Theories Of Parinama

Author(s): Indukala H Jhaveri
Publisher: Gujarat University
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/023179/1

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THE SANKHYA-YOGA AND THE JAIN THEORIES OF PARINAMA by DR. INDUKALABEN H. JHAVERI gata Traine SHOP GUJARAT UNIVERSITY AHMEDABAD-380 009

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About the Book This is a comprehensive study of the Sankhya conception of Parinama (Change and evolution) and the Jain conception of reality. The treatment is critical, scientific and dispassionate. The work is based on extensive study and critical selection of relevant data. It presents a full and critical review of the entire subject-matter chosen for the study complete in all respects. The treatmeat of the evolution in Jain conception culminating in the adoption of the terminology and exposition sponsored by the advocates of Parinama furnishes the evidence of unbiased approach and evalution. Price : Rs. 30-00

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THE SAMKHYA-YOGA AND THE JAIN THEORIES OF PARINAMA by Dr. INDUKALA H JHAVERI GUJARAT UNIVERSITY AHMEDABAD-380 009,

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first Edition] Copies: 500 Gujarat University Ahmedabad-380 009 Price: 30/ Printer : S. T. Shastri Narendra Printers Kaloliawadi, Kankaria Road, Ahmedabad-3800022 Publisher: M. P. Jadia Registrar Gujarat University Ahmedabad-380009 [ 1990

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FOREWORD It gives me great pleasure indeed in publishing, "The SamkhyaYoga and The Jain Theories of Parinama" By Late Dr. Indukala. ben Zaveri. I am thankful to Prof. T. S. Nandi, Dept. Sanskrit, School of Languages of this University and Shri Naginbhai Shah, L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad for leading the script and for giving their vaiuable opinion for publication. I am also thankful to the late Shri Niranjan J. Mehta, Chairman Sadguru Indukalaben Jhaveri Charitable Trust for giving script and financial assistance. The book includes the comperative study of samkhya and Jain theory. I hope that the students and teachers of Sanskrit and Philosophy and learned Scholers interested in this subject will find this publication of great value and interest. Ahmedabad-9 Date 10-10-1991 (M. P. Jadia) Offg. Registrar

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PRE E A CE * The title of my thesis is 'The Samkhya and the Jain theories of Parinama' based mainly on Sanskrit texts. 'In order to make the title more precise I have slightly changed it into 'The Samkhya -Yoga and the Jain theories of Parinama based mainly on Sanskrit texts.' Modern scholars have studied both the Samkhya-Yoga and Jain systems in their various aspects. No one, however, so far as I know, has utilised the Samkhya-Yogi sources and ideas contained in them to formulate a systematic Samkhya-Yoga theory of Parinama, and the Jain sources to formulate the Jain theory of Parinama. What is more, the problem of relation bet. ween the Samkhya-Yoga and Jain systems has been touched by scholars like Garbe, Jacobi, etc., but no one has, I think, attempted a comparative study of these systems and their bearing on the theory of Parinama. Hence, this my attempt. In preparing this thesis I have drawn upon important Sansket sources pertaining to Samkhya-Yoga system and Sansktit and Praket souces pertaining to Jain, system, which all are referred to in the bibliography. I have also utilised translation of the same in European and Indian languages wherever available and necessary. At certain places, we have thought it proper to give only the gist of the passages. For modern criticism of the two theories I have also consulted the relevant journals and such works as Garbe's Samkhya-Yoga, Keith's Samkhya System, Dr. Seal's Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus etc., Jacobi's Studies in Jainism, Dr. Mookerji's Jain Philosophy of Non-absolutism etc. (cf. Bibliography) I have divided my thesis in eleven chapters. In the first chapter, I have tried to show from Vedas - especially the Rgveda

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vi and Atharva-Veda - Brahmanas and earlier Upanisads, how the philosophical tendencies of thought pertaining to the prbolems of One and Many and of the abiding and changing aspects of reality clearly foreshadow the theory of Parinama. Then I have drawn apon Yaska's Nirukta (600 B.C.) which is contemporaneous with the earlier Upanisads and the rise cf Jainism and Buddism. Even though grammatical works are not usually drawn upon for philosophical ideas, yet for us, the Nirukta has a special significance in so far as it precisely enunciates the concept of Vipatinama or Parinama for the first time, at so early an age. (faqftohet . $1847A1 ataifa70#). This shows that unless the concept was well known to and clearly grasped by the thinkers of the time in one form or the other, it could not have become a subjectmatter for definition in a treatise like the Nirukta. It can be said without hesitation that this idea of Viparinama or Parinama must have been favoured by what we may call Proto-Samkhya and Proto-Jain thinkers. And we have already shown how the earlier Upanisads provide ground for the rise of such a concept. The reference to the term Vikara in the sense of Parinama in the Sutras of Panini is also noted. In the same chapter, I have refrerred to the Mahabhasya of Patafijali (which is generally placed in the middle of the 2nd cent. B.C), as it is convenient to treat grammatical works together. This work not only clearly states the idea of Parinama but also makes a clear-cut distinct. ion between Kutastha-nityata and Parinami-nityala for the first time, and hence the significance. Then, in the second shapter I have considered in brief the specific Samkhya ideas as found in the Mahabharata, the Smotis, the Puranas and the Caraka. I may point our here that all the passages of the Mahabharata, the Smotis and the Puranas referred to by me, do not necessarily precede Isvarakrana but there being not enough evidence to discriminate between the various strata, I have followed the old tradition of taking the Mahabharata, the Smotis and the Puranas together as constituting the Smrti tradition to be distinguished from the Sruti tradition of the Vedas and the

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vii Upanisads. I have tried to show, in conclusion, that though in these passages explaining creation there is no explicit mention of Parinama, the idea may have been taken for grantd as implicit in the process, for as already noted, the concept was well-defined as early as the in Nirukta. In the third and the fourth chapters I have attempted to study the theory of Parinama, in its various aspects, as discussed in the important works of the Samkhya and the Yoga darsanas proper because there is no vital difference between the metaphysical theories of the Samkhya and the Yoga excepting that the latter accepts one purusa as Isvara, not as the creator but as guiding the course of evolution. The fifth chapter is devoted to the critical exposition of the other topics related to Parinama. At the end of this chapter, I have given a resume of all these five chapters. In the sixth chapter I have given an account of the main Jain sources on which our discussion is going to be based. In the seventh chapter I have discussed the Jain theory of Parinama as found in the oldest extant Canonical literature of the Jainas, viz. the Agamas. In the treatment of the Agamas I have consulted only those that contain discussion of philosophical doctrines - such as the Bhagavati-Sutra, Sthanamga, Prajnapana, Uttaradhyayana-sutra, Anuyogadvarasutra, Jivabhigama etc. In this seventh chapter which deals with Parinama in the Agamas, I have tried to show that despite the absence of any explicit and precise definition of the theory of Parinama, there are in them, all the elements of it viz., Dravya, Paryaya and Parinama. In the eighth chapter, I have examined the relevant passsages from the Tattvartha-sutra, and its Svopajna-bhasya by Umasvati and the important Prakst a works of the Digambaracarya Kudakunda - such as the Pancastikaya, the Pravacanasara, and the Sama

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viii yasara. I have shown how, in the Tattvartha the various concepts-viz., those of Dravya, Paryaya, Parinama and Sat receive precise definition, though there is yet no elaboration of the same. In the works of Kundakunda I have attempted to show the development of the theory of Parinama in its various aspects as well as its application to different Dravyas. In the ninth chapter I have tried to give further exposition, application, analysis and justification of the doctrine of ParyayaParinama as found in the works of tarka-period- such as the commentaries of the Tattvartha Sutra and other dialectical works. At the end a resume is attempted. Having thus discussed the Samkhya-Yoga theory and the Jain theory of Parinama I have attempted in chapter X critical and comparative study of the theory of Parinama, of these two systems, in its different aspects and discussed the problem of the historical relation between the two schools. Some of the new points which I have attempted to work out in the thesis (i) I have attempted a new study of the emergence of the idea of Parinama in early Vedic literature. (ii) As far as I know, no scholar has drawn attention to the precise definition of Viparinama or Parinama as given by Yaska. (iii) I have attempted to throw new light on the problems of tattvAntarapariNAma, the process of parimama - sasRSTaviveka and vizeSAfa-which all occur in the Samkhya-Yoga works. (iv) The problem of the relation between Pajjava or Paryaya and Parinama, from the Agama passages is discussed for the first time in this manner.

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ix (v) A critical study of the Jain technical term 'agurulaghu' has been attempted for the first time here. (vi) Similarly, further applications of Paryaya-Parinama viz. Dravy paryaya and Guna-paryaya, Parinama and Parispanda, prayoga-parinama and Visrasa-parinama, Artha-prayaya and Vyanjana-paryaya, as found in later Jain dialectical works have not been, so far as I know. critically examined in the way I have done. (vii) In the discussion of the nature of Pre-Isvarakrsna Samkhya and the historieal relation between Samkhya and Jain, I have tried a new approch in the study of the subject. In this way, by putting forward in this thesis, a critical study of the views of India's ancient thinkers, of two imprortaut schools on Parinama, I have attempted to make a contribntion to the understanding of the concept of 'Permanence and Change,' a concept of great significance in the history of philosophy as well as in modern knowledge as a scientific principle. In conclusion, I must express my thanks to Prof. R. C. Parikh for the guidance received from him during my studies. With his approval I have also consulted Pandit Sukhalalji Sangavi to whom I am grateful for his valuable help. Indukala H. Jhaveri

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TRANSLITERATION aa, Rr, A, R, aM i, la1 I, ee, uu, ai ai d, o 0, aH / , gaM g, j, gh. jh, dh, d, dad. AAR 6 4 44 - bb, s , ha. h.

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ABBREVIATIONS AMI. Anu. Su. AS. ASS. AV. AYD, Bh. Su. Br. A. Cha. Up Dhs. HOS. PK. PS. Raj. V. RV. SBE. Ska. SPB. Apta-Mimamsa of Samantabhadra Anuyogadvara-Sutra, Astasati Astasahasri Atharvaveda. Anya-yogavyavaccheda-dvatrimsika Bhagavati Sutra. Brhadaranyakopanisad Chandogya Upanisad Dharma-Samgrahani Harward Oriental Series. Pancastikaya. Pravacanasara Raja-varttika on the Tsu. Rgveda Sacred Books of the East. Samkhya-karika Samkhyapravacanabhasya Samayasara. Samkhya-sutras. Samkhya-tattva-Kaumudi. Syadavada-manjari. Sastra-varta-samuccaya. Sloka-varttika Tattvartha-bhasya. Thanamga-sutra Tattvartha-sutra. Tattva-Vaisaradi, Uttaradhyayana-sutra Vyasa-bhasya Yoga-sutras. Yoga-varttika SS. Ssu, STK. SVM. SVS. SI. V. Tbh, Tha. Su. Tsu. TVS. Ut. Su. VB. Ysu. YV.

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CONTENTS xii Pages 1-21 22-31 32-43 1 Foreword 2 Preface 3 Scheme of Transliteration 4 Abbreviations 5 Contents Chapters I Seeds of Parinama in the Earliest Sanskrit Literature (2500 B. C.-200 B. C.) II Samkhya Ideas in Pre-Isvaraklsna Literature III Parinama in the Samkhya-Karika and its Commentaries IV Development of Parinama in the Yoga-sutras And their important Commentaries and the Samkhya-sutras and their commentaries V Other Topics Related to Parinama VI Jain Sources VII Parinamavada in the Agamas VIII Parinama in the works of Umasvati And Kundakunda IX Parinama in Tarka-Period X Samkhya-Yoga And Jain-A Comparison Appendix on 'Agarulaghu' Bibliography 44-62 63-80 81-91 92-115 116-132 133-169 170-183

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CHAPTER I SEEDS OF PARINAMA IN THE EARLIEST SANSKRIT LITERATURE (2500 B. C.- 200 B. C.) Introductory : The earliest source of religion and philosophy as they have taken shape in Indian culture is the Vedas, especially the Rgveda. The theory of Parinama which I propose to study in the present thesis can be properly understood if we first attempt to discover from the earliest sources i.e. the Vedic sources, those tendencies of thought that helped in its emergence and development in the darsanic form. I shall, therefore, first take notice of those speculations in the Vedas, particularly the Rgveda, which can throw light on this topic.; THE RGVEDA (2000 or About 2500 B.C.): Speculations as to how this whole world came into being are to be found scattered throughout the whole of the Rgveda. "The earliest speculations on the question", as Prof. Belvalkar says, "are, as natural, mainly poetic with hardly any attempt at systembuilding. They name some god or gods Indra, Varuna, Savits or Dyavapsthivi - and credit him or them with the work of creating the world".: However, in the later portions of the Rgveda, espe tures . Prof. Radhakri about 1 Winternitz, 'History of Indian Literature', Vol. I, p. 310. Jacobi puts the Vedic hymns at 4500 B. C. Prof. Radhakrishnan assigns them to the 15th cent. B. C. Max Muller dates them about 1200 B.C. 2 History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 22.

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama cially in the first and the tenth mandala, we find these speculations resolving themselves into definite types which are in character, both mythical and metaphysical. Thus, in the Rgveda X.190 as Prof. Radhakrishnan puts it, 'water is said to develop into the world through the force of time, year, desire or tapas. Sometimes water itself is derived from night or chaos or air as in the Rgveda X.168.'3 In the Rgveda. X.81,82 Visvakarma, a personal deity, is said to produce Heaven and Earth through the exercise of his arms and wings. In the Rgveda, X.72. Brahmanaspati becomes the creater. At certain places Prajapati and Hiranyagarbha occur as the lord of creatures as in the Rgveda X.85,43 and X.121.. . But such a conception of a personal supreme deity, as the source of all existence, could not for long satisfy the 'metaphysical craving to use the term of Schopenhauer, of the more profound thinkers. For, as Max Muller aplty puts it, "every one of the gods called by a personal and proper name was limited ipso facto and therefore not fit to fill the place which was to be filled by an unlimited absolute power which they yearned for as the primary cause of all created things. No name that expressed ideas connected with the male or female sex, not even Prajapati was considered as fit for such a being. And thus we see that as early as the Vedic hymns they arrived at the conception of That One' "4 They applied to this central principle the neuter form 'ekam' and 'sat' to show that it is a comprehensive entity subsuming the duality of sex. "That One' we come across in the Rgveda I. 164.6, wherein after asking who he was that established these six spaces of the world, the poet says, "Was it perhaps the One, in the shape of the unborn ?" "That One' is also referred to in X,82.6. Significant is the reference to this One at VIII.58.2 wherein the last quarter, 'It is the one that has severally become all this' clearly brings out the important ideas of One and Many, of Being and Becoming. 3 Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 99. 4 Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, p. 48

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> Seeds of Parinama in the Earliest Literature This concept of an abstract self-creative principle as the prius of the world is philosophically a definite advance over the previ-. ous one, of a personal creator, showing the operation of thought and abstraction. We have so far left out two important cosmogonic hymns viz. the Nasadiya Sukta (X.129) and the Purusa Sukta (X.90), since they deserve special notice. Prof. Macdonell sees in the former, the starting point of the natural philosophy which developed into the Samkhya system. According to Prof. Belvalkar, it contains the earliest germ of what later developed into the Parinamavada or the doctrine of evolution. But neither of these two views seems to be warranted by the actual wording of the hymn. The first two verses which run thus I, "There was not non-existent nor existent: There was no realm of air, no sky beyond it. What covered in and where ? and what gave shelter? Was water there, unfathomed depth of water? II. Death was not then, nor was there aught immortal : No sign was there, the day's and night's divider. That One Thing, breathless, breathed by its own nature: Apart from it was nothing whatsoever." 3 - bring out that the absolute reality which is at the back of the whole world cannot be characterised by us in any words. In the next three verses, the order of evolution is given : III. "Darkness there was at first concealed in - darkness this All was indiscriminated chaos. All that existed then was void and formless : By the great power of warmth was born that Unit. : 5 Vedic Reader, p. 207. 6 History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II. p. 24. 7 The Hymns of the Rgveda, Griffith, Vol. II. p. 575. This hymn is translated by Muir, Max Muller, Madconell, etc.

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama IV. Thereafter rose Desire in the beginning, Desire, The primal seed and germ of Spirit. Sages who searched with their heart's thought discovered the existent's kinship in the non-existent. V. Transversely was their seyering line extended : What was above it then, and what below it ? There were begetters, there were mighty forces, Free actions here and energy up younder."8 Immediately after this is brought out the mystery of the origin of the world in the last two verses : VI. "Who verily knows and who can here declare it, whence it was born and whence comes this creation ? The Gods are later than this world's production. Who knows then whence it first came into being ? VII. He, the first origin of this creation, whether he formed it all or did not form it, Whose eye controls this world in highest heaven, He verily knows it, or perhaps he knows not".9 Thus the hymn, although expressing the current ideas, regarding the first principle, has got a predominant note of agnosticism about it. It should, therefore, be looked upon as an agnostic. poem as Prof. Ranade does.10 Purusa Sukta : Already in the hymn to Visvakarma, (Rgveda X.81,82), there appears the desire to parallel the creation of the universe with a sacrifice. Similarly in the later portions of the Rgveda, we come across as Prof. Belvalkar says, 11 the liturgical abstractions 8 The Hymns of the Rgveda, Griffith,, p. 575-576. 9 Griffith -p. 576. 10 'A Constructive Survey of Upanisa dic Philosophy' p. 3. 11 History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 24.

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Seeds of Parinama in the Earliest Literature like Rta, Tapas or sraddha and even sacrifice which are conceived as cosmogenic principles - as in X. 190 where it is stated : 1. "From Fervour kindled to its height, Eternal Law and Truth were born Thence was the Night produced and thence the Billowy flood of sea arose. I. From that same billowy flood of sea, the year was afterwards produced, Ordainer of the days and nights, Lord over all who close the eye. III. Dhata, the great creator, then formed in due order Sun and Moon. He formed in order Heaven and Earth, the regions of the air, and light". 19 This idea of sacrifice is carried to its fullest extent in the Purusa Sukta of the Rgveda, one of its latest hymns. In it we have the idea of a cosmic being from whom proceeds this whole universe, along with its social order. The act of creation is treated as a sacrifice in which Purusa is the victim. "Purusa is all this world, what has been and shall be. He not only pervades the whole universe but transcends it too".' Thus we have the idea of both immanence and transcendence expressed here for the first time in clear terms. Again, the struggle between the two notions of 'permanence' and 'change' seems to have already taken hold of the minds of the vedic thinkers. We see it reflected in-" 97EISET fasatt vara faltegiaa fefe 1 - 'all existing things are a quarter of him and that which is immortal in the sky is three quarters of him'. Here is an attempt to put together as it were the experiences of "permanence and ehange into one entity by saying 12 Griffith, Vol. II, p. 609.

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The Sankhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama that one quarter of the purusa is all this changing world while his three quarters are immortal-i.e. permanent in the highest heaven. However all these ideas, which are still in a rudimentary stage only and therefore vaguely stated, attain their gradual development in the Upanisads as we shall see below. THE ATHARVA - VEDA The Atharva-Veda is a collection of hymns whose significance varies from the highest metaphysical and mystical ideas to the jugglery of magical charms. The ideas which we are investigating are to be found in X.7, XI.4, XIX.53-54, - where the very same supreme deity or All God and "Tadekam' found in Rgveda occur under the new names of Skambha, Prana and Kala. Special notice, however, should be taken of the two hymns. of Kala because it is the concept of Kala or Time that is at the basis of all theories of change. The following verses from the two hynins may be noted : I kAlo azvo vahati saptarazmiH sahasrAkSo ajaro bhUriretAH / tamA rohanti kavayo vipazcitastasya cakrA bhuvanAni vizvA / / 1 / / IF sapta cakrAnvahati kAla eSa saptAsya nAbhIramRta nvakSaH / sa imA vizvA bhuvanAnyajatkAlaH sa Iyate prathamo nu devaH / / 2 / / II pUrNaH kumbho'dhi kAla Ahitasta' vai pazyAmo vahudhA nu santaH / sa imA vizvA bhuvanAni pratyaGkAla tamAhuH parame vyoman / / 3 / / IV sa eva sa bhuvanAnyArabhatsa eva saM bhuvanAni payat / pitA sannabhavatputra eSA tasmAdve nAnyatparamasti tejaH // 4 // v kAlo'mU divamajanayatkAla imAH pRthivIruta / ___ kAle ha bhUta bhavya ceSita ha vi tiSThate / / 5 / / '

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Seeds of Parinama in the Earliest Literature VI kAlo bhUtimasRjata kAle tapati sUryaH / het fa al maila wie aufe azafat 11811 AV. XIX. 53 VII ima ca loka parama ca lokaM puNyAMzca lokAvidhatIzca puNyAH / sarvA lokAnabhijitya brahmaNA kAlaH sa Iyate paramo nu devaH // 5 // AV. XIX. 54.5 I Time carries (us) forward, a steed, with seven rays, a thou. sand eyes, full of fecundity. On him intelligent sages mount; his wheels are all the worlds. II This Time moves on seven wheels; he has seven naves; immortality is his axle. He is at present all these worlds. Time hastens onward, the first god. III A full jar is contained in Time. We behold him existing in many forms. He is all these worlds in the future. They call him Time in the highest heaven. It is he who drew forth the worlds, and encompassed them. Being the Father, he became their son. There is no other power superior to him. . Tine generated the sky and these earths. Set in motion by Time, the past and the future subsist.: VI Time created the earth; by Time the sun burns; through Time all beings (exist); through Time the eye sees. VII Having through divine knowledge conquered both this world and the highest world, and the holy worlds, and the holy ordinances, yea all worlds, Time moves onward as the supreme god.13 The rest of the verses, describe more or less mystically the different things of the universe such as mind, breath, name, waters, winds, regions, sky, Rk verses, Yajus ...etc. which all are under: the dominant influence of Kala. 13 Muir's Original Sanski Texts, Vol. V, p. 408-409

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8 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama From our point of view, what is noteworthy in the hymns is the association of Kala with dynamic ideas or ideas signifying movement. These are prominently brought out in the metaphors of a 'horse' and 'wheels'. Just as a horse carries forward a chariot, similarly the Time-horse carries forward all the worlds - i. e. all the things of the universe - which are imagined as the "wheels' of Time. This is how the movement of the universe in time is visualised. Of course, we have not here as yet any conscious or systematic philosophy of change. Its importance for us, however, lies in the fact that it represents an attempt of the ancient thinkers to visualise the cause of all changing world - phenomena. From the above survey of the tendencies of thought that prevailed in the Rgveda and the Atharvaveda, it can be seen that the spirit of philosophic enquiry had already seized the minds of the Vedic thinkers and that by setting up the queries concerning the first principle and by seeking to solve them, they had, no doubt, unknowingly broached the problems of the One and Many, of the abiding' and the 'changing' aspects of reality. These, passing through the Brahmana period, were to gather force and emerge into certain definite concepts in the Upanisadic period. THE BRAHMANAS (1200 B.C. to 1500 B.C)14 When we come to the Brahmanas we find the cult of sacrifice acquiring predominance to an amazing degree. There are, however, two aspects of the development of this idea of sacrifice. One is that of a complex and complicated sacrificial ritual, whereas the other is that of giving a mystical meaning to the entire act of sacrifice. This latter aspect, as seen above, was already foreshadowed in the later portions of the Rgveda (X.90) wherein we have, 14 Prof, Belvalkar, 'History of Indian Philosophy', Vol. II, p. 37.

