Aspect of Jainology Part 2 Pandita Bechardas Doshi

Author(s): M A Dhaky, Sagarmal Jain
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith

Page 424

Ethical Philosophy of Kundakunda
therefore, shall not here talk about the supra-ethical character of life, however, important it may be for Kundakunda. What I intend to discuss here relates to some of the questions that arise in normative ethics, and meta-ethics in the context of the ethical views of Kundakunda.
At the outset, we come across certain presuppositions which Kundakunda has made in order to work out his moral philosophpy. The first presupposition made by him refers to the existence of the individual centres of consciousness which existed in the past, exist at present, and shall exist in future. In other words, these centres of consciousness have been existing since beginningless time : They, moreover, will endure for ever. These are endowed with cognitive, effective and conative tendencies, by virtue of which they see and know, they like pleasure and fear suffering, and they are engaged in beneficial as well as harmful activities. 10 Secondly, according to Kundakunda, for everything that an individual does, he is responsible (Pahu=Prabhu). No other being can be held responsible for the actions which a person commits. To say that a person is held responsible for an action is to say that he could have done otherwise if he had chosen to do otherwise. Thus the ascription of responsibility to man is inconceivable without a free will. If a man is not his own sovereign, he cannot be free; therefore he cannot be held responsible and also he cannot be praised or blamed, punished or rewarded. Kundakunda seems to be aware of the fact that the assumption of responsibility and that of freedom are parts of the moral institution of life Frankena rightly remarks: “We must assume that people are normally free to do as they choose. If by nature, they were like ants, bees, or even monkeys, if they had all been thoroughly brain-washed, if they were all neurotically or psychotically compulsive throughout, or if they were all always under a constant dire threat from a totalitarian ruler of the work's kind, then it would be pointless to try to influence their behaviour in the ways that are characteristic of morality. Moral sanctions, internal or external, could not then be expected to have the desired effects."!! Thirdly, Kundakunda points out that an individual is the doer of actions, right or wrong, good or evil. That he voluntarily performs actions, follows from the fact of his being a free agent. Again, and as a consequence, he is the enjoyer of the results of those actions.
After dealing with the presuppositions of morality in accordance with the ethical philosophy of Kundakunda, we may first proceed to consider what things, or kinds of things, have intrinsic value according to him. In other words, the question that confronts us is : what is intrinsically good or worthwhile in life according to Kundakunda ? The reply of Kundakunda seems to me to be this: The belief in the presuppositions is the first to be intrinsically desired. Kundakunda firmly holds that, without the belief in responsibility, freedom, and the individual centres of consciousness, nothing worthwhile can be achieved in life. 14 It is the root of the tree of moral life, 13 Besides this, compassion for all the living being,'' a