Indian Philosophy

SR No.: 006972
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala
Publication Year: 1998
Total Pages: 162
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 14 MB

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148
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
probandum where and when its probans is physically present, while the latter relation does not do so. The place where the word resides is not the place where its object resides, and the time when the word exists is not the time when its object exists. Yet, the word invariably points to the object meant. Again, the word of an authority is said to have an invariable relation to the thing or fact only in the sense that the thing is invariably present there and then where and when the word means it to be.So (4) Word is a symbol, while smoke etc. are signs. Word works as a symbol of a particular thing, provided men by common consent will it to be so, while smoke etc. do not work as signs of water etc. even if men by common consent how-so-often will them to be so. This is the difference between symbol and sign."! (5) Testimony is not a case of inference because words as spoken of an authority generate valid knowledge, while in inference the mark generates the valid knowledge on the strength of invariable concomitance. S2
The grounds on which the Jaina logicians refute the view that considers testimony to be a case of inference are not strong enough. Even they themselves acknowledge that the residence of a logical reason (hetu) in the subject of inference (pakşa) etc do not constitute the nature of a valid mark. According to them, the essential nature of a valid mark is its invariable concomitance with the thing it signifies. And, invariable concomitance is the basis of testimony. A word always means its object, and a word of an authority always corresponds to actual fact.
Though this invariable relation is based on convention, it could not prevent testimony from being a case of inference. For inference, it is the invariable relation between the mark and the object it signifies that is necessary and not a particular type of invariable concomitance. Otherwise, there would be as many independent sources of valid knowledge as there are types of invariable relations.
Only the word qua utterance of an authority generates knowledge of fact. Thus, here, word serves as a mark of a fact with certain qualification. But on that ground it could not be regarded that testimony is not a case of inference. As a matter of fact, adding of qualifications to the mark could not prevent the case from being an inference as is shown earlier.
All the differences pointed out by the Jaina logicians between inference and testimony are trivial and do not make sufficient ground