Indian Philosophy

SR No.: 006972
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala
Publication Year: 1998
Total Pages: 162
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 14 MB

Page 150

JAINAS ON TESTIMONY
141
(1) According to the Vaiseșika philosophers, the process by which we understand the meaning of a sentence is inferential. Suppose somebody tells one that 'the river is fordable'. What kind of knowledge does one have when one understands that sentence ? Is it inferential ? If so, what is the probans? And, what is the probandum ? As the syllogism has been stated in the Dipikā in support of the Vaiseșika view, it would appear that the probandum is the total meaning of the entire sentence, i.e , of the whole group of words contained in the sentence, "'The river is fordable'. The group of words is the subject (paksa). The conclusion (nigamana) is : "This group of words possesses a connected meaning, i.e , refers to the connection of the meanings of the words of this group.' The probans or mark is the fact that this is a group of words which have, in respect of one another, expectancy, suitability etc. The universal proposition expressing the invariable concomitance of the mark with the probandum is: 'Whatever is a group of words which have, in respect of one another, expectancy, suitability etc. refers to (or means) the connection of the meanings of these words'. An illustration to show that this universal proposition is true is any sentence employed by the person who attempts to understand the sentence, 'The river is fordable : 29 Thus, it is by the process of inference that, after having heard the sentence, “The river is fordable', one understands the total meaning of the sentence.
The generally accepted view that we arrive at the meaning of a sentence by applying rules of syntax and grammar, it seems, is here expressed in a different manner. Since the essence of inference is arriving at knowledge through the application of a gereral rule to a particular instance, this process of understanding the meaning which involves the application of general rules to a particular instance should be deemed inferential.
(2) Like the Naiyāyikas, the Vaisesikas, too, hold that words are directly connected with things and that the connection is conventional. But unlike the Naiyāyikas, they are able to understand the implications of this conventional character of the relation. As the convention is dependent upon or governed by human will or desire, word qua word cannot generate the knowledge of things. Word qua word can generate only the knowledge of the intention of the speaker to convey a particular information in a person who has learnt the convention. It might be urged that if smoke can generate the knowledge of fire in the person who has learnt that smoke is a sign of fire, why should the word not generate the knowledge of the thing in the person who has learnt that that word