Indian Philosophy

SR No.: 006972
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala
Publication Year: 1998
Total Pages: 162
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 14 MB

Page 130

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ON VYAPTI
Paksadharmatā and Vyāpti are the two logical grounds of inference. That is to say, in case we happen to possess the knowledge that two objects or objective characters (say, x and y) are such that y exists wherever x does (vyāptijñāna) and also the knowledge that a particular thing possesses x (pakṣadharmatājñāna), there ensues the inferential knowledge to the effect that this thing possesses y. We infer fire on the hill from the smoke rising from it. Thus for this inferential knowledge viz. 'there is fire on the hill' to be valid we should first be certain that the smoke in question rises from the hill; and this knowledge we get through perception. From this it will be clear that pakṣadharmatājñāna is usually a judgment of perception. Hence the problem of the acquisition of the knowledge that a particular mark (middle term) resides in the subject or locus (minor term) in which we want to prove the presence of the major term does not present any serious difficulty. But merely this knowledge does not validate inference. In addition to the knowledge of paksadharmatā we should possess the knowledge of vyāpti, that is, the knowledge that the middle term is invariably connected with the major. We can infer fire from smoke only when we know that smoke is invariably connected with fire. An inference requires the knowledge that there obtains a universal relation between the concerned middle term and major term. Now, in connection with vyāpti we will have to consider three questions: (i) what do we exactly mean by universal relation (vyāpti)?; (ii) how many types of universal relations are there ? and (iii) how do we come to acquire the knowledge that a particular relation is universal ?
To take the first question, vyāpti is the technical name for the relation obtaining between the middle term and the major term while this relation is of such a nature that the middle is never present where major is absent. Thus vyāpti is not a simple assertoric judgment but it is a necessary judgment. “Smoke is accompanied by fire' is an assertoric judgment while 'smoke must be accompanied by fire' is a necessary judgment. Vyāpti is a necessary judgment having the form 'this happening that must happen.' If the relation between the middle