing (darsana). As we have already said, truly speaking jnana means knowing by reasoning and thought in reflective meditation (savitarkasavicara samapatti) and darsana means seeing in non-reflective meditation (nirvitarka-nirvicara samapatti). Non-reflective meditation invariably follows the reflective one, if it takes place. So, it naturally follows from this that darsana (seeing) always follows jnana (knowing). There is no possibily of their simultaneous occurrence, nor the possibility of their co-existence, nor the possibility of the reverse order, that is, darsana preceding jnana. . But, as we know, Buddhist logicians'consider the six thought-free (kalpanapodha) cognitions produced by six organs to be darsanas (cases of seeing). So, it is quite natural for them to mainatin that if jnana (thought and reasoning = knowing) arises it arises in their wake. But the logicians will not be satisfied with this general statement of the fact. They say that this is true if we have in view the origination of two series - one of seeing and another of knowing; the series of seeing arises first and the series of knowing follows it immediately. That is, in such a situation, in the first moment there takes place seeing only pertaining to that object-series and in the second moment there are both the seeing and knowing of that very object-series. Thus there is a possibility of simultaneous occurrence of both seeing and knowing from the second moment onward even with regard to one and the same object (= objectseries). Again, seeing of one thing and knowing (= thought) of another thing can occur simultaneously. Moreover, when the knowing i.e. thought with regard to one thing is going on, there can take place seeing of another thing. From this point of view, one may say that even at this level knowing can precede seeing. Taking into account all these cases

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86 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY the Buddhist logicians declared that knowing and seeing can occur simultaneously at this level.40 They have not laid down any condition for their simultaneous occurrence. This suggests that two faculties of seeing and knowing, though quite different, rather being quite different, can operate simultaneously. Moreover, these Buddhist logicians observe that two or more knowings (= thoughts) can never occur simultaneously," but two or more seeings (darsana) due to six organs can occur simultaneously. Thus they maintain that all the six darsanas due to six organs can occur simultaneously. Why so ? It is so because there are six instruments of seeing but only one instrument of knowing. When all the six instruments of seeing operate simultaneously six darsanas occur simultaneously. But mind (= manas) being the only instrument of knowing (= thought = jnana), only one knowing or jnana can take place at a time. Were there two or more minds (instruments of thought) there would have been a possibility of occurring two or more knowings (= thoughts = jnana) simultaneously. The six darsanas due to six organs can occur simultaneously with the occurrence of jnana and can co-exist with jnana. But darsana in nonreflective meditation, being what it is, neither occurs simultaneously with the occurrence of jnana nor does it co-exist with jnana. (Let us remember here that in case of momentary things simultaneous occurrence and coexistence mean one and the same thing). The Sankhya-Yoga thinkers, as we have seen, maintain that each and every cognition has both the aspects 'seeing and knowing'. Buddhists contend that no cognition has both these aspects. The cognitions that go by the name of knowing (= jnana = vikalpa) are totally different from those that go by the name of seeing (= darsana = pratyaksa). They do not accept internal fissure or dichotomy in one and the same cognition. Barring non-reflective meditation they accept that seeing and knowing can co-exist, that is, two cognitions of quite different natures can coexist. But they never accept that seeing and knowing both together constitute one cognition. This characteristic of the Buddhist philosophy has been clearly brought out by the Buddhist logicians in their exposition of pratyaksa. The Sankhya-Yoga philosophers regard the faculties of seeing and knowing as fundamentally different from one another. Again, they view them so fundamentally different that they could not be attributed to one

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ON THE PROBLEM QF JNANA-DARSANA 87 and the same principle (tattva). Hence they attributed the faculty of seeing to purusa and the faculty of knowing to citta. Even Buddha and the Buddhists regard them as fundamentally different faculties, but they do not consider them to be so fundamentally different that they could not be attributed to one and the same principle (tattva). Hence they attributed both these faculties to one and the same principle, viz. citta, rejecting purusa (= atman) altogether. Again, Buddha and the Buddhists might have thought if jnana (knowing), karma, klesa, bandha as also jnanavarana, karmavarana, klesavarana and moksa belong to citta, then why should one not recognise citta alone and attribute to it even the faculty of seeing for which alone Sankhya-Yoga thinkers recognise a separate tattva, viz. purusa ? They thought purusa is metaphysically rather ethically useless. So, they totally rejected purusa, and attributed the faculty of seeing to citta. We are reminded here of the view that the original Sankhya accepted only 24 tattvas among which purusa finds no place. This makes us think as follows: In the time of Upanisads atman tradition became very strong. We are told that atman is a principle even greater than buddhi (== citta) (buddher atma mahan parah-Kathopanisasd). Under the strong influence of the atman tradition the later Sankhya-Yoga philosophy made room for purusa in the system; not only that but it accorded the highest place in the hierarchy of tattvas. But if we study the Sankhya of 25 tattvas we feel that purusa is only an appendix, it is not an integral part of the system, the role it is assigned to play is quite negligible. The Buddha and the Buddhists seem to have realised this fact, hence they might have re-established in its original pristine state the anatma tradition which got corrupted, so to say, by the atman tradition of the Upanisads, or, in Buddhism we find a branch of original anatma tradition, remaining uncorrupted by atman tiadition and attacking atman tradition severely. This seems to me to be the true significance of Buddhist anatmavada. (We can say almost all this even in connection with the Jainas. The Buddhist rejected even the term atman (purusa) with the rejection of atma-tattva. But the Jainas accepted the term atman even though they rejected atman-tattva. They applied this term to the citta-tattva. Doing so they created an illusion that they really belong to the atman tradition. We reserve the full discussion on this point for the next section on Jainism).

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88 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Now we have arrived at a stage when we should discuss what the Buddhist logicians call svasamvedana. In the Sankhya-Yoga, purusa is described as prakasa-svarupa. This prakasa of purusa is absolutely different from that of citta." It is nothing but his darsanasakti or drastrs varupata. This nature of his is responsible for the phenomenon of seeing. His faculty of seeing (darsanasakti) works provided there is the object of his seeing. That because he is prakasas varupa he sees himself directly irrespective of the medium of cittavrttris not accepted by these philosophers. Though he is prakasas varupa he can see himself only through the cittavrtti of his form. Thus they do not accept svasamvedana (= svadarsana). Hence they invariably describe the purusa as 'buddheh pratisamvedi +4 but never as svasamvedi. Similarly, they do not maintain that citta can direct its faculty of knowing to operate upon itself. Thus there is no possibility of even sva-jnana in the Sankhya-Yoga. The Buddhists too describe their citta (or vijnana) as prakasasvarupa. They declare in its connection : svayam saiva prakasate." When they say this they do not mean any grahya-grahakabhava in it. They mean the same thing by prakasasvarupata of citta as what the Sankhya-Yoga thinkers mean by the prakasasvarupata of purusa the only difference being that prakasasvarupata of the Buddhist citta includes both darsanasakti and jnanasakti whereas prakasasvarupata of Sankhya-Yoga purusa is the darsanasakti alone. Thus the thinkers of both these camps maintain that prakasasvarupata transcends grahya-grahakabhava. Svasamvedana is quite different from prakasasvarupata as it involves grahya-grahakabhava. In Sankhya-Yoga all the cittavittis are seen by purusa alone. No cittavitti remains unseen by purusa even for a moment. As the Buddhists have rejected purusa altogether, they have no other alternative but to declare that citta and caittas directly see themselves. 46 That is, citta directs its faculty of seeing (drasanasakti) to operate upon itself. As in Sankhya-Yoga so in Buddhism no caitta (= cittavrtti) remains unseen even for a moment but in Buddhism the seer of it is citta itself whereas in Sankhya-Yoga the seer of it is purusa. Thus rejection of purusa hy the Buddhists seems to be the real ground for their acceptances svasamvedana. According to Sankhya-Yoga, in the samprajnata-yoga, purusa clearly sees himself not directly but through citta that has assumed his

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ON THE PROBLEM OF JNANA-DARSANA 89 clear form. Thus there takes place purusasaksatkara in the samprajnatayoga. Is there no possibility of cittasaksatkara which can be considered on par with this purusasaksatkara? According to Buddhism, when citta directs its faculty of seeing to operate upon itself in the non-reflective meditation, there arises cittasaksatkara in the non-reflective meditation. This is also a case of svasamvedana, but this svasamvedana falls under the category of yogi-darsana. Hence Buddhists have reserved the term 'svasamvedana' for that svasamvedana which is a permanent feature of citta. In Sankhya-Yoga cittavrttis are always objects of darsana but never objects of jnana. But the Buddhists find no difficulty in accepting them as objects of jnana too. According to Buddhists citta can direct its faculty of knowing (jnana) to operate upon itself just as it directs its faculty of seeing to operate upon itself. Like sva-darsana sva-jnana is a possibility in Buddhism, because Buddhism does not recognise the kartTkarmavirodhadosa which is recognised by those systems that adopt anthropomorphic way of thinking. As faculties (sakti) jnana and darsana are two permanent features of citta. From the point of view of the manifestations of the darsana faculty we can safely state that darsana-manifestations due to six organs do not constitute the permanent feature of citta because their occurrence depends upon the operation of these six organs, nor does the darsanamanifestation in non-reflective meditation constitute the permanent feature of citta as it always follows reflective meditation (upanidhyanapurvaka). But the darsana-manifestation called svasamvedana seems to be a permanent feature of citta as it never depends, for its occurrence, upon the operation of any organ. As svasamvedana involves grahyagrahakabhava the Vijnanavadin Buddhists do not consider it to be a permanent feature, rather absolute feature, of citta. When citta transcends even the grahya-grahakabhava involved in the svasamvedana it gets established in its absolute nature which is nothing but prakasarupata. From the point of view of manifestations of jnana faculty we can safely state that no jnana manifestation constitutes the permanent feature of citta as each and every jnana-manifestation depends upon the operation of manas (= mind = organ of thought). This suggests the possibility of darsana-manifestation of the form of svasamvedana in Nirvana and the impossibility of jnana-manifestation in Nirvana. As faculty jnana will be there in Nirvana. Thus jnana and

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90 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY darsana are the two faculties constituting the nature of citta. Hence as faculties they are always there in citta, even in the state of Nirvana. (4) Jaina Authors on the Problem of Jnana-darsana The hoary antiquity of Jaina conception of jnanavarana and darsanavarana47 clearly suggests the antiquity of the distinction between jnana and darsana. Again, the Jaina conception of four infinities' (anantacatustaya) as the nature of atman (= citta) points to their distinction because these four infinities include the infinity due to jnana and the infinity due to darsana. These infinities get fully manifest when atman (= citta) destroys all the concerned veils of karmas. Moreover, the frequent occurrence of the phrases "janadi passadi' and "janamane pasamane' in the Jaina Agamas goes to prove their distinction. Only loosely speaking darsana is sometimes regarded as a case of jnana but truly speaking it is a faculty quite distinct from that of jnana." According to Jainas atman (= citta) is prakasarupa; they use the term upayoga for this prakasa. Jnanasakti (faculty of jnana) and darsanasakti.(faculty of darsana) both together constitute the nature of this prakasa. That is, there is no possibility whatsoever of prakasa being bereft of these two faculties; prakasa cannot be found alone without these two faculties," nor can these two faculties be found without this prakasa. In this sense only these two faculties are regarded as identical with upayoga and hence identical with one another. But as faculties they are always quite distinct from one another. 'Knowing and seeing One' (janamine pasamane) is a characteristic description of vitaraga Mahavira. The objects of his knowing and seeing are usually lokalokaso and dhamma (Religion). One of the objects of Buddha's knowing and seeing is, as we know, all dharmas. By fall dharmas' is meant the essence (viz. pratityasamutpada) of all dharmas (= elements). Similarly, by lokaloka is probably meant the essence (viz. uppannei va vigamei va dhuvei va = utpada-vyaya-dhrauvya) of all things. Again, Four Noble Truths are recognized as an object of Buddha's knowing and seeing. Similarly, Dhamma is recognized as an object of Mahavira's knowing and seeing. The order of the occurrence of knowing and seeing in the case of vitaraga Mahavira is suggested by the order of their mention in the Agamas. Again, there is a view that in the case of one who has completely destroyed all the concerned karmas darsana (= seeing) invariably follows jnana (= knowing). 52

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ON THE PROBLEM OF JNANA-DARSANA 91 If we take into account all this, in the case of vitaraga Mahavira jnana seems to mean 'cognition involving thought (vikalpa) in the prthaktva-vitarkasavicara dhyana as also in the former stage of ekatvavitarkanirvicara dhyana', and darsana seems to mean 'cognition free from thought (vikalpa) at the highest point of ekatvavitarkanirvicara dhayana when the mind ceases to function. To use non-Jaina terminology, in the context of Mahavira jnana means 'cognition that a yogi has in savikalpaka samadhi and darsana means 'cognition that a yogi has in nirvikalpaka samadhi.'53 This suggests us the defining characteristics of jnana and darsana. Jnana is that cognition which involves thought (vikalpa) whereas darsana is that cognition which is free from thought.54 But some Jaina thinkers hold that darsana grasps the universal (= generic attributes = samanya) and jnana grasps the particular (= specific attributes = visesa).55 Upholders of this view have to reject the old traditional view that in the case of Manavira darsana follows jnana whereas in the case of ordinary persons jnana follows darsana.56 They declare that in the case of all persons without any exception jnana follows darsana. Thus this view comes in conflict with the old traditional view that in the case of vitaraga Mahavira darsana follows jnana. So, we should reject this view. It is interesting to note that this view betrays Vaisesika influence. Other Jaina philosophers criticized this view from a different standpoint. They say: 'A particular without the universal is a figment, and so jnana grasping a particular bereft of the universal is invalid, nay unreal. Similarly, the darsana grasping the universal without the particular is also unreal. Jnana and darsana both being valid and real must grasp the reality which is of the nature of both particular and the universal. Each of the two, jnana and darsana, grasps reality as it is, that is, a complex of universal-cum-particular. So, the view that darsana cognizes the universal whreras jnana cognizes a particular is not acceptable.'7 .These Jaina thinkers maintain that darsana cognizes the atman i.e. citta (= sva) whereas jnana cognizes the external objects (=para). 8 This view also is not satisfactory because almost all the Jaina acaryas are of the view that jnana grasps both sva and para (jnanam svapara-prakasakam). Each and every cognition, irrespective of its being jnana or darsana, grasps both sva and para. (There are only two exceptions to this general rule. We shall have an occasion to deal with these exceptional cases.) So, we are not in a position to accept even this view that darsana grasps sva and jnana grasps para. As a result of all

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92 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY this we feel that our interpretation of jnana and darsana is correct. Siddhasenagani, the commentator on the Tattvarthabhasya, accepts this interpretations but he fails to see the real significance of this interpretation. On our interpretation jnana is that cognition which involves thought (=vikalpa), whereas darsana is that cognition which is free from thought (= nirvikalpa). We are very often told that in the case of ordinary persons darsana is followed by jnana.60 Our interpretation does not conflict with this matter of fact. Pure sensations due to sense-organs are free from thought (nirvikalpa); hence they can legitimately be described as darsana. Cognitions involving thought (savikalpa) follow these pure sensations. Thus, what is called nirvikalpa pratyaksa (= darsana) arises first and savikalpa pratyaksa (= jnana), if it arises, arises after nirvikalpa pratyaksa. But in the case of dhyanas there is a reverse order. Savikalpa dhyana invariably precedes nirvikalpa dhyana.. This is the real significance of the statement that in the case of a tirthankara jnana precedes darsana whereas in the case of ordinary persons (= chadmastha) darsana precedes jnana. Now we need not dilate upon this point. We take up the problem of knowing-all (sarvajnata) and seeing-all (sarva-darsita). According to Jainas atman (= citta) becomes vitaraga as soon as it destroys completely the mohaniya (deluding) karmas, rather moha (Delusion). And on the destruction of moha all the veils obscuring the infinity of jnana as also all the veils obscuring the infinity of darsana get automatically destroyed without residue. When all the veils obscuring the infinity of jnana are destroyed, the infinity of jnana becomes manifest. (Here we are reminded. of Patanjali's declaration that on the removal of the veils of impurities the infinity of jnana gets manifest - tada sarvavaranamalapetasya jnanasya anantyat...) When all the veils obscuring the infinity of darsana are completely destroyed the infinity of darsana becomes manifest. According to Jainas, all the veils obscuring the infinity of jnana and all the veils obscuring the infinity of darsana get destroyed simultaneously. Hence the infinity of jnana and that of darsana become manifest simultaneously. That is, both these faculties become pure (suddha, aklista, niravarana) simultaneously. Thus, anantya of jnana and darsana is nothing but their pristine nature free from all obscuring veils. As a result of this anantya of jnana and darsana, atman (=citta) acquires simultaneously the capacity (labdhi, siddhi) to know all things and the capacity to see all things. Though these capacities (labdhi) are acquired simultaneously they do not operate simultaneous