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Seeds of Parinama in the Earliest Literature as Prof. Belvalkar puts it, "the most thorough-going elevation of the Sacrifice into a world-principle. The only advance beyond this made by the Brahmanas was the substitution of Prajapati in place of the Virat Purusa". 15 The life-activity of this Prajapati is symbolised as a continuous process of sacrifice, which exhausts him and takes the juice out of him which loss is made up again and again through the sacrifice.16 What is more Prajapati himself is often identified with the sacrifice, and the latter again with the universe - thus - The soul of all beings, of all gods, is this the sacrifice'.17 In this way by elevating the sacrifice into an omnipotent world-principle - the Creative Force, and by indentifying it with Prajapati and the universe, a sort of mystical unity between the three was sought to be established. Such mystical interpretation of the sacrifice greatly tended to divert the minds of the thinking people from the actual performance of the sacrifices to the inner sacrifice in the form of meditations. Thus, in the Br. A. I.1 we find that instead of a horse-sacrifice, the visible universe is conceived as a horse and meditated upon as such. This transformation of Yajna (47), it is significant to note, is responsible for another important development. We know that the word 'brahman' (neuter) was used in the sense of a 'prayer' in the Rgveda. As this simple prayer assumed the importance of a magical or mystical formula, in the AV, the word 'brahman' also came to have that sense. In the Brahmana age we find the word used for the sacrificial act and mystery. So when the identity of Prajapati, yajna and the whole universe came to be mystically postulated, the word 'brahman' came to have this connotation also i.e. signifying the identity of the three). This development, one might say, paved the way for the brahma' philosophy of the Upanisads, traces of which already begin to appear in the later part of the Brahmanas - as for example in the Satapatha Brahmana XI.2.3.1. where 'brahma' is mentioned as the prius of the world 15 History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 25. 16 Tandya -Brahmana, IV. 10.1. 17 Satapatha-Brahmana, XIV, 3.2.1; III, 6.3.1.

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama and in the Taittiriya Brahmana III. 12.9 and Satapatha X. 6.3. where the 'brahman' and the omnipresent 'Atman' are identified. 10 In this way from being merely a ritual act, yajna develops the significance of an act which symbolises world-creation and on the meditative side emerges into the mysticism of 'brahma' philosophy.. THE UPANISADS (700 B.C. 600 B.C.)18 - The number of Upanisads that have come down to us is very great indeed, nearly two-hundred, but all are not equally old. A great many of them belong to comparatively recent times and hence cannot be used as sources for the history of the earlier Indian philosophy. We shall therefore consider, here, only those Upanisads - viz. Brhadaranyaka, Chandogya, Isa, Kena, Aitareya, Katha, Mundaka, Svetasvatara, Prasna, - which are generally regarded as pre-buddhistic. Even amongst these, we shall for the most part, confine ourselves to their older portions only. 19 General remarks20 The subjective or the meditative way of thought already fore-shadowed in the Brahmanas in the conception of the inner 18 Das Gupta, 'A History of Indian Philosophy', Vol. I. p. 28. This is the generally accepted date of the earlier Upanisads. 20 19 The classification of old and new strata is given by Prof. Belvalkar, 'History of Indian Philosophy' p. 135. Cf also 'A Constructive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy' by Ranade, p. 16. According to Deussen. and Winternitz, however, Isa and Kena belong to a period later than that of Aitareya, Taittiriya and Kausitaki. The earlier Upanisads. as is well-known, do not teach one single, uniform doctrine, as Indian commentators have all along held. There is yet a great latitude, freedom of thought and want of a connected system. This is quite natural since the Upanisads are not the works. of a single hand or a single age but of a series of teachers existing

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Seeds of Parinama in the Earliest Literature ir sacrifice', seems to have appealed very much to the Upanisadic thinkers and almost accepted as a method of discovering the truth about reality. With the ascendency of this kind of outlook, it is but natural that the conception of an extraneous personal creator should pale into the background and that of an abstract absolute principle like "Brahman' already foreshadowed in the "Tadekam' of the Rgveda, should assume considerable prominence. Thus the very same "Tadekam' comes to be variously expressed as 'Brahman', 'Atman' or 'Sal' around which centres the whole of the Upanisadic philosophy. What is more, the important problem of "One' and 'Many' - which was raised in the later part of the Rgveda but for which no satisfactory solution was found, assumes a more coherent and determinate form in so far as the nature of the 'One' and its relation to the 'Many are more clearly brought out. Next, the terms like, brahman, sasvata, dhruya, purusa, atman, which are a rarity in the Rgveda and the Brahmanas find frequent mention here and express some of the fundamental concepts of the Upanisads. They have not yet assumed the character of technical concepts of the later philosophical systems but are nonetheless significant as furnishing the basis for the same. With these general observations we may turn to the passages themselves which throw light on the nature of the 'One and the *Many', and their relation. I 'taddhedaM tamu vyAkRtamAsIttannAmarUpAbhyAmeva vyAkriyatAsau nAmA'yamidaMrUpa iti... / sa eSa iha praviSTa AnakhAgrebhyo yathA kSuraH kSuradhAne'vahitaH FITRI HII ai faire que l' Br. Up. I. 4. 7. | 'vo devo'gnau yo'psu yo vizva bhuvanamAviveza / 37 379ig gargfag ../ S've. Up. II 17. / at different periods of time. Hence it is that we find divergent currents. of thought often contradictory in nature in one and the same Upanisad. In our above account of the Upanisads, however, we have not considered all these varied currents of thought that are reflected in them, but only those that bear upon Qur problem:

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama III 'yaH pRthivyAM tiSThanpRthivyA antaro ya pRthivI na veda yasya pRthivI zarIraM yaH pRthivImantaro yamayatyeSa ta AtmA'ntaryAmyamRtaH / apsu, agnau, antarikSe vAyau, divi, Aditye, dikSu, candratAra ke, AkAze, tamasi, tejasi, sarveSu bhUteSu tiSThanvebhyo'ntaro ya sarvAni bhUtAni na viduryasya sarvANi bhUtAni zarIraM yaH sarvANi bhUtAnyantaro yamayatyeSa ta AtmA'ntayamyimRtaH / ' Br. Up. III. 7 12 IV'skAmayata / bahu syAM prajAyeyeti / sa tapo'tapyata / sa tapasta vedaM sarvamasRjata / yadidaM kiMca / tatsRSTvA tadevAnuprAvizat / tadanupravizya sacca tyaccAbhavat / niruktaM cAniruktaM ca / nilayanaM cAnilaya' ca / vijJAnaM cAvijJAnaM ca / satyaM cAnRtaM ca / satyamabhavat / yadidaM kiMca tatsatyamityAcakSate / ' Taittiriya Up. II. 6 'sa vA ayamAtmA sarveSAM bhUtAnAmadhipatiH sarveSAM bhUtAnAM rAjA tadyathA rathanAbhau ca rathanemau cArAH sarve samarpitA evamevAsminnAtmani sarvANi bhUtAni sarve devAH sarve lokAH sarve prANAH sarva eta AtmAnaH samarpitAH / ' Br. Up. II 5.15 VI ' sa yatheorNanAbhistantuneAccaredyathA'gneH kSudrA visphuliGgA vyuccarantyevamevAsmAdAtmanaH sarve prANAH sarve lokAH sarve devAH sarvANi bhUtAni vyuccaranti tasyopaniSatsatyasya satyamiti prANA vai satya teSAmeSa satyam / ' Br. Up. II. 1.20 V VI tasmAdvA etasmAdAtmana AkAzaH saMbhUtaH / AkAzAdvAyu / vAyoragniH / agnerApaH / addbhyaH pRthivI / pRthivyA auSadhayaH / ' 1 VIII 'thorNanAbhiH sRjate gRhyate ca yathA pRthivyAmauSadhayaH saMbhavanti / yathA sataH puruSAt kezalomAni tathAkSarAtsa' bhavatIha Taittiriya Up. II. 1 vizvam // ' Mundaka Up, I.1.7. IX . ...............................sattveva somyedamagra AsIdekamevAdvitIyam / tadaikSata bahu syAM prajAyeyeti tattejo'sRjata tatteja aikSata bahu syAM prajAyeyeti tadapo'sRjata /

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Seeds of Parinama in the Earliest Literature 13 ...... 1 al 3719 Teen 964: 5914... al pahaa za 121 Cha. Up. VI. 2. 1 to 4. Verily, at that time the world was undifferentiated. It became differentiated just by name and form, as the saying is : "He has such a name, such a form'. He entered in here, from top to toe, as a razor is entirely closed up within the razor-box or again as a bird is pent up within its nest. Him they see not".22 Br. Up. 1.4.7. II "The God who is in fire, who is in water, who has entered into the whole world, who is in plants, who is in trees'. III "He who, dwelling in the earth, and within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who controls the earth from within - He is your soul, the inner controller, the Immortal. The inner controller is He who is immanent likewise in waters, fire, air, in the heavens, in the sun, in the quarters, in the moon, in the stars, in space - (in short) in all things and within all things, whom these things do not know, whose body these things are, who controls all these things from within'. Br. Up. III.7 IV 'He desired : 'Would that I were many ! He performed austerity. Having performed austerity he created this whole 21 22 For similar creation-accounts - from 'Asat', 'Atman', 'Brahman' cf. Tattiriya Up. II. 7,- Aitareya Up. I. 1--2 and Br. Up. I. 4. 1--4, Br. Up. 1. 4.11 respectively. We have translated the passage 'fa u hit an fare! H o according to Prof. Ranade (Constructive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy. p. 261 ). The other passages are translated according to Hume. Hume, following Sankaracarya, translates it thus: 'as fire would be hidden in a fire--holder'. In the foot--note, he gives other references, of this simile and interpretation of Whitrey and Lanman. (Hume. Thirteen Upanisads, p. 28.) D enn: Shume

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14 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina- Theories of Parinama world, whatever there is here. Having created it, he entered into it. Having entered it he became both the This and the That, the Defined and the Undefined, the Supported and Supportless, Knowledge and Not-knowledge, Reality and Unreality - yea, he became the Reality, it is for this reason that all this is, verily, called the Real. Taitt. Up. II.6 Verily this soul is the overlord of all things, the king of all things. As all the spokes are held together in the hub (navel) and felly of a wheel, just so in this all things, all gods, all worlds, all these selves are held together'. VI "As a spider might come out with his thread, as small sparks come forth from the fire, even so from this Soul come forth all pranas, all worlds, all gods, beings. The mystic meaning thereof is, 'the Real is of the real. Pranas verily are the real. He is their Real'. Br. Up. II.1.20. VII "From this Soul, verily, space arose, from space, wind; from wind, fire; from fire, water; from water, the earth; from the earth, herbs etc'. Taitt. II.1. VIII 'As a spider emits and draws in (its thread), As herbs arise on the earth, As the hairs of the head and body from a living person, So from the Imperishable arises everything here. Mundaka Up. I.1.7. IX. ......... In the beginning this world was just Being, one only without a second. It bethought itself : "would that I were many! Let me procreate myself". It created fire...... Fire created water......... Water created food'. Ch. Up. VI.2. 1-2. The above passages point out that this universe is a real transformation of the first principle, Brahman, Atman or Sat and that it (the first principle) is thoroughly immanent in every object

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Seeds of Parinama in the Earliest Literature of this universe. According to Prof. Ranade, the Passages I, II & III (noted above), speak of the thorough immanence of the first principle. The fourth one not only declares the immanence of God in all things, whatsoever but also tells us that what thus. comes to exist is the Real.24 23 The different metaphers like the spinning of the web by the spider attempt to bring out the intimate relationship between the first principle and its derivatives. The external world is not something separate existing side by side with the Atman but is permeated through and through by the latter. Referring to the passage I.1.7 of the Mundaka Up., Deussen points out that 'the inner dependence of the universe on 'Brahman' and its essential identity with him was represented as a creation of the universe by and out of Brahman. 25 In short, Brahman is looked upon as the sole substratum of the universe, the principle that runs like a thread through the whole plurality, thereby binding it (i.e. the plurality) into a single unity. This plurality, having its basis in the highest reality Brahman, is real (and not illusory). 26 15 The above may be regarded as describing the Upanisadic thought with regard to the derivation of the world-phenomena from one principle. There is a divergence of views amongst the ancient and modern writers regarding the reality of derivatives. Some Upanisadic thinkers speculate in a way which opens the 23 'Constructive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy' p. 262. 24 'Constructive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy' p. 212. The reality of the universe is also shown in the Passage No. VI (above) also in the Br. Up. II 3. 1--6. 235 26 Philosophy of the Upanisads, p. 164. 3.. It may be noted that, just as the passages quoted above point to the immanence of the first principle in the universe, even so passages like V. 9. 10 in the Katha, III. 9 and 14 in the Svetasvatara point to its transcendent character in the manner of the Purusa--Sukta of the Rgveda.

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16 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinamar door for the doctrine of Maya or Avidya in the sense of illusion. These passages 37 are seized by Sankaracarya and his followers in ancient and modern times as purporting to give the essential doctrine of Upanisads. It may be conceded that the possibility of the above passages implying Maya is not excluded, but that at any rate, does not justify the claim of Sankara that all the Upanisads consistently uphold the doctrine of Maya28 (in the sense understood by him). For, we have seen above, that there are a number of passages which clearly imply the reality of the objective world. 29 This trend of thought which takes the world. 27 I 'yatra hi dvaitamiva bhavati taditara itaraM jighrati taditara itaraM pazyati taditara itaraM zRNoti.....yatra vA asya sarvamAtmaivAbhUttatkena kaM jighettatkena ke pazyettatkena kaM zRNuyAt... | Br. Up. II 4.14 II 'yatra vA anyadiva syAttatrAnyo'nyatpazyedanyo'nyajji danyo'nyadrasayedanyo 'nyadvadet.....vijAnIyAt / ' Br. Up* IV. 3.31 II 'manasaivAnudraSTavya neha nAnAsti kiMcana / mRtyoH sa mRtyumApnoti ya iha nAneva pazyati // Br. Up. IV. 4.19 & Cf also Katha Up. IV. 11. VI 'yathA somyai kena mRtpiNDena sarva mRNmaya vijJAta syAdvAcA''rambhaNaM vikAro nAmadheya mRttiketyeva satyam // ' Cha. Up. VI. 1.4 v. '...tadetadRSiH pazyannavocat / rUpaM rUpa pratirUpo babhUva tadasya rUpaM praticakSaNAya / indro mAyAbhiH pururUpa Iyate yuktA hyasya harayaH zatA dazeti / ' Br. Up. II. 5.19 VI 'mAyAM tu prakRti vidyAnmAyina tu mahezvaram / / Sve. UP. IV. 10 28 What is more the word Maya does not exclusively connote the illu sory nature of phenomena. In some passages it is distinctly used to suggest the power of God, which is real and which is responsible for the existence of world--phenomena as in the Sve. Up. IV. 10. and Br. Up. II--5.19. One might say that the independent entity of Prakrti in the Upanisads becomes the Maya of Isvara. It is a sort of Upani sadic approriation of the Samkhya Praksti. 29 "These passages are clearly repugnant to the doctrine of Maya' Thibaut, Vedanta Sutras, Part I, SBE, Vol. XXXIV, p. cxviii. 'The doctrine of

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Seeds of Parinama in the Earliest Literature 17 evolved out of Brahman as real, foreshadows the development of the theory of Parinama. YASKA (about 600 B.C.)30, PANINI (500 B.C.): 1, PATANJALI: 2 It has been customary with historians of Indian Philosophy like Das Gupta, Radhakrishnan and others, to pass from the Upanisads to the epics, early Buddhism, Jainism, Samkhya and other Vedic darsanas. This is quite a justifiable process in the ordinary course of things. But it should be noted that in our culture, as early as the Upanisadic period, the first thing upon which scientific reason was exercised was language, so much so that it was pursued as an independent discipline and various systematic treatises were also written on it. What is important for us to note is that scientific or philosophic outlook - for in the earlier stages it is difficult to distinguish clearly between science and philosophy - often got Maya is not to be derived in any reasonable way from a system which was pantheistic or cosmogonic and in which, therefore, the assumption that the world was illusory would have been ridiculous. A pantheism and still more a cosmogonism are under the danger of falling to the level of materialism but not of evoking an illusionism'. Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and the Upanisads' by Keith, Vol. II, p.531. - 'Is there anything in the early Upanisads to show that the author. believed in the objective world being an illusion ? Nothing at all.' Hopkins, J. A. O. S. xxii, p. 385. "The opinion expressed by some eminent scholars that the burden of the Upanisad teaching is the illusive character of the world and the reality of one soul only is manifestly wropg and I may even say is indicative of an uncritical judgement. R. G. Bhandarkar - Vaisnavism and Saivism. p. 2. foot-note. According to Prof. Belvalkar, Yaska is not later than 700 B. C... 'History of Indian Philosophy', Vol. II, p. 37. Macdonell (History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 22) places him in the 5th cent. B.C. Goldstucker, R.G. Bhandarkar, place him in the 7th cent. B. C. Macdonell assigns him to the 4th cent. B.C. - Middle of the 2ad cent. B. C. cf. Keith's Samkhya System, p. and Das Gupta, History of Indian Philosop'y, 'Vol. I, p. 212. 2 - 30 31

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18 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama effectively expressed in thoughts and theories about language. So it would not be out of place if I draw upon for the theory of Parinama what the Nirukta, the Astadhyayi of Panini and the Mahabhasya of Patanjali have to say about it. Yaska mentions six modes in which bhava or action in general) is classified by Varsyayani. - Of these six bhava-vikaras, we are concerned only with "viparinamate'. It is defined as the modification of a being that does not fall away from its own self or essential nature'. 33 The evidence of Nirukta is significant from two points of view. The age of its composition, as said above, is contemporaneous with that of earlier Upanisads and the rise of Jainism and Buddhism, if not earlier. The second point which gives significance to this reference in the Nirukta is the character of the work. Even though it is a Vedanga and in that sense, sacred, yet it contains discussions pertaining to language which was a common property of the people, especially of men of learning. In fact, linguists had to give precision to words in order to clarify ideas which must have formed the subject matter of discussion amongst thinkers. Thus the Nirukta reflects current and older philosophical ideas. There can be no doubt that various types of change were analysed and put into precise terms of which Yaska has taken notice in the above passage. Of these, change in a thing without its original nature being lost, was indicated by the word viparinama and this, as we shall see, is precisely the idea underlying the metaphysical concept of parinama of the Sarkhya and the Jain system. In the Nirukta, of course, viparinama is not meant to be a philosophical doctrine but one of the modes of bhava and is thus more a category of grammar. Nevertheless, unless this. 16h1af$iti wanalfa aszfafor: 1...... vipariNamate ityapracyavamAnasya tattvAdvikAram /

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Seeds of Parinama in the Earliest Literature concept of viparinama or parinama was well-known to and clearly grasped by the thinkers of the time in one form or the other (whether as a metaphysical or a grammatical concept), it could not have become a subject-matter for definition in a treatise like the Nirukta. We can, therefore, without hesitation say that this idea of viparinama or parinama must have been favoured by what we may call proto-Samkhya and proto-Jain thinkers. We have also seen how the earlier Upanisads provide ground for the rise of such a concept. 19 PANINI Panini in his Astadhyayi mentions the word vikara in the sutras, tasya vikAraH / ( 4 / 3 / 134 ) and tadartha vikRteH prakRtau / ( 5/1/12). Patanjali, the author of the Mahabhasya, does not say much on these sutras by way of explanation, especially of the word vikara. However, Kasika, a late commentary on the sutras of Panini, written by Vamanajayaditya, a Buddhist, (about the 9th cent. A. D.) explains these respectively, as follows: 'vikara is the change of state of the original.' 'Prakrti is the original cause while Vikrti is its subsequent change of state'.34 It may be noted that the Jain grammarian Hemacandra (12 th cent. A. D.), too, explains 'vikara' in a similar manner, thus 'Vikara is the change of state of the substance. '95 However, as Panini himself has not explained the term, we cannot exactly say what he meant by 'vikara'. Nevertheless, considering the fact that Vamanajayaditya takes 'vikara' to mean parinama and that Hemacandra also follows the same traditional interpretation, we can reasonably presume that Panini also must have implied parinama by the word "vikara' which, otherwise, is a wider term. What is more, there has generally been 34 'prakRteravasthAntaraM vikAra: / ' and 'prakRtirupAdAnakAraNaM, tasyaiva uttaramavasthAntaraM vikRtiH / ' 35 dravyasyAvasthAntara vikAsaH / 6-2-30

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20 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama an unanimity of view, amongst grammarians, in regard to the traditional interpretation of grammatical terms, whatever may be their other dogmatic differences. PATANJALI Patanjali clearly explains the concept of parinama at two places, one, while defining the concept of dravya in his bhasya on the Panini Sutra 5/1/119, and the other while distinguishing two types of nityata, viz., kutastha-nityata and parinama-nityata. Dravya is defined as that whose thatness' is not destroyed even on the manifestation of new qualities. And 'thatness' is the essential nature of a thing. Thus, for example, the qualities like redness, yellowness etc. appear in amalaka etc., but yet the latter is recognised to be the same (amalaka). 36 Here it can be easily seen that the words 'tatvaM na vihanyate'. occurring in the passage under discussion are only a paraphrase of 'tattvAdapracyavamAnasya' of the Nirukta, Next, in the discussion of the 'nityanityatva' of sabda in the first Adhyaya (1/1/1), while trying to show that the meaning of the word 'siddha' in fe gorg#Fare' is synonymous with that of nitya, Patanjali points out incidentally that 'nitya' signifies that which is eternal, absolutely steady, immoveable, not subject to growth, decay or destruction, unchanging, beginningless and imperishable,37 in other words, kutastha-nitya. But this, according to him, does not constitute the sole definition of nitya. That also is 'nitya' in which the 'thatness' of a thing is not destroyed.38 This is made clearer by the illustration of 'aksti'. When an 'akrti' 36 'yasya guNAntareSvapi prAdurbhavatsu tattvaM na vihanyate tad dravyam / kiM punastattvam / taddhAvastattvam / tadyathA AmalakAdInAM phalAnAM raktAdayaH pItAdayazca guNAH prAdurbhavanti AmalakaM badaramityeva bhavati / ' 37 dhrava kUTasthamavicAlyana pAyopajanAvikAryanutpattyavRddhayavyayayAgi / 38 aafa farqi arta rata' faecual

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Seeds of Parinama in the Earliest Literature or from disappears in the case of one dravya, it does not altogether cease to exist but is seen to subsist in another dravya.39 What is meant is that inspite of undergoing change, akrti never totally abandons its essential nature (tattva) of 'akrtitva'. This obviously refers to the concept of parinami-nityata. Thus Patanjali not only explains and illustrates the concept of parinama which was for the first time enunciated in the Nirukta, but also makes for the first time a precise and clearcut distinction between two types of nityata viz., kutastha-nityata and parinami-nityata. 21 39 '..... nizyAsskRtiH / katham / na kvaciduparateti kRtvA sarvatroparatA bhavati / dravyAntarasthA tUpalabhyate / ' ..... kiM punastattvam / tasya bhAvastattvam / AkRtAvapi tattva na vihanyate / I. 1. 1 sense of It should be noted that akrti is here understood in the akrti-samanya compared to which the different dravyas in which akrti comes to inhere become visesas.

