Nyayavatara

Author(s): Satyaranjan Banerjee
Publisher: Sanskrit Book Depot P Ltd

Page 12

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Anekāntavāda, often translated as "Indefiniteness of Being”. It tells us that any material thing continues for ever to exist as matter, and this matter may assume any shape and quality. Thus mrttikā (clay) as a substance may be regarded as permanent, but the form of a jar of clay (ghata-pašādi), or its colour, may come into existence and perish.
The doctrine of anekāntavāda is upheld by a logical method called syād-vāda. According to the doctrine, there are seven forms of metaphysical propositions and all contain the word syāt, meaning 'may be'. As it consists of seven propositions, it is known as Saptabhangi. These propositions are
(1) syad asti, (2) syān nāsti, (3) syād asti nästi ca, (4) syād avyaktavyaḥ, (5) syâd asti avyaktavyasca, (6) syān nästi avyaktavyasca, (7) syâd asti nästi avyaktavyaśca.
According to this logical doctripe every fact of reality can be described in two logical propositions--one affirmative and the other negative. We have described before that the ultimate reality is a permanent and changing entity manifesting itself through constant change of appearance and disappearance, then we can understand that a fact of reality when looked at from the underlying permanent substance may be described to be non-permanent and changing. When a substance is described from the aspect of the underlying substance, it is called dravyārthikanaya and when the description is based on the modifications or changes, it is called paryāyārthikanaya. As a dravya has two aspects, it should be described logically from two points of view : positive and negative. For example, if a jar is made of clay, then it is possible to describe it as a jar made of clay. But can we describe it as 'a jar made of stone' ? Certainly not. But it must be remembered that to describe every fact of reality, four conditions are to be taken into considerations : dravya, kşetra, kāla and bhāva. Name of the substance, the place where it is, the time when it exists, and characteristics intrinsically presented in it. Every object from its own dravya admits an affirmative predication and looked at from the paradravya admits of a negative predication. So the example given above from its own substance (clay) admits of affirmative predication, and from the view of paradravya, a negative