Indian Philosophy

SR No.: 006972
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala
Publication Year: 1998
Total Pages: 162
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 14 MB

Page 123

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INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
Besides, another point has been made. Since it is always possible to have memory of a past cognition and since no such memory can take place unless this past cognition was cognised at the time it took place. this past cognition - unless selfcognised - must have been immediately followed by a cognition of itself; and since the consideration that applies to the original cognition also applies to the cognition of this cognition, this second cognition must have been immediately followed by a cognition of itself, and so on and so forth. The result would be, so thinks Dharmakīrti, that on the rival view one should spend one's whole lifetime cognising an object, then cognising this cognition, then cognising this new cognition, and so on and so forth.23 .
One aspect of Dharmakīrti's discussion on the nature of cognition as such deserves separate consideration. For in the relevant portion of the Pramāņavārttika, Pratyaksapariccheda (vv. 300-541), he has come out with a detailed and repeated defence of idealism?'. The venture is rather intriguing because it puts in serious jeopardy the findings in Dharmakīrti's own earlier treatment of logical problems. Thus the most conspicuous and crucial feature of Dharmakīrti's logic is the sharp distinction drawn between sensory experience and thought, a distinction which crucially hinges on a clear-cut admission of the reality of physical objects; on the other hand, the central aim of idealism is to deny that there exist any real physical objects. Little wonder that it is the same language Dharmakīrti uses both when speaking about thought in the context of logical problems and when speaking of sensory experience in the context of his defence of idealism. For example, he earlier tells us that the sensory experience of fire is different from the thought of fire because the former takes place when fire as a physical object acts on an appropriate sense-organ while the latter takes place when some association of ideas reminds one of fire; but later he argues that the sensory experience of fire too takes place not because of the presence of fire as a physical object but because of some sort of association of ideas. Likewise, Dharmakīrti earlier makes a serious attempt to distinguish a genuine sensory experience from an illusory one by pointing out that the former takes place in the presence of a corresponding physical object, the latter in the absence of any such object26; but later he argues that an alleged genuine sensory experience too takes place in the absence of any physical object, thus emphatically falling prey to illusory sensory experience27. All this makes it incumbent on a serious student to sharply distinguish Dharmakīrti the logician from