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CHAPTER II SANKHYA IDEAS IN PRE-ISVARAKRSNA LITERATURE SAMKHYA IN THE UPANISADAS Though we are in this thesis primarily concerned with the study of the theory of parinama in the Samkhya darsana, we cannot understand it without a knowledge of its other doctrines. We have seen, in the previous chapter, the early formulations of parinama ideas. Now let us study the early occurrence of otherSamkhya ideas. So I propose to give a brief account of Samkhya ideas as found in per-isvarakssna literature. SAMKHYA IDEAS IN THE UPANISADS In one of the oldest Upanisads viz. the Cha.Up., the passage (VI. 4) which states that behind all things there are really three primary colours, the red, the white and the black which may really be said to exist, while all other things that are constituted out of them are merely a word, a modification and a name.' contains according to scholars like Prof. Ranade, the rudiments of the Samkhya Guna Theory. The names Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, however, it may be noted, get the earliest mention in the Maitrayani, a late Upanisad. According to Das Gupta, a comparison and combination of the two passages of the Cha. Up. viz. - one noted above (VI. 4) and the other (VI. 1.4) stating, "as by one clod of clay, all that is made of clay is known, the difference being only in name, arising from speech, so it is only the clay that is true' -practically give the evolution - Parinama theory of the Samkhya school.3 1 A detailed account of the same is given in 'Samkhya System' by Keith, Ch. I. p. 1 to 19 and in 'Yoga Philosophy' by Das Gupta, p. 17 to 34. 2 'A Constructive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy' p. 182. 3 'Yoga Philosophy in relation to other systems of Indian Thought p. 33-34.

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Sarkhya Ideas in Pre-isvarakrsna Literature 23 In the Katha Up. we are told that "the objects are higher than the senses, mind than the objects, the Buddhi than mind, the great self than Buddhi, the Avyakta than the Great Self, the Purusa than the Avyakta and that beyond and above the Purusa there is nothing else'.4 In the same Up. a similar account is given. Here the mind stands above the senses, Sattva above the mind, over that the Great Self, over that the Avyakta, and over that the Spirit.5 Here we find terms like (54197' and 'fe' used in the classical Samkhya. Thus these passages give us important categories of the Samkhya philosophy. A much more developed form of Samkhya is to be found in the Sve. Up. This Up. abounds in the Samkhya categories. In this work the words Samkhya and Kapila are to be found for the first time. It may be noted that the various categories of the classical Samkhya viz., Vyakta, Avyakta, Jna, Pradhana, Prakrti, Parinamayet also find mention in the same Upanisad.? One should bear in mind that all these Samkhya categories are related to one supreme God, Brahman or Rudra. Again, therein the three-coloured she-goat is said to refer to the three Gunas of the Samkhya Praksti and the two he-goats, to the t:vo kinds of souls, one still in the enjoyment of Praksti and the other, who, after having enjoyed her, has left her.8 The passage, V. 5. of this Upanisad deserves special notice as it uses the word 'parinamayet' for the first time in the earlier Upanisads. Samkaracarya does not explain the word "parinamayet.' 4 1. 3. 10-11 5 II. 6. 7-8 6 aa fircut AIETETIFTITIT 1 (VI. 13) and to gai afaris PETAI (V. 2). 7 1. 8-10, 1V. 10, 1, 13, V. 7., VI. 4, V. 5, V. 8. 8 ajAmekAM lohitazuklakRSNAM bahvIH prajAH sRjamAnAM sarUpAH / 371 a. gaisgata grigi YHTIATISFA: ? (IV.5)

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama May not 'parinamayet' here be used in the sense of a process similar to the one which turns the digested food into blood. Thus, the sense here might be akin to that found in medical works. The general meaning of 'carrying a thing to another state', is of course implied but here it seems to have this specific sense. 24 In the Prasna Up.9 we have an account of how all things are resolved into the Imperishable in the order of the five elements with the corresponding matras or subtle elements and this distinctly refers to the elements of the Samkhya. Again as Prof. Ranade10 points out, the conception of Linga-sarira of the later Samkhya philosophy is already adumbrated for us in the Prasna which reiterates from time to time the nature of the Purusa with sixteen parts. Thus, one passage, VI. 2. says that 'in this body verily is that Being who is made up of sixteen parts.' Another passage VI. 4 gives us the constituents of this Person such as breath, space, air etc. which are more or less mythological but which nevertheless point to the similarity of idea. - The Maitrayani Up. is assigned a very late date and is often not included in the thirteen Upanisads. The mention of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas by name, the exposition of the five subtle elements, the enunciation of the five gross elements and reference to the Samkhya categories. viz. Ksetrajna, Samkhya, adhyavasaya and linga all occur in this Upanisad.11 From the foregoing review, it would appear that general ideas underlying Samkhya philosophy such as those of change and permanence, derivation of the world from one principle, three colours etc, occur in the earlier portions of the Srauta 9 'pRthivI ca pRthivImAtrA cApazcApomAtrA ca tejazca tejomAtrA ca vAyuzva vAyumAtrA cAkAzazcAkAzamAtrA ca etatsarvaM pare'kSare Atmani saMpratiSThate / ' IV. 8 10 'Constructive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy' p, 183. 11 A detailed account of Samkhya ideas in this Upanisad is found in Keith's Samkhya System, p. 13-14 and Das Gupta's Yoga Philosophy, p. 29 to 31.

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Samkhya Ideas in Pre-isvarakrana Literature 25 literature; while specific Samkhya terms find mention in the later portions : what bearing this fact has on the history of Samkhya darsana, we shall study, later on. SAMKHYA IN THE MAHABHARATA13 (400 B.C. to 400 A.D.) 13 After the Upanisads, our next sources for studying the development of Samkhya ideas are the works like the Mahabharata, the Smotis and the Puranas. It should be pointed out here that by putting this discussion before Isvarakrsna's Samkhya, I do not wish to imply that all these works preceded in time to the Samkhyakarika. While some portions of these works dealing with Samkhya might have very well preceded Isvarakatsna, there might be others which would be due to the influence of Isvaraklsna. As, however, there is not enough evidence to discriminate between the various strata of these works, I have thought it proper to follow the old tradition of taking the Mbh., the Smotis and the Puranas together as constituting the Smoti tradition to be distinguished from the Srauta literature. In the Mbh. at XII.318, three schools of Samkhya are mentioned viz. those who admitted twenty-four categories, those who admitted twenty-five and those who admitted twenty-six categories. The school of twenty-four, according to Das Gupta, agrees with the views of Pancasikha found in the Mbh. XII.219 as also with those of Caraka, a work on medicine which will be noticed hereafter, The school of twenty-five categories, Das Gupta identifies with the well-known orthodox Samkhya System of Isvaraklsna.14 This, however, is not exactly the case. The one that would identify the twenty-fifth category with that of the Purusas, regarding the latter 12 For a detailed account of Sainkhya in the Mbh., vide Samkhya System by Keith, Ch. III, and Great Epic of India by Hopkins p. 97 onwards. 13 'The Great Epic of India', p. 398 Hopkins gives different stages of additions to the (pic. According to him, the didactic matter was included about 200 B.C. 14 History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 216-217.

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama as 'nirguna' would be representing the view of Isvaraklsna. This kind of doctrine is to be found at XII. 194, XII. 306, XII. 314315, XIV. 50.8. The other that takes the twenty-fifth principle to be one Atman who is sometimes called Visnu, Vasudeva, Narayana etc. and derives Praksti from him or regards him as an Adhisthata should be regarded as different. This view is mentioned in XII. 303, XII. 302.38, XII.339. In the school of twenty-six categories, the twenty-fifth category is that of Purusas and the twenty-sixth is Brahman, Visnu or Narayana as in XII.350, 25-26 and XII. 351, XII. 217, XII. 308. It may be noted that the Gita throughout upholds the last view and takes Krsna as the twentysixth principle. What is more, the Mbh. (XII.318) recommends. this view and explicitly denounces the view of twenty-four and twenty-five categories as unsatisfactory:15 Just as there is no uniformity in the Mbh. in regard to the number of fundamental categories, so also there prevails a variety of views on the different evolutes of the series. Thus in XII.298, 7 the following eight categories are given - viz. the five senses, mind, Buddhi and Ksetrajna. 16 At another place XII. 275, 16-18, for the Spirit, Citta is substituted and the Spirit is reckoned as the ninth element. In XII.313, the following are derived from Nature the five organs of perception, the five organs of action, mind, Individuation and Buddhi. This, it can be seen, in its substance, corresponds with the products of the classical Samkhya.17 In XII. 306, the eight Prakrtis are mentioned in the manner of the classical Samkhya with this difference that instead of the five Tanmatras, five Bhutas are substituted. The order of development is thus stated. From the Avyakta Praksti is produced the Mahat, from 15 7 ggfa ea na ughafaqfti: Mbh. XII 318.74 _ 'tenaitAnnAbhinandanti paJcaviMzakamacyutam / janmamRtyubhayAgItA yogAH sAMkhyAzca kAzyapa / gefa Ta97a: 172479714011: ll' Mbh. XII 318.79 16 PETIT 77 957 qoy' J 4 gota i Atarf TIC: 77TEAH I'Mbh. XII 248. 17 17 Vide Chapter III.

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Samkhya Ideas in Pre-Isvarakrsna Literature 27 it Individuation, from it the five Elements. The Vikaras are said to be sixteen but after that only five visesas and five senses, i. e. in all ten vikaras are mentioned. In XII. 310.10-17, five organs of perception - eye, ear, etc., their five objects, five organs of action, speech, hands etc. and mind are mentioned as the sixteen vikaras. The evolutionary series given in the Anugita (XIV, 40-42) agrees in many respects with that of the classical Samkhya. It is stated that from the Avyakta 'is produced the Mahat, from it Individuation, from it the five Elements, from them on the one hand the qualities of sound etc. and on the other the five vital airs, while from Individuation arise the eleven organs of sense - five of perception, five of action and mind. It may be noted that nowhere in the Mbh. do we get a reference to the five Tanmatras (which in the classical Samkhya are derived from Individuation) and to the division of Individuation into Vaikarika, Taijasa and Tamasa found in the Samkhyakarika. With the exception of these two, the Mbh. records the categories of the classical Samkhya in a variety of ways. Nevertheless the important concepts of the classical Samkhya, like those of the three Gunas, the distinction between Purusa and Praksti, the plurality of passive Purusas etc. are clearly mentioned. From the above, it is clear that the Mbh.-Samkhya provides a cosmology with a God. Though the terms like 'vikurvanah' and "Vikuste', Vikriya' do occur in the Mbh. (XII.313.15, 302.21.42, 308.2)18 yet we do not find any explicit mention of parinama as explaining creation. It may be that the idea of parinama was taken for granted as implicit in the process. SANKHYA IDEAS IN THE SMRTIS AND PURANAS The Smatis and the Puranas adopt the Mbh. tradition of theistic Samkhya in one form_or another. In the Manu-Smoti which is contemporaneous with the main body of the didactic 18 Cf. also 307, 13

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama epic,19 references to the Samkhya terms, viz. Mahat, Ahamkara, and the three Gunas are to be found.20 28 The Yajnavalkya Smrti, however, alludes to the categories of the Samkhya in greater detail.21 It gives a more systematic account of the Samkhya categories than the one found in the Manu-Smrti. It gives twenty-four categories viz., Avyakta - Atma, Buddhi, Individuation, eleven senses (five of preception, five of action, and mind), five Arthas (objects) and five Elements, prthivi etc. which agree in almost all the details with those of the classical Samkhya, except the substitution of the Arthas in place of the Tanmatras of the classical Samkhya and the absence of the recognition of Prakrti, the 24th principle, as distinct from the Purusa, the twenty fifth principle. It is noteworthy that the whole series is said to evolve from the Avyakta atma who thus ceases to be a mere passive spectator as in the classical Samkhya. The Atma is said to have got entangled in the three Gunas. The same Atma freed from the bondage of the three Gunas is called ::, the highest self (st. 174), wherein takes place the dissolution of all the principles. This account, it may be noted, closely resembles the Mbh. view of twenty-four categories as well as the one given in the Caraka. -- The cosmogonic accounts of the Puranas mention all the categories of the classical Samkhya, by including the Tanmatras 19 'Samkhya System' Keith, p. 44. 20 'udvavarhAtmanazcaiva manaH sadasadAtmakam / manasazcApyahaMkAramabhimantAramIzvaram ||14|| Manu Smrti 1.14 21 #gizaHa ac81a' aaffu fagonfa a 1 viSayANAM grahItRNi zanaiH paJcendriyANi ca // 15 // teSAM tvavayavAnsUkSmAn SaNNAmapyamitaujasAm / sannivezyAtmamAtrAsu sarvabhUtAni nirmame ||16|| ' The three Gunas are elaborately described in XII. 24-52. II. 168-174

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Samkhya Ideas in Pre-Isvarakrsna Literature and the three kinds of Individuation viz. Vaikarika, Taijasa and Tamasa I that were so far omitted in the accounts of the Samkhya categories. However these Samkhya ideas are given a mould which would be consistent with the view of the sectarian schools, like the Bhagavata, Pasupata etc. That is why in all the accounts we find a God postulated as the Creator and ten Devas as the presiding deities of the ten senses22. The personification of the three Gunas as Brahma, Visnu and Siva in the Matsya Purana also points to the same things. This way of looking at trinity, it may be noted, became a popular dogma as can be seen from the mangala verse of Kadambari.24 - CARAKA (78 A.D.)25 Just as we drew upon grammatical works for understanding the history of Samkhya doctrine, similarly we may draw upon the medical work viz. the Caraka26. This work, gives an elaborate account of the twenty-four categories of the Samkhya27. It enumerates not only the twenty-four categories of the Samkhya but also states the order of evolution, which is the same as the one found in the classical Samkhya (st. 63, 64, 66). The twenty-four categories are, Avyakta, Buddhi, Individuation, five gross Elements, (these eight are 'bhutaprakrti') the five organs of 29' 22 Visnupurana, I.2. 19-57. All the other Puranas give more or less similar account of creation. 23 guNebhyaH kSobhamANebhyastrayo devA vijajJire / ekA mUrtistrayo devA brahmaviSNumahezvarAH / ( ekA mUrtistrayo bhAgA ) Matsya P.I.3.16 24 rajeAjuSa' janmani sattvavRttaye sthitau prajAnAM pralaye tamaH spRze / ajAya sargasthitinAzahetave trayImayAya triguNAtmane namaH // 2 // 25 'History of Indian Philosophy, Das Gupta, Vol. I, p. 212. 26 This work is generally not dealt with in the study of the Samkhya. Attention to it was drawn by Prof. Das Gupta in his 'History of Indian Philosoyhy', Vol. I, p. 213. 27 Katidhapurusiya Prakarana, Carakasamhita, p. 287. ff.

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama perception, the five of action, mind and the five Arthas (these sixteen being called vikaras as in the classical Samkhya). The place of Tanmatras of the classical Samkhya is here taken by the five Arthas (as in the Mbh. and Yajnavalkya Smrti). 30 By a conglomeration of the Avyakta with its later evolutes, Rasi-purusa or Jivatma comes into existence (st. 35). All karma, good or evil, pleasure, pain, cognition, birth, death, bondage, liberation etc. (st. 39,40,41) belong to this Rasi-purusa, i e. to say, he, on account of his delusion, desire, aversion and karma, is the cause of all these things (st. 53). When, however, the Sattva Guna predominates (st. 36) and the true knowledge dawns, the conglomeration ceases to exist and the Purusa comes to have the pure state. This free Purusa is called Bhutatma or Paramatma (st. 84, 57,53). It must be noted here that this pure Purusa, Bhutatma, is not given a separate existence from the Avakta-prakrti but is only regarded as a state of Prakrti i. e. Avyakta and Atma or Ksetrajna are identified and the very same Atma when in union with its later products is called Rasipurusa or Jivatma. The utlimate state of liberation is characterless absolute existence and is spoken of as the Brahma-state (aaa) (St. 154-155).88 In the above account what is important for us to notes is that the plurality of passive purusas, reckoned as the twentyfifth principle in the Samkhya of Isvarakrsna is assimilated here in the Avyakta, the twenty-fourth principle. Consequently, the Purusa no longer remains a passive spectator but an active agent responsible for his bondage and liberation which in the classical Samkhya are effected by the non-sentient Prakrti. On the other hand, the non-sentient Prakrti, the twenty-fourth principle, the prius of the world phenomena, in the classical Samkhya becomes a sentient principle having the same functions (as those vested in the Prakrti of the classical Samkhya). 28 For a detailed account of Caraka cf. 'History of Indian Philosophy' Vol. I, Das Gupta, p. 213 onwards.

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Samkhya Ideas in Pre-Isvarakrsna Literature 31 REVIEW The numerous references to the Samkhya ideas noted above both in the religious and secular literature make it abundantly clear that the Samkhya ideas must have been widely prevalent then. That they must have been greatly authoritative and must have powerfully influenced the contemporary thought is brone out by the explicit statement in the Mbh. to that effect. 'In the Mbh.', as Hopkins puts it 'Kapila is authoritative in all philosophical matters and that his name covers every sort of doctrine. He is in fact the only founder of a philosophical system known to the epic'.29 The best evidence', in the words of Hopkins, 'of the authority of Kapila is given not by express statement but by implication in the praise of other systems which, an important point, are by the same implication looked upon as distinct from that of Kapila, although his name is used to uphold them. Thus Kapila's own system is called generally the Samkhya-Yoga or specifically the Kapilam. The Samkhya-Yogins are said to be the models even in teaching of other tendency as in XII. 347.22. and nothing better can be said of the Bhagavatas, here extolled, than that their system is equal to the Samkhya-Yoga', not, be it observed, the same but as good as the system of Kapila. In the Gita, too (I, 75) the Samkhya is cited alone as the one system of Salvation'.30 It is also significant to note that Kapila's treatise is repeatedly regarded to be the oldest.81 All this leaves no doubt as to the antiquity and supremacy of the Samkhya thought in ancient india. 29 Great Epic of India, p. 97, 99, 100. 30 Great Epic of India, p 100 31 Great Epic of India, p. 98, (Mbh. X1I. 350, 6)

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CHAPTER III PARINAMA IN THE SAMKHYA-KARIKA AND ITS COMMENTARIES Introductory : Our discussion of the theory of Parinama in Samkhya-Yoga is based mainly on the Ska. of Isvaraklsna, the Samkhya-sutras, and the Yoga-sutras of Patanjali with their important commentaries. and sub-commentaries The Samkhya-karika of isvaraklsna is the earliest available: work of the Samkhya system. Scholars have held divergent views as regards the date of this work.1 It may be assigned to the 2nd or 3rd cent. A. D. Isvarakrsna describes himself as being in the succession of disciples from Kapila, through Asuri and Pancasikha. Thus Kapila becomes the original 'seer' of this system. Various mythical accounts are to be found in regard to Kapila? but according to Prof. Radhakrishnan it may be accepted that a historical individual of the name of Kapila was responsible for the Samkhya tendency of thought. It will not be wrong, in his opinion, to place him in the century preceding Buddha.3 According to Max Muller, however, the oldest text-book of the Samkhya is the Tattvasamasa, but this view has now been 1 Prof. A. B. Dhruva (cf. his paper in the proceedings of the First Oriental Conference) and Gopinath Kaviraj (cf. his introduction to Jayama ngala, p. 8) place it in the 1st cent. B. C. Dr. Belvalkar in the 1st cent. A.D. or the 1st half of the 2nd cent. A. D. (Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume, pp. 175-178). According to Prof. Das Gupta (History of Indian philosophy, Vol. I, p. 212) and Radhakrishnan (Indian philosophy, Vol. II, p. 255) it is a work of the 3rd cent. A.D. Keith places it in the 4th cent. A.D. (Sankhya System, p. 69). 2 Mbh. XII. 340. 67, Ramayana, I. 40-41, Bhagavata, III, 24. 36. Sve. Up. v. 2, 3 Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 254, 4 Six Systems of Indian Philosophy', p. 318-319.