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ON THE PROBLEM OF JNANA-DARSANA 93 ly.62 Operation of the capacity to know all invariably precedes the operation of the capacity to see all. The infinity of jnana is neither identical with the capacity to know all nor identical with actually knowing all. The same thing can be said with regard to the infinity of darsana. However infinite all the objects taken together may be, their infinity can never coincide with the vast infinity of jnana and darsana. (Here again we are reminded of Patanjali's dictum... jnanasya anantyaj jneyam alpam). So, those who say that jnana is infinite because it knows all things as also that darsana is infinite because it sees all things are committing a bluner. As a matter of fact, we should say that jnana knows all things and darsana sees all things because jnana and darsana have attained their infinity on the destruction of all veils. Now there arises a question as to whether or not such a person actually knows all things simultaneously and sees all things simultaneously. Jainas are of the opinion that he knows all things simultaneously and sees all things simultaneously.63 Thus they differ from the early Buddhists who maintain that such a person does never know all things simultaneously, nor does he see all things simultaneously but he knows and sees that thing which he wants to know and see at a particular time. Jainas agree with the Sankhya-Yoga thinkers on the point that such a person can actually know all things simultaneously and can actually see all things simultaneously. But they differ from them in that they contend that this person knows always all things simultaneously and sees always all things simultaneously. The Sankhya-Yoga thinkers, as we know, maintain that he can actually know all things simultaneously and can actually see all things simultaneously provided he performs samyama (= dharana-dhyana-samadhi) on ksana and ksanakarama. Jainas reject this proviso laid down by the Sankhya-Yoga thinkers. (Even the Buddha and the Buddhists have accepted the proviso for knowing-all and seeingall though they have accepted knowing-all and seeing-all in a different sense.) For the Sankhya-Yoga thinkers actual knowing-all and actual seeing-all do not constitute the permanent feature of viveki. But for Jainas they are the permanent features of viveki (= <Page #103
94 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY from vitaragata to sarvajnata-sarvadarsita. Hence they have gone to the extent of saying that none can become kevali without becoming sarvajnasarvadarsi. Thus they have gone even futher than the Sankhya-Yoga thinkers who explicity declare that it is not absolutely necessary for one to become sarvajna-sarvadarsi for becoming kevali. According to the Sankhya-Yoga thinkers viveki who has completely destroyed the veils and in this sense has attained the anantya of jnana can attain the kevalihood without actually becoming sarvajna. Upadhyaya Yasovijayaji criticizes this Sankhya-Yoga view.as Jainas who value destruction of delusion more than the acquisition of jnana and hence declare that the meagre jnana of alpamoni (= one under the slight influence of delusion) is superior to the vast jnana of bahumohi (= one under the strong influence of delusion),66 should value vitaragata more than the labdhis which are simply the by-products of this vitaragata. Their undue emphasis on sarvajnata-sarvadarsita is not in consonance with their spiritual and ethical outlook. Here the influence of the conception of nitya jnana of isvara recognized by Pasupatas and later Vaisesikas seem to be at work. Under the strong pressure of this influence Jainas seem to have made sarvajnata-sarvadarsita to be a permanent (nitya) feature of vitaraga and kevali. It is important to note here that sarvajnata (ommiscience) in the sense of constant knowledge of all the states - past, present and future - simultaneously of all things necessarily entails strict predeterminism' (niyativada) which gives no scope to the freedom of will, recognised in all spiritual discipline as also in karma theory. Their rejection of the proviso has led to the rejection of the distinction between two faculties. viz. jnana and darsana. Once it is held that vitaraga always knows all things simultaneously and always sees all things simultaneously, that will naturally lead to the simultaneous occurrence of sarvajnana and sarvadarsana,67 and ultimately to their identity. Here the distinction between jnana and darsana gets altogether effaced because they take place irrespective of the concerned meditations, viz. savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka respectively. On the distinction between these two meditations was based the distinction between knowing-all and seeing-all. When the ground for their distinction is rejected, their distinction cannot stay. It must vanish. Some Jaina logicians contend that knowing-all and seeing-all are identical.68 Really speaking, with the rejection of their distinction they are rejecting

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ON THE PROBLEM OF JNANA-DARSANA 95 both. How can there be knowing-all without savikalpaka dhyana ? And how can there be seeing-all without nirvikalpa dhyana ? With the rejection of these dhyanas, there cannot be the functioning of these two labdhis at all. These logicians wrongly ask if there remains anything unknown to vitaraga. If yes, then he is not sarvajna. If no, then what is the use of seeing-all ? In other words, knowing-all is identical with seeing-all.69 But this logic is defective. Knower of all is not necessarily seer of all. We should note that the objects that are grasped by his jnana are the same in number (i.e. sarva= all) as those grasped by his darsana. Though the objects are the same in number there is a difference in their graspings by jnana and darsana. The grasping of all objects by jnana is not of the nature of saksatkara whereas grasping of all objects by darsana is of the nature of saksatkara. So, logicians should not reject the grasping which is of the nature of saksatkara. They should not even reject the grasping of all objects by jnana because it is a necessary previous stage on the basis of which is founded the grasping which is of the nature of saksatkara. On studying the arguments given by these logicians for identifying knowing-all and seeing-all we feel that they are obsessed with the idea of nitya jnana of Isvara recognized in some non-Jain circles. As Jainas have rejected the proviso, those who strictly follow the agamic view of their successive occurrence have to declare that their alternative occurrence goes on perpetually, i.e. in all the old moments will occur knowing-all and in all the even moments will occur seeingall. (According to those who believe in the reverse order of their occurrence, their alternative occurrence goes on perpetually, i.e. in all odd moments will occur seeing-all and in all the even moments will occur knowing-all).10 This position is vulnerable and ludicrous. If they would have accepted the proviso, their position would have become most cogent and logicians would not have dared to attack it. The yogi having avadhi-jnana and avadhi-darsana as labdhis does not always know and see all physical things falling within the spatial and temporal boundaries; he knows and sees only that physical object which he wants to know and see at a particular time, having entered into proper meditations ('upayoga lagakara'). This is what the Jainas believe. Even in the case of knowing-all and seeing-all they should accept the same procedure. They should say : In the case of knowingall and seeing-all there is no avadhi. That is, vitaraga can know and see

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96 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY all sorts of things of all times and climes; but he does not know and see all of them always; he knows and sees that thing which he wants to know and see at a particular time and that too after having entered into proper meditations. Under the wrong conception of darsana as samanyagrahi and jnana as visesagrahi Jaina authors are compelled to declare that avadhi-darsana precedes avadhi-jnana. But as avadhi-jnana and avadhi-darsana are the cases of yogi-jnana and yogi-darsana respectively, their order of occurrence should be reverse, that is, avadhi-jnana should always precede avadhi-darsana. But we should acknowledge the fact that no Jaina work accepts this order of their occurrence. Of course, the order of janai pasai terms used in connection with avadhi-jnana and avadhi-darsana in the Nandisatra corroborates our view.?! According to Jainas manahparyaya-jnana is that yogic cognition which cognizes the changes that take place in the subtle physical mindstuff when the jnana faculty of atman (= citta) operates. These changes are not thoughts, because thoughts are the cittavittis (= jnanaparyayas) that occur in the citta due to the functioning of mind, the organ of thought. We should bear in mind this distinction between manahparyaya and cittavrtti. This means that a yogi can infer the cittavrtti of others by the changes taking place in their mind-stuff, he can never see the cittavrttis of others. Thus, in this sense there is no possibility of paracitta-darsana. Paracitta-jnana recognized by the Sankhya-Yoga and the Buddhist thinkers is identical with what the Jainas call manahparyaya-jnana. Now, we understand why the Jainas have not recognized manahparyayadarsana.72 By the changes taking place in the mind-stuff of others a yogi can infer cittavittis (jnana paryayas) as also the objects of these cittavrttis. A yogi possessed of the capacity of avadhi-jnana and avadhi-darsana may know and see the physical mind-stuffs and changes taking place in them but he is not able to infer from those changes the cittavrttis as also the objects of those cittavrttis. This seems to be the true answer to those logicians who are bent on wiping out the distinction between avadhi jnana and manahparyaya-jnana.73 What are kevalajnana and kevaladarsana? Kevalajnana and kevaladarsana are mostly taken to mean sarvajnata and sarvadarsita respectively. But kevalajnana seems to be nothing but sva-jnana (= atmajnana=cittajnana), and kevaladarsana seems to be nothing but svadarsana (= atmadarsana = cittadarsana). When the object of savikalpaka dhyana is atman (= citta), there takes place kevalajnana. And the

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ON THE PROBLEM OF JNANA-DARSANA 97 nirvikalpaka dhyana following this savikalpaka dhyana gives rise to atmasaksatkara (= cittasasatkara) as its object is atman (= citta). This saksatkara is really kevaladarsana. (Like Buddhists Jainas too maintain that citta and its vittis never remain unseen even for a moment. They are seen by themselves. This is what is called svasamvedana. But this is not to be regarded as kevaladarsana.) Study the following statements(1) 'na havadi paradavvagayam damsanamidi vannidam tamha', (2) ditthi appapayasaya ceva'. (Niyamasara gathas 160-161). We feel that these two statements have in view the kevaladarsana. All other darsanas see objects other than sva. It is only kevaladarsana that sees sva (= atman=citta). From this it naturally follows that there is a jnana which precedes this kevaladarsana and this jnana should be regarded as kevalajnana because its object is sva. Like Buddhists Jainas too hold that citta can direct its faculties of jnana and darsana to operate upon itself. Avadhi jnana, manahparyaya-jnana, sarva-jnana and kevalajnana are the cases of yogi-jnanas. Avadhi-darsana, sarva-darsana and kevaladarsana are the cases of yogi-darsanas. We have an Agamic statement that a person who has acquired any of the three jnanas viz. avadhijnana, manahparyayajnana and kevalajnana is a kevali.74 Hence the dictum damsanapuvvam nanam chadamatthanam does not apply to these jnanas. These jnanas, being yogi-jnanas or kevalijnanas, invariably precede their corresponding darsanas. Darsanas (rather darsana-manifestations) due to six sense-organs (including mind) are to be regarded as thought-free cognitions - pure sensations. Darsana' due to caksu (visual sense-organ) is called caksudarsana'and darsanas due to other sense-organs (including mind) are called acaksudarsana. According to Jainas no two or more darsanas out of these six can take place at a time.75 Thus they differ from the Buddhists on this point and agree with the Vaisesikas. The Vaisesikas could not accept the simultaneous occurrence of even the sensations due to five sense-organs because they regard the contact of atomic mind with the concerned sense-organ as necessary even for the rise of sensation and mind being one in each body as also atomic cannot come into contact with two or more sense-organs simultaneously. But what prevents Jainas from accepting their simultaneous occurrence ? The mind of the Jainas is body-sized, it is not atom-sized. Again, what compels the Jainas to accept the operation of mind as necessary even for the rise of these pure sensations due to five sense-organs? We think there is nothing to compel them. In answer to the question as to why two or more darsanas due

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98 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY to sense-organs cannot take place simultaneously Jainas say that there is an Agamic rule that two upayogas cannot take place simultaneously. The term 'upayoga' yields more than one sense - (1) prakasarupata of citta (= atma), (2) darsanasakti, (3) jnanasakti, (4) manifestations of darsanasakti, (5) manifestations of jnanasakti, (6) mental operation or attention or concentration. In this context those who accept upayoga in the sense of darsana-manifestations seem to be wrong. In this context we should understand upayoga in the sense of 'mental attention. Though mind is body-sized it can concentrate on or attend to one thing only at a time. Mind cannot attend two sensations or things at a time. But this does not mean that there cannot occur two or more sensations simultaneously. Two or more sensations due to sense-organs can occur simultaneously because they do not involve any mental'attention. But Jainas have not accepted this. Buddhists seem to be right in their stand. The Vaisesika procedure of the origination of the sensory cognition being what it is the Vaisesika philosophers cannot help rejecting the simultaneous occurrence of two or more pure sensations due to senseorgans. Jainas have not thought over this problem seriously. If they would have done so, they would have been with the Buddhists because their epistemological foundations are almost indentical with those of the Buddhists. This will be clear from the concluding portion of this essay." Jainas do not accept the simultaneous occurrence of a darsana (rather darsana-manifestation) and a jnana (rather jnana-manifestation). This view of theirs is not objectionable in the case of yogi-jnanas and yogidarsanas (otherwise called kevali-jnanas and kevali-darsanas). When it is said that in the case of a kevali the two upayogas cannot take place simultaneously,18 what is meant is that yogi-jnana and corresponding yogi-darsana cannot take place simultaneously. This is inevitable because yogi-jnana airses in savikalpa dhyana which invariably precedes nirvikalpa dhyana in which arises the corresponding yogi-darsana. But in the case of jnanas and darsanas of ordinary persons Jainas should have maintained that a jnana and a darsana can occur simultaneously. On the contrary, Jaina logicians explicitly reject the possibility of their simultaneous occurrence.99 Here again they are influenced by the view of Nyaya-Vaisesika thinkers. Nyaya-Vaisesika theory of mind and its function in the orignation of cognitions being what it is, the NyayaVaisesika thinkers reject the possibility of the simultaneous occurrence of any two cognitions.80 Jainas are wrong in following the NyayaVaisesika philosophers in this matter. They should have agreed with the

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ON THE PROBLEM OF JNANA-DARSANA 99 Buddhists who accept the possibility of simultaneous occurrence of a jnana and a darsana of ordinary persons.81 No two thoughts (jnanas-vikalpas) occur simultaneously. The Jaina, the Buddhist and the Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers accept this. In Moksa jnana and darsana become doubly ananta. In addition to their being niravarana they become nirvisaya (= not paricchinna by any object = aparicchinna = ananta). Sukha in moksa is considered to be ananta on the ground of its being nirvisaya. The same logic should be applied to jnana and darsana. In Moksa citta is a knower without knowing and a seer withour seeing. The Sankhya-Yoga thinkers recognized two tattvas. viz. purusa (= atma) and citta. They attributed the faculty of darsana to purusa alone and the faculty of jnana to citta alone. Buddhists rejected purusa (= atma) altogether and attributed the faculty of darsana to citta. Thus the citta recognized by the Buddhists possesses both the faculties, viz. darsana and jnana. Those very reasons that urged the Buddhists to reject atma urged the Jainas also to reject it. Jainas rejected atma, accepting the citta alone. The terms 'sacitta', 'acitta', (pudhai citta'82 etc. frequently used in old Jaina literature point to this fact. Jainas rejected atma-tattva but retained the name 'atman' which they gave to the citta-tattva. Hence for them "atman' and 'citta' became interchangeable terms, synonyms83 meaning that very thing which the Sankhya-Yoga and the Buddhist thinkers mean by the term 'citta' alone. We know that the citta of Sankhya is variable constant (parinaminitya) and body-size (sariraparimanakaramatram); it can expand or contract itself according to the size of the body which it inhabits (sankocavikasi).84 The Jaina description of atma exactly tallies with this description of Sankhya citta. As a matter of fact, Sankhya citta is totally accepted by the Jainas without introducing any change in it; of course, they attributed darsana of purusa to citta as they have totally rejected purusa or atman. Thus Jainas are as anatmavadi as the Buddhists. But by giving the name atman to the citta they have created an illusion that they belong to the atman tradition. This Jaina position will be clear if we contrast it with the Vaisesika and the Sankara Vedanta positions. The Vaisesika thinkers rejected citta altogether and attributed its faculty of jnana (along with other cittadharmas) to absolutely changeless purusa. They neglect the faculty of darsana, they do not refer to it, so we can say that they do not accept it. According to them jnana is the quality of purusa. They maintain that by (sariravacchinna) atma-manah-samyoga (nimittakarana) jnana is

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100 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY produced in purusa (samavayikarana). On this account purusa does not lose its absolute changelessness (kutasthanityata) because according to these philosophers jnana (guna) is different from its substratum (dravya) atman. As a result of this view of theirs, though jnana is a quality of purusa it is absent in moksa because of the absence of its nimittakarana, viz. sariravacchinna atmamanah-samyoga. Sankara Vedantins rejected both citta and citta-dharmas. They do not attribute any citta-dharma to purusa. Their purusa is simply cit of the nature of darsana which is loosely called jnana. Thus Jainas and Bauddhas form one group as against the group of Vaisesikas and Sankara Vedantists. Thus we have before us two clear-cut traditions, viz.' atman tradition, and anatman tradition. Sankhya of 24 tattvas, Jainism and Buddhism clearly represent the anatman tradition whereas Vaisesika philosophy and Sankara Vedanta represent the atman tradition. Sankhya of 25 tattvas represents the compromise of these two fundamentally different traditions. Notes 1. In Brhadaranyaka Upanisad 2.4.5 and 4.5.6 there occurs the famous sentence : atma va are drastavyah srotavyah mantavyah nididhyasitavyah | It refers to the four stages of darsana, Sravana, manana and nididhyasana (= dhyana). Here the term 'darsana' is employed in the sense of sraddha. This is corroborated by two trios mentioned in the two sentences (7.18-19 and 7.25) of Chandogya Upanisad. In 7.18-19 there occurs : namatva vijanati, matvaiva vijanati ...nasraddadhan manute, sraddadhad eva manute. Thus here the trio of Sraddha, manana and vijnana is mentioned. In 7.25 we have : eva pasyan evam manvana evam vijanan. Here the trio of darsana, manana and vijnana is mentioned. The first trio corresponds to the second one. Hence the first member of the first trio viz. Sraddha exactly corresponds to and is identical with the first member of the second trio viz. darsana. Sraddha grows as it passes through the stages of sravana, manana and nididhyasana. Thus there are four stages of Sraddha, viz. Sravanapurvavartini, Sravananuvartini-mananapurvavartini, manananuvartini-nididhyasanapurvavartini and nididhyasananuvartini. In Upanisads we come across sentences and phrases that point to the four stages of sraddha. Jainism explicity recognises two stages of sraddha, viz. naisargika and adhigamika. The first corresponds to sravanapurvavartini sraddha and the second to

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ON THE PROBLEM OF JNANA-DARSANA 101 Sravananuvartini-mananapurvavartini sraddha. Jaina Devagupta in his commentary on sambandhakarika on Tattvarthabhasya writes : naisargikad avaptasraddho' dhyayanadibhir adhigamikam apnoti / Janias do not talk of the remaining higher stages of sraddha, but they implicitly accept them. In Buddhism we find references to all the four stages of sraddha. In the following passage of Camkisutta (MajjhimaN. 2.173), there is reference to sravanapurvavartini Sraddha. saddhajato...dhammam sunati 1 We have references to manananuvartini-nididhyasanapurvavartini (the third stage) sraddha. It is called akaravati saddha (Majjhiman I. 320). Here the term 'akara' is used in the sense of 'supporting logical reasons'. This sraddha is also described as 'avetysprasada' (Abhidharmakosa 6.75). In Abhidharmakosabhasya (8.7) we have reference to nididhyasananuvartini sraddha (i.e. the fourth stage). The following is the passage in point : tasmat tarhi sraddha prasadah 1 tasya hi dvitiyadhyanalabhat samahitabhuminihsarane sampratyaya utpadyate so 'dhyatmaprasadah | This Sraddha is adhyatmaprasada. It is interesting to note that like many important technical terms, this term 'adhyatmaprasada' also occurs in Patanjala Yogasutra I. 47. 2. TAH: HEYATS: 1 Yogabhasya I. 20; Puggalapannttitika, 248; GT FAH: SATS: 1 Abhidharmakosabhasya,' II. 25; HGT... HITTAT HETHE HAGUT I Dhammasamgani Atthakatha, III. 213. THISISHTHard4 | Sphutartha, VIII. 75; of Arci ad altraud | Abhidharmadipavstti, p. 367. 3. Study the Jaina conception of abhigrahika mithyatva. 4. Umasvati has in view this stage of darsana when he describes it as apayarupa : Joud-379714GGOTRAT ARIES-4, 37474: 371faf41 Tattvartha-bhasya, I. 8 5. Lokatattvanirnaya, 38 6. Siksasamuccaya (Ed. P. L. Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit Text Series No. 11), p. 12. 7. yato yato imassa dhammapariyAyassa pacAya atthaM upaparikkheyya labhetheva attamataM labheta TAHT TACI Majjhima Nikaya, 1.114. 8. jayA se mANAvaraNaM, savvaM hoi khayaM gayaM / tao logamalogaM ca jiNo jANati kevlii||8|| jayA se darisAvaraNaM savvaM hoi khayaM gayaM / tao logamalogaM ca jiNo pAsati kevalI // 9 //

