Indian Philosophy

SR No.: 006972
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala
Publication Year: 1998
Total Pages: 162
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 14 MB

Page 9

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i.e. as something excluded from everything else, while a piece of thought reveals it as excluded from a particular set of objects; and Dharmakirti suggests that 'exclusion from everything else' constitutes the total nature of an object while 'exclusion from a particular set of objects' constitutes but an aspect of this nature. Certainly, Dharmakirti has put right things in odd manner. One can easily see that Dharmakirti has an almost correct understanding of the relative roles played in the knowledge-situation by bare sensory experience on the one hand and thought on the other, as also of the type of objective features - whether exclusively negative or otherwise - that thought manages to notice.
The eighth essay mainly deals with the problem of the acquisition or grasping of a universal necessary relation obtaining between two things 'or two features. The Nyāya-Vaisesika, Buddhist and Jaina positions are explained. And various solutions offered by different thinkers to solve the problem of grasping the universal necessary relation (vyāpti) are presented and their defects are pointed out
The ninth and last essay expounds Jaina theory of testimony. Keeping in, view the main controversy regarding the question as to whether testimony is an independent pramānd, the Nyāya, the Vaiseșika, the Buddhist and the Jaina views are discussed. The Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that words are directly connected with things, of course, through convention. They maintain that as soon as we understand the meaning of words we acquire the knowledge of facts and that the process of understanding the meaning of words is not inferential. So, they believe that the knowledge through testimony is not inferential. The Vaiseșikas, on the other hand, maintain that the process of understanding the meaning of words is inferential. Moreover, though they, like the Naiyāyikas, accept that the words are conventionally connected with things, they, unlike the Naiyāyikas, are conscious of the implications of this conventional character of the relation. Words are symbols and not signs. Hence, they contend that words qua words enable us to infer only the intestion of the speaker and not the fact. But they state that words qua utterances of a reliable person enable us to infer facts. This view closely tallies with the view of Dharmakirti, except the fact that Dharmakirti goes even a step further and maintains that words are not in any way connected with things. The Jaina logicians refute Dharmakīrti's position that words could not directly lead to the knowledge of things. Jainas also refute the view that testimony is a form of inference. It has been pointed out that all the differences shown by the Jaina logicians between inference and testimony are trivial and do not furnish a sufficient ground for their view that testimony is a source of knowledge independent of inference.
I am sure this work will prove useful to all those interested in the study of Indian philosophy.
Nagin J. Shah