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Parinama in the Samkhya-karika and its Commentaries 33 rejected by scholars like Garbes, Keith, Das Gupta etc., who place it after 1400 A.D. Commentaries on the Ska. : Prof. R.C. Parikh, after having examined the arguments of Prof. Belvalkar, Keith and Takkasu in regard to the date of Matharavstti, as also the internal evidence of the same, concludes that it can be placed in the beginning of the 4th cent. A. D. or the latter half of the 3rd cent. A. D. Thus Magharavstti can be said to be the earliest commentary of the Ska. Next Gaudapada and Raja wrote commentaries on the Ska. There is, however, dispute about Gaudapada's date and personality. He is generally placed before Vacaspati (9 th cent. A.D.). According to Das Gupta, Raja's commentary on the Ska. was the same as Rajavarttika quoted by Vacaspati and is probably now lost.8 The Buddhist monk Paramartha translated the Ska. into Chinese and also wrote a commentary on it in the 6th cent. A.D. We have consulted its English translation by S.S. Suryanarayanan. Next, attention may be drawn to an anonymous commentary on the Ska. viz. the Yuktidipikawhich is recently discovered and is assigned to the 6th Cent. A.D. by Dr. Mookerji. 10 Finally, we may mention the most important commentary viz. Tattva-kaumudi of Vacaspati on the Ska. which is placed, without dispute, in the 9th cent. A.D. Jayamangala, in the opinion of Dr. Gopinatha Kaviraj, is wrongly attributed to Samkaracarya. Kaviraj 5 Sankhya Philosophy, pp. 68-70. 6 Samkhya System, p. 68, 89. 7 'Puratattva' (Gujarati quarterly), Year I (1923), Vol. 2, pp. 152-160. 8 History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 212. 9 This work has been edited by Pulinbih ari Cakravarti and published in 1938. 10 'Samkhya-Yogi System', History of Philosophy-Eastern and Western, Vol. I. p. 292

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama presumes Samkararya to be the author and places him about 1400 A D.11 34 Parinama in Isva rakrsna's Karika we As our main concern is with the theory of Parinama, shall here consider those Karikas which have a direct or indirect bearing upon it. Parinama, however, being a metaphysical concept can only be understood in relation to other metaphysical concepts of the Samkhya. Hence we shall have to take notice of these also. Isvarakrsna analyses the whole universe into twenty-five principles, of which twenty-four, from the Avayakta-Prakrti down to the gross Elements represent the mental and material creation, while the twenty-fifth, the Purusas, is distinct from these. The order of evolution of the twenty-four Principles is as follows: From the Prakrti proceeds the Mahat, thence Individuation; from the Vaikrta Individuation proceeds the group of eleven senses (five of knowledge, five of action and mind) characterised by Sattva; from the Bhutadi Individuation proceed the subtle elements which are characterised by Tamas; from the Taijasa Individuation proceed both. Thus out of Individuation a group of sixteen is produced. Lastly from the five subtle elements arise the five gross elements. 12 Of these twenty-four principles the primal Prakrti is not an evolute but an evolvent only as it becomes the cause of later principles and is itself not caused by anything. The group of seven, viz. Mahat, Individuation and the five subtle elements, being the cause of some and the effect of others is called both the evolvent and the evolute, while the eleven organs and the five gross elements, being only the effects and not the causes of further 11 Introduction to Jayamangala, p. 9. cf. also Literary Gleanings in Q. J. of the Andhra Hist. R. S., Oct, 1927. 12 prakRtermahAMstato'haGkArastasmAd gaNazca SoDazakaH / tasmAdapi SoDazakAt paJcabhyaH paJca bhUtAni // Ska. 22.

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Parinama in the Samkhya-karika and its Commentaries 35 principles, are designated as vikaras or evolutes only. The Purusathe Subject, the twenty-fifth principle, is neither an evolute nor an evolvent as it is not caused by anything, nor does it become the cause of anything 13 ! The twenty-five principles are also classified as Vyakta (Manifest), Avyakta (Unmanifest) and Jna (the Subject). It is the knowledge of these three that liberates man from wordly misery. 14 Of these three, the Vyakta15 is stated to be caused, non-eternal, non-pervading, mobile (i.e. capable of movement in space),16 manifold, dependent, mergent,17 conjunct and subordinate. The Avyakta is the reverse of this.18 The Vyakta and Avyakta are similar19 in so far as both are possessed of the three Gunas, are indistinguish sAttvika ekAdazaka: pravartate vaikRtAdahakArAt / bhUtAdestanmAtraH sa tAmasastaijasAdubhayam // Ska 25... 13 mUlaprakRtiravikRtirmahadAdyAH prakRtivikRtayaH sapta / SoDazakastu vikAro na prakRtirna vikRtiH puruSaH // Ska. 3 14 tadviparItaH zreyAn vyaktAvyaktajJavijJAnAt / Ska. 2 15 hetumadanityamavyApi sakriyamanekamAzritaM liGgam / __sAvayavaM paratantra vyaktaM viparItamavyaktam // Ska. 10 16 'sakriyam' - parispandavat / yathA hi buddhyAdayaH upAttamupAttaM dehaM tyajanti dehAntaraM copAdadata, iti teSAM parispandaH / zarIrapRthivyAdInAM ca parispandaH prasiddha ev|' STK on Ska 10 'liGga' however is differently explained by Vacaspati as : yathA caite buddhayAdayaH pradhAnasya liGga tathopariSTAdvakSyati / pradhAnaM tu na pradhAnasya liGgama anumitikAraNam / .... ...' i.e. STK on Ska. 10. Yuktidipika gives the same meaning, Jayamangala notes both the senses, viz. 'mergenti and the mark leading to the inference of Pradhana'. 18 Note that the reverse of 'sakriyatva' in the Avyakta is to be understood in the sense of the absence of 'parispanda' only for "sadazapariNAma is there cf. STK on Ska 10. niSkriyam ... yadyapyavyaktasyAsti pariNAma lakSaNA kriyA tathApi parispado nAsti / 19 triguNamaviveki viSaya: sAmAnyamacetanaM prasavami / ___ vyaktaM, tathA pradhAnam, tadviparItastathA ca pumAn // Ska 11.

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36 The Sarikhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama able,20 objective, common, insentient and productive. The Jna is. the reverse of these two and yet also similar to them in some respects. Thus like the Avyakta, the Jna is uncaused, enternal, allpervading, independent, non-mergent, non-conjunct and like the Vyakta, multiple, As distinguished from the two, He is devoid of the three Gunas, distinguishable (Viveki), non-objective, non"general, sentient, non-productive and absolutely passive (i.e. devoid of both parispanda and parinama). Thus, Isvarakrsna, in the ultimate analysis, recognises twofundamental principles, one of unchanging conciousness which is multiple and the other, an entity which is the source of the remaining phenomena of the world. In short, all changes, mental21 and physical are relegated to Prakrti and the unchanging aspect of our experience is called the Purusa - the Subject. The Prakrti is made of the three Gunas, i.e. the three constituents, viz. Sattva, Rajas and Tamas which on the material side are: responsible for shining (prakasa), energy (pravstti), obstruction or mass (niyama) respectively, and on the mental side for pleasure. sorrow and dullness. 22 These three, though not causally related, are yet absolutely dependent upon one another. They are found to co-operate in spite of their natural opposition in every object physical or mental. Just as the wick, fire and oil combine to produce illumination, so these also always co-operate throughout 20 Vacaspati gives an additional meaning of 'aviveki' as follows : 'athavA smbhuuykaaritaa'traavivekitaa| na hi kiMcidekaM paryAptaM svakArya, 379 T FTTT ...I i.e. 'non-separativeness'. One thing is not adequate by itself to produce its eftect but can do so only when in co-operation with other things. 21 It is this characteristic of Prakrti viz. that it is an evolvent of bo mental and material phenomena and particularly the fact that the first evolute is Mahat or Buddhi and everything else, mental and physical, is derived from it - which has induced Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar to look upon the Samkhya as an idealism which he compares with that of Fichte, 'Indian philosophical Review', Vol: II, pp, 201-209, (1918-1919), 22 prItyaprItiviSAdAtmakAH prakAzapravRttiniyamArthAH / artufarmerafaelaran TUT: 11 Ska 12

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Parinama in the Samkhya-karika and its Commentaries the course of evolution. 23 The preponderance of one and the subordination of the others in different manner and proportion give rise to the plurality of phenomena in their infinite complexity. Isvarakrsna describes the functioning of Prakrti through the Parinama of the three Gunas. He uses the word parinama in the Ska. 16 and 27. In the sixteenth, he says that the Avyakta operates through the three Gunas by blending and modification, like water, on account of the difference arising from the predominance of one or the other of the Gunas. In the second half of the Ka. 27, he points out that the diversity of the organs arises from the specific modifications of the Gunas, and from the diversity of their objects.25 37 The evolutes of Prakrti which arise from the parinama of the Gunas and which constitute the Vyakta are considered as karyas (effects) of Prakrti. Isvarakrsna tries to prove the existence of the Avyakta, the prius, through the Vyakta-karyas by the principle of causation.26 His pirnciple of causation, however, is not of the same type as that of the Vaisesikas in which one thing causes another thing which is non-existent (asat), to come into being. Isvarakrsna's ... 23 pradIpavaccArthato vRttiH // Ska 13 24 kAraNamastyavyaktaM pravartate triguNataH samudayAcca / pariNAmataH salilavat pratipratiguNAzrayavizeSAt / / Ska. 16 25 guNapariNAmavizeSAnnAnAtvaM grAhyabhedAcca / I have adopted the reading of Mathara viz. i. c. viSaya as it suits better in the context. Gaudapada, Vacaspati, and the Chinese version of Parmaratha readi.e. the external diversities. Vacaspati explains the second half thus: 'the diversity of organs is due to specific modification of the Gunas like the external diversity'. The reading of Yuktidipika is altogether different. It is fanefaqui tasmAdubhayapracAraM tat / ' This reading is also adopted by Bhattotpala in his commentary on the Brhat Samhita, p. 7. 26 bhedAnAM parimANAt samanvayAt zaktitaH pravRttezca / kAraNakAryavibhAgAdavibhAgAd vaizvarUpyasya / / Ska. 15

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38 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama causation is a manifestation of what already pre-exists. This theory is called the Satkaryavada, while that of the Vaisesikas is called the Asatkaryavada. He establishes it in the following maner. 'The effect is existent (in its cause), since non-existent cannot be produced; since - there is a definite relation of the cause (with the effect); since all is not possible; since the efficient can do only that for which it is efficient and lastly since the effect is of the same essence as the cause. 27 Such a theory of causation can be understood only on the basis of Parinamavada according to which everything evolves out of a primary substratum and, therefore, in a sense existing in it i.e. in the primary substratum and only becoming manifest through the process of parinama. Thus, on one hand, we see that the Avyakta becomes Vyakta through parinama and on the other, the existence of Avyakta is inferentially proved through the principle of Satkaryavada. Now remains the problem of relating the Avyakta-Praksti to the Purusa (Jna). isvaraksyna explains it as follows : From the union of Purusa and Praksti the insentient 'Evolute' appears as if 'sentient and similarly, from the activity really belonging to the Gunas, the Spirit (Purusa) which is neutral, appears as if it were active. For the perception of Nature (Prakrti) by the Spirit and for the isolation of the Spirit, there is the union of both, like that of the halt and the blind; and from this union proceeds evolution. This evolution from the Mahat down to the specific elements is brought about by the Praksti. This work is done for the emancipation of each Spirit and thus is for another's sake, though appearing as if it were for the sake of Nature herself. As the insentient milk flows out for the growth of the calf so does Nature act towards the emancipation of the Spirit.18 27 369. UTGITT UTE HATHTETET I zaktasya zakyakaraNAt kAraNabhAvAcca satkAryam // 28 Ska, 20, 21, 56, 57.

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Parinama in the Samkhya-karika and its Commentaries This, however, must be understood as follows. In the Samkhya theory, Prakrti evolves by itself. No sentient agent is thought necessary. Nevertheless, a philosopher cannot rest content without discovering the purpose of Prakrti. This he does in t'e 'bhoga' and 'moksa' of Purusas. Here we must bear in mind that neither the Purusas can, by definition, have any purpose, nor the Prakrti, being non-sentient, can have one. So we cannot say that the evolution of Prakrti is teleological in the ordinary sense of the word. We should, therefore, regard it as achieving a purpose without meaning it and look upon the teleological expressions as only a way of explaining the relation between Prakrti and Purusa. 39 Development of the Theory of Parinama in the Commentaries of the Samkhya-Karika I, here, deliberately leave out the Samkhya-sutras with the Pravacana-bhasya of Vijnanabhiksu and the Yoga-sutras of Fa anjali with their commentaries since these works present certain differences of interpretation on some of the important topics of the Samkhya philosophy. They will be treated in detail hereafter. The commentaries on the Ska. will be examined in their chronological order. We first take up the commentaries on the Ska. 9. It may be here pointed out, at the outest, that Mathara, Gaudapada and Paramartha's Chinese version, while commenting on the Ska. 9, simply paraphrase what is stated in that Karika itself, adding illustrations for the sake of clarity. Thus they do not contribute much to the understanding of Parinama. In the Yuktidipika, we find the problem of Parinama in relation to the Satkaryavada receiving further elucidation. While refuting the Asatkaryavada of the Nyaya-Vaisesika school, the author of the Yuktidipika defines and explains Parinama. 'Parinama is the manifestation or appearance of another aspect and the disappearance of the previous one, in a substrate, which

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40 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaing Theories of Parimana is being favoured by other requisite concomitant conditions. These appearance and disappearance are not production and destruction. This answers the objection that the terms 'birth' (FFA) and 'existence' (aa) will be synonymous on the assumption of the Satkaryavada. For when the different karakas by their activity cause to manifest the cloth which is nothing but the threads themselves arranged in a particular way, it is said by the people in vyavahara that the cloth is made, produced or is born. When, on the other hand, these karakas cause to disappear the existing state by a different form owing to the manifestation of other potentialities, the previous form is said to be destroyed. Really speaking, however, there is no production of anything nor destruction of anything?.29 Vacaspati Misra in his STK says almost the same thing, adding only the different proofs (FHTUT) establishing the nondifference between cause and effect. This shows that according to the Samkhya the so-called production is only the manifestation of what already exists and is not a new creation. The so-called beginning of an object', as Prof. Hiriyanna puts it, is only an event in its history; the object itself is not and cannot be made. Similarly the destruction means only change of form for there can be nothing like absolute annihilation'.30 Thus, as Keith correctly observes, 'causality in Samkhya, in its ultimate essence, is reduced to change of appearance in an abiding entity'.31 The causality of the Satkaryavada, as is 29 sAdhanAnugRhItasya dharmiNo dharmAntarasyAvirbhAvaH pUrvasya ca tirobhAvaH pariNAmaH / na cAvirbhAvatirobhAvAvutpattinirodhau / .. ... ... ... etenArambhoparamotpannavizeSaprasaGgo janma-sacchabdaH pratyuktaH / katham ? AtmabhUtaM hi tantUnAM paTAkhyaM vyUhasthAnIyaM sannivezavizeSaM yadA kArakANi svena vyApAreNAviSkurvanti tadA kriyate utpadyate jAyate ityevamAdirlokasya vyavahAraH pravartate / yadA tu kArakANi zaktayantarAvirbhAvAt saMsthAnAntarenautsukyartitAmavasthAmupasaMharanti tadA prAgupalabdhaM saMsthAnaM vinAzazabdavAcyatAM prtipdyte| paramArthatastu na kasyacidutpAdo'sti na vinAzaH / 30 Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 273. 31 Samkhya System, p. 73.

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Parinama in the Samkhya-karika and its Commentaries apparent from the above, is only a natural and logical deduction from the postulate of Parinamavada, just as that of Asatkaryavada, is from that of the Arambhavada. Mathara's explanation of the word 'afzucht:' occurring in the Ska. 16 points out that there are two kinds of causation. One is the production of effect by automatic transformation, as for instance the transformation of milk into curd. In the other case the effect does not come out by automatic transformation of the material, but it is made out of the material with the help of extraneous .agency, as for example the manufacture of pot from clay with the help of rod, thread, water etc. Of these two kinds of causation, Mathara says that, the first kind operates in Pradhana since it is transformed into the Vyakta, viz. Mahadadi, of its own accord.38 This kind of distinction is not to be found in the Gaudapadabhasya, Yuktidipika, STK and Jayamangala. The Yuktidipika, however, tries to elucidate parinama in a different way by raising the objection that the Prakrti being immobile (farfoza) will not be able to put forth the different effects. This is met by pointing to two kinds of kriya viz, TRGETATOTT activity involving flow i.e. movement and gf ||HTETUT activity of the nature of simple transformation in a thing. Of these two, the first is denied in the Pradhana, as it is too subtle (apa). It is the second kind of 32 - pilot fafaat Air cu afeunty feetcafeumaticaloa I 0717 pariNAmakatvAd mRtpiNDasUtrodakavidalAnpazyAmaH / pariNAmatazca kSIraM dadhIti / tatra pradhAnaM kathaM kAraNamityatrocyate-pariNAmataH / yathA kSIraM dadhibhAvena pariNamati, yadeva kSIraM tadeva dadhi, evaM pradhAnaM vyaktabhAvena pariNamati dadhivad vyaktaM kSIravat pradhAnamityarthaH / yadevAvyaktaM tadeva vyaktamiti / tasmAducyate pradhAnaM kAraNamiti / This passage distinguishes two types of causality, one, that of parinama, i. e. natural causation and the other involving extraneous agency. Note that Paramartha's version gives this passage verbatim but cites the example of 'parcots giving birth to a child' while explaining the sccond kind of causation.

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42 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama kriya - viz. Parinama-laksana, that produces the various effects. This parinama is then defined thus : When the substrate without leaving its essential nature, puts on another aspect, giving up the previous one, it (i.e. this whole process) is called Parinama. Just as a leaf without abandoning its essential nature assumes yellowness, on the disappearance of its previous dark green colour, on account of such causes as heat etc, similarly is this to be understood.33 Jayamangala explains parinama as the change of state. Just as a big tree manifests itself from a subtle seed through the growth of roots, branches, sub-branches etc., similarly the Avyakta transforms itself into the Vyakta. 34 __The last quarter of the Ka. 16 viz. 'salilavatpratipratiguNAzrayavizeSAt' which deals with the question as to how one Prakrti can bring about diverse manifestations, is explained by all the commentators in more or less the same manner with variation in the illustrations. We give below Vacaspati's explanation since it is somewhat elaborate. .. Just as the water falling from the clouds though naturally of itself having one taste, becomes sweet, sour, saline, bitter, pungent etc according as it comes into contact with different modifications of earth and becomes transformed into the juice of fruits such as cocoanut, plam, wood-apples and so forth; in the same manner, the Gunas of the Pradhana come to be predominant one 33. jahaddharmAntaraM pUrvamupAdatte yadA'param / tattvAdapracyuto dharmI pariNAmaH sa ucyate // yadA zaktyantarAnugrahAt pUrvadharma tirobhAvya svarUpAdapracyuto dharmI dharmAntareNAvirbhavati tadavasthAnaM asmAkaM pariNAma ityucyate / yathA pAlAzaM palAzAdapracyutaM nimittAntarasyAtapAderanugrahAcchayAmatAM tirobhAvya pItatAM vrajati, tathedaM draSTavyam / 34 pUrvasyAmavasthAyAmavasthAntaraM pariNAmaH... / yathA kaNikAyAH sUkSmAyA mUlakaH(?) zAkhAprazAkhAdipravRddho mahAnvanaspatirvyakto bhavati evamavyaktAdvayaktaM pariNamati /

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Parinama in the Samkhya-karika and its Commentaries by one and thereby bring about various modifications in the form. of various products.35 43deg The commentaries on Ka. 27 ' guNapariNAmavizeSAnnAnAtvaM' do not. throw any more light than the passages noted above. They simply seek to show that the diversity of the organs and the external: diversity are not caused by God, Buddhi, Ahamkara, Pradhana or Svabhava but by the specific modifications of the Gunas.36 Thus we see that Mathara distinguishes parinama as an automatic change by assuming two types of causation and constrasting parnama-karana with aparinama-karana. The Yuktidipika and STK. explain parinama in relation to Satkaryavada. The Yuktidipika alone, however, defines parinama.37 35 yathA hi vAridavimuktamudakamekarasamapi tattadbhUvikArAnAsAdya nArikelatAla-tAlIbilva..............................kapitthaphalarasatayA pariNamanmadhurAmlalavaNatiktakaSAyakaTutayA vikalple evamekaikaguNasamudbhavAtpradhAnaguNAH pariNAmabhedAn pravartayanti / tadidamuktam... 'pratipratiguNAzrayavizeSAt / ekaikaguNAzrayeNa yo vizeSasta-mAdityarthaH / 36 cf. Mathara and Gaudapada, on the Ska. 27. 37 Yuktidipika on Ska. 16

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CHAPTER IV DEVELOPMENT OF PARINAMA IN THE YOGA-SUTRAS AND THEIR IMPORTANT COMMENTARIES AND THE SANKHYA-SUTRAS AND THEIR COMMENTARIES Sources The yoga-works : Indian traditioni identifies Patanjali, the author of the Mahabhasya with Patanjali, the author of the Yogasutras. If this tradition can be relied upon, then the date of the Yoga-sutras, will be the middle of the 2nd cent. B. C. which is the generally accepted date of the Mahabhasya. But Scholars like Keith and Woods do not subscribe to this traditional view and regard the two Patanjalis as different. Prof. Wood places the Yoga-sutras in the 4th or 5th cent. A. D. However, they are not later than the 3rd cent. A. D.4 The earliest commentary on the Yoga-sutra is the Vyasa-bhasya (4th cent. A.D.): Vacaspati and Vijnanabhiksu wrote commentaries on the Vyasa-bhasya, called Tattva-Vaisaradi, and Yoga-varttika respectively. Bhiksu has also written Yogasarasamgrah and Vijnanamota-bhasya, a commentary on the Brahmasutra. The commentaries of Bhoja (10th cent. A.D.)6 and Nagesa (17th cent. A.D.)? on the Yoga-sutras, are respectively called Bhojavstti and Chayavyakhya. 1 cf. The commentary of Bhoja on the Yoga-sutra. Introduction st. 5. 2 Samkhya System, p. 59-57. 3 The Yoga System of Patanjali, Harward Oriental Series, Introduction P, xv. 4 cf. Prof. R. C. Parikh's article in 'Puratat tva' Year I, Vol. 2, p. 158. 5 Radhakrishnan, Indian philosophy, Vol. II, p. 341-342 cf. Prof. R. C. Parikh's article in "Puratattva', Ycar I, Vol. 2, p. 159. 6 Das Gupta, History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 212. 7 Das Gupta, History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 212.

