Indian Philosophy

SR No.: 006972
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala
Publication Year: 1998
Total Pages: 162
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 14 MB

Page 151

142
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
is a symbol of that thing ? This is so because a sign has always a physical and natural connection with the thing it signifies, while the symbol has merely a mental and arbitrary connection with the thing it symbolises. So, the sign gives us the knowledge of the thing, while the symbol gives us the knowledge of mental image or concept of the thing that is in the mind of the speaker. On this account through word qua word we cannot have knowledge of a thing, but only the concept of it in the mind of the speaker or, in other words, the intention of the speaker to convey a particular information. And, the word and the concept being invariably related, we infer the concept from the words. That is to say, from words qua words we infer only the intention of the speaker to convey a particular information.30
(3) At times, they observe that through words we get the knowledge of things, but they add that this knowledge is inferential. They consider knowledge to be inferential because words give us the knowledge by the force of universal connection just as smoke gives knowledge of fire by the force of universal connection between smoke and fire. Sentences, when understood, serve as invariable marks of external things and facts. Though these marks have no natural relation with things, as shown above, they enable us to infer things, with certain qualifications viz., that they are conventionally connected with things and that they are spoken by an authority. The adding of qualifications to the mark' does not prevent the case from being an inference. Even such an inferential mark as smoke used in inferring that there is fire on the hill is a valid mark only with certain qualifications, e.g., the smoke rising upward in an unbroken connection with the ground.” .
Thus, from all this it follows that according to the Vaiseșika philosophers, knowledge through words is inferential. Words qua words enable us to infer the intention of the speaker, while the words qua utterances of an authority enable us to infer the things. In other words, according to the Vaiseșikas, the mere understanding of a sentence cannot lead to the knowledge of things. For that the knowledge of the authoritativeness of the speaker as also the knowledge of the universal rule that the sentences spoken by an authority, when understood, do invariably point to facts, is necessary. Mere statement of an authority, unless we possess the knowledge that it is an invariable mark of the thing, does not generate the knowlede of that thing, just as smoke qua smoke does not generate the knowledge of fire unless we know it to be an invariable mark of fire. The Vaiseșika view that there are only