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.102 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY paDimAe visuddhAe mohaNijaM khayaM gayaM / asesaM logamalogaM ca pAseti susamAhie // 10 // Dasasrutaskandha, Adhyayana 5 9. AhakSayAt jJAnadarzanAvaraNAntarAyakSayAcca kevalam / tattvArthasUtra 10.1 / mohakSayAditi pRthakkaraNaM kramaprasiddhayartham / yathA-gamyeta pUrvaM mohanIyaM kRtsnaM kSIyate / tato'ntarmuhUrta chadmasthavItarAgo bhavati / tato'sya jJAnadarzanAvaraNAntarAyaprakRtInAM tisRNAM yugapat kSayo bhvti| Tattvartha-bhasya, X.1. . 10. sA cArthakAratA buddhau pariNAmarUpA...puruSe ca pratibimbarUpA / Yogavartika, 1.4 Sarkhya-Yoga (Gujarati), Nagin J. Shah, pp. 98-100, 109-112, 200 201, 245-246. 11. ato buddhereva sAkSI puruSo'nyeSAM tu draSTamAtramiti zAstrIyo vibhaagH| Sankhyaprava canabhasya, 1.161. 12. yo hi jAnAti...natasya...arthadarzanam...yasya cArthadarzanaM nasa jaanaati| Nyayamanjari (Kashi Sanskrit series) p. 4 13. sadA jJAtAzcittavRttayastatprabhoH puruSasya... | Yogasutra, 4.18 14. tadavasthe cetasi viSayAbhAvAd buddhibodhAtmA puruSaH kiMsvabhAva iti ? - 'tadA draSTaH svarUpe'vasthAnam' / (bhaassyotthaanikaashit)| Yogasutra, 1.3 15. ...svarUpamAtrapratiSTho'taH zuddhaH kevalo mukta ityucyata iti / Yogabhasya, 1.51 16. Yogasutra, 2.6 17. sattvapuruSAnyatApratyayo vivekakhyAtiH / . Yogabhasya, 2.26...puruSakhyAte.... / Yogasutra, 1.16 tathA ca sAkSAtkArayuktaikAMgracakAle samprajJAtayogo...... / Yogavartika, 3.3 18. yathA ca citi buddheH pratibimbamevaM buddhAvapi citpratibimbaM svIkAryamanyathA caitanyasya bhAnAnupapatteH svayaM sAkSAt svadarzane karmakartRvirodhena buddhayArUDhatayaivAtmano ghaTAdivajjJeyatvAbhyupagamAt / Yogavartika, 1.4 19. yogAGgAnuSThAnAdazuddhikSaye jJAnadIptirA vivekkhyaateH| Yogasutra, 2.28 20. upadezyopadeSTatvAt tatsiddhiH (= jiivnmuktsiddhiH)| Sankhyasitra, 3.79; jiivnmuktsyaivopdessttutvsmbhvaaditi| Saikhyapravacanabhasya, 3.79 21. vRttayaH pnyctyyHklissttaa'klissttaaH| Yogasutra, 1.5; klezahetukAHkarmAzayapracayakSetrIbhUtAH kliSTAH, khyAtiviSayA gunnaadhikaarvirodhinyo'klissttaaH| Yogabhasya, 1.5 22. ...vivekapratyayapravAho nirmalo bhavati / sA ca vivekakhyAtiraviplavA hAnopAyaH / Yogabhasya, 2.26

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ON THE PROBLEM OF JNANA-DARSANA 103 23. tArakaM sarvaviSayaM sarvathAviSayamakramaM ceti vivekajaM jJAnam / Yogasutra, 3.54; kSaNa tatkramayoH saMyamAd vivekajaM jJAnam / Yogasutra, 3.52 24. etasyAmavasthAyAM kaivalyaM bhavatIzvarasyAnIzvarasya vA vivekajajJAnabhAginaH itarasya vA / na hi dagdhaklezabIjasya jJAne punarapekSA kaacidsti| Yogabhasya, 3.55 25. tadA sarvAvaraNamalApetasya jJAnasyAnantyAd jnyeymlpm| Yogasutra, 4.31 26. Some regard citta as vubhu whereas others citta as body-sized and its vrtti as vibhu. (Yogabhasya 4.10). Those who uphold the first view mean to say that citta being vibhu knows distant things; not only that but when all impurities are removed from the citta it can know all things simultaneously. Those who uphold the second view seem to mean something special by the vTtti. Every now and then Yoga system declares that citta resembles a magnet (cittam ayaskantamanikalpam). So, here by vitti they seem to suggest cetasika force. A magnet has magnetic force; similarly, citta has cetasika force. Though citta is body-sized, its cetasika force (vitti) is all-pervasive. Though this cetasika force is by nature all-pervasive it is not capable of functioning everywhere if the citta is impure. The cetasika force becomes capable of functioning everywhere simultaneously as soon as the impurities are removed from the citta. 27. tallAbhAd (= vivekadarzanalAbhAd) avidyAdayaH klezAH samUlakASaM kaSitA bhavanti / kuzalAkuzalAzca karmAzayAH samUlaghAtaM hatA bhavanti / klezakarmanivRttau jIvanneva vidvAn vimukto bhavati / kasmAt ? yasmAd viparyayo bhavasya kAraNam / na hi kSINaviparyayaH kazcit - kenacita kvacit jAto dRzyate iti| Yogabhasya, 4.30 28. etenAsamprajJAtAbhAve'pi prArabdhabhogAnantaraM jJAninAM mokSo bhavatyeveti siddhAnto na virudhyate / Yogasarasangraha, p. 11. / asamprajJAtayogastvAzutaramokSArthamevApekSyate ityaashyH| Yogavartika, 2.15 29. vivekakhyAtiraviplavA haanopaayH| Yogasutra, 2.26 30. tatra cAsamprajJAtayogenAkhilasaMskAradAhakena prArabdhakarmApyatikramyata iti jJAnAd vizeSaH / Yogavartika, 1.1 31. MajjhimaNikaya, 2.3 32. MajjhimaNikaya 1.329 33. ariyasaccAni avecca passati / Suttanipata, 229 | sabbesu dhammesu ca traanndssii| Ibid, 478 Buddhist philosophers declare that pratityasamutpadata, the nature of all things, is not the object of sense-perception; it is known by reasoning-and-thought and seen in non-reflective meditation.

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104 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 34. Y EHI - raapai Part -asri gola ad 15.10 35. According to Sankhya-Yoga manas (= mind) is an organ of knowing = thought = vikalpa ("manah sankalpakam'-Sankhyakarika 27). In Buddhism it is recognized as an organ of both seeing and knowing. According to Sankhya-Yoga mind is not required for seeing. But according to the Buddhists in all cases of seeing mind is not required (i.e. only in some cases of seeing it is required) whereas in all cases of knowing mind is invariably required. Hence it is primarily the organ of thought. There arises a question as to how one and the same organ can work in the production of two quite heterogeneous effects - seeing and knowing. Logic demands that the Buddhists should not accept seeing due to mind. This seems to be the real ground for the rejection of manasa pratyaksa by some Buddhists. Jainas too regard mind as an organ of both seeing and knowing (= thought). Hence they have recognised seeing due to mind (manodarsana falling under the class of acaksurdarsana). We find no Jaina author who rejects darsana due to mind whereas we find at least a few Buddhists who are hesitant to accept darsana due to mind. It is very important to note that manas is not citta; it is simply an organ which citta utilises for thinking (= knowing). 36. For the details of all these pratyaksas one may refer to 'Akalarika's Criticism of Dharmakirti's Philosophy (L. D. Series No. 11), pp. 200-218. . . 37. It is interesting to note here the declaration of Patanjali that 'jneya is alpa' (Yogasutra 4.31). 38. Milindapanho (Ed. Vadekar, Bombay, 1940), p. 105. 39. 1484 144pifaarfany i kITasaGkhyAparijJAnaM tasya naH kvopayujyate / / dUraM pazyatu vA mA vA tattvamiSTaM tu pazyatu / UTIU graaffaaa TEENE II Pramanavartika, I. 33, 35 [Tr. Therefore, think about his knowledge of what one should do (to remove internal impurities). At what stage is his knowledge of the number of worms useful to us (who desire emancipation)? He may or may not see far but he does see the desired essentials (i.e. essentials desired by those who want to remove impurities). If the far-seeing one is the authority (in these spiritual matters), then we who desire emancipation should worship vultures.)

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105 ON THE PROBLEM QF JNANA-DARSANA 40. ...vikalpendriyajJAne...ca shotpdynte| Manorathavrtti, II. 502-503 41. vikalpAH krmbhaavinH| Pramanavartika, II. 502 42. cakSuHzrotrAdijJAne ca sahotpadyante / Manorathavrtti, II. 505-506 yataHsamAnendriyayo sti, na bhinnendriyayoH SaNNAMyugapadutpattiriti vcnaat| Nyayabindu likatippani, p. 29 43. jaDaprakAzAyogAt prkaashH| Sankhyasutra, 1.145 prakAzasvarUpa eva purussH| Sankhyapravacanabhasya, 1.145 44. Yogabhasya, 1.7 . 45. Pramanavartika, II. 327 46. srvcittcaittaanaamaatmsNvednm| Nyayabindu, I. 10 47. In the Sankhya-Yoga philosophy darsana belongs to purusa. Purusa being absolutely changeless nothing can obstruct his darsana. Hence these thinkers have not recognized any obstructive veil with regard to darsana. They have recognized obstructive veils with regard to jnana which belongs to citta alone (tada sarvavaranamalapetasya jnanasya... Yogasutra 4.31). The Buddhists have recognized jfieyavarana. The term 'jfieyavarana' suggests both the avaranas, viz. jnanavarana and darsanavarana. But the Jainas have explicitly posited two avaranas, viz. jhanavarana and darsanavarana. 48. aupacArika nayazca jJAnaprakArameva darzanamicchati / zuddhanayaH punaranAkArameva saGgirate darzanamAkAravaccaM vijnyaanm| Tattvarthabhasya-Siddhasenaganitika (= TBST), 2.9 49. etAvAnupayogo bhavan bhaved yaduta jJAnarUpo darzanarUpazceti, nAto'nya upayoga smsti| nanu ca ___ jJAnadarzanAbhyAmarthAntarabhUta upayogo'styekAntanirvikalpaH...tadetat sarvamayuktamuktam / ___TBST, 2.9 . 50. tadA lokamalogaM ca jiNo jANati kevlii| Dasakaliyasutta, 4.45 51. Suyagada, 1.2.2.31 and 2.6.50 52. anyacca yasmin samaye sakalakarmavinirmukto jIvaH saJjAyate tasmin samaye jJAnopayogopayukta eva; na darzanopayogayuktaH darzanopayogasya dvitIyasamaye bhAvAt... | Karmagrantha svopajnatika, 1.3 53. When Up. Yasovijayaji discusses the view of successive occurrence of kevalajnana and kevaladarsana he gives this as one of the possible alternatives. He says : atha nirvikalpakasamAdhirUpachadmasthakAlInadarzanAt prathama kevalajJAnotpattiH...| Jhanabinduprakarana (Singhi Jaina Series-16), p. 38. Up. Yasovijayaji is absolutely right in conceiving this alternative

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106 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY but he seems to be wrong in rejecting it. 54. sa upayogo dvividhaH-sAkAro'nAkArazca / AkAro vikalpaH, saha AkAreNa sAkAraH / anAkArastadviparItaH, nirvikalpa ityrthH| Tattvarthabhasya, II. 9; TBST, II. 9 55. jaM sAmaNNagahaNaM daMsaNameyaM visesiyaM NANaM / Sanmatitarkaprakarana, 2.1 jaM sAmaNNagahaNaM bhAvANaM Neva kaTTamAyAraM / avisesidUNa aMDe daMsaNamidi bhaNNae samae / Bshaddravyasangraha 43; also Karmaprakrti, 43; Pancasangraha, 1.138; Gommatasara Jivakanda,481. 56. upayogakramazca dRSTavyaH - prAganAkAraH pazcAt sAkAra iti, pravRttau kramaniyamaH, yatastu nAparimRSTasAmAnyo vizeSAya dhaavti| TBST, II. 9... 57. na jJAnaM pramANaM sAmAnyavyatiriktavizeSasyAkriyAkartRtvaM pratyasamarthatvato'vastuno grahaNAt / . natasyagrahaNamapi sAmAnyavyatirikte vizeSe hyavastuni krtRkrmruupaabhaavaat| tat evana darzanamapi prmaannm| Dhavala, 1.1.4 58. sAmAnyavizeSAtmakabAhyArthagrahaNaM jJAnaM, tadAtmakasvarUpagrahaNaM darzanamiti siddham / Ibid, 1.1.4 59. See foot-note No. 54 60. darzanapUrvaM jJAnamiti chadmasthopayogadazAyAM prsiddhm| Jhanabindu-prakarana, p. 43 61. tato'syajJAnadarzanAvaraNAntarAyaprakRtInAMtisRNAMyugapat kssyobhvti| Tarvathabhasya, ____X.1 62. hou NAma kevalaNANadaMsaNANamakkameNuppattI, akkameNa viNaTThAvaraNattAdo, kiMtu kevalaNANa Chuanita durata zifat i Kasayapahuda (The D. Jain Sangh Grantha mala) 352 . 63. ...kevalino yugapat sarvabhAvagrAhake nirapekSe kevalajJAne kevaladarzane cAnusamayamupayogo Hafat i Tattvarthabhasya, I. 31 64. ...kSAyikajJAnamavazyameva sarvadA sarvatra sarvathA sarvameva jAnIyAt / Pravacanasara ___ Tattvadipika, 1.47 65. "IzvarasyAnIzvarasya vA vivekajajJAnavatastadabhAvavato vA sattvapuruSayoH zuddhisAmye - kaivalyam''' ityapyayuktam, vivekajaM kevalajJAnamantareNoktazuddhisAmyasyaivAnupapatteH / Patanjalayogadarsana-vyakhya, Vibhutipada. 66. Pt. Sukhlalji's Commentary on Tattvarthasutra (L. D. Series No. 44) pp. 18-19. 67. jugavaM vaTTai NANaM kevalaNANissa daMsaNaM ca thaa| . diNayarapayAsatApaM jaha vaTTai taha muNeyavvaM // Niyamasara, 159 68. yadeva kevalajJAnaM tadeva kevaladarzanamiti vAdinAM ca mhaavaadishriisiddhsendivaakraannaam......| Jianabinduprakarana, p. 33 40-19.

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ON THE PROBLEM OF JNANA-DARSANA 107 69. Sanmatitarkaprakarana, 2.13 70. ekasmin samaye kevalajJAnopayoge vRtte tato'nyasmin kevaladarzanopayoga iti, evaM Ad114444 1 TBST, I. 31 71. ...IfuTrotot...FIRST Nandisutta (Mahavir Jain Vidyalaya Ed.) p. 11 72. According to the Sankhya-Yoga thinkers, purusa is the seer and citta is the knower. Objects of purusa's seeing (darsana) are the cittavittis of his own citta. Purusa can never see the cittavrttis of the citta that belongs to another purusa. This philosophy recognizes the possibility of the jnana of paracitta (rather paracittavrtti) but it rejects the possibility of darsana of paracitta (rather paracittavrtti). Buddhists have attributed both knowing and seeing to citta. Yet they seem to hold that one citta can know paracitta but it cannot see paracitta. Seeing of the citta amounts to experiencing the citta - svasamvedana. How can one-experience the paracitta ? This same logic has compelled the Jainas to reject manahparyayadarsana. We feel that the Jaina term 'manahparyayajnana' is somewhat misleading. 73. alarguacu CO 8C1 74. ai dorit - T u dalt, 4414/Hudat, tocaruldast i Sthana ngasutra, 3.4.220 75. THT The et quuit HET MIT alati . 377ami a tratara auta nusta 114EUR!! Pravacanasara, 1. See also Tattvarthaslokavartika, I. 30 76. Prabhacandracarya, the author of Nyayakumudacandra, seems to accept the possibility of the simultaneous occurrence of pure sensations (darsanas) due to five sense-organs. He says : chef forfatura nusta Heffauigara Nyayakumudacandra, p. 271 77. The Sankhya-Yoga thinkers have recognized pure sensations. They do not call them darsanas. They call them indriyavrttis. These indriyavrttis are to be regarded as pure sensations so long as they do not give rise to cittavrtti (= buddhivitti = adhyavasaya) and hence do not involve thought due to mental operation. Two or more indriyavrttis due to five jnanendriyas can occur simultaneously. This is what they believe. manfacfarfar fara nyifayahihisha daft:i Sarkhyakarika, 29. 481Safsucfa: 1 Sarkhyasutra, 2.32

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108 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 78. Hoon daftar at treft 39311 I AvasyakaNiryukti, 973 79. Tattvarthailokavartika, I. 30 Anantavirya seems to accept the possibility of simultaneous occurrence of a pure sensory cognition and a conceptual cognition. He goes even a step further and declares that there can take place savikalpaka perception of one thing and thought of another thing simultaneously. He says : TETET Naftal 378f471, they yugapad upayogadvayAnupapatteriti cet, mAnasaM samamupayogadvayaM neSyate na indriyamAnase... / Siddhiviniscayatika, p. 113 Akalanka, the author of Siddhiviniscaya, holds this view. See Siddhiviniscaya p. 112. Ac. Hemacandra also accepts this view. He writes in his Pramanamimarasa (1. 1.26) as follows : 7 garfactor 4 cef74114 'avagrahaH / na cAyaM mAnaso vikalpaH,... pratisaGkhyAnenApratyAkhyeyatvAcca / mAnaso hi vikalpaH pratisaGkhyAnena nirudhyate, na cAyaM tatheti na viklpH| This view of Akalanka, Anantavirya and Hemacandra accepts the possibility of simultaneous occurrence of a savikalpaka perception of one thing and a thought of another thing. This practically and theoretically amounts to the acceptance of simultaneous occurrence of two thoughts. This seems to be an objectionable stand that they have taken. They should not have gone to such an extent. But their theory of pramana seems to have forced them to do so. 80. Six Philosophies of India, Vol. II, Nyaya-Vaisesika. (Gujarati), Nagin J. Shah, pp. 170, 467.469. 81.The Sankhya-Yoga thinkers accept the possibility of simultaneous occurrence of a pure sensation (indriyavstti), a thought (samkalpa=manovitti) and a judgement (cittavrtti=buddhivrtti = adhyavasaya). JERRI I Fa: Sarkhyatattvakaumudi, 30 ...cat UrdsaGkalpAbhimAnAdhyavasAyA yugapad eva prAdurbhavanti / 82. Dasakaliyasutta, 4.4.8 83. Fariautica, contactata | Agastyasimhacurni, Dasakaliyasutta, 4.4 84. ghaTaprAsAdapradIpakalpaM saMkocavikAsi cittaM zarIraparimANAkAramAtramityapare pratipannAH / Yogabhasya 4.10. ga144 HGCH BIERef: 1 Yogavartika, 4.10