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Development of Parinama in Yogasutras The Samkhya-sutras are traditionally attributed to Kapila. But they are assigned to the 14th cent. A.D. by modern scholars chiefly on the ground that Madhava's Sarvadarsanasangraha does not refer to it but bases his account of the Samkhya on the Karika.8 Aniruddha was the first to write a commentary on the Samkhya-sutra in the latter half of the 15th cent. A.D. The important commentary on the Samkhya-sutras is, however, that of Vijnanabhiksu, called the Samkhyapravacanabhasya ( 16th cent. A. D.). Bhiksu also wrote an independent work called Samkhyasara. There are two other works on Samkhya, viz. Simananda's (or Ksemendra's) Samkhyatattvavivecana and Bhavaganesa's Samkhatattvayatharthyadipana, both of which are later than Vijnanabhiksu. Parinama in the Sutras of Patanjali and the V.B. The sutras of Patanjali do not define" or explain parinam as. such. They seem to take for granted the idea of parinama. They explain the different parinamas of the Citta and only incidentally refer to those of the Elements (bhutas) and Senses (indriyas). The word parinama, however, is used in ten sutras viz. III. 9, 11, 12, 13. 15. 16. IV. 2, 14, 32, 33, of which only the relevant ones are considered here. Sutras III. 9, 11, and 12 explain the nirodh-parinama, the samadhi-parinana and the ekagrata-parinama of the Citta. The suppressive modification (nirodh-parinama) is the conjunction of the mind with the moment of suppression (nirodh), when the outgoing and suppressive potencies disappear and appear respectively.9. The trance modification of the mind (samadhi-parinama) is the destruction and rise of all-pointedness and one-pointedness, respectively.10 It is the mental modification of one-pointedness when the subsiding and rising cognitive acts are similar, 11 It is clear that these indicate the different stages of development of the mind. 8 "Indian Philosophy', Radhakrishnan, Vol. II, p. 255. 1 vyutthAnanirodhasaMskArayorabhibhavaprAdurbhAvau nirodhakSaNacittAnvayo nirodhaqfUITH: 1 . - - 10 apranticat: apulaut faire facuta: 11 Ja: gat: Ariasi_grarerut fartei atuatefeuita: 1

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- 46 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama III. 13 just refers to dharma-parinama (change of charactristic), laksana-parinama (a technical term denoting parinamas dependent on time-variation) and avastna-parinama (change of state or condition) of the Elements (bhutas) and the Senses.18 III. 15. points out that the distinctness of succession is the reason for the distinctness of modifications.18 Let us now consider what Vyasa, Vacaspati, Bhoja, Vijnanabhiksu and Nagesa have to say on parinama, while commenting on the Ysu. Vyasa developes the theory of Parinama while explaining the relevant sutras. He gives a comprehensive view of the three aspects of parinama, viz. dharma-laksana-avasthaparinama in his bhasya on the Ysu. III. 13 thus : Dharma-Parinama is the change of characteristic in the characterised or the substance, as for instance, the disappearance and appearance of the characteristic of the Vyutthana (outgoing activity) and Nirodha (suppression) respectively in the characterised (i.e, the Citta here). LaksanaParinama refers to the three time-variations, viz. past, present and future of the same characteristic. Thus the characteristic of Nirodha, having given up the first time-form (adhva) which consists of the time-variation (Laksana) not yet manifested (anagata), attains the present time-variation, without overstepping its essential nature of Dharmatva.' It is in this time-variation which manifests in the present that the true nature of Nirodha is manifested. This is its (Nirodha's) second time-form (adhva). It is not severed from the past and the future time-variations (Laksana). Likewise Vyutthana-characteristic has three time-variations and is connected with three time-forms. Having givien up the present time-variation, it (Vyutthana) passes over into the past time-variation, without, however being apart from its nature of 'Dharmatva'. This is its third time-form (adhva) and it is not severed from the future and the present time-variation (Laksana). 12 etena bhUtendriyaSu dharmalakSaNAvasthApariNAmA vyAkhyAtAH / 13 HACE furthtrata

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Development of Parinama in Yogasutras Similarly, inclining again to Vyutthana it gives up the future time-variation without leaving its essential characteristic and attains the present time-variation (Laksana). This is its second time-form and it is not severed from the past and the future time-variations. Similarly Nirodha again and Vyutthana again.14 Thus the Laksana Parinama considers the three stages of a characteristic, the unmanifested when it exists in the future, the manifested moment of the present and the past when it has been manifested, now lost to view but conserved and kept in all the onward stages of the evolution. As Prof. Das Gupta puts it, 'it records the history of the thing in future, present and past which are only the three different moments of the same thing according to its different characters, as unmanifested, manifested and manifested past but conserved.'15 In the Avastha-Parinama, during the moment of Nirodha, the suppressive potencies become powerful and the Vyutthana potencies become weak. It, thus, refers to the change of state or condition. These three aspects of Parinama are also illustrated in the bhutas by the example of clay. When the substance clay undergoes a change of characteristic from the form of lump to that of pot, it is its Dharma-Parinama. This characteristic viz. the ghata-form may be thought to have itself undergone a change in as much as it has now come into being from a state of relative non-being or latency. This is called the Laksana-Parinama of the Dharma or characteristics as constituting ghata. This ghata is again suffering another change as new or old as it is just produced or is gradually 14 tatra vyutthAnanirodhadharmayorabhibhavaprAdurbhAvau gharmiNi dharmapariNAmA lakSaNa pariNAmazca / nirodhastrilakSaNastribhiradhvabhiryuktaH / sa khalvanAgatalakSaNamadhvAnaM prathamaM hitvA dharmatvamanatikrAnto vartamAnalakSaNaM pratipannaH / yatrAsya svarUpeNAbhivyaktireSo'sya dvitIyo'dhvA / na cAtItAnAgatAbhyAM lakSaNAbhyAM viyuktaH / tathA vyutthAnaM trilakSaNaM tribhiradhvabhiryuktaM...evaM punavyutthAnamiti / 15 Study of Patafijali, p. 73...---

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama running towards its decay. This is its Avastha-Parinama or change of condition. 16 Having explained these three aspects of Parinama, Vyasa clarifies that it is from the view-point of distinction (bheda) between the charasteristic (Dharma) and the characterised (Dharmi), that this three-fold change is to be understood. Again, it is from this point of view that it is said that the substance has neither past nor future but that it is the characteristics only that are manifested in time by virtue of which the substance is spoken of as varying and changing temporally just as a line remains unchanged itself but acquires different significances as one or two zeroes are placed on its right side. 17 48 In reality, however, (i. e. from the standpoint of non-distinction between Dharma and Dharmi) there is but one change because the characteristic is the very being itself of the characterised; and it is the change of the characterised alone that is detailed by means of the characteristic. Thus it is that the threefold change, Dharma, Laksana and Avastha, does not overstep the being of the characterised substratum and it is for this reason that there is but one change which runs through all these specialisation thereof. This change, Vyasa defines as the manifestation of another characteristic on the removal of the previous characteristic of a substance which remains constant.18 16 tathA'vasthApariNAmaH / tatra nirodhakSaNeSu nirodhasaMskArA balavanto bhavanti durbalA vyuthAnasaMskArA iti / eSa dharmANAmavasthApariNAmaH / paramArthatasveka eva pariNAmaH / dharmisvarUpamAtro hi dharmo dharmivikriyaivaiSA dharmadvArA prapaJcayata iti / tatra dharmasya dharmiNi vartamAnasyaivAdhvasvatItAnAgatavartamAneSu bhAvAnyathAtvaM bhavati na tu dravyAnyathAtvam / yathA suvarNabhAjanasya bhittvA - 'nyathA kriyamANasya bhAvAnyathAtvaM bhavati na suvarNAnyathAtvamiti / dharmiNo'pi dharmAntaramavasthA dharmasyApi lakSaNAntaramavasthetyeka eva dravyapariNAmo bhedenopadarzita iti / ... na dharmI tryadhvA dharmAMstu tryadhvAnaste lakSitA alakSitAstatra lakSitAstAM tAmavasthAM prApnuvanto'nyatvena pratinidizyante'vasthAntarato na dravyAntarataH / yathaikA rekhA zatasthAne zataM dazasthAne daza / ...... 18 paramArthatastu eka eva pariNAmaH / dharmisvarUpamAtro hi dharmo dharmivikriyaiva eSA dharmadvArA prapaJcayata iti / ta ete dharmalakSaNAvasthApariNAmA dharmisvarUpa 17

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Dcyclopmcit of Parinama in Yogasutras Thus Vyasa explains the three aspects of Parinama and shows how these are to be comprehended from standpoints of distinction between Dharma and Dharmi and non-distinction between the two. The latter' seems to be the real, proper philosophical view according to Vyasa. . Next, while commenting on the Ysu. IV. 33, Vyasa makes more explicit the Sarkhya concept of Parinama, more properly of Parinaminityata by distinguishing it from the other type of nityata, viz. the Kutasthanityata. Permanence is two-fold, the absolutely unchanging permanence and permanence amidst change. Of these the first belongs to the Purusa and the second to the three Gunas. The Permanent or Eternal is that in which the substance or the essence is not destroyed by changing appearances. Both are permanent because their substance or essence is never' destroyed. Now with regard to the characteristics of the Gunas viz. Buddhi, etc., succession has., an end which is cognised by the cessation of the changes. In the eternal Gunas, however, it has no end. In the case of the absolu- : tely permanent ones, the existence of the released Purusas who are established in their own natures is also known by succession. In their case too, therefore, it has no end. The succession here is. abstracted from the act of existence and is based upon words only.10 19 manatikAntA ityeka eva pariNAmaH sarvAnamUnvizeSAnabhiplavate |...ath ko'yaMH pariNAmaH / avasthitasya dravyamya pUrvadharmanivRttau dharmAntarotpattiH pariNAma iti / dvayI ceyaM nityatA kUTasthanityatA pariNAminityatA ca / tatra kUTasthanityatA puruSasya / pariNAminityaMtA guNAnAm / yasminpariNamyamAne tattvaM na vihanyate tannityam / ubhayasya tattvAnabhighAtAnnityatvam / tatra guNadharmeSu buddhayAdiSu pariNAmAparAntanirmAhyaH kramo labdhaparyavasAno nityeSu dharmiSa guNeSvalabdhaparyavasAnaH / kUTasthanityeSu svarUpamAtrapratiSTheSu muktapuruSeSu svarUpAstitA krameNaivAnubhUyata iti tatrApyalabdhaparyavasAnaH zabdapRSThenAstikriyAmupAdAya kalpita iti /

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50. The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama. Another important development, to be noticed for the first time in. Vyasa, pertains to the elucidation of the nature of the process of Parinama of twenty-three principles from Praksti. Ahankara and five tanmatras are the six unspecialised modifications of Pure Be-ness, the Great Principle, the Maha Atma. That which is prior to the unspecialised forms is the undifferentiated Mahat Principle. Remaining in the Mahat of pure Be-ness, these (six avisesas) grow up to their highest capacity. On involution, they pass back into the state of Pure Be-ness, the great principle; and thence they pass into the state which neither is nor yet is not, that in which it exists and yet does not; that which is Real, the Unmanifested, the background of all. This is their undifferentiated phenomenal modification; and that which neither is aor yet is not, is the noumenal modification, The undifferentiated phenomenal (Linga) is the next after the Noumenal (Alinga). Existing therein, it becomes distinguished from it (Aliaga), because the law of the order of appearance is inviolable. Similarly the six unspecialised modifications have their being in the undifferentiated phenomenal and are distinguished from that by the order being inviolable. Likewise, are the elements and organs having their being in these unspecialised modifications, distinguished from them, as has been already described. There is no other tattva appearing in succession after the specialised modifications. So there is no evolution into any other principle beyond the visegas. But their Dharma-Laksana-Avastha-Parinama will be explained later on.20 20 ete sattAmAtrasyA''tmano mahataH SaDavizeSapariNAmAH / yattatparamavizeSebhyo liGgamAtraM mahattattvaM tasminnete sattAmAtre mahatyAtmanyavasthAya vivRddhikASTAmanubhavanti / pratisaMsRjyamAnAzca tasminneva sattAmAtre mahatyAtmanyavasthAya yattanni:sattAsattaM niHsadasannirasadavyaktamaliGgaM pradhAnaM tatpratiyanti / eSa teSAM liGgamAtra: ofeullet FATHATHEI arfar suferre fa ........FETE="HTT+F pratyAsannaM tatra tatsaMsRSTaM vivicyate kramAnativRtteH / tathA SaDavizeSA liGgamAtre saMsRSTA vivicyante pariNAmakramaniyamAt / tathA tevavizeSaSu bhatendri

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Development of Parinama in Yogasulfassnis:. jeIjhIsiMhanI tI gerdefinition tic and laborate Thus in the Vyasa-bhasya we of the theory of Parinama but also a exposition of the various aspects of Parinama and of the process of Parigams which is not to be found in earlier Samkhya-Yoga literature Vacaspati, Bhoja, Vijnanabhiksu and Nagesa add nothing new in the explanation of the passages pertaining to dharma-laksanaavastha parinama and twofold permanence. Vacaspati and Bhiksu, however, attempt to throw further light on the passage dealing with the Tattvantara-parinama and Samsrsta-viveka, by giving their own interpretations which deserve special notice. So we consider them independently. The Tattvantara-Parinama Vacaspati attempts to explain Tattvantara Parinama in his commentary on the Ska. 3, though he does not elucidate the point while commenting on the Vyasa-bhasya. There he arrives at the conclusion that the absence of equal degree of grossness and perceptibility is the criterion of tattvantaratva. Let us see how he arrives at this conclusion. ...The five gross elements and the eleven sense-organs are mere products or modifications, not productive. Though the cow, the jar, the trees and the rest are the products of the earth, and so are curd and sprout, of milk and seed respectively, which latter are the products of the cow and the tree, yet these facts do not touch our position; since trees etc., do not differ from earth, in their essence, and it is the productiveness of something different in essence, for which the term Root, 'Prakrti' stands; and that the cow, the tree etc, do not differ from each other in their yANi saMsRSTAni vivicyante / tathA coktaM purastAt / na vizeSebhyaH paraM tattvAntaramastIti vizeSANAM nAsti tattvAntarapariNAmaH / teSAM tu dharmalakSaNAvasthApariNAmA vyAkhyAyiSyante /

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The Sankhya-Yoga und the Jaina Theories of Parinama" essence, is proved by the fact that they have the same degree of grossness and perceptibility'. 31 Vijnanabhiksu's explanation of the same is as follows: 'tattvatvaM ca dravyatvaM tattvAntaratvaM ca svAvRttidravyatvasAkSAdvayApyajAtimattvam / ' "Tattvatva consists in the possession of substantiality (dravyatva), and tattvantaratva i.e. distinctness of tativa consists or lies in the possession of the generality (jatimatva, as e.g. 'purusatva') which is directly pervaded by the generality ('dravyatva' i.e. substantiality which ch@racterises the twenty-five tattvas) and which does not reside or inhere (Fatalet) in the other tattvas (as c.g. other twenty-four,.than the Purusa).' Thus according to Bhiksu, the twenty-five principles of the Samkhya are distinct tattvas because each one possesses a distinct: *Jati'. But this is only explaining away in the terminology of Vaisesika, what is accepted as a dogma. Vacaspati, however, may be said to have attemptec a sort of rational explanation of 'tattvantaratva..22 ; 21 paJcamahAbhUtAni ekAdaza indriyANIti SoDazako gaNo vikAra eva, na prakRtiriti / yadyapi pRthivyAdinAM goghaTavRkSAdayo vikArarA: evantahikArabhedAnAM payobIjAdInAM dadhyakurAdayaH, tathA'pi gavAdayo bIjAdayo vA na pRthivyAdibhthastattvAntaram / tattvAntaropAdAnatvaM ca prakRtitvamihAbhipretana , iti na doSaH / sarveSAM goghaTAdInAM sthUlatendriyagrAhyatA ca sameti na tattvAntaram / 22 Das Gupta's interpretation of the same is as follows: "The produc-- tion of these Visesas and Avisesas is called tattvantaraparinama, as distinguished from the changes that take place among the visesas themselves. Thus for example when the tanmatras are produced from ahamkara, the state of teirg, involved in the tanmatras, is altogether different from the state of being of ahamkara. It is not merely a mere change of quality, but a change of existence or state of being. Thus though the tanmatras are derived from mahat through ahamkara, the traces of abamkara caprot be easily found in them. This derivation is not such that the ahamkara remains principally unchanged and there is only a c harce of qualis 0 ite ilirikala, lut it is a different exis.

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Development of Parinama in Yogasutras The above discussion regarding the twenty-four principles being distinct tattvas, points to one fact, viz,, that the Samkhyas either reduced all the world-phenomena to these twenty-four distinct elements or regarded all the world-phenomena as resulting from the association and dissociation of these elements The hypothesis that the Samkhyas were so called because they accepted a particular samkhya of elements, receives support if we regard that *the Samkhyas regarded this particular samkhya as indicating so many distinct elements. In this matter, the 'tattvantaras' can be compared with the Astikayas of the Jain, the difference, however, being that the Jainas do not attempt to derive them from any one principle. One may regard the evolution of these twentythree elements from Prakrti as so many Distinctions which Praksti put forth through the process of Parinama and which, later on, by mutual association and dissociation, gave rise to the multifarious world-phenomena. We may now turn to the next problem, which attempts to describe the process of Parinama, Samsrsta-viveka. The Process of Parinama - samsrsta-viveka Before, however, we proceed to understand the process of Parinama (HX6T-1927), it is necessary to take notice of Vijnana'bhiksu's view regarding the nature of the three Gunas because his interpretation of Samsysta-viveka can ouly be understood in the light of his conception of the three Gunas. According to Vijnanabhiksu, the Gunas are super-subtle tence altogether, and has properties which differ widely from that of ahajnkara. So it is tattvantaraparina na, i.e. evolution of the different categories of existence. The evolution of the senses and the five gross ele mets cannot be o? this nature, for they are the visesas which have been too much specialised to allow the evolution of any other substance of a grade of existence different from themselves. With them there is en end of all emanations and the changes or modifications that they suffor are brought under the dharma, laksana and avastha-par nama. Yoga Philosophy, p. 178-179.

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54 The Sarkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama substances, 23 infinite in number according to the diversity of individuals. Praksti according to Bhiksu is a conglomerate (sanuka) of an infinite number of subtle Guna-seals. It is not correct, according to this view, to say that the universal Gunas produce a diversity of effects on account of their varying combinations since such a view cannot account for the appearance of minor differences, increase, decrease etc, and for the initial disturbance in the Praksti.24 It is, however, not possible to find endorsement of this view of Bhiksu in any of the earlier Samkhya works. 25 On the contrary, the express statement of the Ska. 10.26 that the Avyakta is not savayava (having parts) seems to go against Bhiksu's view. Moreover, it is not clearly stated in any earlier work as to whether the Gunas are to be regarded as subtle substances infinite in number. On the (ther hand, in consonance with the nature of Prakrti, as cne lorogeneous and integrated whole, the 23 igreifar scanfit at azifaat TTT: jatifqu1a6917 | SPB 1.61 24 'sattvAditrayamapi vyaktibhedAdanantam / anyathA hi vibhumAtratve gugavimardavaici vyAt kAryavaicitryaniti siddhAnto nopapadyeta / vima'vAntarabhedAsaMbhavAt / ....... Tutai Arasta f ar afzuS 717752 tathA paricchinnatve ca tatsamUharUpasya pradhAnasya paricchinnatvApatyA zrutismRti--- HGAFGTSETTILITETIT 719777 | SPB 1.127 25 Pol. Das Gupta opines that "there is nothirc, however, in the inter pretation of Gaudlapada and Vacaspati which would militate against the interpretauon of Bhiksu, tut yet while they were silent as to any definite explanations regarding the nature of the Ganas, Bhiksu cefintely came forward with a very satisfactory and ratioral interpretation of their rature......... Bhiksu's interpretation slits excec dingiy wet all that is known of the manifestations and workirgs of the Gunas in all carly documeris". History of Indian Philosoj hy, Vol. I., p. 224.. We, cannot, however, agree with this vicw, for reasors stated above. 26 Cf. STK on SKa. 10.

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Development of Parinama in Yogasutras three Gunas seem to indicate the three universal powers or potentialities of Prakrti which bring about various manifestations in this universe. Now, let us understand Bhiksu's interpretation of the process of Parinama sa msrsta-viveka, in the light of his theory of the Gunas, as given by him in his YV. (II. 19). 1 27 : 55 According to Bhiksu, when the process of creation starts, there occurs only a partial, not a total disturbance in the equilibrium of Prakrti, the equilibrium being maintained for ever in a certain part of Prakrti. Otherwise, i.e. on the assumption of a total disturbance of the equilibrium, the different stages (vise sa, avisesa, linga) in the order of cosmic evolution, will not be possible. The transformation of the subsequent categories (tattvas) takes place successively from only a part of the preceding categories, like that of foam taking place in part of the ocean and not like that of milk into curd which is a total parinama of the previous state. The existence of the preceding tattvas, the causes, as pervading the subsequent ones, their effects, after the production of the latter, comes to be established by the fact that the deficiency of the reals in the cause, consequent upon the production of the effect, has to be made gocd by the preceding tattvas successively by a process of refilling. 21 27 athavA sarvadA sattvarUpaM nityatvamevAtrApyartho'stu sarge'pi guNAsAsyasvAtyantato'nucchedAt, aMzata evaM vaiSamyeNAvaraNarUpasya guNasAgyasya sarvadA sattvAt, anyathA sAmyAvasthAyA anyantocchede parvatvAnupapattezca / tasya ca vaMzatulyasya guNavRkSasyAvaraNAlA pUrvapUrva tattvAnAmaMzata evottaratattvarUpeNa pariNAmo bhavati samudrasyAMzataH phenAdirUpatAvad na tu dadhnA dugdhasyeva pUrvapUrvatattvasya sarvazina pariNAma, utpannakAryasya kAraNena punarApUraNArthaM tu kAraNAMnA svakAryAvarakatayA'vasthAnaM sidhyati, tasmAt sargakAle'pi bahiraliGgAvasthAva ........... a fazafafa.........I' Dr. Seal and Das Gupta, accepting the above interpretation of Bhiksu regarding the nature of the Guns and the process of Parinama give an capition of the same in modern terms as follows: "This evolution in its

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:56 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama From the above, it is obvious that the problem of the nature of the process of parinama, depends upon the view that we take formal aspect is defined as differentiation in the integrated. In other words, the process of Evolution consists in the development of the differentiated within the undifferentiated, of the determinate within the indeterminate, of the coherent within the incoherent. The evolutionary series is subject to a definite law which it cannot overstep. The order of succession is not from the whole to parts, nor from parts to the whole, but ever from a relatively less differentiated, less determinate, less coherent to a relatively more differentiated, more determinate, more coherent whole. That the process of differentiation evolves out of homogeneity as separate or unrelated parts, which are then integrated into a whole, and that this whole again breaks uo by fresh differentiation into isolated factors for a subsequent reintegration, and so on ad infinitum, is a fundamental inisconception of the course of material evolution. That the antithesis stands over against the thesis, and that the synthesis supervenes and imposes unity ab extra on these two independent and mutually hostile moments, is the same radical misconception as regards the dialectical form of cosmic develop nent. On th: Samkhya view, increasing differentiation proceeds pari passu with increasing integration within the evolving whole, so that by this two-fold process what was an incoherent indeterminate ho.nogeneous whole evolves into a coherent determinate heterogeneous whole." Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, p. 7-8. Das Gupta, after quoting the above passage from Dr. Seal, adds, "The meaning of such an evolution is this, that all the changes and modifications in the shape of the evolving collocations of guna reals take place within the body of the Prakrti. Prakrti consisting of the infinite reals is infinite, and that it has been disturbed does not mean that the whole of it has been disturbed and upset, or that the totality of the gunas in the Praksti has been unhinged from a state of equilibrium. It means rather that a very vast number of gunas constituting the worlds of thought and in atter has been upset. These gunas, once thrown out of balance begin to group themselves together first in one form, then in another, then in another, and so on. But such a change in the formation of aggregrates should not be thought to take place in such a way that the latter aggregates appear in supersession of the formere ones, so that when the former comes into being the latter ceases to exist. For the truth is that one stage is produced after another; this second stage is the result of a new aggrega tion of some of the reals of the first stage. This deficiency of the reals of the first stage which had gone forth to form the new aggregate as the second stage is made good by a refilling from the Prakrti. So also, as the third stage of aggregation takes place frum out of the reals of the se

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Development of Parinama in Yogasutras 57 of the nature of the contitution of Praksti. If we imagine Praksti to be a homogeneous, integrated whole, as the Ska. seems to understand in our opinion, then the disturbance at one point should disturb the whole, i.e. when the parinama-process starts, the whole of the Praksti must become active. This seems to be the view of the Ska, as well as of Vyasa (who, it must be noted, simply refers to it as a process of differentiation in the integrated' without touching the question of the total or partial Parinama) though neither the Ska. nor Vyasa has stated the position in clear terms as regards the process of Parinama, (total or partial). The interpretation, given by Bhiksu, becomes intelligible in the light of his view of the constitution of Praksti which, as we have already noted, is a conglomerate of an infinite number of the Guna-reals. It seems to me that this view of Bhiksu, if not contradictory of the view of the orthodox Samkhya, is distinctly different from it 28 Consistently with the concept of Prakrti as held by the old Samkhya writers, it does not stand to reason to assume that the disturbance in the equilibrium of the Gunas affects only a certain part of Prakati and not the whole of it. The view of Bhiksu can, however, be reconciled with the Samkya view proper, if we interpret his ima: TUTTA' as 319a: furra og for 'Fruifpoufti' i.e. siage, the deficiency of the reals of the second stage is made good by a refilling from the first stage and that of the first stage from the Praksti, Thus by a succession of refilling the process of evolution proceeds, till we come to its last limit, where there is on real evolution of new substance, but mere chemical and physical changes of qualities in things which had already evolved." History of Indian Philosophy, Vol.I., pp. 246-247. 'Evolution in Samkhya (aratrasnfOTTA) moans the development of categories of existence and not mere changes of qualities of substances (physical, chemical, biological or mental). Thus each of the stages of evolution remains as a permanent category of being and offers scope to the more and more differentiated and coherent groupings of the succeeding stages. Thus it is said that the evolutionary process is regarded as a diferentiation of new stage; as integrated in previous stage. 23 Radiakrishnan too, calls the view of Bhiksu regarding the nature of the Gunas different view." Indian Philosophy, Vol. II. p. 265.

