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ON VYAPTI
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inference that are ordinarily deemed valid but the relation between the major term and the middle term of which is not ordinarily recognised as either that of causality or that of essential identity. Thus, for example, the rise of the sun in the morning is inferred from its rise on the previous day; high tide in the sea is inferred from the rise of the moon; the forthcoming appearance of the krttikā constellation is inferred from the appearance of the bharani constellation; impending rainfall is inferred from the movements of ants and also from some peculiar overt features manifested by fish, etc. All these are instances of invariable sequence which is not founded on causality. Again, we infer the particular taste of a fruit from its particular colour. Yet the relation obtaining between the two is not founded on causality because they arise simultaneously whereas causality is a relation of necessary sequence. Nor could it be held that in this case there obtains the relation of essential identity because - so would say the Nyāya-Vaisesikas - the taste in question and the colour in question are two quite different qualities residing in one substance.
The Jaina logicians in general and Akalanka in particular cite similar cases in order to refute the Buddhist logician's position. Akalanka's criticism is based on a general understanding that the simultaneous occurrence of two things does not necessarily suggest that they are essentially identical and that the successive occurrence of two things does not necessarily suggest that they are causally related. As for the vyāpti based on essential identity, Akalanka does not deny that it is a case of necessary simultaneous existence of hetu and sādhya. But he goes on to point out that there are cases of necessary simultaneous existence of hetu and sādhya where the relation between hetu and sādhya is not that of essential identity; nevertheless these latter are the cases of valid vyāpti according to Akalanka. Thus Akalanka finds out instances where two phenomena are invariably simultaneous but have no relation of essential identity. Though at this juncture he refers to the inference of a particular flavour from a particular colour yet he is conscious of the fact that it could not be of much help to him because on the non-absolutistic theory of Jaina metaphysics he could not deny that there does obtain the relation of identity between the flavour in question and the colour in question. As they are inseparable and are the qualities of one substance they will have to be treated as somewhat identical. So, he gives other instances of inference ordinarily accepted as valid - in which the objects denoted
| SR No. | 006972 |
| Book Title | Indian Philosophy |
| Original Sutra Author | N/A |
| Author | Nagin J Shah |
| Publisher | Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala |
| Publication Year | 1998 |
| Total Pages | 162 |
| Language | English |
| Classification | Book_English |
| File Size | 14 MB |