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ESSENTIALS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE (BASED ON THE PRAMANAVARTTIKA) Dharmakirti (c. 550-600 A.D.) is a brilliant Buddhist logician. In this article we shall study his views regarding the main problems pertaining to his theory of knowledge. While discussing what constitutes the object of perception, Dharmakirti considers a prima facie view. To put it in simple language, this view maintains that the object of perception is a physical aggregate which is something over and above the individual atoms that constitute it. As against this view, Dharmakirti submits that the object of perception are these atoms themselves, which as a result of combining with one another develop the capacity to become visible instead of remaining invisible - his point being that a physical aggregate is nothing over and above its constituent atoms. In reply to a query of Dharmakirti the oppanent suggests that a variegated colour-patch which is something over and above its constituent colours is a case of an aggregate standing over and above its constituent elements. Dharmakirti refuses to agree and argues that a variegated colour-patch too is nothing over and above its constituent colours. At this stage the opponent raises a point which gives an altogether new turn to the controversy; for he says that if a variegated colour-patch is not something unitary then our cognition of this colour-patch too cannot be something unitary (and it goes without saying that a piece of cognition is something unitary). Dharmakirti meets the point by urging that there is something essentially enigmatic about a thing becoming an 8bjeet 8f 88gnition inasmuch as this thing exists outwards while cognition is something oriented inwards. His concluding argument is that since we know one object as different from another on the basis of our cognition of these objects and since our cognition of an object is something essentially enigmatic, there in fact exist neither objects different from one another nor pieces of cognition different from one another, but just something which is essentially single, devoid of any difference (this something to be called vijnapti - meaning

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110 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY "cognition as such"). This is the ultimate view of reality as Dharmakirti sees it, and he tells us that if he nevertheless continues to speak of things existing independent of cognition (and pieces of cognition noticing these things), it is because he has deliberately turned a blind eye towards this untimate view?. Elsewhere too he declares that the view according to which there exist no objects independent of cognition is the learned man's view (the implication being that the view according to which there exist objects independent of cognition is the common man's view). And yet the fact remains that Dharmakirti's almost entire treatment of logical problems - which practically constitute his one subject matter - works on the supposition that there exist objects independent of cognition (it is only in the case of a few minor problems that room has been made for alternative theses that do away with this supposition). With a view to demonstrating the validity of this basic assessment of Dharmakirti's performance, a summary review of his treatment of logical problems is undertaken in what follows. Svalaksana is Dharmakirti's word for a thing as a unique-particular -- that is, as a particular object existing at a particular place at a particular point of time. And it is Dharmakirti's view that svalaksanas alone constitute real reality'. In most contexts of logical discussion, svalaksanas are supposed to be physical, but actually to say that a svalaksana is necessarily physical would mean endorsing materialism, a doctrine refuted at length in the very first chapter of the Pramanavarttika. So, a svalaksana can be either a physical object existing at a particular place at a particular point of time or a mental state occurring at a particular place or at a particular point of time. A mental statelo can be of the form of a cognition, a feeling, a conation or the like; but in a broad sense each is said to be of the form of cognition (jnanarupa) because each is cognised itself (sva-samvidita) just like a piece of cognition strictly so called. The mental states belonging to one particular individual form a series where an immediately preceding member acts as chief-cause (upadana-karana) in relation to the immediately succeeding one, all members being strictly momentary in duration. A physical object too is of the form of a series of strictly momentary states where the relation of chief-causeship obtains in a similar fashion". The one common feature of all physical svalaksanas - a feature in the absence of which a thing will be no physical svalaksana - is the capacity to act on sense-organs and thus produce sensory experience in the cogniser concerned. By way of contrast a thing could

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THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 111 be a mental svalaksana; but in most cases while contrasting a physical svalaksana to something else what Dharmakirti has in mind is a different thing altogether. The reason is that for all practical purposes Dharmakiti understands by svalaksana a physical svalaksana and contrasts it with samanyalaksana which is another crucial concept of his logic 3. If svalaksana alone constitutes real reality then the conclusion is automatic that a samanyalaksana lacks real reality14. But what is samanyalaksana ? By samanyalaksana, Dharmakirti understands an abstract generic feature which real things are found to exhibit now here now there, and he denies real reality to it not because real things do not really exhibit it but simply because it is not itself a real thing - which is a truism. As a matter of fact, Dharmakirti's own treatment of perception and inference - the only two means of valid cognition recognised by him - goes to make clear as to how vital a role is played by samanyalaksana in each. Thus perception is here identified with the bare sensory experience which an object produces in the cogniser concerned, but it is at once admitted that perception thus understood serves no practial purpose unless followed by the attribution of an abstract generic feature - a samanyalaksana - to the object perceived. Similarly, inference is an impossibility unless the relation of invariable concomitance is observed to obtain between the probans and the probandum concerned, but this relation obtains not between a probans and a probandum conceived as two particular things but between them as possessed of this or that abstract generic feature - this or that samanyalaksana. Yet Dharmakirti feels that there is nothing anomalous about his emphatic denial of real reality to a samanyalaksana, and there are two reasons for this. First, Dharmakirti finds it rather easy to point out loopholes in the concept of samanya as upheld by the philosophers belonging to the Nyaya-Vaisesika and Mimamsa schools, and this misleads him into thinking that all talk about an abstract generic feature really characterising a real thing' must be erroneous. Secondly, Dharmakirti feels, mistakenly of course, that there results nothing incongruous in case an abstract generic feature is conceived negatively rather than positively; e.g. on his view it would be erroneous to suppose that all cows share in common the positive feature 'cowhood' but not at all erroneous to suppose that they share in common the negative feature 'absence of non-cows', a misconceived view. Some details of Dharmakirti's treatment of perception (pratyaksa) and non-perceptual cognition (anumana) are also noteworthy. Thus he

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112 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY defines perception as that type of cognitive activity which is altogether devoid of kalpana. Now kalpana is Dharmakirti's word for thought and since bare sensory experience (also bare self-cognition) seems to be the only type of cognitive activity altogether devoid of a thought-element the surmise is natural that Dharmakiiti equates perception with bare sensory experience (also bare self-cognition). The surmise is amply confirmed by what Dharmakirti says in this connection. Here it will be useful for us to confine our attention to the case of bare sensory experience (taking note of the case of bare self-cognition when necessary). Dharmakirti argues that a svalaksana is really real because it possesses the capacity to perform a function (arthakriyakaritva). 'capacity to perform a function' being his equivalent for capacity to enter into a causal relationship'.15 And by way of denying seal reality to a samanyalaksana he says that it is not possessed of the capacity to cause cognition, the idea being that the capacity to cause cognition is the minimum condition that a really real object must satisfy.16 A physical svalaksana satisfies this condition by acting on a sense-organ and thus producing sensory experience concerning itself while a samanyalaksana fails to satisfy it because it becomes an object of cognition without actually causing cognition."? Kalpana, to be equated with thought, is Dharmakirti's word for the type of cognition which makes a samanyalaksana an object of itself, and so the net purport of his argumentation is that thought concerning an object is not caused by this object while sensory experience concerning an object is caused by this object. It can easily be seen that Dharmakirti is here drawing our attention to the important fact that sensory experience is an essentially physiological process and thinking an essentially psychological one, the former governed by the physiological laws of sense-object interactivity, the latter by the psychological laws of 'association of ideas'. This becomes evident from Dharmakirti's repeated emphasis that there is much arbitrariness about a piece of thinking and little of it about a piece of sensory experience. Thus two persons even when seated at the same place at the same time will think of very different things depending on their respective life-histories, but they will have the same sensory experience in case the same physical object acts on the same sense-organ of theirs. 18 Dharmakirti has also given consideration to the nature of cognition as such, a nature to be shared both by sensory experience and thought. In this connection two points have been emphasised and they

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THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 113 need separate treatment : (1) Thus in Dharmakirti's view a piece of cognition has impressed upon itself the form of its object; in other words, identity of form (sarupya) is the relation that obtains between a piece of cognition and its object. In the case of sensory experience, the object is active on its part and so it is this object that is supposed to impress its own form on the corresponding piece of cognition; but in the case of thought this much alone can be said that the cognition concerned has somehow got impressed upon itself the form of its object. Here Dharmakirti has polemised at length against the philosophers who maintain that a piece of cognition is devoid of form in the sense that it has got impressed upon itself no form of its object. His point is that one piece of cognition cannot be distinguished from another unless two happen to bear the form of their respective objects.!' Dharmakirti specially emphasises that on the rival view all cases of memory should turn out to be identical; for, so runs his arugment, a piece of memory cognises a past cognition, but if one piece of past cognition does not differ from another, one piece of memory too should not differ from another.20 (2) Then Dharmakirti is of the view that a piece of cognition is necessarily self-cognitive, and this is how he argues his case : 'All our dealing with the things of the world is based on our cognition of these things, but our cognition cannot play this role if it itself remains uncognised. And it will not do to say that one piece of cognition is cognised by a subsequent piece of cognition, for this subsequent piece of cognition too cannot play its role if it itself remains uncognised. So one is bound to face the contingency of an infinite regress unless one concedes that a piece of cognition is necessarily self-cognitive,21 Here too Dharmakirti has polemised at length against the rival philosophers and here too he has made special reference to the phenomenon of memory. Thus, he points out that the cognition of a word takes place by way of recalling the earlier heard cognitions of the different letters that go to constitute this word, but that no such recall can take place unless the cognitions in question were cognised at the same time they took place; but, so runs his argument, if each of these cognitions is cognised not by itself but by another cognition, then what should take place, though it never does take place, is that the cognition of the first letter of the word is followed by the cognition of this cognition; then follows the cognition of the second letter to be followed by the cognition of this cognition, and so on and so forth.22

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114 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Besides, another point has been made. Since it is always possible to have memory of a past cognition and since no such memory can take place unless this past cognition was cognised at the time it took place. this past cognition - unless selfcognised - must have been immediately followed by a cognition of itself; and since the consideration that applies to the original cognition also applies to the cognition of this cognition, this second cognition must have been immediately followed by a cognition of itself, and so on and so forth. The result would be, so thinks Dharmakirti, that on the rival view one should spend one's whole lifetime cognising an object, then cognising this cognition, then cognising this new cognition, and so on and so forth.23 . One aspect of Dharmakirti's discussion on the nature of cognition as such deserves separate consideration. For in the relevant portion of the Pramanavarttika, Pratyaksapariccheda (vv. 300-541), he has come out with a detailed and repeated defence of idealism?'. The venture is rather intriguing because it puts in serious jeopardy the findings in Dharmakirti's own earlier treatment of logical problems. Thus the most conspicuous and crucial feature of Dharmakirti's logic is the sharp distinction drawn between sensory experience and thought, a distinction which crucially hinges on a clear-cut admission of the reality of physical objects; on the other hand, the central aim of idealism is to deny that there exist any real physical objects. Little wonder that it is the same language Dharmakirti uses both when speaking about thought in the context of logical problems and when speaking of sensory experience in the context of his defence of idealism. For example, he earlier tells us that the sensory experience of fire is different from the thought of fire because the former takes place when fire as a physical object acts on an appropriate sense-organ while the latter takes place when some association of ideas reminds one of fire; but later he argues that the sensory experience of fire too takes place not because of the presence of fire as a physical object but because of some sort of association of ideas. Likewise, Dharmakirti earlier makes a serious attempt to distinguish a genuine sensory experience from an illusory one by pointing out that the former takes place in the presence of a corresponding physical object, the latter in the absence of any such object26; but later he argues that an alleged genuine sensory experience too takes place in the absence of any physical object, thus emphatically falling prey to illusory sensory experience27. All this makes it incumbent on a serious student to sharply distinguish Dharmakirti the logician from

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THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 115 Dharmakirti the idealist. Tradition itself, Buddhist as well as Brahmanical, distinguishes between Dharmakirti's theses developed from the standpoint of Sautrantika realism and those developed from the standpoint of Yogacara idealism, and broadly speaking it is the former that characterises Dharmakirti the logician, the latter Dharmakirti the idealist. Indeed, almost all characteristic theses developed by Dharmakirti in the field of logic have to be understood exclusively from the standpoint of realism. There is perhaps only one thesis that constitutes an exception in this connection, for in its case Dharmakirti has thought it proper to formulate an idealist version along with the realist one. This is his thesis on pramanaphalabhava i.e. on what constitutes a means of valid cognition and what constitutes its result. It is of a highly technical character but deserves notice because of its availability in two versions. Thus, adopting the realist standpoint, Dharmakirti argues that since a piece of valid cognition manages to apprehend its object bacause it bears the form of this object, here the means of valid cognition is 'this piece of cognition bearing the same form as its object (arthasarupya)', and the result produced is this piece of cognition apprehending its object (arthadhigati)'28. But from the idealist standpoint there exist no objects independent of cognition, while it is owing to the agency of nescience that a piece of cognition gets split into something-that-is-grasped (grahya) and something-that-grasps (grahaka); so that what this piece of cognition apprehends is nothing but itself. Hence, adopting this standpoint. Dharmakirti maintains that in the case of a piece of cognition the means of valid cognition is this piece of cognition assuming the form of something-that-grasps (grahakabhava)', and the result produced is 'this piece of cognition apprehending itself (svasamvadana) 29, the object of valid cognition being 'this piece of cognition assuming the form of something-that-is-grasped (grahyabhava).' For the rest, in the manner already hinted, Dharmakirti the idealist simply seeks to puncture what Dharmakirti the logician so strenuously seeks to establish. It is difficult to fathom the precise intentions that lay behind Dharmakirti's adopting so anomalous a procedure, but that there was something essentially extralogical about them seems certain, for otherwise it remains incomprehensible why the master-logician should indulge in the wanton game of intellectual suicide. Within the Buddhist camp idealism was certainly a Mahayana novelty, but realism was as old as Buddha himself and its latest outstanding defence had come from the Sautrantika school. So in defending idealism Dharmakirti was perhaps only paying homage

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116 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY to the fashion of the day, but when the question was of raising a wellconstituted edifice of logical doctrine he based himself on the solid ground of Sautrantika realism. But then the realist position itself suffered from an inherent difficulty which idealists exploited to the full. The difficulty pertained to the problem of envisaging a tangible relationship between a piece of cognition and the physical object that serves as its object. If, as was maintained by the realist, cognition and things physical belong to two different realms of reality, it is really difficult to see how the two stand related to each other. The idealist came out with the agrument that since all that we know of physical things we know through cognition, there is no warrant to suppose that there at all exist physical things independent of cognition. This was a wreckless solution of a genuinely difficult problem, but the realist alternative virtually amounted to confessing that the relation between cognition and things physical is a relation sui generis, an alternative equally suspect. So the controversy went on and on. It is not accidental that in the discussion noticed by us in the beginning of the present investigation, Dharmakirti deserted the realist position only when he realised that there was something essentially enigmatic about the relation alleged to obtain between a piece of cognition and its object. And in his subsequent defence of idealism he adopts the usual idealist practice of taking full advantage of the very difficulty here brought to light. So Dharmakirti the logician's account of cognition as such deserves some futher consideration. Dharmakirti has attributed to cognition two essential characteristics, viz. (1) its bearing the form of the object concerned and (2) its cognising itself. Now cognition being ex hypothesi something nonphysical and its object being something physical it has to be admitted that cognition can bear the form of its object only in some figurative sense, the net import of Dharmakirti's thesis being that a piece of cognition must possess some such characteristic as makes it the cognition of this object rather than that; and as thus put, the thesis is thoroughly unexceptionable though also platitudinous. So according to Dharmakirti the only essential characteristic of cognition is that it cognises itself (Dharmakirti himself emphasizes the point by saying that the relation of bearing the same form' is possible between any two objects whatever, so that this is not what distinguishes a piece of cognition from what is not cognition)30. But the difficulty with this characteristic is that it contains reference to.cognition itself and so cannot serve as a defining characteristic of cognition. Thus judged from

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THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 117 the standpoint of formal correctness, Dharmakirti's definition of cognition turns out to be defective. Yet in the course of describing cognition he has said things that prove to be of material worth in the task of defining cognition. A tolerably correct definition of cognition should be the activity on account of which a particular sensory stimulation becomes the signal for a particular motor response.' Thus when, taking its clue from the sensory stimulation caused by a physical object, an organism acts in relation to this object and finds it useful, this clue becomes a confirmed signal for the presence of the object thus proved to be useful; likewise, when under similar conditions the organism finds the object harmful, the clue concerned becomes a confirmed signal for the presence of the object thus proved to be harmful. In both cases appropriate relationships are established between the concerned elements of the sensory-motor apparatus; it is the employment of these earlier established relationships that constitutes memory, an activity which plays so crucial a role in converting a 'trial and error clue' into a confirmed signal. This much is broadly true of all living organisms but in the case of man something qualitatively new emerges as a result of the employment of words. Thus through a mere verbal instruction a man can be taught to treat a particular sensory stimulation as a signal for the presence of a particular object, useful or harmful, though in this case too better results follow when verbal instruction is accompanied by the actual causing of the concerned sensory stimulation. All this is directly relevant for an intelligent appreciation of Dharmakirti's position. Thus he is of the view that the sensory stimulation produced by an object in a person makes this person cognise this object in its entirety. But Dharmakirti has himself taught that right cognition is that which enables one to undertake successful activity in relation to its object, while it seems obvious that bare sensory experience enables one to undertake successful activity in relation to its object only when elements of this experience are recognised as a signal for the presence of this object. The anomaly has not escaped Dharmakirti's own attention but his solution of it is extremely roundabout. For this is how his thought runs: "When an object produces sensory stimulation in a person this person certainly comes to cognise this object in its entirety, but soon after he falls under an illusion and unless this illusion of his is removed he is not in a position to undertake successful activity in relation to this object. Thus after a jar has produced sensory stimulation in a person he falls under an illusion and