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama to say the disturbance taki ng place in the whole of Prakrti but the manifestation of effects occurring partially or rather gradually. For even on the view of ho mogeneous, integrated Prakrti in which the slightest disturbance is a disturbance of the whole, the 'abhivyakti' or actual manifestation or what we might call its assuming of particular stages such as Buddhi, Ahamkara etc., is gradual. 58 Study of Parinama from another point of view Let us now study parinama from the point of view of its operation in regulating the creation or manifestation of different things. Amongst modern writers Dr. Seal and Dr. Das Gupta have tried to give a sort of exposition of the above problems in an able and lucid way. It will be better, therefore, to study this problem in the words of these scholars. 'Considering the cosmic changes as a whole, the gunas remain for ever as their permanent substrata. The chages come and go, the combinations break and form but the reals remain ever the same, though they may seem to appear in diverse characters. The characters and qualities are the results of the diversity of their combination. Thus the totality of the mass and energy also remains constant if we take account of both the manifested and the unmanifested, the actual and the potential. Such is the bond of teleological relation between the gunas and the purusas, that the course of evolution follows an unalterable definite law, not only as regards the order of succession but also about the appearance and mutual relations of the separate units of like and unlike energies. Had there not been such a definite order, the world would have been a chaos instead of cosmos, in spite of all the three gunas. All things being composed ultimately of the three gunas, there are no intrinsic differences amongst them (sarvam sarvatmakam). The only difference is the difference in the constitution of the collocation of the gunas, or as expressed in the phenomenal world of matter as the collocations of the atoms. It is theoretically therefore possible to change anything in the world to any

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Development of Parinama in Yogasutrus 59 other provided the necessary collocations of the atoms could be arranged. The changes or modifications only give expression to the latent varieties of the substance. As the atoms change their position by their innate rajas or energy, the substance changes its form and manifests diverse new qualities which could not be perceived before. But still such a change is not possible to an unlimited degree, for in the constitution of the relations of the gunas there are limitations and obstacles which cannot be overstepped. These limitations may generally be counted in the phencmenal world of change, as being of the nature of time, space, form and disposing cause. Thus Kashmere being the country of saffron, it does not grow in the Pancala country, even though the other causes of its growth may be present there. Similarly there are no rains in the summer season, therefore the growth of rice is not possible in that season; so also the form of a man cannot take its rise from that of a deer. Thus, though all things are intrinsically the same yet the obstacles to change, of the constitution of the gunas in the formation of different substances in certain directions, are such that these cannot be removed, and so those modifications though theoretically possible will ever remain a practical impossibility. This brings us to the relation of case and effect and the part which is played by concomitant conditions in transforming the cause into the effect. We know that there is no other difference between cause and effect than this that the former is only the po. tential state of which the latter is the actual. The sum of material causes is only the vehicle of the power which is eficient in the production. The concomitant conditions are said to help the effectuation of this transformation from the potential to the actual state. Thus the work of the sculptor may be regarded as the concomitant condition which transforms a piece of marble into a statue. The oilman has helped the oil which was already in existence in the mustard to manifest itself as such. Thus, looked at from this point of view, all concomitant causes may be regarded as helping the passage of the effect from its potentiality as the cause, into the effect as an actuality'.29 29 Yoga Pilosophy, Das Gupta, pp. 209-211. This expo.ition is based on VB. III. 14, TVS III. 14, YV IV. 12 and

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama "These mechanical examples of the Kapila-Sankhya have the merit of simplicity, but the Patanjali-Samkhya brushes them aside, and explains causation on the basis of the conservation and transformation of Energy advancing it as the liberation of potential Energy existing stored up in a Guna collocation (the sum of material causes), the liberation following on the action of the proximate efficient cause, or concomitant condition. 60 The causal operation of concomitant conditions (efficient causes) lies only in this, that they supply a physical stimulus which liberates the potential Energy stored up in a given collocation. Everything in the phenomenal world is but a special collocation of the ultimate Reals (Energy, Mass and Essence). The sum of (material) causes potentially contains the Energy manifested in the sum of effects; and in the passage from potency to actualisation, the effectuating condition (the concomitant cause), when it is itself accom SPB 1. 20. (1) sarva sarvAtmakamiti / yatroktam - jalabhUmyoH pAriNAmikaM rasAdivaizvarUpyaM sthAvareSu dRSTam / tathA sthAvarANAM jaGgameSu jaGgamAnAM sthAvareSvityevaM jAtyanucchedena sarva sarvAtmakamiti / dezakAlAkAranimittApabandhAnna khalu samAnakAlamAtmanA - mabhivyaktiriti / VB on III. 14. (( 2 ) yadyapi kAraNaM sarvaM sarvAtmakaM tathA'pi yo yasya kAryasya dezo yathA kuGkumasya kAzmIraH / teSAM sattve'pi pAJcAlAdiSu na samudAcAra iti na kuGkumasya pAJcAlAdiSvabhivyaktiH / evaM nidAghe na prAvRSaH samudAcAra iti na tadA zAlInAm / evaM na mRgI manuSyaM prasUte na tasyAM manuSyAkArasamudAcAra iti / evaM nApuNyavAnsukharUpaM bhuGkte na tasminpuNyanimittasya samudAcAra iti / TVS. on III. 14 ( ( 3 ) dRSTaM ca kAraNavyApAreNa sadevAbhivyajyata iti yathA pASANeSu satAmeva pratimApadmAdInAM laukikavyApAreNAbhivyaktimAtramiti... | YV on IV. 12. + (4) ......abhivyaktirvartamAnAvasthA / kAraNavyApAro'pi kAryasya vartamAnalakSaNapariNAmameva janayati / yathA zilAmadhyasthapratimAyA laiGgikavyApAreNAbhivyaktimAtraM tilasthatailasya ca niSpIDanena, dhAnasthataNDulasya cAvaghAteneti / SPB on I. 120

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Development of Parinama in Yogasutras plished, is only a step in the evolutionary series, which adds a specific stimulus, and renders determinate that which was previously indeterminate. When the effectuating condition is added to the sum of material conditions in a given collocation, all that happens is that a stimulus is imparted which removes the arrest, disturbs the relatively stable equilibrium, and brings on a liberation of Energy together with a fresh collocation. Describing the production of bodies (organic vehicles') for individual souls out of matter of Praksti, under the influence of their merit and demerit, as concomitant conditions, Patanjali points out that non-material concomitant like merit and demerit do not supply any moving force or Engery to the sum of material condi... tions, but only remove the arrest (the state of relatively stable equilibrium) in a given collocation, even as the owner of a field removes the barrier in flooding his field from a reservoir of water. This description is intended to represent the super-physical influence of non-material concomitants (or causes) like volition, merit. and demerit, etc., but the causal operation of a material concomitant condition is essentially the same; there is the same reservoir of stored-up Energy in a given collocation, the same condition of arrest or relatively stable equilibrium, the same liberation of the stored-up potential Energy which flows along the line of least resistance, the only difference being that in the case of material concomitants the stimulus which removes the arrest is physical, instead of being transcendental as in the case of non-meterial causes like will, merit and demerit, etc. The Vyasa-Bliasya helps us to a clear mental representation of the details of this process : As-the owner of many fields can irrigate, from a field which is already flooded, others of the same or a lower level, without forcing the waters thereto with his hands, and merely by making an opening in the barrier or dyke, on which waters rush in by their own force; or, further, as the same person cannot force these waters, of the earthly matters held in solution therein, into the roots of the rice plants, but only removes : the obstructive grasses and weeds, on which the fluids of their

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-62 The Samkhya-Yoga and the aina Theories of Parinama own power enter the roots - such is the action of effectuating condition added to a sum of material causes or conditions'. 30 Thus we see that the energy conserved in one form naturally passes into another by manifesting consequent changes or transformations designated by the name of evolution. As natural flow is obstructed in various ways by the resistance offered by space, time, form and causality, it has naturally to take the course in which there are no impediments and obstacles; at each stage new impediments may come in and interfere with the evolving process and compel the flow to change the direction of its course at every stage; so it is that we find that the evolutionary process has naturally to take a curvilinear line rather than the straight one. It is this resistance against the eovlutionary flow which compels it to reject thousands of courses open to it and select a particular one in which there is no resistance. It is this, there-fore, that gives niyama or a regulation (parinamakramaniyama)'1. 30 Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus. B. N. Seal, pp. 14-16. 31 Yoga Philosophy, pp. 212-213.

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CHAPTER V OTHER TOPICS RELATED TO PARINAMA Introductory In this Chapter I propose to treat other topics of Samkhya philosophy which are directly or indirectly conditioned by the concept of Parinama or which in some way throw light on the character of Parinama. These pertain to the concept of Akasa and Kula, the derivation of the different categories from Prakrti, their character, the nature of the relation between Prakrti and Purusa, the purpose guiding parinama and the function given to, Isvara by Yoga in it. Concept of. Akasa and Kala in Samkhya-Yoga The foregoing discussion of the different aspects of parinama especially the last one viz., its relation to causality brings us to the consideration of the problem of Time (Kala) and Space (Akasa) in the Samkhya-Yoga system. The Ska. does not say anything on the concept of Kala. . Amongst its commentaries only the STK. incidentally touches it. The VB., the TVS., and YV. deal with it at some length. Vyasa explains it as follows: As an aton is a substance in which minuteness reaches its limit, so a moment is a division of time in which minuteness. reaches its limit. Or a moment is that much of time which an atom takes in leaving the position in space it occupies and reaching the next point. The succession of moments is the noncessation of the flow thereof. The moments and their collection do not fall into a collection of actual things. The Muhurta, the day and night are all aggregates of mental conceptions. This time which is not a substantive reality in itself, but is only a mental concept, and which comes into the mind as a piece of verhle knowledge only, appears to people whose minds are given to out

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64 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama going activities, as if it were an objective reality. The moment falls under the head of reality and is maintained by succession. This succession consists in the sequence of moments. The Yogis who know time call this by the name of time. Further two moments cannot co-exist. There can be no succession of two co-existent moments. It is impossible. The uninterrupted sequence of the first moment and of the one which follows, is what is called succession. For this there is but one moment existing in the present; the antecedent and postcedent moments do not exist; therefore, there cannot be any collection of them. Further, the moments that have passed and those that have yet to come, should be described as existing in consequence of universal change in evolution. For this reason the whole world undergoes change every moment and all these characteristics are relatively established in that one moment of time. I Vacaspati, while commenting on the concerned passage, adds no new idea. His remarks on the Ska. may be noted. Therein he points out that according to the Vaisesikas, Time being one (indivisible) it cannot admit of such divisions as "present and future' and hence they attribute these divisions to certain "accidents' (adventitious conditions) : but according to the Samkhyacaryas, says Vacaspati, these same 'accidents' themselves may be regarded as the basis of the notions of 'future', 'present". and 'past, and there is no need for the postulating of an inter- : vening entity as "Time'; this is the reason why time is not accepted as a distinct entity. Vijnanabhiksu in his YV. points out that though Time is defined as buddhi-nirmana, yet it may be taken as real. For it only means that Time has no real (objective) existence apart from the 'noment. The latter is real being identical with the unit of change of the Gunas in phenomena. But, as Dr. Seal points out, 1 VB III, 51 2 ......afe T U ga att for faTreti; prentsa FTTTTTT

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Other topics related to Parinama 'even this is real only for our empirical (relative) consciousness (f), which intuits the relation of antecedence and sequence into the evolving Reals (Gunas), in the stage of 'empirical intuition' (savicArA nirvikalpaprajJA ). The intellectual intuition' (nirvi* a fafa), on the other hand, apprehends the Reals as they are, without the imported empirical relations of Space, Time, and Causality'.3 6.5 From the above it is clear that the Samkhya-Yoga accepts kala, not as a distinct eternal entity, like the Vaisesikas, but only as the one present moment which is identical with the unit of change of the Gunas. Akasa In Samkhya-Yoga works earlier than Bhiksu's, we are given to understand Akasa as a gross evolute produced from the Sabdatanmatra (sound-potential). This means that the evolution of the categories upto Akasa takes place without the latter. Bhiksu seems to have experienced this difficulty and hence his clever innovations in the SPB & YV. We elucidate his innovations as follows. At one place he states that Eternal Space (Dik) and Time (Kala) are of the form of Prakrti or the root cause of the (produced) Akasa, and are only the specific qualities of Prakrti. Hence the universality of Space and Time is established. But these, space and time, which are limited, are produced from Akasa through the conjunction of this or that limiting object.4 At other place he writes that the notion of eternal Dik should be understood to be unreal, for generally there is no Dik-Vyava 3 4 iti kasyacit pralApastu bhASyArthAvivekamUla iti, yatta, pUrva dezAsaMyogAdyavacchinnaH paramANukriyA''direva kSaNaH kAlastu tadatirikto nitya iti vaizeSikA : AhuH, tanna......asmAbhistAdRzasyaiva guNapariNAmasya kssnntvvcnaat......|' YV on III 51. Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, p. 21. SPB. II. 12. 5

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66 The Sarkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama hara.5 The notion of purva-dik etc. is due to the limiting adjuncts of Dik which is accepted (as an entity) by others (e.g. the Vaise. sikas). So, even though ordinarily there is the vyavahara of Kala and Dik, yet the two are to be explained through Akasa only. There is however a difference between Time and Dik in as much as the latter is absolutely illusory (having no real existence at all), whereas, the former is admitted to exist as moments. At the third place he anticipates an objection that if Akasa is allpervading, it can neither be an effect of something nor can it be described as atomic as is done by the Bhasyakara. His reply to the objection is as foliows : Akasa is of two kinds. one original and the other, derivative like the earth-element of the Vaisesikas. The original or Karanakasa is "the undiffe. rentiated formless Tamas (mass in Prakrti, matter-rudiment. Bhutadi), which is devoid of all potentials and is merely the allpervasive seat? or vehicle of the ubiquitous original Energy (Rajas)". This Karanakasa, on the association of the other Gunas first modifies itself partially as the sound-potential, and then the gross Akasa is produced by a conglomeration of the Akasa-atoms like the gross earth (of the Vaisesika). This gross Akasa is limited from the point of view of Ahamkara (the preceding evolute) and serves as the medium for air (vAyorAvaraNam). Thus, we see that, Bhiksu, having before him the full-fledged discussions of Space and Time of the Nyaya-Vaisesika, has felt the difficulty of thinking anything without postulating Akasa and Kala. With the help of Vaisesika ideas, he imagines two types of Akasa and Kala, primary or original and derivative or empirical. He looks upon the primary or Karanakasa as being identical with Tamoguna in Praksti and regards, the eternal Dik and Kala as the specific qualities of Praksti. Empirical dik-kala, he explains, through the association of Akasa with limiting adjuncts. 5 6 7 8 i.e. simply "dik' without any qualifications like, 'purva' etc YV. III, 51 Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, p. 27. YV. III 40.

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Other topics related to Parinama It is clear that this has no textual justification for it (and even philosophically its value is doubtful because the Samkhya concept of Prakrti is beyond Time and Space). We may, however, say that this Prakrti, in as much as it brings forth the empirical Time and Space, has the potentialliy of that Time and Space. And if we consent to call this potentiality of Time and Space as Kala and Karanakasa respectively, we may have reason to agree with Bhiksu.9 67 On the Derivation of the different Categories from Prakrti The Ska, and its commentaries, as already noted, describe the order of evolution of the different categories from Prakrti as follows: From Prakrti is derived the Mahat, from Mahat Ahamkara, from the three-fold Ahamkara- eleven senses and five Tanmatras and from the five Tanmatras the five Bhutas. The SSu. too gives the same order. However, a different order is given by VB and TVS. Here two parallel lines of evolution start from the Mahat which, on one side, develops into the Ahamkara and eleven 9 It may be noted that Simananda in his Samkhyatattvavivecana, points out that the Vaisesika view which regards Kala as an independent eternal entity and, the Samkhya view which regards the notion of the Maha-Kala (i.e. the eternal Time) and the moment as being due to the conjunction of the Akasa with the limiting adjuncts-are not endorsed by the Yoga. According to the latter, the moment alone is the real Kala and that Pradhana (i.e. its parinama) is the cause of the Kala-vyavahara and not the Akasa. Thus, Simananda makes a distinction between the Samkhya view and the Yoga-view. He, however, does not say anything regarding the Concept of Akasa, in Samkhya-Yoga (i.e. as to whether it is to be identified with the Tamas in Prakrti or regarded as produced from the Sabdatanmatra only). Note that Vijnanabhiksu, while commenting on the Ssu. II. 12, (dikkAlo AkAzAdibhyaH / ) says that the notion of 'khaNDakAla' is the result of the association of the Akasa with the limiting adjuncts. But, in his Yoga-Varttika, as we have seen, he identifies Kala (ie. the moment) with the unit of change of the Gunas in accordance with Vvasa-bhasya.

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68 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama senses and on the other into the five Tanmatras and the five Bhutas. 10 10 VB. and TVS. on Ysu. II. 19. Dr. Seal remarks that the first order given by the Ska. and others, is literally correct but misses the significance of the doctrine of SamSrsta-viveka or differentiation in the integrated', according to which the Tanmatras are all evolved through the medium of Ahamkara, in the cosmic matter of Experience (Mahat). Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, p. 12. It may be noted that Bhiksu who comments on the VB. and the SSu, points out that, truly speaking, the genesis of the Tanmatras from Mahat takes place through the Ahamkara and in association with it for it has been so described in the VB. on the Ysu. I. 45 (YV. on Ysu. II. 19). Thus both Bhiksu and Seal purport to convey the same thing from Vyasa's statement though in different way. Incidentally we may note here other differences of view between the earlier and later works as regards the derivation of other categories. It may be noted that nothing is stated about the manner of the order of evolution of the Tanmatras from Ahamkara, in any of the Samkhya-Yoga works excepting those of Vijnanabhiksu. In his YV. (on II. 19) and SPB. (I. 62), he points out that the same order of evolution is to be followed in the case of the Tapmatras as is followed in the case of evolution of the Bhutas from the Tanmatras. Thus Ahamkara gives rise to Sabda-tanmatra, the Sabdatanmatra in association wtth Ahamkara, to Sparsa-tanmatra, and so on. (For a detailed discussion of the different views of the derivation of Tanmatras as found in the Smrtis and Puranas, cf. Dr. Seal's Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus p. 28 onwards). As regards the mannner of the derivation of the Bhutas from the Tanmatras, the Ska. says nothing. The Matharavrtti, STK, Jayamangala (Ska. 22), VB. and TVS. hold that one i.e. the first Tapmatra combines with one, two, three or four to produce the more complex Bhutas with the correspoding number of qualities. According to Gaudapada and the author of Yuktidipika, however, the Tapmatras can singly produce the Bhutas. According to Bhiksu Akasa-atom is generated from the Sabdatanmatra with an accretion from bhutadi, (YV. on Ysu. I. 43). According to Nagesa, to produce the gross atoms from the Tanmatras, an accretion of bhutadi as an accompanying agent is necessary at every step. Thus

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Other topics related to Parinama 69 The more important problem, however, is not the order of evolutes but the character of differentiation. This is the problem of Visesavisesa. In the Ska. 38, the term Avisesa is applied to the five Tanmatras and Visesa to the Bhutas. The VB. applies the term Avisesa both to the Ahamkara and Tanmatras and Visesa to the eleven senses and five Bhutas. But what is meant by these two terms is not made clear either in the Ska. or in the VB. However, the commentaries on the Ska. and on the VB. attempt to explain these terms as under. According to Mathara and Gaudapad the Tanmatras are Avisesa because they all give pleasure to gods owing to the predominance of Sattva, 'even though the Rajas and Tamas are there. The Rajas and Tamas do not produce their painful and deadening effects respectively. The five Bbutas are Visesas because they become objects of enjoyment for men and produce pleasure, pain and delusion in them. 11 Let us see how Vacaspati in his STK. explains them. The Tanmatras, says he, are Avisesa because they are subtle and therefore their 'specific character' consisting of the realmness, turbulence and delusiveness' is not patent enough to be enjoyed. On the other hand, he points out that the Bhutas are called Visesa because Vayu-atom is produced from these three-Sabda + Sparsa + accretion from bhutadi. Similarly Tej, Ap and Prthivi atoms are produced. It may be noted that the introduction of 'atom' as an additional stage between Tanmatra and Bhuta occurs only later on, in the VB, TVS and YV. probably due to the influence of the Nyaya--Vaisesika school. There is a difference of view in regard to the derivation of the eleven senses. According to the Ska (25) all the senses emerge from the SattvikaAhamkara with the help of Rajas. The same view is endorsed in its commentaries. According to The TVS and Nagesa-vrtti (Ysu. II. 19), the five organs of perception arise from the Sattvika- Ahamkara, the five of action from the Rajasa-Ahamkara and the mind from both. Bhiksu in his SPB. (II. 18), holds that the ten_senses, five of perception and five of action, are produced from the Rajasa-Ahamkara and the mind alone is produced from the Sattvika-Ahamkara. 11 Mathara and Gauaapada on Ska. 38.

