Nyayavatara

Author(s): Satyaranjan Banerjee
Publisher: Sanskrit Book Depot P Ltd

Page 36

न्यायावतार!
साध्याविनाभुनो लिङ्गात् साध्यनिश्चायकं स्मृतम् ।
अनुमानं तद्भ्रान्तं प्रमाणत्वात् समक्षवत् ॥ ५ ॥ साध्याविनाभुन इत्यनेन परप्रणीतलिंगलक्षणव्युदासमाचष्टे । ततश्च यत् परे प्रोचुः । पक्षधर्मान्वयव्यतिरेकलक्षणरूपतयोपलक्षितानि त्रीणि एव लिंगानि अनुप - लब्धि: स्वभाव: कार्यतेति । तदुक्तं
"अनुमेयेऽथ तत्तुल्ये सद्भावो नास्तिताऽसति ।
निश्चितानुपलम्भात्मकार्य्याख्या हेतवस्त्रयः " ।। इति ॥
तथाऽन्येऽस्येदं कार्यं कारणं संयोगि समवायि विरोधि चेति लिंगिकमिति । तथा पूर्ववत् शेषवत् सामान्यतोदृष्टमित्यादि । तद्वालप्रलपितप्रायमित्यवगन्तव्यम् । पक्षधर्मत्वविरहेsपि अनुमिमीमहे कालादिकसूत्रधर्मी समस्त्येव तत्र पक्षधर्मता लिंगस्य गृह्यते इति चेत् न, अतिप्रसङ्गात् । एवं हि शब्दस्य अनित्यत्वे साध्ये काककायदेरपि गमकत्वप्रसक्तेः । तत्रापि लोकादेर्धर्मिणः कल्पयितुं शक्यत्वात् । अधुना यत् शौद्धोदन शिष्यकैर्न्यगादि यदुत भ्रान्तमनुमानं सामान्यप्रतिभासित्वात् तस्य च बहिः स्वलक्षणे व्यतिरेकाव्यतिरेकविकल्पाभ्यामपाक्रियमाणतया योगात्तद्रूपतया वत न तस्याध्यवसायादतस्मिन् तद्ग्रहस्य च भ्रान्तिलक्षणत्वात् तदुक्तम् "अतस्मिन् तद्ग्रहो भ्रान्तिरपि संबन्धतः प्रमा" इति तदपाकर्तुमाह तदभ्रान्तमित्यादि ।। ५ ।।
5. Knowledged eterminant of that which is to be proved (i.e., the major term called in Sanskrit sadhya), derived through the mark (i.e. the middle term called in Sanskrit linga) which is inseparably connected with the same, is known as anumana (inference): being a pramāņa it is free from invalidity like perception (pratyakşa).
Inference is of two kinds (1) svārthānumāna, inference for one's own self, and (2) parärthānumāna inference for the sake of others, The first kind is the inference drawn in one's own mind after having made repeated observations. Suppose that having repeatedly seen in the kitchen and other places, that where there is smoke there is fire, and having realised in his mind that there is a universal antecedence of fire in respect of smoke, a man afterwards goes to a hill and entertains a doubt as to whether or not there is fire in it. Instantly, when he observes smoke on it, he recollects the inseparable connection between fire and smoke, and concludes in his mind that the hill has fire in it, as it has smoke on it. This is an inference for one's own self. Inference for the sake of others will be defined later on.
This definition of inference, says the commentator, sets aside the view of certain writers [ such as Dharmakirti the Buddhist ] who maintain that nonperception (anupalabdhi), identity (svabhāva) and causality (kārya) are the marks or grounds of inference, or of certain other writers who hold the effect (karya), cause (kārana), conjunction (sariyoga), co-existence (samavāya), and opposition (virodha) to be such marks or grounds. The division of inference as (1) à priori (purvavat, from cause to effect), (2) à posteriori (Sesavat from effect to cause),