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118 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY says to himself, 'the object lying there is not a jar', this illusion of his is removed by somehow producing in him thought to the effect 'the object lying there is not a non-jar'. Similarly, after seeing smoke-onthe-mountain a person falls under an illusion and says to himself, this mountain possesses no fire'; this illusion of his is removed by somehow producing in him thought to the effect 'this mountain is not a nonpossessor of fire". In the former case the illusion is removed by pointing out such elements of sensory experience as signalize the presence of a jar; in the latter case the illusion is removed by pointing out such elements of sensory experience as signalize the presence of smoke and then recalling the universal rule, 'Wherever there is smoke there is fire'. This is the intended meaning of Dharmakirti's famous couplet : tasmad dsstasya bhavasya drsta evakhilo gunah / bhranter nisciyate neti sadhanam sampravartate /P, a meaning through which the strength as well as the weakness of his position stand out most conspicuously. Dharmakirti very correctly realises that sensory stimulation produced by a physical object is the indispensable starting point for all cognition concerning this object, his mistake lies in identifying this sensory stimulation with an all-comprehending cognition concerning this object; similarly, his description of how elements of sensory experience become a signal for the presence of the corresponding physical object is essentially correct, his mistake lies in supposing that this signalling activity is always preceded by an illusion concerning the identity of this object. Here we also get an inkling as to why Dharmakirti assigns an essentially negative rather than positive function to thought; in his eyes, thought is primarily meant to remove an illusion and only incidentally to produce a conviction. However, here another line of thought has also been operative. For what thought reveals about an object is what is common to several objects but Dharmakirti is of the view that each object has got just one positive nature which it does not share with any other; so according to him what several objects have in common is not any positive feature but just that feature which excludes them from everything else (i.e. what jars have in common is what excludes them from non-jars). In this way Dharmakirti also feels justified in maintaining that bare sensory experience reveals the total nature of an object while a piece of thought concerning it reveals only an aspect of this nature. For sensory experience reveals an object as a bare particular, i.e. as something excluded from everything else, while a piece of thought reveals it as excluded from a particular set of objects;

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THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 119 and Dharmakirti suggests that 'exclusion from everything else' constitutes the total nature of an object while 'exclusion from a particular set of objects' constitutes but an aspect of this nature. All this is very much confusing, but is the true indicator of the somewhat odd workings of Dharmakirti's mind. Perhaps, the most odd is his contention that bare sensory experience reveals a thing's total nature whose partial aspects are alone revealed by thought, only a little less odd his contention that thought notices as belonging in common to several objects features that are exclusively negative in import. However, reading between the lines one can easily see that Dharmakirti has an almost correct understanding of the relative roles played in the knowledge-situation by bare sensory experience on the one hand and thought on the other, as also of the type of objective features - whether exclusively negative or otherwise - that thought manages to notice. Notes 1. PV (= Pramanavarttika, ed. Rahul Sankstyayana), II. 194 2. Ibid., II. 195-196 3. Ibid., II. 200-202 4. Ibid., II. 208 5. Ibid., II. 212 6. Ibid., II. 213-214, 217-218 7. Ibid., II. 219 8. Ibid., II. 398 . 9. Ibid., II. 1.65-166 10. Ibid., II. 249-280 11. This is the central contention that emerges in the course of all his defence of momentarism. For the momentary character of a mental state is seldom 'under dispute. 12. PV, III. 166 3. The so important Svarthanumanapariccheda of the Pramanavarttika and the author's own commentary on it are substantially concerned with the problem of samanya. 14. PV. III. 166 15. Ibid., III. 165 16. Ibid., II. 5, 50 .

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120 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 17. Ibid., II. 39 18. Ibid., II, 175-176 19. Ibid., II. 301-319 20. Ibid., II. 374-387 21. Ibid., II. 423-484 22. Ibid., II. 485-502 23. Ibid., II. 503-541 24. Ibid., II. 320-373, 388-422 25. Ibid., II. 336 26. Ibid., II. 288-300 27. Ibid., II. 361-363 28. Ibid., II. 306 29. Ibid., II.364 30. Ibid., II. 429-430 31. Ibid., III. 44

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X ON VYAPTI Paksadharmata and Vyapti are the two logical grounds of inference. That is to say, in case we happen to possess the knowledge that two objects or objective characters (say, x and y) are such that y exists wherever x does (vyaptijnana) and also the knowledge that a particular thing possesses x (paksadharmatajnana), there ensues the inferential knowledge to the effect that this thing possesses y. We infer fire on the hill from the smoke rising from it. Thus for this inferential knowledge viz. 'there is fire on the hill' to be valid we should first be certain that the smoke in question rises from the hill; and this knowledge we get through perception. From this it will be clear that paksadharmatajnana is usually a judgment of perception. Hence the problem of the acquisition of the knowledge that a particular mark (middle term) resides in the subject or locus (minor term) in which we want to prove the presence of the major term does not present any serious difficulty. But merely this knowledge does not validate inference. In addition to the knowledge of paksadharmata we should possess the knowledge of vyapti, that is, the knowledge that the middle term is invariably connected with the major. We can infer fire from smoke only when we know that smoke is invariably connected with fire. An inference requires the knowledge that there obtains a universal relation between the concerned middle term and major term. Now, in connection with vyapti we will have to consider three questions: (i) what do we exactly mean by universal relation (vyapti)?; (ii) how many types of universal relations are there ? and (iii) how do we come to acquire the knowledge that a particular relation is universal ? To take the first question, vyapti is the technical name for the relation obtaining between the middle term and the major term while this relation is of such a nature that the middle is never present where major is absent. Thus vyapti is not a simple assertoric judgment but it is a necessary judgment. "Smoke is accompanied by fire' is an assertoric judgment while 'smoke must be accompanied by fire' is a necessary judgment. Vyapti is a necessary judgment having the form 'this happening that must happen.' If the relation between the middle

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122 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY and the major terms were not necessary, how can the conclusion be certain ? That the relation between the two terms is necessary implies that it is universal. Thus vyapti is a necessary and universal statement of the relation holding between the middle and the major, e.g. 'all men are mortal.' It is not a summary statement of some totality of observed events. 'All men are mortal' is not the 'short-hand' of 'John is observed to be mortal, Lucy is observed to be mortal, Dick is observed to be mortal, etc.' It does not refer merely to the observed cases but to the unobserved ones as well. Vyapti contains a leap from the observed to all, observed and unobserved. It contains a prediction of the unknown events on the basis of the known ones. What is the justification for taking such a leap ? Or how do we acquire the knowledge of all events on the basis of the observation of some of them only ? This is the fundamental problem which has proved 'dispair of philosophy.' Before we take up this problem for discussion it would be proper to consider the second question, viz. whether the number of universal-necessary relations is fixed. Dharmakirti holds that there are only two necessary connections - causality and essential identity. What is the logic behind the acceptance of these two necessary connections only ? This logic is as follows. That one thing is necessarily connected with another means that the existence of the former is necessarily dependent upon the existence of the latter. Now one thing's existence could necessarily depend on the existence of another only under two conditions. One thing's existence necessarily depends on another's if the latter causes the former or if the latter is a part of the essence of the former. There is no other condition that makes the existence of one thing necessarily depend on the existence of another thing. Hence Dharmakirti asserts that the relation of causality and that of essential identity are the only two necessary relations.? In the Sutras of Kanada we find a tendency to reduce the necessary connections to a fixed number. But it is given up later on. The established tradition of the Nyaya and Vaisesika schools is to regard the necessary connections as innumerable and inexhaustible. Hence they repudiate the Buddhist view that there are only two necessary connections - that of causality and that of essential identity. In order to show that there are necessary connections other than those of causality and essential identity they cited many instances of

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ON VYAPTI 123 inference that are ordinarily deemed valid but the relation between the major term and the middle term of which is not ordinarily recognised as either that of causality or that of essential identity. Thus, for example, the rise of the sun in the morning is inferred from its rise on the previous day; high tide in the sea is inferred from the rise of the moon; the forthcoming appearance of the krttika constellation is inferred from the appearance of the bharani constellation; impending rainfall is inferred from the movements of ants and also from some peculiar overt features manifested by fish, etc. All these are instances of invariable sequence which is not founded on causality. Again, we infer the particular taste of a fruit from its particular colour. Yet the relation obtaining between the two is not founded on causality because they arise simultaneously whereas causality is a relation of necessary sequence. Nor could it be held that in this case there obtains the relation of essential identity because - so would say the Nyaya-Vaisesikas - the taste in question and the colour in question are two quite different qualities residing in one substance. The Jaina logicians in general and Akalanka in particular cite similar cases in order to refute the Buddhist logician's position. Akalanka's criticism is based on a general understanding that the simultaneous occurrence of two things does not necessarily suggest that they are essentially identical and that the successive occurrence of two things does not necessarily suggest that they are causally related. As for the vyapti based on essential identity, Akalanka does not deny that it is a case of necessary simultaneous existence of hetu and sadhya. But he goes on to point out that there are cases of necessary simultaneous existence of hetu and sadhya where the relation between hetu and sadhya is not that of essential identity; nevertheless these latter are the cases of valid vyapti according to Akalanka. Thus Akalanka finds out instances where two phenomena are invariably simultaneous but have no relation of essential identity. Though at this juncture he refers to the inference of a particular flavour from a particular colour yet he is conscious of the fact that it could not be of much help to him because on the non-absolutistic theory of Jaina metaphysics he could not deny that there does obtain the relation of identity between the flavour in question and the colour in question. As they are inseparable and are the qualities of one substance they will have to be treated as somewhat identical. So, he gives other instances of inference ordinarily accepted as valid - in which the objects denoted

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124 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY by the major and the minor, though simultaneous, are not essentially identical. We infer the downward movement of one scale of a balance from the upward movement of the other scale. In this case though the two movements are invariably simultaneous the relation between them cannot be construed as that of essential identity. This seems to be the case because the two movements have different substrata.? Coming to the cases of vyapti based on the relation of necessary succession between hetu and sadhya, Akalanka points out that even if some of these are the cases of causal relationship between hetu and sadhya the others are not. Thus he finds out instances where though two things are invariably successive yet they are not causally related. Such for example is the inference of the previous appearance of the bharani constellation and the forthcoming appearance of the rohini constellation from the rise of the krttika constellation. The krttika appears invariably after the appearance of the bharani and the rohini appears invariably after the appearance of the kittika. Yet they are not causally related with one another. Merely on the ground that the krttika appears after the appearance of the bharani we could not assert that the krttika is caused by the bharani. Certainly, the stars forming the constellation bharani do not generate the stars forming the constellation krttika. Thus Akalanka proves the possibility of there being necessary sequence even without causality. Like the Nyaya-Vaisesika logicians the Jaina logicians refute the Buddhist position but unlike the Nyaya Vaisesika logicians they recognised only four necessary connections. They are; (1) Relation of simultaneity based on essential identity, (2) Relation of simultaneity which is necessary without any apparent reason, (3) Relation of succession (sequence) based on causality, (4) Relation of sequence which is necessary without any apparent reason. In reply to this usual criticism the Buddhist logicians point out that the alleged additional necessary relations are traceable to causality, if causality is rightly understood. We infer a particular taste from a particular colour. Here the two are simultaneous, yet there obtains between them no relation of essential identity. The necessary dependence of one on the other and vice versa is due to the fact that both of them are the co-effects of certain causal conditions that are available when the fruit in question attains the requisite stage of ripeness. The necessary sequence of the appearance of the bharani, the krttika and the rohini is caused by certain cosmic changes. The relation between certain overt features manifested by fish and the forthcoming

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ON VYAPTI 125 rain is necessary because they are the co-effects of atmospheric changes. In this manner all these necessary relations can be reduced to that of causality. This shows the insight of the Buddhist logicians into the nature of causality. It is their fundamental tenet that between two independent phenomena there can be no necessary relation other than that of causality. (Dharmakirti has repeatedly stated this in his Pramanavartika as we have seen earlier.] This helps them to be thorough in their study of causality. Moreover, the emphasis put on causality in the Pali canon might have stimulated the Buddhist philosophers to probe deep into the phenomenon of causality. As we shall see, this Buddhist position somewhat helps the Buddhists to answer the third and difficult question, viz. how do we acquire the knowledge that a particuar relation is necessary and universal." Those who posit innumerable necessary connections cannot say that a particular relation is necessary because it is based on either causality or essential identity. Even the Jaina logicians are here not in a better position than their Nyaya-Vaisesika counterparts. The former have accepted two types of necessary connections in addition to those based on causality and essential identity; but the acceptance is without any (apparent) reason. A relation cannot be established as necessary merely by swearing that it is necessary. So, the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Jaina' logicians have to find out other means of justifying the necessity of a particular connection. Some hold. that the knowledge of necessary connection (vyapti) is acquired by a single act of sense-perception. For example, the necessary connection between smoke and fire is grasped at the time of the very first observation of the two together.12 On the very face of it this view is untenable. The object of sense-perception is something existing at the present time and place while the necessary connection between smoke and fire expresses their relation in all times and places. So, we cannot grasp the necessary relation between two things at the time of the first observation of the two together.13 Some have modified this view. According to them, though it is not possible for a sense-organ to grasp the necessary connection at the first observation, it can do so at the time of the final observation. Why ? It is so because at the latter time the capacity of the sense-organ is much more enhanced as a result of repeated observations. Thus at the time of the final observation the relevant sense-organ, assised by the revival of the memory impressions of previous observations, grasps the necessary connection between two

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126 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY things.! This view also is unsound and for the following reasons. Auxiliary conditions can only enhance the natural capacity of a cause proper to produce the effect concerned but they cannot generate in this cause proper quite a new capacity or nature that may enable it to produce an effect not proper to its type. The nature of perception is to grasp objects here and now. And auxiliary conditions like revival of the memory impressions formed as a result of repeated observations can enhance the capacity of perception to grasp such'objects but certainly they cannot change the nature of perception and enable it to grasp objects remote in time and place. According to some, it is mental perception that grasps necessary connections;'6 but this view also fares no better than the one just considered, because in the case of external things mind cannot function independently of the sense-organs while necessary connections in the case of external things - which are the things usually considered in this connection) are something external." Mind even when assisted by repeated observition cannot perceive necessary connection. Repeated observation may at the most produce in a mind the habit of expecting an event at the time of perceiving its usual attendant. It cannot validate the idea of necessary connections. 'Logically, multiplication of instances is superfluous, for, an inductive inference which cannot be derived from one instance cannot be derived from a thousand instances.' Experiences, positive and negative, cannot establish the necessary connection.18 Nor could it be held that it is inference that grasps necessary connections. For, it might he asked as to which inference grasps a necessary connection - the inference requiring the knowledge of necessary connection or another one. The first alternative involves the fallacy of mutual dependence; the second involves an infinite regress.19 The Jaina philosophers opine that reasoning (tarka) based on the observation and non-observation of the co-occurrence of two objects together gives us the knowledge of a necessary connection between the two.20 But this opinion could not be justified. How can tarka based on a limited number of observations and non-observations of two objects together give us certain knowledge to the effect that one of them must always accompany the other ? The Jainas seem to have been conscious of this difficulty as they often say that at the time of realising the necessary connection between two objects a man attains the status of a mystic.21 Some Naiyayikas are of the view that a relation must be treated as necessary if our doubt as to its necessity were to bring our everyday behaviour or practice to

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ON VYAPTI 127 a standstill. As for instance, if one doubts that smoke is necessarily produced by fire he would not try to get fire for the purpose of igniting his cigar.22 But this view is not sound because our practice is not based on the absolute certainty of knowledge. Do people have the absolute certainty that the train by which they travel shall not meet with an accident ? They do not have. Yet they travel by the train. This shows that certainty is not essential for our everyday practice.23 The Naiyayikas seem to be conscious of the fact that the method of agreement, the method of difference, the joint method of agreement and difference, the non-observation of any contradictory instance (vyabhicaragraha) and even the method of practical contradiction (tarka) could not give us the knowledge of necessity or absolute certainty. So, they posited a type of extra-ordinary (alaukika) perception which involves no sense-operation and yet grasps the necessary and universal connections. To this perception they give the name samanyalaksana. This perception enables a cogniser to become directly aware of all the past, future and present instances of a class of objects through observing the 'universal' commonly residing in the objects. When we perceive fire and smoke we also perceive the universals 'fireness and smokeness and through this latter perception we perceive all the actual and possible instances of fire and smoke.24 But this view of the Naiyayikas is nothing more than a hypothesis formulated in order to solve the problem of induction. It is not a fact of experience.25 Not only the Naiyayikas but the Jainas also posit some extra-ordinary experience supposed to grasp necessary connections. Even the Buddhist philosopher Prajnakaragupta offers a similar explanation. According to him yogic perception is the means of cognising necessary connections.26 We shall call these theories by one name 'intuition theories. As it was impossible for these ancient philosophers to give up the ideal of certainty and necessity, they took refuge under the shelter of intuition. But to take shelter under intuition is to escape from the difficulty rather than solve it. Again, the intuition of any and every individual person does not possess so much authenticity and universality as to be made the basis of a sound and commonly accepted philosophy. That the connection is necessary cannot be established either by non-observation or by observation - this is endorsed by Dharmakirti. The observation of positive instances (sapaksas) is not enough to prove that the relation is universal and necessary. The mere non-observation of one object without another in

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128 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY a limited number of negative instances too cannot assure us that there will be no instance in future of the presence of the former in the absence of the latter. But, he says, when it is known that A is either the cause or the nature of B then, since it is inconceivable that a thing can ever come into existence without its cause or can ever exist without its nature, we know the necesasary connection of B with A.27 Here Dharmakirti assumes two things : (i) Every thing has a cause. (ii) The same cause always uniformly produces the same effect. We may grant that there is a general or broad regularity in the universe, that is, no thing is causeless (or natureless). But even then how are we to know that the cause which we have discovered in a particular instance will necessarily be the cause of similar things also in future ? To be more clear, we may admit that every event has a cause. Every event may have a cause, but the same cause need not always produce the same effect, nor the cause of the same effect be always the same. The human will, for example, is a cause but it does not always act in the same way under the same circumstances; to-day in a given situation I may act meanly; but it is possible that in a situation of the same kind I may act better to-morrow. To take another instance, it is not logically necessary that heat should cause bodies to expand rather than contract. We may accept that every event has a cause, but whether causes act uniformly, whether the same cause in the same situation always has the same effect can never be determined with certainty. Similarly, we can never assert with certainty that the specific gravity of mercury will always be 13.6 a number which is found to constitute the nature of mercury in observed cases. . To this Dharmakirti's reply is as follows. Whatever is a cause of a particular type of thing remains for ever the cause of that type of thing. To think otherwise, namely, that one type of cause does not always produce only one type of effect is to go against logic. Y cannot be treated as an effect of X even in a single case if all Y is not an effect of some X. It is so because we call X the cause of Y, only if X invariably produces Y. Moreover, to say that at times Y is produced by X and at times it is produced by something other than X, that is non-X, would mean that Y possesses two contradictory natures. Again, this would suggest that the nature of a thing does not depend on its cause; and to grant this suggestion would mean that the thing comes into existence without any cause. This, in turn, would make it eternal and consequently devoid of efficiency which is the criterion of reality.