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70 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama they are calm, turbulent and deluding; they are thus perceived to be distinguished from one another while the Tanmatras cannot be similarly distinguished by us and hence they are Avisesa and subtle 12 The same explanation is given by Vacaspati and Vijnanabhiksu while commenting on the VB. (Ysu. II, 19) with this difference that the explanation of Avisesa is made applicable to Ahamkara also since Ahamkara along with the Tanmatras, is called Avisesa in the VB.18 It must be noted that the expression 'grifafasiqa' occurring in the concerned passage in YV. does not mean that the Tanmatras are all absolutely devoid of Teccaifa' 'but only that they are so subtle that these can neither be felt not perceived in any way by the senses. The expression 'Suresirgefarfetarefaa', also occurring in the same passage, with reference to Ahamkara should be similarly understood, From the above interpretations of Vacaspati and Bhiksu, the criterion of Visesavisesa comes out to be, the capability or otherwise, respectively of becoming the objects of 'upabhoga' which, 12 See STK. 30. Yuktidipika gives quite a different explanation of the term Avisesa. It is as follows: The five Tanmatras viz., sabda, rupa, rasa, gandha and sparsa are called Avisesa because each of them is not differentiated into its particulars such as Sabda into udattanudatta etc., rupa into white, black etc. and so on. This explanation, it can be seen, is on the Vaisesika line of Samanya and Visesa. Jayamangala explains these terms in a still different way. The Tanmatras are called Avisesa because they are not capable of being particularly qualifying anything on account of their subtleness. The Bhutas are called Visesa because through them the Tanmatras get differentiated. 13 TVS II.19; YV II, 19. 3fahamuti raat 4652T FENTFI fagia.... TVS II 19 AkAzAdIni bhUtAni-zabdAditanmAtrANAM zAntAdivizeSazUnyazabdAdidharmakasUkSmadravyANAmata evAvizeSasaMjJakAnAM-vizeSA abhivyaktazAntAdivizeSakAH pariNAmA:... yathAkramamiti zeSaH tatheti / ...abhimAnamAtradharmakasya zravaNasparzanadarzanAdirUpafasiatfagfIE ATTFifa 19: 1 YV II. 19 Nagesa too gives a similar explanation.

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Other topics related to Parinama 21 in Samkhya, denotes both cognition and conation. Here, it may be noted that the commentators are silent on the question as to whether the Mahat and the Ahamkara (in the first order of evolution which is given in the Ska.) are Avisesa or not. Bhiksu touches this point by saying that though 'Avisesatva' does belong to Mahat and Praksti, yet the term Avitesa is conventionally fixed for the six categories (Ahamkara and five Tanmatras) only, like the word 'pankaja'. This is just explaining away the thing and the question therefore still remains as to whether Mahat and Ahamkara are Avisesa or not.14 Vacaspati, however, approaches this problem of Visesavisesa' from another point of view, viz. that of causality. Thus he says: The five Tanmatras have the Buddhi as their cause because they are the unspecialised modifications, just like the principle of Individuation Avisesatva (non-specialisation) consists in being the cause of further vikaras or modifications; this characteristic is common to both the Tanmatras and Asmita. Visesas, on the other hand, are the final modifications which do not become the cause of further tattvas.15 Thus, according to this interpretation of Vacaspati 'farefittaca' (wherein, 'vikara' signifies "vikaramatra") is the criterion of 14 Probably they must have been regarded as having the character of the 'subject' of 'upabhoga' rather than the object. Though, in Samkhya philosophy the subject is the Purusa, yet the Buddhi must do the activity of being the subject for Purusa and therefore, in this sense we cay say that the Mahat and Ahamkara are equal to what in ordinary psychology would be called consciousness which cognises and feels and which, therefore, cannot be an object. If this explaration is correct, we can say that 'Visesavisesa' cannot be applied to Bucdhi (and Ahamkara) in the sense in which the terms are applied to the Tanmatras and Bhutas. 15 ...atra ca paJcatanmAtrANi buddhikAraNakAni avizeSatvAd asmitAvad iti / vikArahetutvaM cAvizeSatvaM tanmAtreSu cAsmitAyAM cAviziSTam / ...vizeSA... faalt Ta 7 g Tratatu: 1 TVS on II. 19.

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama Avisesa. The Ahamkara and five Tanmatras being the cause of further modifications or the tattvas (i.e. of the last sixteen vikaras) are termed 'Avisesa', while the eleven senses and five Bhutas are called 'Visesa' because they do not possess this characteristic viz. 'fa', ie. they do not become the cause of further tattvas. (These sixteen represent the final stage of evolution of the tattvas). This interpretation, it can be seen, is free from the difficulties which faced us in the first interpretation. It is precise and avoids the fallacy of being too narrow (avyaypti). 72 The Nature of the Relation between Prakrti and Purusa Divergent explanations are given by later commentators in regard to the nature of the relation between the changing Prakrti and unchanging Purusa. In the Ska. (20), it is simply stated that the non-sentient Linga becomes as if sentient on account of its contact with the Purusa.16 But nothing is said as to the nature of this contact. Neither Mathara nor Gaudapada enlightens us much on this point. Nevertheless, this problem is indeed a crucial one for the Samkhya and hence could not be evaded especially when the opponents made it the target of thier attack and demanded its clarification. Hence the attempts of the later commentators to elucidate the same. Let us see how far they succeed in the solution of this problem. According to Vacaspati there is no samyoga or contact of the Buddhi with the Purusa but a reflection of the Purusa is caught in the states of Buddhi by virtue of which these become intelligised and transformed into consciousness. But this view is said to be open to the objection that it does not explain how the Purusa can be said to be the experiencer of the conscious states of the Buddhi, for its reflection in the Buddhi is merely the image and there cannot be any experience (bhoga) on the basis of that image merely, as actually there is no connection of the Purusa with the Buddhi. The answer of Vacaspati is that there is no contact 16 tasmAttatsaMyogAdacetanaM cetanAvadiva liGgam /

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73 Other topics related to Parinama between them in Space or Time but the 'sannidhi' or proximity, here means 'yogyata' or passive capacity of being treated and by virtue of it the Purusa, though it remains aloof, is yet felt to be united and identified with the Buddhi, and as a result of that the states of the Buddhi appear ascribed to a person. 17 Bhoja maintains that just as the proximity of a magnet manifests the power of movement in a piece of iron, so by the mere proximity of the Purusa, the cit which exists in a potential manner as it were in the sattva, becomes manifest and this manifestation of cit which illumines the whole vrtti or state becomes the object of Purusa's experience partly because of the closest proximity of the Purusa and partly because the whole process of Prakrti's transformations is for the experiences and the liberation of the Purusa. Prakrti is not conscious that it will serve the purpose of the Purusa but its forward and backward transformations are called its tendencies for the services of the Purusas. As both the Prakrti and the Purusa are omnipresent, there cannot be any actual contact or samyoga. 18 Vijnanabhiksu points out that yogyata or capacity, which Vacaspati speaks of, on the part of the Purusa by virtue of which even though it may not be in touch with the Buddhi, yet the states of Buddhi can continue to be expressed in terms of an experience, will continue even in the state of emancipation; for it is the nature of the Purusa and so the experience will continue even in the emancipated state. Second, if the beginningless experience of states be said to be serving the purpose of samyoga or contact, then the assertion of the VB that this seeming union is due to avidya potency breaks down. Thirdly, the objection of Vacaspati that samyoga of the Buddhi and the Purusa will necessarily mean that the Purusa is exposed to change is groundless, for samyoga and change are not synonymous. The Akasa has also sammyoga, but it is not by virtue of that called parinamin or changing. Change means the rise of new qualities. It is the 17 TVS. II. 17 and 1.4. 18 Bhojavrtti IV. 22 and II. 23.

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74 The Samkhya-Yoga und the Jaina Theories of Parinama Buddhi which knows or forms its states and when this is reflected in the Purusa, there is the notion of the person or the experiencer in the Purusa and when the cit is reflected in the Buddhi, there is the knowledge as conscious state in the Buddhi. The notion of the knower as 'I', the experienter cannot be generated in the Buddhi by the reflection of the cit; for the mere reflection cannot be said to be of any purpose. It is when by the reflection of the cit, the states of Buddhi become intelligised, that the Purusa shines forth through their reflections as the coniser of those states. 19 In all these explanations, it can be seen, attempts are made to remove the defects of the earlier ones and keep the kutasthanityatva of the Purusa in tact. But while one explanation removes one drawback, it creates a number of other difficulties which have to be explained away somehow. In fact, the real source of the difficulty is in regarding the Purusa and the Prakrti as absolutely distinct in character and then finding out some way of bringing them together because in empirical experience this is a felt fact. The Purpose guiding Parinama and the function given to isvara by Yoga in it All the Yoga-works hold Isvara responsible for the removal of all barriers in the way of Prakrti's development. 20 Thus, 'the Yoga philosophy differs from the Samkhya in this that the Purusartha or serviceability to the Purusa is only the aim or end of the evolution of Prakrti and not actually the agent which 19 YV, on II. 17, SPB. I. 19. These views summarised from 'Yoga Philosophy' by Das Gupta. 20. SAJTETTO affaizrarei sfaara19774 52 347977: 1 TVS IV. 3. Cf. also 'PATET HEEFTTIHTEETTfqarac i catai YV. and Nagesa vsitti, IV. 3

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755 Other topics related to Parinama removes the obstacles of the Prakrti in such a way as to deter-mine its course as this cosmical process of evolution. Purusartha is, indeed, the aim for which the process of evolution exists; for this manifold evolution in all its entirety affects the interests of the Purusa alone; but that does not prove that this its teleology can really guide the evolution in particular lines so as to ensure the best possible mode of serving all the interests of the Purusa,. for this teleology being immanent in the Prakrti is essentially non-intelligent.21 The Samkhya, however, hopes that this immanent teleology in Prakrti acts like a blind instinct and is able to guide the course of its evolution in all its manifold lines in accordance with the best possible service of the Purusa. The Patanjala view, as we have seen, maintains that Isvara removed all obstacles of Prakrti in such a way that this teleology may find scope for its realisation. 22 It may, however, be noted in passing that even the theism of Yoga is a halting sort of theism because according to it the only thing that God does is to remove the obstacles from the move-ment of Prakrti. Then Prakrti moves according to its inherent directive energy. In this view, God cannot really be said to direct Prakrti as such. Recapitulation In this section I propose to consider the various stages of the development of the idea of Parinama and its application to the different categories. In some of the later hymns of the Rgveda, we find the Vedic seers visualising certain general principles about the world, its. 21 a a geareitsfa nada: farg agena far: 1 uddezyatAmAtreNa puruSArtho pravartakaH TVS. IV. 3. 22 Study of Patanjali, Das Gupta, pp. 89-92.

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.76 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama nature and its relation to man. The world in its manifold aspects seems to be a created thing. They, therefore, searched the creator and the substance out of which it must have been created, on the analogy, say, of a carpenter or a potter creating his artifacts. In the earlier stages such gods, as Indra, Agni, Varuna etc. are regarded as creating the world. Later, Hiranyagarbha, Visvakarma and Prajapati perform this function. As to the original substance water seems to have a preference over others. Sometimes, however, Tamas, Tapas and Sraddha are regarded as the original entities. Some of the Vedic thinkers alight upon such distinctions as one (97) and Many (a) Sat and Asat i. e. Being and Non-being and get perplexed as to what must have been the first principle from the manifold might have come forth. Some of the thinkers appear to have grappled with the difficulty of relating One and Many, Being and Non-being, Permanence and Change. Those who could not resolve the contradiction assumed one of these as the ultimate principle according to their predilections. Sometimes Sat was posited as the original principle, sometimes Asat and sometimes That One, Tadekam. We are interested in understanding these later principles viz. Sat, Asat and Tadekam. These terms suggest an approach different from that of the creationist thinkers. They suggest what we might call a metaphysical tendency seeking for a general principle in the multifarious phenomena of the world, In the terms Sat and Asat, the Vedic thinkers seem to have embodied their ideas of Permanence and Change. In their attempt to find something which would comprehend the 'dvandvas' (opposites) or to discover a principle from which these could be derived, they alight upon the idea of Purusa who can give birth to the phenomenal world and yet remain permanent or immortal. This idea is expressed by saying that a part of the Purusa becomes the world while its three parts are immortal in heaven. Thus the problem of the existence of the world is solved by regarding it as merely worked out from a part of Purusa. Anyway, here is an

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Other topics related to Parinama 77 attempt to combine in one entity the divergent ideas of One and Many, Permanence and Change. We find a new development in the search of the first principle in the Atharva-Veda in the conception of Kala. This Kala which is viewed as movement on the analogy of a horse is the creative principle of the universe. This is a distinct advance in the philo. sophy of change. In the Brahmanas Prajapati is firmly established as the creator of the world. In the identification of Yajna, universe and Prajapati, we see the assumption of a world-ground which not only provides the material for world phenomena but also the energy and agency which bring forth and preside over the world-phenomena. In some portions of the earlier Upanisad, 28 we find the thinkers still struggling with the 'dvandvas' (opposites) of earlier thinkers. The result of this diverse thinking seems to be reflected in the Vedanga, viz. the Nirukta. In its discussion of the six bhavavikaras, we find bhava or kriya as such, analysed and given precise momenclature as jayate, asti, viparinamate, vardhate, apaksiyate and vinasyati. Of these 'viparinamate' deserves special notice because it is a clear enunciation of the principle of Permanencein-change which, as we see, governs all later Parinama-thinking. The Upanisads, as a whole, show a clear tendency towards "Sentient Monism which seems to take two forms. One regards multiplicity and change as real - a precursor of the philosophy of the Svetasvatara Up., of the different schools of Samkhya mentioned in the Mahabharata, of the creationist theories of the Smotis and Puranas, of Samkhya in the Caraka and of the Visistadvaita of Ramanuja which all unanimously uphold the theory of Parinama, whatever may be the other divergences regarding the nature of the first principle. The other form is that of Yajnavalkya who seems to regard all change and diversity (faxraera) as chimerical - a precursor- of Gaudapada and Samkaracarya. 23 Cha. Up. VI. 2.-44 and Taittiriya Up. II. 7

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78 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama All the thinkers of the time, however, were not monists. "There were dualists both amongst Vedic and non-Vedie thinkers. They regarded the distinction between the 'sentient and the 'nonsentient' as fundamental and so, in their opinion, one could not be derived from the other. The Samkhyas, the Vaisesika and the Mimamsakas were such amongst Vedic thinkers and the Jains and the Buddhists, amongst Non-Vedic thinkers. They all tried to explain the genesis of the world by various theories. The Vaisesika view was the creationist one, God creating the material world out of atoms and dispensing the goods of the world to the different souls according to their actions. They adopted the principle of causation as explaining the regulated creation of things. 'The Samkhyas adopted the principle of Parinama to explain the material creation or change in the world. Both the Vaisesikas and Samkhyas regard the Purusas as kutastha-nitya with the difference that the former would allow changes in their gunas or qualities which are absolutely distinct from their permanent substrates whereas the latter would not allow the slightest change in them. The Jains adopt as we shall see the principle of Parinama as governing both the Jivas and the material world. The Buddhists accept the principle of flux without accepting any abiding entity. It is, however, the grammarians who supply us with references which enable us to study the development of the concept of Parinama. Panini refers to vikara in all probability in the sense of 'RUTH'. Patanjali in his Mahabhasya reflects the development of Parinama in a proper philosophical manner. He follows, in essence, Yaska's definition of viparinama' while defining 'dravya', and posits two types of nityata-viz. parinami-nityata and kutasthanityata, All these ideas had assumed more or less definite conceptual forms before Isvarakrsna summarised the tenets of the Sarkhya in his work

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79 Otner topics related to Parinama Isvarakrsna refers to Parinama only twice, in the Ka. 16 and 27. Ka, 16 brings out the idea of Parinama by stating that the functioning of Prakrti is Parinama and this Parinama is characterised by the predominance of the one or the other of the Gunas. The same is applied in Ka. 27 to explain the mutual distinction between the eleven senses. This lack of further elaboration of Parinama can be explained on two grounds viz. that Isvarakrsna might have felt that the idea was too well-known to require any elaborate explanation and secondly we see the same idea worked out in the theory of Satkaryavada. If it were possible to identify the author of the Yoga-sutras with that of the Mahabhasya, we could have said that Patanjali had before Isvarakrsna clearly visualised and defined Parinama in philosophical terms. The Yoga-sutras define the different Parinamas of the Citta such as the Vyutthana, Nirodha and Samadhi Parinamas and only incidentally refer to the Dhrama-LaksanaAvastha Parinamas of the bhutas and senses. Mathara elucidates Parinama by distinguishing two types in transformation. One is of the nature of creation or manufacture like that of a pot. This he calls : . The other is natural transformation like that of milk into curd. This he calls f: '. He identifies the process of Prakrti's Parinama with the latter. This makes clear the idea that Parinama is a sort of material evolution and not of the nature of anything created or made on the analogy of human work. Vyasa not only defines but also explains in detail the three aspects of Parinama, viz. Dharma-Laksana-Avastha Parinama, the process of Parinama (a) of the twenty-three categories, called the Tattvantara-Parinama, show how the course of evolution is regulated in a certain fixed manner owing to the limitations of space (deza), time (kAla), form (AkAra) and other extraneous causes (faf) and distinguishes between kutastha-nityata and parinami

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Farinama nityata. He elucidates for the first time the concept of kala as it is conceived in Samkhya-Yoga. 80 Yuktidipika also attempts a definition of Parinama which is essentially the same as that given by Vyasa. Both the Yuktidipika and STK. explain parinama in terms of Satkaryavada. Vijnanabhiksu has attempted a different interpretation of the nature of Gunas and of the process of Parinama fa which has created a new problem in the understanding of the nature of the constitution of Prakrti and its Parinama-process. The older view seems to regard Prakrti as one homogeneous whole, as undergoing Parinama but manifesting itself in the form of effects. gradually. Bhiksu would regard Prakrti as consisting of an infinite number of the 'Guna-reals' undergoing Parinama only in part and maintaining at the same time the state of equilibrium in the other part, on the analogy of the Parinama of foam in the ocean. The deficiency caused by the production of different effects is said to be supplied by the process of re-filling from the remaining infinite reals. 24 Thus the world-process according to the Samkhya is the continuous mutual interaction of the three Gunas to which has been applied the concept of Parinama as defined by Yaska. The Yogaschool attempts to understand primarily the mental processes in the light of Parinama and so refers incidentally to the Parinamas of the bhutas and the senses. They, however, bring in God to remove the obstacles in the way of the evolution of Prakrti. 24 This reminds us of the Purusa-sukta of the Rgveda, wherein the one part of the Purusa constitutes this world while its three parts remain immortal in heaven, and of the first principle of the Upanisads which is both immanent and transcendent. This may also be compared to the Jain concept of Lokakasa and Alok akasa. Changes, both similar and dissimilar. take place in the former whereas the latter which extends infinitely beyond the Lokakasa, undergoes homogeneous parinamas only (Viz., agurulaghu-parinama).

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CHAPTER VI JAIN SOURCES History of the Jain Church According to Jain tradition, Jain religion is eternal and it has been revealed again and again in every one the endless succed. ing periods of the world by innumerable groups of twenty-four Tirthamkaras. In the present Avasarpinil period, the first Tirthamkara was Rsabha and the last, the twenty-fourth was Vardhamana Mahavira. According to Jacobi, "all the Tirthamkaras except the two last, viz., Parsva and Mahavira, belong to mythology rather than to history"? The Svetambara tradition places the death of Mahavira in 527 B. C. Jacobi, however, gives 477 B. C, as the date of Mahavira's death. The death of Parsva is placed at the reasonable interval of 250 years before that of Mahavira. This fact, viz. that the Jain Church existed before Mahavira and that the latter was only a reformer and propagator of the old religion 1. Tim, in Jain philosophy, is infinite; but there are cycles in it, each cycle having two eras of equal duration described as the Avasarpini and the Utsarpini - a metaphor drawn from the revolving wheel. The former is the descending era in which virue gradually decreases; and the latter, the ascending in which the reverse takes place. The present era is stated to be the former. Studies in Jainism, p. 9. The Gujarati translation of his article in German - published in the Journal 'Bhartiya Vidya', 1945, (Singhi Smaraka Grantha), p. 182. This is his last article discussing the probable dates of the death of Maha. vira and Buddha (1930). In a previous article which is published in ERE, Vol. VII. pp. 465-474 as well as in 'Studies in Jainism', he held a different view, about the dates of the Nirvana of Mahavira and Buddha - according to which Mahavira died before Buddha's death. Now, he is of the opinion, that Mahavira lived seven years after the death of Buddha which is assigned to 484 B.C. .

