Indian Philosophy

SR No.: 006972
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala
Publication Year: 1998
Total Pages: 162
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 14 MB

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INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
they too uphold that one point instant is always caused by the point instant immediately preceding it. The Buddhist logician would however argue that this is a generalisation which intends to predicate of the unique particulars something that is common to them, while as a matter of fact the particulars being unique have nothing common to them. Thus it involves a selfcontradiction to make any generalisation in the case of the unique particulars, and any attempt to do so should be viewed as futile. The causality (relation of necessary sequence) that is said to obtain between two point instants is as unique as the point instants themselves. In this sense, it seems, causality is not denied by the Buddhist logician. It is rather the empirical causality that he refuses to treat as real. We ordinarily conceive causality as a relation over and above the relata and subsisting in them but in reality - so says the Buddhist logician - causality is identical with the concerned couple of point instants and it does not subsist in the two because the two are never simultaneous.29 The Buiddhist logician's denial of causality (empirical) may have a further implication. Causality (empirical) without uniformity and necessity is inconceivable. Causality means the principle that the same cause always produces the same effect on different occasions. But in the world of unique particulars how can this principle have its sway ? As soon as we think away the uniformity and necessity suggested by the words 'same' and 'always' occurring in the statement of causal principle causality "loses all its meaning. To say that though a thing does have a cause it does not have the same cause always is to give up causation in favour of chance. And as it is impossible to think of any uniformity or necessity in the case of unique particulars it is better to deny causality outright and declare it to be unreal. Causality does not have its sway in the realm of reals - particulars. Could this not be the implication of the Buddhist logician's denial of causality in the case of real things themselves ? Thus it is the empirical causality and not the transcendental causality, that is denied by the Buddhist logician.30 Uniformity and order as such are the creation of Intellect (vikalpa-buddhi). Intellect creates and superimposes them on the particular discrete reals where they are virtually absent. So, it is only the concepts that are necessarily related with one another and not the external things themselves. And ultimately, what we infer is also a concept. We mistake this concept for something real. Yet this mistake leads to successful purposive action because the concept in question