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ON VYAPTI 129 So, one type of effect can never be regarded as being produced at times by this type of cause and at times by that type of cause. When we feel that there are instances of one type of effect at times being produced by this type of cause and at times by that type of cause (e.g. scorpions being generated at times by cowdung and at times by scorpion-parents) our feeling is not justified. We commit a fallacy of non-observation. The two effects produced by two different types of cause are not really of one type. We are deceived by their outward similarity. A close scrutiny and examination may reveal the traits which turn them into different types.28 But this does not solve the problem. We ask Dharmakirti as to how he determines that there obtains a causal relation (i. e. the relation of necessary sequence) or an identity relation (i. e. the relation of necessary simultaneity) between two things. Experience cannot give us the knowledge of necessary squence or necessary simultaneity. It gives us the knowledge of mere sequence or mere simultaneity. Thus the notorious problem of induction remains unsolved. It is not easy for Dharmakirti' to show how one acquires the knowledge of causality or identity, i. e. of necessary sequence or necessary simultaneity. But he does not take recourse to the idea of a direct transcedental perception of these two necessities as was done by other philosophers including even Prajnakaragupta. Looking to the general trend of his philosophy we may surmise that the following might be the solution at the back of his mind. Buddhist logicians hold that we directly perceive nothing but point instants; thus on their view perception is nothing but a running multiplicity of sensations without any connections or order in them. It is only the Intellect (vikalpa-buddhi) that constructs a system or order out of them through the instrumentality of the two necessities in question. Thus these two necessities are not derived from experience but in fact 'precede experience and make the world orderly and intelligible. In this sense they are apriori. This means that according to the Buddhist logicians there is no uniformity, universality and order in the universe. It is the Intellect (vikalpa-buddhi) that imparts order and uniformity to the world. They are superimposed by it on the external reality. The universe is really not a cosmos but a chaos, so to say. The pure sensations as such represent what reality is and they being chaotic what they represent should also be regarded as chaotic. Some one might urge here that the Buddhist logician too should be regarded as considering the world to be uniform and regular because

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130 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY they too uphold that one point instant is always caused by the point instant immediately preceding it. The Buddhist logician would however argue that this is a generalisation which intends to predicate of the unique particulars something that is common to them, while as a matter of fact the particulars being unique have nothing common to them. Thus it involves a selfcontradiction to make any generalisation in the case of the unique particulars, and any attempt to do so should be viewed as futile. The causality (relation of necessary sequence) that is said to obtain between two point instants is as unique as the point instants themselves. In this sense, it seems, causality is not denied by the Buddhist logician. It is rather the empirical causality that he refuses to treat as real. We ordinarily conceive causality as a relation over and above the relata and subsisting in them but in reality - so says the Buddhist logician - causality is identical with the concerned couple of point instants and it does not subsist in the two because the two are never simultaneous.29 The Buiddhist logician's denial of causality (empirical) may have a further implication. Causality (empirical) without uniformity and necessity is inconceivable. Causality means the principle that the same cause always produces the same effect on different occasions. But in the world of unique particulars how can this principle have its sway ? As soon as we think away the uniformity and necessity suggested by the words 'same' and 'always' occurring in the statement of causal principle causality "loses all its meaning. To say that though a thing does have a cause it does not have the same cause always is to give up causation in favour of chance. And as it is impossible to think of any uniformity or necessity in the case of unique particulars it is better to deny causality outright and declare it to be unreal. Causality does not have its sway in the realm of reals - particulars. Could this not be the implication of the Buddhist logician's denial of causality in the case of real things themselves ? Thus it is the empirical causality and not the transcendental causality, that is denied by the Buddhist logician.30 Uniformity and order as such are the creation of Intellect (vikalpa-buddhi). Intellect creates and superimposes them on the particular discrete reals where they are virtually absent. So, it is only the concepts that are necessarily related with one another and not the external things themselves. And ultimately, what we infer is also a concept. We mistake this concept for something real. Yet this mistake leads to successful purposive action because the concept in question

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ON VYAPTI 131 is generated only by some select individuals and no others, that is, by the individuals that are capable of performing the action in question. Thus according to Dharmakirti, the necessities are apriori. They are present to the Intellect or mind prior to all experience. He holds that our mind is so made that from the very beginning it faces nature in the expectation that the latter will be uniform. The experience here plays only a psychological part, that is, it simply makes us conscious of a notion which the mind already possessed. In other words, experience is but an occasion for calling forth this notion into consciousness.31 This apriori view of Dharmakirti is a natural deduction from the metaphysical doctrine of momentarism and its epistemological counterpart, viz. sensationism. - Notes 1. vastutastAdAtmyAt tadutpattezca / Nyayabindu II. 22 2. atatsvabhAvasyAtadutpattezca tatrApratibaddhasvabhAvatvAt / Nyayabindu II. 23 See also Dharmottara's comment on the same. 3. asyedaM kAryaM kAraNaM sambandhi ekArthasamavAyi virodhiceti lainggikm| Vaisesikasutras, IX.. 18 4. zAstre kAryAdigrahaNaM nidarzanArthaM kRtam, naavdhaarnnaarthm| Prasastapadabhasya (with Vyomavati etc. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series No. 61) p. 562 5. tasmAd yo vA sa vA'stu sambandhaH kevalaM yasyAsau svAbhAviko niyataH sa eva gamako gamyazcetara:-sambandhIti yujyte| Nyayavartikatatparyatika (Kashi Sanskrit Series. No. 24), p. 165 6. tadyathA adhvaryu: om zrAvayan vyavahitasya heturliGgam, candrodayaHsamudravRddheH kumudavikAzasya ca, zaradi jalaprasAdo'gastyodayasyeti / evamAdi tat sarvamasyedamiti sambandhamAtravacanAt siddham / Prasastapadabhasya, p. 563 See also Vyomavati on the same; Nyayavartikatatparyatika, pp. 161 163: Nyayamanjari (Kashi Sanskrit Series No. 106), pp. 113-118 7. tulonAmarasAdInAM tulyakAlatayA na hi| nAmarUpAdihetutvaM na ca tadvyabhicAritA // tAdAtmyaM tu kathaJcit syAt tato hi na tulAntayoH / sAsnAdInAM... cndraarvaakprbhaagyoH| Akalankagranthatraya, p. 75 See also Siddhiviniscaya, 6.15

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132 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 8. bhaviSyat pratipadyeta zakaTaM kRttikodayAt / zva Aditya udeteti grahaNaM vA bhaviSyati // tadetad bhaviSyadviSayamavisaMvAdakaM jJAnaM pratibandhasaGkhyAM pratiruNaddhi / Akalaikagra_nthatraya, p. 5. See also Siddhiviniscaya 6.16 9. shkrmbhaavniymo'vinaabhaavH| sahacAriNoH vyApyavyApakayoH shbhaavH| pUrvottaracAriNoH kAryakAraNayozca krmbhaavH| Pariksamukha, III. 16-18 ... 10. ekasAmAyadhInasya rUpAde rasato gtiH| hetudharmAnumAnena... // ...etena pipIlikotsaraNa-matsyavikArAdeH varSAdyanumAnamuktam / tatrApi bhUtapariNAma eva varSAhetuH pipIlikAdisaMkSobhaheturiti / Svarthanumanapariccheda, p. 5 * See also Dharmottarapradipa, pp. 115-116 :: 11. kAryakAraNabhAvAdvAsvabhAvAdvA niyaamkaat|avinaabhaavniymo...| Svarthanuma napariccheda, p. 13 12. tatpUrvakamityanena liGgaliGginoHsambandhadarzanaM linggdrshnNcaabhismbdhyte| Nyayabhasya, I. 1.5 liGgaliGgisambandhadarzanamAdyaM pratyakSam, liGgadarzanaM dvitIyam / Nyayavartika (Ed. Vindhyeshvariprasada Dvivedi, 1916), p. 44 See also Nyayadarsana (Bengali translation of Nyayabhasya with notes etc by Phanibhusana) Vol. I, p. 135 Read the following passage : atrocyate vahnidhUmAdInAM tAvat saMyogAdisambandhaH pratyakSAdibhiravasIyate / tatrApi saMyogo vizeSaNatvena guNAdInAM dravyaparatantrasvabhAvatvAt / vizeSyatayA ca svatantrabhUtaM dravyaM prakAzate / dezakAlAvapi vizeSaNatvenaivAvabhAsataH / sannihitadezavartamAnakAlatA hi idaMtA / sA ca vizeSaNameva / evaM ca dezakAlAbhyAM saMyogAdisambandhenaca viziSTau dravyabhUtau vahnidhUmau avagamyatena punardezakAlAbhyAMsambandhasya viziSTasyAvagatiH / tathA hi saMyaktAvimAviti pratiyanti na panarayamanayoH saMyoga iti dezakAlAvacchinnaH prathamamagnidhUmayoH saMyogalakSaNo sambandho dvyorvgmyte| Prakaranapaficika (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series No 17), p. 70 13. na hi pratyakSaM yAvan kazcid dhUmaH kAlAntare dezAntare ca pAvakasyaiva kAryaM nArthAntarasya' iti iyato vyApArAn kartuM samarthaM sannihitaviSayabalotpatteravicArakatvAt / Akalaikagrathatraya, p. 5 See also Bhamati (Nirnayasagara), p. 766 14. ...bhUyodarzanabalAdagnidhUmayordezAdivyabhicAre'pyavyabhicAragrahaNam / Vyomavati, p. 570 prAcInAnekadarzanajanitasaMskArasahAye carame darzane cetasi caMkAsti dhUmasya vahniniyatasvabhAvatvam / Kasika on Slokavartika, Anumana., ka. 12

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ON VYAPTI 133 15. na khalu pradIpasahakRtaM cakSU rasAdau pravartamAnaM pratIyate / svaviSaye pravartamAnasya atizayAdhAnaM ca adhyakSasya vyAptiviSayatve siddhe siddhayet / taccAsiddham, sambaddhavartamAnArthaviSayatvAt tasya / na ca tatsahakRtasyApIndriyajAdhyakSasya kazcana utkarSo jAyate, yena svaviSayAti krameNApyarthAn gRhNIyAt / Nyayakumudacandra, p. 430 16. tatra kecidAcakSate mAnasaM prtykssNprtibndhgraahiiti|prtykssaanuplmbhaabhyaamnlshcritmngneshc vyAvartamAnaM dhUmamupalabhya vibhAvasau niyato dhUma iti manasA pratipadyate / manazca sarvaviSayaM kena vA nAbhyupeyate / asannihitamapyarthamavadhArayituM kssmm| Nyayamarijari, pp. 110-111 tasya grahaNaM pratyakSAnupalambhasahAyAt maansaatprtykssaat| dhUmamagnisahacaritamindriyeNopalabhya anagnezca jalAdeyA'vartamAnamanupalambhena jJAtvA manasA nizcinoti dhUmo'gniM na vybhicrtiiti| Nyayakalika (Prince of Wales Series, Kashi), p. 3 17. pratyakSaM mAnasaM yeSAM sambandhaM lingglingginoH| vyAptyA jAnAti te'pyarthe'tIndri yatrAkSANi pravartante mAnasaM tatra vrtte| no'nyatrAkSAdivaidhuryaprasaGgAt sarvadehinAm ||Tattvarthaslokavartika (Nirnayasagara), pp. 179 na cAtItAnAgatAnAM vyaktInAM manasA saGkalanamiti nyAyyam, manaso bahirarthe svAtantrye andhabadhirAdyabhAvaprasaGgAt / Kandali (Vizianagaram), p. 210 nApi mAnasam, manaso bAhyendriyanirapekSasya bahirarthe pravRttyabhAvAt / ...vyAptizca afecaferfranga aferet: 1 Nyayakumudacandra, p. 431-432 18. avinAbhAvaniyamo'darzanAna na darzanAt / Pramanavartika, III. 30 19. nAnumAnAMdasiddhatvAt... / nApyanumAnAntaram, sarvatrAvizeSAt / Akalankagranthatraya, p. 5 20. upalambhAnupalambhasambhavaM trikAlikalitasAdhyasAdhanasambandhAdyAlambanamidamasminsati eva bhavatItyAkAraM saMvedanamUhAparanAmA tarka iti / Pariksamukha, III. 7 sambhavapratyayastarkaH prtykssaanuplmbhtH| Akalaikagranthatraya, p. 100 21. tasyApi vyAptigrahaNakAle yogIva bhavati pramAtA sampadyata iti| Pramanamimamsa, p. 36 . 22. vyAghAtAvadhirAzaGkA / Nyayakusumanjali, p. 23 See also The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, p. 277 23. yat tApaduktaM nizcayena prekSAvatAM pravRttiriti tadasat / saMzayenApi pravRttidarzanAt / Tattvasangrahapanjika (GOS), p. 3 24. Siddhantamuktavali, ka. 64

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134 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 25. tathA ca sAmAnyalakSaNAM vinA dhUmatvena sakaladhUmAnAM vahnitvena sakalavahrInAM ca bhAnaM kathaM bhavet tadarthaM sAmAnyalakSaNA sviikriyte| Ibid, ka. 65 26. kAryakAraNabhAvasya vizeSeNa vinishcye| atItAnAgatajJAnamasya bhAvi parisphuTam / / Pramanavartikabhasya, p. 329 yastu manyate prajJAkaraguptaH yogijJAnaM vyAptijJAnamiti / Siddhiviniscayatika, p. 189 27. kAryakAraNabhAvAd vA svabhAvAd vA niyAmakAt / ___avinAbhAvaniyamo'darzanAnna na darzanAt // Pramanavartika, III. 30 (with Dharmakirti's Commentary) 28. kasyacit kadAcit kutazcid bhAve'pi sarvastAdRzastathAvidhajanmeti kutaH; tathA ca nAnvayavyatirekau iti cet / na / atadbhAvinastasya sakRdapi tato'bhAvAt / parasparApekSayA . janyajanakasvabhAvalakSaNe kaarykaarnne| tatra yadidhUmo'gnyAdisAMmaNyA anyato'pi bhavet tadA tajanyasvabhAvo na bhavatIti sakRdapi tato na bhavet / arthAntaravat / nApi sAmagrI taM janayet, atajananasvabhAvatvAt / sAmaNyantaravat / na ca dhUmasya tadatajanyaH svabhAvo yuktaH / eksvbhaavtvaat| dhUmAdhUmajananasvabhAvAt bhavato dhUmAdhUmasvabhAvaH syAt / kAryasvabhAvAnAM kAraNasvabhAvakRtatvAt / akAraNApekSaNe cAhetukatvaprasaGgAt / tasmAd yo dhUmajananaH sa agnyAdisAmagrIvizeSo bhavatIti kAryakAraNayorevaM svabhAvasya niyamAt tadvijAtIyAd utpattirna bhavati / tat yAdRzaM kAryaM kAraNAd dRSTamekadA tat tanna vyabhicarati / tena siddhe kAryakAraNabhAve kAryasya kAraNena vyAptiH siddhaabhvti| nanu vijAtIyAdapi kiJcidbhavad dRSTaM tdythaagomyaadeHshaaluukaadiH| na vijAtIyAd utpttiH| tathAvidhameva hitAdRzAmAdinimittamiti na kAraNabhedaH / prabandhena utpattau zarAd bhavati / asti ca gomayetarajanmanoH svabhAvabhedaH rUpasyAbhede'pi, na hi AkAratulyataiva bhAvAnAM tattve nimittam / abhinnAkArANAmapi keSAJcidanyato vizeSAjjAtibhedo dRshyte| Hetubindu, pp. 63-64 See also (Pramanavartika-) Svarthanumanapariccheda, p. 15 29. kAryakAraNabhAvo'pi tayorasahabhAvataH / prasiddhayati kathaM dviSTho'dviSThe sambandhatA katham / / Sambandhapariksa, ka. 7 as quoted in Prameyakamalamartanda, p. 509 30. Buddhist Logic, Vol. I, p. 247, 4n 31. Ibid, p. 262

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JAINAS ON TESTIMONY The necessity of testimony is felt by all the Indian philosophers because all of them, alike, believe in the objects that are amenable neither to perceptual nor to inferential cognition. All would join hands with Vatsyayana' who observes that objects like svarga etc. could be known only through testimony. But this does not mean that testimony cannot give us knowledge of perceptible things. It does. But, then, why should we make use of testimony in objects which are perceptible ? The answer to this question is not a difficult one. Man cannot progress if he were to depend on his own experience in all matters of perceptible objects and were not to accept the results of his predecessors; he would have to start anew every generation. Again, were he dependent upon his own experiences alone for his knowledge, his stock of knowledge would be very meagre, his mental outlook would be narrow and he could neither impart the results of his experiences to others nor could he become acquainted with their achievements. Hence the necessity of testimony to know even objects which are perceptible. Testimony is defined as a 'word' of an authority. What are the characteristic features of an authority ? Is it possible to know these features ? Is testimony a form of inference ? If it is, how is it reduced to inference ? If it is not, what are the fundamental differences obtaining between the two that render such reduction impossible ? How do we know the validity (pramanya) of testimony ? These are some of the main topics of discussion that will engage one's attention while on an investigation, on testimony. It is intended to discuss the problem concerned under the two main heads : (A) Treatment of testimony upto the time of Jinabhadra, and (B) after the time of Jinabhadra. Under the second head, the views of the non-Jaina schools of Indian philosophy would also be taken into account. (A) Treatment of Testimony upto the time of Jinabhadra The Anuyogadvarasutra recognises two types of agamas (scriptures), viz., empirical (laukika) and transcendental (alaukika). The nonJaina sastras like the Vedas, the Mahabharata, the seventytwo sciences and arts are included in the first category. The second type comprises

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136 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY the Jaina sastras only. With regard to the first type of sastras, it is stated that they are the fanciful creation of perverse persons. But the sastras falling under the head of transcendental agama are composed by omniscient beings. It seems that in very early times only the words of Jina (omniscient person) were regarded as pramana (valid), but gradually even the words of srutakevalin and dasapurvi came to be regarded as pramana. Of course, the words of the latter were regarded as pramana not independently but on the ground that they were always in consonance with the agamas by Jinas. It is a belief among the Jainas that only the Caturdasapurvadhara and Dasapurvadhara are invariably possessed of the right attitude;" hence there is no possibility of their stating things that may go against the agamas by Jinas. Eventually, even the instructions of sthaviras, not found in the agamas but visualised by them on the strength of their genius, also came to be regarded as pramana. Thus, the alaukika agama is further divided under two heads, angapravista and angabahya., One important thing to be noted here is that in the Dasavaikalika-Niryukti it is explicitly stated that though the words of a Jina are infallible and valid, one should give logical reason (hetu) and illustration (udaharana) in their support. The above discussion shows that the pramanya-apramanya of agamas depend on the right or wrong attitude of the author. But there is another criterion also for its determination. All words are neutral, that is, neither pramana nor apramana. It is the attitude of the knower that makes them pramana or apramana. Thus, pramanya or apramanya of words depends upon the attitude of the knower. If his attitude is right, whatever he knows becomes right and if his attitude is wrong, his knowledge derived from right scriptures also becomes wrong. Similarly, if the result of the knowledge of the mithya (laukika) sruta (false scriptures) by a mithya-drsti (person of perverse attitude) turns out in the end to be the abandonment of the perversity, the mithya-sruta (false scripture) is to be considered as samyak-sruta (right scripture). Umasvati gives the following synonyms of sruta : aptavacana, agama, upadesa, aitihya, amnaya, pravacana and Jinavacana. He recognises two types of scriptures, viz., angabahya and angapravista. Samayika etc. are included in the first type and the twelve angas are included in the second type. What is the basis of this distinction ? The distinction is based on the types of teachers. Regarding agama, Kundakunda observes. * 'He who is free from all defects and is possessed of all pure qualities is the supreme authority.

