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THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
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the standpoint of formal correctness, Dharmakīrti's definition of cognition turns out to be defective. Yet in the course of describing cognition he has said things that prove to be of material worth in the task of defining cognition. A tolerably correct definition of cognition should be the activity on account of which a particular sensory stimulation becomes the signal for a particular motor response.' Thus when, taking its clue from the sensory stimulation caused by a physical object, an organism acts in relation to this object and finds it useful, this clue becomes a confirmed signal for the presence of the object thus proved to be useful; likewise, when under similar conditions the organism finds the object harmful, the clue concerned becomes a confirmed signal for the presence of the object thus proved to be harmful. In both cases appropriate relationships are established between the concerned elements of the sensory-motor apparatus; it is the employment of these earlier established relationships that constitutes memory, an activity which plays so crucial a role in converting a 'trial and error clue' into a confirmed signal. This much is broadly true of all living organisms but in the case of man something qualitatively new emerges as a result of the employment of words. Thus through a mere verbal instruction a man can be taught to treat a particular sensory stimulation as a signal for the presence of a particular object, useful or harmful, though in this case too better results follow when verbal instruction is accompanied by the actual causing of the concerned sensory stimulation. All this is directly relevant for an intelligent appreciation of Dharmakīrti's position. Thus he is of the view that the sensory stimulation produced by an object in a person makes this person cognise this object in its entirety. But Dharmakirti has himself taught that right cognition is that which enables one to undertake successful activity in relation to its object, while it seems obvious that bare sensory experience enables one to undertake successful activity in relation to its object only when elements of this experience are recognised as a signal for the presence of this object. The anomaly has not escaped Dharmakīrti's own attention but his solution of it is extremely roundabout. For this is how his thought runs: “When an object produces sensory stimulation in a person this person certainly comes to cognise this object in its entirety, but soon after he falls under an illusion and unless this illusion of his is removed he is not in a position to undertake successful activity in relation to this object. Thus after a jar has produced sensory stimulation in a person he falls under an illusion and