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JAINAS ON TESTIMONY 137 The defects are hunger, thirst, fear, anger, attachment, delusion, anxiety, old age, disease, death, perspiration, fatigue, pride, indulgence, surprise, sleep, birth and restlessness. One free from all these defects and possessed of sublime grandeur such as omniscience is called the perfect One. Words proceeding from his mouth, pure and free from the flaw of internal inconsistency are called agama (verbal testimony). In that agama, the principles are enunciated.'' For him, absence of hunger, thirst and such things constitute some of the marks of an apta (reliable person). Kundakunda's definition of apta is based on the Digambara tradition. It is noteworthy that Kundakunda recognises coherence or internal consistency as the essential feature of a true scripture. The systematic treatment of Jaina logic starts from Siddhasena Divakara. In his short treatise entitled Nyayavatara, he defines sabda or verble testimony as a valid knowledge which arises from a right understanding of the words (tattvagrahitaya) that express the real object and are not contradicted by perception and one's own accepted system. Words characterised by the two above-mentioned characteristics come from the mouth of an apta - authority. And the purpose of verbal testimony is to instruct, to relate the nature of reality, to be beneficial to all and to remove false notions." In the Dasavaikalika-Niryukti, it is said that agama stands in need of no proof; it is self-established; hetu and udaharana are necessary only to elucidate the agama. It did not occur to the persons of this period that even the agama needs to be examined. They thought that they were composed by.an omniscient person and hence infallible. But how could one know that they were really composed by an omniscient person when the author had left the world long ago ? Some such cosideration seems to be at the back of Kundakunda's mind when he states that the words of an apta are free from internal inconsistency. He means to say that a particular work should be considered to have been composed by an apta if there do not occur in it contradictory statements. But is it not possible to speak the untruth consistently ? Again, is it not possible to have coherence in the body of knowledge inspite of its being wholly wrong? So, it seems that Siddhasena Divakara took a step in the right direction when he stated that verbal testimony to be pramana must not be in conflict with perception in addition to its being self-consistent or coherent.12 Later logicians like Samantabhadra,13 Akalankal4 etc. collow him in this matter and add that it should not be contradicted

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138 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY by reason (yukti). Another statement of Siddhasena Divakara is significant. He says : Words expressing the real object and consistent with perception as well as with the whole body of the speaker's knowledge generate valid knowledge in the hearer provided he understands the import rightly. Even the words of an apta may cause wrong knowledge if the hearer is not a proper person. Thus, to generate valid knowledge in the hearer, words should not only come from a reliable person but should also reach a person who is capable of understanding their true import. We surmise that the two ways of determining the validity of agama are assimilated here into one by Siddhasena Divakara in his characteristic style, which renders his difinition a considerable advance on the agamic treatment of the problem. In Jinabhadra little that is important is to be found on the subject. It is indeed surprising that at one place he states explicitly that agama is a case of anumana.16 (B) Treatment of Testimony after Jinabhadra In Indian philosophy, there has raged a controversy on the point whether testimony is an independent source of knowledge or is merely a case of inference. The Vaisesika and the Buddhist philosophers regard it as a case of inference, while others, including Jaina logicians, consider it to be an independent source. For a clear understanding of this controversy, it is necessary to know how we derive knowledge by testimony. First, we have the auditory or visual perception of the spoken or written sentence. Then we try to understand the meaning of a sentence. For understanding the meaning of a particular sentence, the knowledge of three things is necessary, viz., that the words constituting it expect one another (akanksa), that they have mutual fitness (yogyata), and that they are continuous with one another in time and place (sannidhi). And, the knowledge of the expectancy, fitness and propinquity of the words in a particular sentence requires the application of general rules for their determination. But the mere understanding of the meaning of a sentence does not lead directly to the knowledge of things. For the knowledge of things what is necessary is the knowledge that the speaker is an authority even if he may not be so actually. As soon as one understands the meaning of a sentence and knows the speaker to be an authority, there arises in him the knowledge of things. Afterwards, if he wants

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JAINAS ON TESTIMONY 139 to ascerain the validity of the knowledge, he will have to examine whether his anderstnding of the meaning of a sentence is correct and whether his knowledge of the speaker's authoritativeness is true. Of the two, it is the second that requires close scrutiny and critical exmination. So, the question as to how we can determine the authoritativeness of a speaker is of prime importance in testimony. There are four conditions that characterise an apta : (1) He should know correctly the fact stated by him. (2) He should have no desire to deceive others. (3) He should have a desire to speak out the truth. (4) He should have his sense-organs in perfect order. Out of these four, the first two are really important. Capacity to know things as they are and absence of the disire to deceive others are invariably related with freedom from narrow love and harted." Dharmakirti is right when he observes that universal love is the prime condition that makes a man reliable and truthful, i.e., apta. 18. A man impelled by universal love would never think of deceiving others and would always exert himself to know as precisely as possible the ways of freeing man from worldly misery. Even the Jainas hold the same view." It is interesting to note that the conditions regarded necessary to make a person an authority are more or less similar in all the systems of Indian philosophy. But opinions are divided on the question as to how to ascertain whether a particular person is an authority or not. A Jaina logician Akalanka recognises the possibility of the knowledge of internal quality, viz., absence of narrow love and hatred which, as we have already seen, makes a person an authority. He opines that man's good and bad overt behaviour is governed by and caused respectively by his internal good and bad qualities. And hence from the good overt behaviour we can infer the internal good quality, viz., absence of narrow love and hatred. But Dharmakirti is of the opinion that the character of man is not easy to discern. The overt behaviour mainly depends on human will, and if a man wills to behave in such a fashion as would not disclose his internal qualities he can do so. He may be a hypocrite. He may put on the air of a righteous man, while he may not be so in reality. Even a villain may pretend to be virtuous. So, overt behaviour cannot always enable us to infer correctly the internal quality and ultimately the reliability or otherwise of a person.20 So, he supplies us with another criterion for the ascertainment of authoritativeness or reliability. It is coherence in the body of what he has said and written, 21 and non-contradiction of it by perception and inference.22 Even

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140 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Akalanka accepts this,23 but he criticises Dharmakirti's view that internal qualities could never be inferred legitimately from overt behviour. A well-examined overt behaviour would always enable us to infer its cause, viz., the internal quality. It is a rule that a wellscrutinised effect would never frustrate our efforts to infer its proper cause 24 Of course, votaries of every system regard the scriptures of their faith as valid on the ground that they are not composed by persons smitten with narrow love and selfishness. The Mimarsakas consider the Vedas as authorless and thus above the possibility of composition by a person with defects.25 The Nyaya-Vaisesikas maintain that they are composed by God who knows things as they are and is beyond attachment and hatred. The Jainas and Buddhists consider their scriptures to be the words of their masters who have freed themselves from the clutches of internal enemies and, as a result, developed transcendental vision. Now, let us consider, the point whether the knowledge derived through testimony is inferential. The Nyaya logicians hold that words are directly connected with things, though this connection with things is conventional or arbitrary. But that does not mean that words do not generate knowledge of things in those who have learnt the convention. They do generate the knowledge of things in persons acquainted with convention.26 But they do not generate valid knowledge. In other words, they are not responsible for the generation of vaildity or invalidity in the knowledge. Validity and invalidity depend on guna and dosa respectively. Here in the present context, authoritativeness or otherwise of the speaker constitutes, respectively, the guna and dosa of the cause of the knowledge.27 Thus, the attitude of the Nyaya logicians is that as soon as we understand the meaning of a sentence, we acquire the knowledge of things and if it is a sentence of an authority, the knowledge is valid. And, as, according to them the process of understanding the meaning of a sentence is not inferential,28 even the knowledge of things through words should not be regarded as inferential. They consider the process of understanding the meaning to be quite different from that of perception, inference and the rest. The knowledge of things through words is an independent source of valid knowledge. The Vaisesika philosophers consider the knowledge of things through words to be a case of inference on the following grounds.

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JAINAS ON TESTIMONY 141 (1) According to the Vaisesika philosophers, the process by which we understand the meaning of a sentence is inferential. Suppose somebody tells one that 'the river is fordable'. What kind of knowledge does one have when one understands that sentence ? Is it inferential ? If so, what is the probans? And, what is the probandum ? As the syllogism has been stated in the Dipika in support of the Vaisesika view, it would appear that the probandum is the total meaning of the entire sentence, i.e , of the whole group of words contained in the sentence, "'The river is fordable'. The group of words is the subject (paksa). The conclusion (nigamana) is : "This group of words possesses a connected meaning, i.e , refers to the connection of the meanings of the words of this group.' The probans or mark is the fact that this is a group of words which have, in respect of one another, expectancy, suitability etc. The universal proposition expressing the invariable concomitance of the mark with the probandum is: 'Whatever is a group of words which have, in respect of one another, expectancy, suitability etc. refers to (or means) the connection of the meanings of these words'. An illustration to show that this universal proposition is true is any sentence employed by the person who attempts to understand the sentence, 'The river is fordable : 29 Thus, it is by the process of inference that, after having heard the sentence, "The river is fordable', one understands the total meaning of the sentence. The generally accepted view that we arrive at the meaning of a sentence by applying rules of syntax and grammar, it seems, is here expressed in a different manner. Since the essence of inference is arriving at knowledge through the application of a gereral rule to a particular instance, this process of understanding the meaning which involves the application of general rules to a particular instance should be deemed inferential. (2) Like the Naiyayikas, the Vaisesikas, too, hold that words are directly connected with things and that the connection is conventional. But unlike the Naiyayikas, they are able to understand the implications of this conventional character of the relation. As the convention is dependent upon or governed by human will or desire, word qua word cannot generate the knowledge of things. Word qua word can generate only the knowledge of the intention of the speaker to convey a particular information in a person who has learnt the convention. It might be urged that if smoke can generate the knowledge of fire in the person who has learnt that smoke is a sign of fire, why should the word not generate the knowledge of the thing in the person who has learnt that that word

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142 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY is a symbol of that thing ? This is so because a sign has always a physical and natural connection with the thing it signifies, while the symbol has merely a mental and arbitrary connection with the thing it symbolises. So, the sign gives us the knowledge of the thing, while the symbol gives us the knowledge of mental image or concept of the thing that is in the mind of the speaker. On this account through word qua word we cannot have knowledge of a thing, but only the concept of it in the mind of the speaker or, in other words, the intention of the speaker to convey a particular information. And, the word and the concept being invariably related, we infer the concept from the words. That is to say, from words qua words we infer only the intention of the speaker to convey a particular information.30 (3) At times, they observe that through words we get the knowledge of things, but they add that this knowledge is inferential. They consider knowledge to be inferential because words give us the knowledge by the force of universal connection just as smoke gives knowledge of fire by the force of universal connection between smoke and fire. Sentences, when understood, serve as invariable marks of external things and facts. Though these marks have no natural relation with things, as shown above, they enable us to infer things, with certain qualifications viz., that they are conventionally connected with things and that they are spoken by an authority. The adding of qualifications to the mark' does not prevent the case from being an inference. Even such an inferential mark as smoke used in inferring that there is fire on the hill is a valid mark only with certain qualifications, e.g., the smoke rising upward in an unbroken connection with the ground." . Thus, from all this it follows that according to the Vaisesika philosophers, knowledge through words is inferential. Words qua words enable us to infer the intention of the speaker, while the words qua utterances of an authority enable us to infer the things. In other words, according to the Vaisesikas, the mere understanding of a sentence cannot lead to the knowledge of things. For that the knowledge of the authoritativeness of the speaker as also the knowledge of the universal rule that the sentences spoken by an authority, when understood, do invariably point to facts, is necessary. Mere statement of an authority, unless we possess the knowledge that it is an invariable mark of the thing, does not generate the knowlede of that thing, just as smoke qua smoke does not generate the knowledge of fire unless we know it to be an invariable mark of fire. The Vaisesika view that there are only

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JAINAS ON TESTIMONY 143 two sources of valid knowledge, viz., perception and inference, and that testimony is a case of inference is an original one but their explanation of how testimony can be reduced to inference seems to be borrowed from the Buddhist logicians. The fact that the Vaisesika explanation tallies closely with the Buddhist one and that only in those Vaisesika works that are later than Dinnaga and Dharmakirti do we find the attempt to explain how testimony be reduced to inference corroborate our presumption. Let us now see in what ways the Buddhist logicians reduce testimony to inference. For them, words have no connection whatsoever with the external things.32 Were they connected with the things, there would have been the relation either of causality or of essential identity between them. But there obtains neither of the two relations between the two. Words are not even conventionally connected with the things. They are conventionally connected with concepts. That is why it is said that words call forth concepts in the mind and concepts call forth the words. And, it is only on this account that words qua words give rise to cognitions that bear no form of the external things at all.33 For example, the words 'there are hundreds of elephants dancing on a finger-tip' have no corresponding actual fact outside. Of course, the Buddhists would not deny the fac' that on hearing these words we are able to form or construct an image or concept, in our mind, of hundreds of elephants dancing on a finger-tip. But this concept or image is not an external fact. This naturally means that from words we can infer the concept in the mind of the speaker. In other words, though the words and verbal statements are not connected with things and facts, they are invariably connected - for the persons who have learnt the relevant convention - with the concepts, rather the intention of the speaker. The verbal statements are the effects of the intention of the speaker. So, they enable us to infer the intention of the speaker.34 But, do they enable us to infer the intention of the speaker in general or a particular intention ? It is said that they enable us to infer both. The verbal statements qua verbal statements enable us to infer the intention in general, but the verbal statements qua utterances of a normal man enable us to infer the particular intention also. The verbal statements qua verbal statements, that is, verbal statements as are not determined to be of normal persons, enable us to infer merely their desire to speak. They cannot enable us to infer the desire to give expression to a particular information. This

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144 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY is so because there are verbal statements that have no particular intention, i.e., desire to express a particular information, as their cause. For example, a drunken man or a mad person speaks sentences without any particular intention. He has merely the desire to speak but not a particular desire, i.e., the desire to convey a particular information. Thus, verbal statements qua verbal statements enable us to infer only the disire of the speaker to speak but the verbal statements qua utterances of a normal man enable us to infer his desire to convey a particular thing.35 The desire of the speaker to convey a particular information is not always generated by actual fact. So, the knowledge of intention could not enable us to infer the fact.36 ' . We should note that the inference that enables us to infer only the intention cannot be regarded as a source of knowledge or pramana, because it does not give us the knowledge of things and facts while a source of knowledge (pramana) gives us the knowledge of things and facts. We may call this inference of intention from words a source of knowledge (pramana) only by way of courtesy, considering the intention itself to be the fact. Thus, on the basis that verbal statements, when understood, enable us to infer the intention of the speaker, the Buddhist logicians could not regard this verbal knowledge to be a case of inference which is a source of knowledge of external things and facts. The Buddhist logicians know this and are conscious also of the force of the objection. They, therefore, go one step further and observe that words or verbal statements not only indicate the speaker's intention but also enable us to infer the things and facts provided they are known to be spoken or written by an authority because it is a general rule that the words of an authority always correspond to facts. ? They further observe that it is ingrained in man to take for granted the authoritativeness of a person or a scripture whose words are in tune with his desires or interests. Man accepts preceptors and scriptures as authoritative on matters pertaining to heavenly happiness and hellish tortures and the ways and means to attain and avoid them, respectively, because he craves for the one and shivers merely at the thought of the other, and there is no other valid knowledge to contradict them. But if a man is determined to lead his life in accordance with the words of the scriptures or the preceptors (i.e., in accordance with the knowledge derived through those words), he should first examine and ascertain their authoritativeness which has so far been taken for granted.

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JAINAS ON TESTIMONY 145 It is on the authoritativeness that the validity of the knowledge derived through words depends.38 Thus, for the Buddhist logicians, this is the process by which knowledge of facts or things through words and sentences is arrived at. Versal statements are invariably connected with the intention of the speaker to convey a particular information. So, they enable us to infer merely the intention of the speaker. But as soon as they are known to come from the mouth or pen of an authority, they enable us to infer not only the intention but also facts because the intention of an authority to convey a particular information always coincides with actual facts. Now, the validity of this knowledge can be ascertained only after having examined and ascertainted the authoritativeness of the speaker or writer. How the authoritativeness of a speaker or a scripture could be ascertained is an important problem which has already been discussed. The Jaina logicians refute the Buddhist view that words do not lead directly to the knowledge of things. They observe that words are connected with things. Of course, though words and things, like Krttika and Sakata constellations, are not related by natural and physical relation, they do have some invisible relation between them.39 Again, they observe that though words have neitlser the relation of causality nor that of essential identity with things, they do have yogyata-sambandha with them. The Buddhist logicians might urge that in the absence of these two relations how even this relation could be possible ? The Jaina logicians observe that this relation is seen between the visual sense-organ and its object even in the absence of those two relations. Even the Buddhist logicians have recognised it. Were they to reject this, their position would come in conflict with experience and with their doctrine that the senseorgan is not in bodily contact with its object (aprapyakarita). It might be urged that if there is yogyata-sambandha between a word and its object, the object can as well serve as a denoter and the word as a denoted. This objection, say the Jain logicians, is illfounded, because capacities of things are definite. Some might say : If words are inherently capable of generating knowledge of things, they would generate it even in a man innocent of language. In reply, it is said that this does not happen because words generate knowledge of things only in those who have learnt the language or the convention. Convention means the man-made rule that a particular word would denote a particular thing. Just as smoke could not enable a man, who does not know that smoke is an invariable mark of fire, to infer fire, even so a

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146 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY word could not enable a man who has not learnt the convention to know the thing. 42 Someone might here insert a suggestion that convention being dependent upon and governed by the human will and human will being free, even the thing may become the denoter and the words the denoted. The Jaina logicians observe that just as an invariable relation between smoke and fire is natural, even so the relation between a word and a thing is natural. Convention merely makes us conscious of that relation in the same way as repeated observation makes us conscious of the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire.43 Granted that there obtains a natural relation between them, one might, here, raise a question as to whether words generate knowledge of certain things or of all things. If the first alternative is accepted, nothing other than those certain things would be cognised through words even if hundreds of conventions are formed. If the second alternative is accepted, then, through a single world all things would be cognised at a time and consequently our activity with respect to a definte object would become impossible because all words would be capable of generating knowledge of all things. The Jaina logicians reply that this difficulty would not arise because though every word is capable of being related to any object, yet it would denote that object only with which it is conventionally connected.44 Thus, words being connected with things enable us to know the thing. It might be objected that if the words were having yogyata-sambandha with things, as the visual organ has with its object, then words would generate knowledge of external things without requiring any convention as the visual organ does. In answer, it is said that word is a jnapaka-karana (revealing cause) and hence it requires the assistance of convention while visual organ is a karaka-karana (generating cause) and hence it does not require any convention to generate the knowledge of its object. The visual organ, being the karaka-karana of the knowledge of its object, generates it even when the cogniser has not learnt that there obtains an invariable relation between the organ and the knowledge generated by it. But words, like smoke etc., being just jnapaka-karanas cause the knowledge of objects only when one has learnt that there obtains an invariable relation between the mark and the marked.45 The entire trend of the argument makes it clear that even the Jaina logicians, like the Nyaya logicians, are of the opinion that as soon as we bear the word, the knowledge of the thing is generated in us, and if the speaker is an authority, valid knowledge or the knowledge of things as they are is generated.

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JAINAS ON TESTIMONY 147 The Jaina logicians maintain that words enable us to know not only the intention of the speaker but external things also. The mere ground that the knowledge through words does not, at times, correspond to facts is not sufficient to establish that all knowledge through words is such and that words could not enable us to know things at all. They observe that if this be the reason for the Buddhist logician's acceptance of the position that words do not enable us to know things and that they enable us to know only the intentions of the speakers, they are labouring under a misapprehension because, sometimes, words, as in the case of gotraskhalana (mistake of pronouncing a different family name from the intended one) etc., are not used by the speaker according to his intention to convey some particular information and hence knowledge derived through words would not then correspond even to his intention to convey some particular information. But the Buddhist logicians deem it possible to know the intention through words inspite of the fact that all words are not used in accordance with the intention of the speaker Similarly, they should recognise the possibility to know things through words even though all words do not describe the things as they are. Again, those who think that words enable us to know intentions only have to face an inconsistency when they state that Sugata is an authority as his words are true to facts, while others are not so as their words are not in accordance with facts, as also when they determine as to what statements are necessary for proving the fact syllogistically and what statements are not necessary for that.47 This shows that the Jainas, like the Naiyayikas, maintain emphatically that words lead to the knowledge of things directly. But the question remains as to whether this knowledge of things derived through words is inferential. The Jaina logicians do not regard this knowledge to be a case of inference. The reasons given by them are as follow : (1) The objects of inference and testimony are not identical. The object of testimony is an unqualified thing while that of inference is the thing qualified by an attribute desired to be proved in it.48 (2) Even their causes are not identical. Presence of the middle term in the minor term etc. (paksadharmatvadi) that are the necessary conditions of an inference are not applicable in the case of testimony.49 (3) The relation that obtains between the probans and the probandum is different from the one that obtains between a word and its object because the former relation necessitates the physical presence of the

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148 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY probandum where and when its probans is physically present, while the latter relation does not do so. The place where the word resides is not the place where its object resides, and the time when the word exists is not the time when its object exists. Yet, the word invariably points to the object meant. Again, the word of an authority is said to have an invariable relation to the thing or fact only in the sense that the thing is invariably present there and then where and when the word means it to be.So (4) Word is a symbol, while smoke etc. are signs. Word works as a symbol of a particular thing, provided men by common consent will it to be so, while smoke etc. do not work as signs of water etc. even if men by common consent how-so-often will them to be so. This is the difference between symbol and sign."! (5) Testimony is not a case of inference because words as spoken of an authority generate valid knowledge, while in inference the mark generates the valid knowledge on the strength of invariable concomitance. S2 The grounds on which the Jaina logicians refute the view that considers testimony to be a case of inference are not strong enough. Even they themselves acknowledge that the residence of a logical reason (hetu) in the subject of inference (paksa) etc do not constitute the nature of a valid mark. According to them, the essential nature of a valid mark is its invariable concomitance with the thing it signifies. And, invariable concomitance is the basis of testimony. A word always means its object, and a word of an authority always corresponds to actual fact. Though this invariable relation is based on convention, it could not prevent testimony from being a case of inference. For inference, it is the invariable relation between the mark and the object it signifies that is necessary and not a particular type of invariable concomitance. Otherwise, there would be as many independent sources of valid knowledge as there are types of invariable relations. Only the word qua utterance of an authority generates knowledge of fact. Thus, here, word serves as a mark of a fact with certain qualification. But on that ground it could not be regarded that testimony is not a case of inference. As a matter of fact, adding of qualifications to the mark could not prevent the case from being an inference as is shown earlier. All the differences pointed out by the Jaina logicians between inference and testimony are trivial and do not make sufficient ground

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JAINAS ON TESTIMONY 149 for their view that testimony is a source independent of inference. What Akalanka, the eminent Jaina logician, has observed in the context of analogy (upamana) applies equally to testimony. He says : If merely on the strength of such trivial differences among various pieces of knowledge we were to regard them as independent sources, then there would be innumerable independent sources. This is a healthy attitude and the Jaina logicians should have maintained it even in the case of testimony. Notes 1. vyavasthA punaH 'agnihotraM juhuyAt svargakAmaH' iti / laukikasya svarge na liGgadarzanaM na pratyakSam / Nyayasutra-Bhasya, 1.1.3. 2. AptopadezaH shbdH| Nyayasutra, 1.1.7. 3. suttaM gaNadharakathidaM taheva patteyabuddhakathidaM c| sudakevaliNA kathidaM abhiNNadasapuvvakathidaM / / Mulacara, 5.80. 4. coddasa dasa ya abhinne niyamA smmN...| Brhat-Kalpasutra (Atmananda Jaina Granthamala) 132 5. gaNahara-therakayaM vA AdesA mukkavAgaraNato vaa| dhuva-calavisesato vA aMgA'NaMgesu NANattaM / / Ibjd, 144. 6. jiNavayaNaM siddhaM ceva bhaNNae katthaI udAharaNaM / - Asajja u soyAraM heU vi kahiMci bhaNNejA / / Dasavaikalika-Niryakti, 49. 7. bhArahaM rAmAyaNaM......cattAri aveAsaMgovaMgA, eAiMmicchadihissa micchattapariggahiAI micchAsuaM, eAI ceva sammadihissa sammattapariggahiAI sammasuaM; ahavA micchadihissavieAIcevasammasuaM, kamhA? sammattaheuttaNao, jamhAte micchadiTThiA tehiM ceva samaehiM coiA samANA kei sapakkhadiTThIo cyNti| Nandisutra, 42, 8. Tattvarthabhasya (Devacandra Lalbhai Series, 67, 76) 1. 20. 9. Niyamasara (Jaganimandal Jain Mem. Series) 5-8. 10. dRSTeSTAvyAhatAd vAkyAt prmaarthaabhidhaayinH| tattvagrAhitayotpanaM mAnaM zAbdaM prakIrtitam // Nyayavatara (Singhi Jain Series, Bombay), 8. 11. Ibid., 9. 12. adRSTeSTavirodhakam / Ibid., 9. 13. sa tvamevAsi nirdoSo yuktizAstrAvirodhIvAk / Aptamimamsa (N. S. Press, Bombay), 6.

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150 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 14. zruteH pramANAntarAbAdhanaM pUrvAparAvirodhazca avisNvaadH| Akalaika-Granthatrayam (Singhi Jain Series 12), p. 24. 15. Nyayavatara, 8. 16. sArikkhavivakkhobhayamuvamAgamameva savvamaNumANaM / Visesavasyakabhasya (Yasovijaya Jain Granthamala, 35) 470. 17. Nyayasutra-Bhasya, 1.1.7. 18. sAdhanaM / karuNA......Pramanavarttika (Ed. with Manoratha-vrtti by Rahul Sanskritayana, Patna), 1.36. . sA (karuNA) bhagavataH prAmANyasya saadhnm| Manoratha-vrtti on the above. 19. Aptamilansa, 1. 3-4. 20. caitasebhyo hi guNadoSebhyaH puruSAH samyaga mithyApravRttayaH / te . cAtIndriyAH svaprabhavakAyavAgvyavahArAnumeyAH syuH| vyavahArAzca prAyazo buddhipUrvamanyathApikartuM zakyante, puruSecchAvRttitvAt teSAM ca citrAbhisandhitvAt / tadayaM liGgasaGkarAt kathamanizcinvan ufarvela i Svarthanumana-Paricchedah with Svopajna-vrtti on Pramana-varttika (Nepala Rajya Sanskrit Series, 12), p. 73. atra yathA rakto bravIti tathA virakto'pIti vacanamAtrAdapratipattiH / nApi vizeSAt / abhiprAyasya durbodhatvAt / vyavahArasareNa sarveSAM vyabhicArAt / Ibid., p. 6. 21. zAstraM yat siddhayA yuktyA svavAcA ca na baadhyte| .. dRSTe'dRSTe'pi tad grAhyamiti cintA pravartate / / Pramanavarttika, 4.104. 22. pratyakSeNAnumAnena dvividhenApyabAdhanam / Ibid., 3.215. 3. Akalanka-Granthatrayam, p.' 14; Nyayakumudacandra of Prabhacandra (Manikacandra Dig. Jain Granthamala, 38, 39), p. 634. 24. yatnataH parIkSitaM kAryaM kAraNaM nAtivartata iti cet stutaM prastutam / Astasati, p. 72; Akalarka-Granthatrayam. p. 10. 25. vede tu praNetuH puruSasyAbhAvAd doSAzakaiva na pravartate vaktradhInatvAd doSANAm... Nyayamanjari (Kashi Skt. Series. 166), p. 154, 26. na, saamyiktvaacchbdaarthsmprtyysy| Nyayasutra, 2.1.56. zabdasya jJApakatvAt / jJApakasya dhUmAderetadrUpaM yat sambandhagrahaNApekSaM svajJApyajJApa katvam / Nyayamarijari, p. 221. 27. yuktaM caitadeva yad dIpavat prakAzatvamAtrameva zabdasya svarUpaM na yathArthatvamayathArthatvaM vA viparIte'pyarthe dIpasya prakAzatvAnativRtteH / ... ... ... prakAzAtmanastu zabdasya vaktRguNadoSAdhIne ythaarthetrtve| Ibid., p. 146. 28. yogyatArthagatAkAGkSA shbdnisstthitaanubhaavikaa|| pratyekaM vA militvA vA naite linggmsiddhitH|| Sabdasakatiprakasika, 4.

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JAINAS ON TESTIMONY 151 29. nanu etAni padAni svasmAritArthasaMsargavanti AkAGkSAdimatpadakadambakatvAt madvAkyavadityanumAnAdevasaMsargajJAnasambhavAcchabdo na prmaannaantrm| Tarkasangraha of Annambhalta, (Bombay Skt. Ser., 55), p. 54. 30. vAkyarUpastu zabdo'rthapratipattau samayamapi nApekSata iti sambandhabalenArthapratipAda katvamasiddham / na ca zabdasyAnumAnatvameva niSidhyate / vivakSAkAzAdhigame liGgatvAt / yathA hyAkAzAdhigamesarvaHzabdo'numAnaM vivakSAkAryastu vivkssaadhigme'piiti| Vyomavati p. 574. . 31. Nyayakandali, pp. 214-17. 32. na vai zabdAnAM kAcid viSayasvabhAvAyattA vRttiH| Svarthanumanapariccheda, p. 21. tatra vAcyeSu puruSAyattavRttInAM zabdAnAmavastusandarzinAM yathAbhyAsaM vikalpaprabodhahetUnAM pravRtticintA, tadvazAd vastuvyavasthApanaM ca kevalaM jADyakhyApanam / Ibid., p. 23. 33. tasmAnna svalakSaNe smyH| Ibid., p. 29. vikalpavAsanobhUtAH smaaropitgocraaH|| Ibid., p. 102. jAyante buddhayastatra kevalaM naarthgocraaH| . nAntarIyakatA'bhAvAcchabdAnAM vastubhiH sh| nArthasiddhistataste hi vaktrabhiprAyasUcakAH / / Ibid., p. 71. 34. tasmAnna svAbhAvikaH zabdArthayoH sambandhaH / tadabhiprAyaprayogAdutpanno'bhivyakto vA zabdo . tadavyabhicArIti tattvamasya smbndhH| Ibid., p. 80. te hi vakturvivakSAvRttaya iti tannAntarIyakAstAmeva gmyeyuH| Ibid., p. 71. 35. Tattvasaigraha (Gaek. Or. S, 30, 31), Karikas 1515-20. 36. na ca puruSecchAH sarvA yathArthabhAvinyaH / na ca tadapratibaddhasvabhAvo bhAvo'nyaM gamayati / Svarthanumanaparichheda, p. 72. 37. aaptvaadaavisNvaadsaamaanyaadnumaantaa| buddheragatyAbhihitA parokSe'pyasya gocare // tasyAsyaivaMbhUtasyAptavAdasyAvisaMvAdasAmAnyAdadRSTavyabhicArasya pratyakSAnumAnAgamye'pyarthe pratipattestadAzritatvAt tadanyapratipattivad avisNvaado'numiiyte| tataHzabdaprabhavApisatIna zAbdavadabhiprAyaM nivedayatyevetyarthAvisaMvAdAdanumAnamapi / Ibid., p. 72. athvaa'nythaa''tvcnsyaavisNvaadaadnumaantvmucyte| Ibid., p. 72. 38. Ibid. 39. yathA kRttikAdeH zakaTAdijJAnaM svabhAvapratibandhamantareNa tathaivAdRSTapratibandhArthAbhidhAnaM jJAnamavisaMvAdakam | Akalaika-Granthatrayam, p. 9. 40. tadabhAve so'pi katham ? ityapyavAcyam; cakSurUpayostadabhAve'pi taddarzanAt / na khalu cakSuSo ghaTAdirUpeNa saha tAdAtmyaM tadutpattiH saMyogo vA saugatairabhyupagamyate pratItivirodhAnuSaGgAt, aprApyakAritvakSatiprasaGgAcca / Nyayakumudacandra, p. 538.

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152 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 41. ...pratiniyatazaktitvAd bhAvAnAm / Ibid., p. 538. 42. saGketo hi 'idamasya vAcyam idaM vAcakam' ityevaMvidho vAcyavAcakayorviniyogaH, sa yasyAsti tasyaiva zabdaHsvArthaM pratipAdayati naanysy......|yenaivsaadhysaadhnyorvinaabhaavo gRhItaH taM pratyeva sAdhanaM sAdhyasya gamakamityabhyupagame yenaiva zabdArthayoH saGketo gRhItaH taM pratyeva zabdo'rthasya vAcakaH ityabhyupagamyatAmavizeSAt / Ibid., p. 539. 43. nanu saGketaH puruSecchAkRtaH, na ca tadicchayA vastuvyavasthA yuktA atiprasaGgAt, ato'rtho'pi vAcakaH, zabdastu vAcyaH kinna syAt, tadicchAyA niraGkuzatvAt ? ityaMpyasundaram / ttsngketsyshjyogytaanibndhntvaaluumaagnivt| yathaiva hidhUmAgnyornaisargika evAvinAbhAvaH sambandhaH, tadvyutpattaye tu bhUyodarzanAdinimittamAMzrIyate, tathA zabdArthayoH svAbhAvika va pratipAdyapratipAdakazaktayAtmA sambandhaH, tadvyutpattaye tu saGketaH smaashriiyte| Ibid., p.539. 44.....anekArthapratyAyanayogyasyApizabdasya pratiniyatasaGketavazAt pratiniyatArthapratipAda katvamaviruddham / Ibid., pp. 539-40. . 45. yajjJApakaM tat jJApye pratipannapratibandhrameva pratItimutpAdayati yathA dhUmAdi, jJApaMkazca zabda iti / cakSurAdInAM tu kArakatvAt yuktaM svArthasambandhagrahaNAnapekSANAM tadutpAdakatvam / ..zaktistu svAbhAvikI yathA rUpaprakAzane cakSurAMdeH tathA arthaprakAzane zabdasya / Ibid., pp. 540-42. 46. Akalanka-Granthatrayam, p. 9. 47. Ibid., p. 10. 48. arthamAtraM hizabdasya viSayaH, anumAnasyatu sAdhyadharmaviziSTodharmI iti| Nyayakumuda___candra, p. 532. 49. pakSadharmatvAdirUpatrayarUpA hi anumAne sAmagrI, sA ca zabde na sNbhvti| Ibid., p. 532. 50. Ibid., pp. 534-35. 51. ito'pyananumAnamasau puruSairyatheSTaM niyujyamAnasyArthapratItihetutvAt, yat punaranumAnaM na tat tathA yathA kRtakatvAdi, tathA ca zabdaH, tasmAnAnumAnamiti / na ca sAdhanAvyatireko'yaM dRSTAntaH ityabhidhAtavyam; tathA tairniyujyamAnasya asya sAdhyapratItyajanakatvAt / na hi kRtakatvaM nityatvasAdhyecchayA dhUmatvAdikaM vA jalAdisAdhyecchayA niyujyamAnaM ttprtiitihetuH| Ibid., p. 535. 52. kRtakatvAdisAdhanasya hi sAdhye'vyabhicArijJAnajanane'vinAbhAva eva nimittaM __nAptoktatvamanAptoktatvaM vA, zabdasya tu Aptoktatvameveti / Ibid., p. 536. 53. yadi kiJcidvizeSeNa prmaannaantrmissyte| pramito'rthaH pramANAnAM bahubhedaH prasajyate // Akalaika-Granthatrayam, p. 93.

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