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82 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinam a - - is attested not only by the Jain Agamas* but also by the oldest Buddhist texts. Thus, the antiquity of the root-ideas of Jain philosophy may be said to date back, at least to the time of Parsva, i, e. 800 B. C. The Jain church, as it is well-known, is divided into two sccts the Svetambara and the Digambara. According to Jacobio this schism originated in the second or the third century after Mahavira's death, although as Charpentieri says, the final divison did not take place till a later date in either 79 or 82 A. D., according to varying traditions. There are however no essential dog. matic differences between the two sects though, as we shall see, there prevails a divergence of view about the existence of the original Jain canon. Jain Sources Before proceeding to study the concept of Parinama, as discussed in Jain works, it would be necessary to give first a brief A References to the followers of Parsva are to be met with in the Jain canonical works, such as the Bh.Su. V.9.1.9., Ut. Su. XXIII. Next Mahavira's parents are said to have been followers of the tenents of Parsva in Acaranga--Sutra 11-15. That Mahavira was only a reformer of old religion is further testified by Ut. Su. xxiii st. 12-13 wherein we are told that Parsva enjoined on his followers four great vows. viz., not to injure life, to be truthful, not to steal, and to possess no property, while Mahavira added a fifth requisition, viz. that of chastity. Next, Parsva allowed his disciples to wear an upper and an under garment. Mahavira, on his part, followed the more rigid rule which forbade totally the use of clothes for an ascetic. After a detailed examination of the Buddhist texts, Jacobi concludes that "as it is now here said or even merely implied that the Niganthas were a newly-founded sect, we may conclude that they had already existed a considerable time before the advent of the Buddl a". SPE, Vol. XLV, p. xii. For details of the Buddhist evidence cf. SBE. Vol. XLV, pp. xxi, xxii. xxiii. Jain Sutras, Part I, SBE, Vol. XXII. The Uttaradhyayanasutra, Introduction, p. 15. Archives D'Etades Orientals, Vol. 18. 5. 6. 7.

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Ja in Sources account of the main sources on which our discussion is going to be based. 83 Our material is drawn from both the Svetambara and Digambara works. The source-books are spread over three periods viz., (A) the oldest or the Agama period, (B) the period of Umasvati and Kundakunda, i.e. the period of transition from the Agama to Tarka period, and lastly (C) the Tarka period from Siddhasena and Samantabhadra to Yagovijayaji. A The Agama Period (About 4th cen. B. C. to 4th cent. A. D.)8 As mentioned above, there is a difference of opinion about the authenticity of the extant Jain canon between the Svetambara and the Digambara sects. According to the former the extant bulk of the canon, consisting of the forty-five texts is authentic in character and is really based on the older one that had been compiled at the Council of Pataliputra (300 B.C.) and it can be 9. 8. We have taken into account only those Agamas that precede Umasvati. The usual list is as follows: A. The twelve Angas - 1. Ayara (Acara); 2. Suyagada (Sutrakrta); 3. Thana (Sthana); 4. Samavaya; 5. Viyahapannatti (Vyakhyaprajnaptimostly called Bhagavati); 6. Nayadhammakahao (Jnatadharmakathah); 7. Uvasagadasao (Upasaka dasah); 8. Antagadadasao (Antakrddasah); 9. Anuttarovavaiyadasao (Anuttraupapatikadasah); 10. Panhavagaranaim (Prasna-vyakaranani); 11. Vivagasuya (Vipakasruta); 12. Ditthivaya (Drstivada). B. The twevle Uvamgas (Upangas) - 1. Uvavaiya (Aupapatika); 2. Rayapasenaijja (Rajaprasniya); 3. Jivabhigama: 4. Pannavana (Prajnapana); 5. Suriyapannatti (Suryaprajnapti); 6. Jambuddivapannatti (Jambudvipa-Prajnapati); 7. Candapannatti (Chandraprajnapti); 8. Nirayavali; 9. Kappavadamsiao (Kalpavatamsikah); 10. Pupphiao (Puspikah); 11. Pupphaculiao (Puspaculikah): 12. Vanhidasao (Vrsnidasah). C. The ten Painnas (Prakirnas) : 1. Causarana (Catuhsarana) 2. Aurapaccakkhana (Aturapratyakhyana); 3. Bhattaparianna (Bhaktaparijna); 4. Samthara (Samstara); 5. Tandulaveyaliya (Tandulavai

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84 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama: traced back to Mahavira and his disciples. 1o The Digambara, however, repudiate the existing canon as spurious, merely a late talika); 6. Candavijjhaya (Buhler gives Candavija); 7. Devindatthava (Devendrastava); 8. Ganivijja (Ganividya); 9. Mahapaccakkhana. (Maha-Pratyakhyana); 10. Viratthava (Virastava). D. The six Cheya-Suttas (Cheda-sutras) :- 1. Nisiha (Nisitha); 2. Mahanisiha (Maha-nisitha); 3. Vavahara (Vyavahara); 4. Ayaradasao (Acaradasah) or Dasasuyakkhandha (Dasasrutaskandha); 5. Kappa (Bihat-kalpa); 6. Pancakappa (Panca-kalpa.) E. Individual texts :- 1. Nandisutta (Nandi-sutra); 2. Anuogaddara (Anuyogadvara). F. The four Mula-suttas (Mulasutras): 1. Uttarajjhayana (Uttaradhyayana); 2. Avassaya (Avasyaka); 3. Dasaveyaliya (Dasavaikalika); 4. Pinda-nijjutti (Pinda-Niryukti). According to the Svetambaras, there were originally two kinds of sacred books, the fourteen 'Purvas' and the eleven 'Angas', the fourteen Purvas were, however, reckoned, to make up a twelfth Anga under the name of Dithivaya. The knowledge of the fourteen Purvas continued only down to Sthulabhadra, the eighth patriarch after Mahavira; the next seven patriarchs down to Vajra knew only ten Purvas, and after that time the remaining Purvas were gradually lost, until, at the time when the final redaction of the canon took place - 980 years after the death of Mahavira - all the Purvas had disappeared, and consequently the 12th Anga too. (cf. 'Studies in Jainism', p. 11-12). About the Angas : (For details cf. 'Parisistaparvan' edited by Jacobi p. 1xxxii-lxxxiii and 'Vira Nirvana Samvet and Jain kala ganana' by Muni Kalyanavijayaji). In the second century after Mahavira's death there was a terrible famine in the land of Magadha which lasted for 12 years. At that time the Maurya Candragupta was the king of Magadha and Thera Bhadrabahu was the head of the Jain community. Owing to fantine Bhadrabahu migrated to Nepal. During these unsettled times, themonks neglected their regular studies so that the sacred lore was on the point of falling into oblivion. The Sangha therefore {reassem-- bling in Pataliputra when the famine was over, collected the fragments of the canon which the monks happened to recollect, and in this way brought together the eleven Angas. In order to recover the Ditthivaya, the Sangha sent 500 monks, with Sthulabhadra as their leader, to Bhadrabahu in Nepal, who had then undertaken the 'mahaprana' vow, lasting for twelve years, but all of them except Sthulabhadra, becoming tired by the slowness of their progress, soon fell off; Sthulabhadra alone stayed out the whole term of his master's

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Jain Sources and unauthoritative collection of works brought together by Jincandra in Valabhi at a far later date.11 vow and learned the fourteen Purvas; but he was forbidden to teach more than the first ten of them to others as a penalty for misusing them. Thus the first compilation of the canon took place in Pataliputra during the time of Candragupta Maurya who is assigned 299 B.C.i. e. the beginning of the 4th cent. B. C. or the end of the 3rd cent. B. C. Now owing to another famine in the year 827 after the death of Mahavira (i. e. about 4th cent. A.D.) when all the sacred lore was again in danger of becoming obsolete, another council of monks was convened at Mathura under the guidance of Acarya Skandila in order to collect the scriptures and arrange them in an orderly way. Synchronous with this, Acarya Nagarjuna did the same work of collecting the sacred texts by convoking a council of monks at Valabhi, but unfortunately as these two Acarvas, Skandila and Nagarjuna could not meet, there remained certain differences in some of the readings, allusions to which can still be found in the commentaries. The well-known final council presided over by Devardhigaoi was 'held at Valabhi, 150 years after the councils presided over by Skandila and Nagarjuna at Mathura and Valabhi respectively. (i.e. in the beginning of the 6th cent. A.D. or 980 years after the death of Mahavira). Devardhi prepared his final version of the Jain canon with the aid of the written texts as well as the memory of the monks who had assembled at the council. The twelfth Anga containing the *Purvas, as said above, was already missing by this time and that is why we find only eleven Angas in the recension that has come down to us. It may be noted that Devardhi followed mainly the version of "Skandila. The latter's readings were accepted in toto and where the readings of Skandila and Nagarjuna differed, Devardhi tried to reconcile them as far as possible. Most important differences were, however, retained by giving them, in the Mula-sutra, i.e. the text as also in the "Tika and Curnis' (For details CF "Vira Nirvana Samvat and Jain kala-ganana" by Muni Kalyanavijaya-p. 688 onwards). Thus the redaction by Devardhi represents the canon in the present form which forms the earliest source of information about Jain religion and philosophy. This is the Svatambara tradition regarding the present Jain canon. Cambridge History of India, Vol. I. *Even the Digambaras admit that the first disciples of Mahavira knew 11.

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinam a There being thus two opposite traditions regarding the Jain canon, we have to take note of the views of modern scholars who have critically examined the whole question as to the authenticity and antiquity of the Jain canon. 86 It is noteworthy that the result of recent researches of Jacobi inclines more towards the tradition of the Svetambaras. In his opinion which is also endorsed by Dr. Charpentier,1 the Svetambara tradition regarding the Jain canon cannot be regarded as wholly without any historical foundation. Of course all the works comprising the present canon do not belong to the same period but are of different origin and age. Of the 45 texts mentioned above, the eleven Angas which are said to have been compiled by Mahavira's pupils are undoubtedly the oldest part of the canon-which is assigned to the end of the 4th cent. B. C. or the beginning of the 3rd cent. B. C., by Jacobi and others on a consideration of language and metre on the one hand and comparison with the oldest Buddhist Pali works on the other.13 It should be noted that when the Angas are said to be the oldest, that should not be taken to mean that the form in which they have come down to us is the same as it was at the time of their origin. Not only the passing of time but the traditional reliance upon memory rather than upon written documents made some additions, omissions and alterations inevitable. What is however contended is that they adequately preserve the oldest portions too. 12 33 13. the fourteen Purvas and eleven Angas. They relate however that not only was the knowledge of the fourteen Purvas lost at an early period but that as early as 436 years after Mahavira's Nirvana, the last who knew the eleven Angas died and the teachers who succeeded him knew less and less Angas as time went on until the knowledge of these works was completely lost 683 years after Mahavira's death." "History of Indian Literature" by M. Winternit, Vol IL p. 432-433. The Uttaradhyayanasutra Introduction p. 31. SBE, Vol. XXII, p. xliii (Introduction).

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Jain Sources Of the eleven Angas, Viyahapannatti usually called the Bhagavati-sutra, which is the fifth Anga and the biggest of all, shall be our main source of material for the discussion of Parinama in the Agamas, as it, besides being antique in character, presents an exhaustive and lucid description of the varied questions metaphysical and ethical, which were being discussed since the time of Mahavira and even before that during the period of Parsva. Thus both from the point of view of its subject-matter and its antique character the Bhagavai occupies a prominent place in the Agama literature. Other relevant old works such as Thananga, Pannavana, Ut. Su., Anuogaddara, Jivabhigama containing references to metaphysical problems will also be consulted whenever necessary. B 87 The Darsana Perio 1 The Period of Umasvati and Kundakundacarya : (4th and 5th cent. A. D.) As we shall see, the account of the Jain doctrines as found in the Agamas is descriptive in its treatment. The doctrines are simple, stated without any attempt at elaborate explanation or establishing anything on the basis of reasoning. Hence many terms and phrases are left unexplained. This development is to be found in the Darsana and the Tarka period. In the earliest darganic texts viz., the Tattvartha-sutra of Umasvati and the works of Kundakunda (which shall be presently noticed), we find the material of the Agamas systematised in such a way as to give a comprehensive view of all the doctrines of Jain philosophy. Though these texts do not show any essential difference from the doctrines of the Agamas, yet advance over the latter is discernible in so far as a certain clearness and accuracy of idea and expression, as will be seen, characterise them. However, for the subtle dialectical exposition and discussions, we shall have to go to the still later works of the Tarka period.

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama The Tattvartha-sutra with the svopajna-bhasya of Umasvati is a work which is regarded as authentic both by the Svetambaras and the Digambaras, while the important works of the Digambaracarya Kundakunda viz.., Pravacanasara, Pancastikaya, Samayasara and Niyamasara, which we are to consider are the prime authority of the Digambaras. The dates of these two Acaryas cannot be fixed with certainty. According to Digambara tradition and scholars like Dr. Upadhyelt and Wirternitz15. Kundakunda lived in the first cent. A.D. and was anterior to Umasvati whose date is stated to be about the 3rd or 4th cent. A D.16 On the other hand certain scholarsli assign a later date to Kundakunda viz., beginning of the 5th cent. A.D. i.e. after Umasvati. It is not necessary for us to enter into this controversial issue. We shall, however, take up first the Tattvartha in as much as it does not show such a detailed and elaborate treatment of metaphysical problems, especially of the concept of Parinama, as is seen in the works of Kundakunda. The unique feature of the Tattvartha is that it is the first of its kind in the whole of Jain philosophical literature, attempting to systematise all the tenets of the Jain system on the basis of the Agamas. Further, as we know, the darsanic-sutra period of Indian Philosophy had come to a close by the time of Umasvati and the age of commentaries on these sutras had already set in. But there was not a single Jain Sanskrta (or Prakrta) philosophical work so far written in the sutra style. This need was fulfilled by the work of Umasvati which therefore comes to occupy the position of the first philosophical work written in Sanskrta and in the sutra style in the whole of Jain literature. The works of Kundakunda too, are the first to be written systematically in Praksta verses. They treat the very same philosophical problems that are dealt with in the Agamas and the Tattvartha, though they cannot be said to be based on the Agamas as their authority is denied by the Digambaras. 14 Pravacanasara Introduction p. xxii. 15 History of Indian Literature Vol. II, p.476. 16 History of Indian Literature, Winternitz. Vol. II, p.578. Pt. Sukhalalji's Introduction to the Tattvartha (Gujarati) p 11. 17 Muni Kalyanavijaya's Sram ana Bhagavan Mahavira (Hindi) p.392.

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Jain Sources The Tarka Period (5th Cent. A.D. to 17th cent A.D.) The Tarka period is prolific in dialectical works. I have drawn upon the most prominent and authoritative texts which throw light on the problem of Parinama and the subject-matter related to it. I mention below, in chronological order, these works with the names of their authors. 1. Sanmati-Tarka by Siddhasena Divakara. Later part of the 4th cent. A.D. or the beginning of the 5th cent. A.D.18 Svetambara. 2. Sarvartha-Siddhi by Pujyapada. About 5th cent. A.D. (latter half).19 Digambara. 3. Apta-mimamsa by Samantabhadra. About 6th cent. A.D.20 Digambara. 4. Visesavasyaka-bhasya by Jinabhadra. About 1st half of the 7th cent. A.D.91 Svetambara. 5. Tattvartha-Rajavarttika, Astasati, Laghiyastraya etc. by Akalanka. About 7th cent. A.D.22 Digambara. 6. Tattvarthasutrabhasyavrtti by Siddhasena Gandhahasti. Later half of the 8th cent. A.D.23 Svetambara. 7. Dharma-samgrahani, Sastravartasamuccaya, etc., by Haribhadra. 8th cent. A.D.24 (latter part). Svetambara. 18 Pandit Sukhalalji's Introduction to Sanmati-Prakarana (Gujarati Translation) p.69.19 'Jainendravyakarana and Acarya Devanandi' an article in Sahitya Samsodhaka' p. 79. 20 Pt. Sukhalalji's Prakkathana, Nyayakumudacandra, Part II,p.17. 21 Muni Jinavijayaji, 'Bharatiya Vidya', Singhi Smaraka Grantha. 22 Pt. Sukhalalji's Prakkathana, Nyayakunudacandra. Part II. p.16-17. 23 Pt. Sukhalalji, Iptroduetion to the Tsu. (Gujarati), p.59. 24 Muni Jinvijayaji, "Jain Sahitya Samsodhaka', year I, Vol.I.

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The Sankhya-Yoga and the Jair Theories of Parinama: 8. Tattvartha-slokavarttika, Astasahasri, by Vidyananda. First half of the 9th cent. A.D.95 Digambara. 9. Commentaries on the three important works of Kundakunda viz. Pravacanasara, Pancastikaya, Samayasara by Amrtacandra. First half of the 10th cent. A.D.?Digambara. 10. Commentary on the Sanmati of Siddhasena Divakara by Abhayadeva. (Svetambara). Later half of the 10th cent. A.D.'" 11. Syadvadaratnakara by Vadideva, Early part of the 12th cent. A.D.28 Svetambara, 12. Dvatrinsika, Pramana-mimamsa by Hemcandra. 12th cent. A.D.". Svetambara. 13. Syadavada-manjari, by Mallisena, (13th cent. A.D.)30: Svetambara. 14. Pancadhyayi by Rajamalla (15th cent. A.D.)si Digambara. 15. Dravya--Guna Paryaya Rasa, Naya--Pradipa, commentary on the SVS. of Haribhadra, etc., by Yasovijayaji,(17th cent. A.D.): 3 Svetambara. In all these works, as we shall have occasion to sec, two or three things stand out prominently. Firstly, in all of them we find an attempt at establishing and justifying the Jain position on the strength of dialectical reasoning. This had to be done in answer to the various objections raised by the rival schools of thought that had developed then. The objections are generally answered by controverting the objecter's position and by pointing out the fallacy and inconsistency therein, and then Jain standpoint is 25 Prof. A. B. Dhruva, Introduction to SVM, p.lxxxi. 26 Winternitz, History of Indian Literature, Vo!,JI.584. 27 Pt. Sukhalalji, Introduction to Sanmati-prakarana Guj. Translation,p.144 28 Prof. A. B. Dhruva, Introduction to SVM, ,7. Ixxxi. 29 Prof. A. B. Dhruva, Introduction to SVM, p.lxxxii. 30 Introduction, Nyayakumudacandra, Part II, p.42. 31 Introduction to Pancadhyayi, by Phulacandra Siddhantasastri, p. 16. 32 Winternitz, History of Indian Literature, Vol. II, p.593:

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Ja in Sources 91 sought to be established by showing it to be free from the alleged inconsistencies and fallacies. This method of argumentation, no doubt, went a long way in the development of thought. For, all the questions so far left untouched and for whose explanation no need had so far arisen had, of necessity, to be taken up and treated at full length with a view to make the Jain system of thought strong and cogent. In this way, this later development of thought helped to fill in the gaps found in the pre-darsanic stage and to bring about a full-fledged development of all the main concepts of the Jain philosophy...

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CHAPTER VII PARINAMAVADA IN THE AGAMAS *Introductory The Agamas, as already said above, do not contain any systematic exposition of the Jain doctrines but a detailed descriptive account of them in a desultory manner. So, it shall be our task, here, to gather from the Agamas such references as have a bearing on Parinama and related matter. But, as Parinama being a concept of reality is closely related to other metaphysical ideas, it is necessary to study it in relation to general Jain metaphysics. We shall have to keep close to this approach throughout the discussion of Parinama, even in later works. Otherwise we would miss the different bearings of Parinama on different aspects of reality. So, first I give below a general scheme of metaphysics as is found in the Agamas. 1 Jain Metaphysics The Davvas (Dravyas) The universe (Loga) is said to be constituted of the five Atthikayas, viz., Dhammatthikae (Principle of Motion), Ahammatthikae (Principle of Rest), Agasatthikae (Space), Jivatthikae (Soul), Poggalatthikae1 (Matter). These are classed under two kinds of substances viz. Jivadavvas and Ajivadavvas. Of the four Ajivadavvas, Poggalatthikae is ruvi (i.e. possessed of colour, taste, ' kimayaM bhaMte loetti pavRccai ?" 'goyamA ! paMcatthikAyA, esa NaM evatie loetti pabuccai, taM jahA - dhammatthikAe ahamatkiAe jAva poggalatthikAe / ' Bh. Su. 13.4.481 cf. also 2.10.117, 7.10-Pannavana and Tha Su. 1.251.

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Parinamavada in the Agamas 93 smell and touch) while the rest are aruvi (i.e, not possessed of colour, taste etc.) ? Agasatthikae is again comprised of Loyagase and Aloyagase. The space containing substances Jiva and others is called Loyagase while the one extending infinitely beyond it, is called Aloyagase. It is a void devoid of substances, 3 Thus if we want to picture to ourselves Jain cosmography we shall have to regard Agasa (Space), as the primary entity, a part of which is peopled with Jiva, - Poggala, Dhamma, Abamma. It may be noted that at certain places in the Agamas, Kala too is admitted as a separate sixth substance (dravya).* At Ut. Su... 28.736 the six substances viz., Dhamma, Ahamma, Agasa, Kala, Poggala and Jiva are said to make up this universe (Loga). When, however, Kala is not recognised as a separate substance it is identified with Jiva and Ajiva. These two views about Kala persist throughout the later period. Of the six substances, Agasa, Dhamma and Ahamma are each one substance only while Kala, Poggala and Jiva are an infinite number of substances. (Ut. Su. 28.8) 2 'kativihA NaM bhaMte ! davvA pannattA?' 'goyamA ! duvihA davA pa. taM jahA jIvadavvA ya ajIvadavvA ya / ' 'ajIvadavvA NaM bhaMte ! kativihA pannattA ?' 'goyamA ! duvihA pa. taM jahA - rUviajIvadavA ya arUviajIvadavvA ya / Bh. Su. 25.2.720 (2.10.120), Anu. Su. 14. 3 Bh. Su. 2.10. 120-121. kativihA NaM bhaMte ! savvadavvA pannattA ?' 'goyamA / chavihA savvadavvA pannattA -- taM jahA -- dhammatthikAe ahamatthikAe jAva addhAsamae / ' Bh. Su. 25.4 cf. Also Bh. Su. 2.10,120, 11.11.424, 13.4.482-483; Pannnvena. 1. 5 dhammo ahammo AgAsaM kAlo puggljntvo| esa logo tti pannatto jiNehiM. varadaMsihiM // 7 // 6 (Jivabhigam) 'kimayaM bhate ! kAlo tti pavuccai ?' 'goyamA ! jIvA ceva ajIvA ceva tti / '

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama With these general remarks we may proceed to consider the nature and functions of each of these substances. 94 Jiva : The main characteristic of Java is stated to be uvaoga, the capacity to attend and to know. The other characteristics are knowledge (nana), faith (darsana), conduct (caritta), austerities (tava), energy (viriya) and the experience of happiness and misery. From the standpoint of substance (dravya), Jiva is described to be infinite (in number), from that of khetta ( ksetra), pervading the Logagasa, from that of Time, eternal, and from that of bhava, devoid of colour, taste, smell and touch. Each Jiva has innumerable (asamkhyata) space-points, i.e. equivalent to those of Logagasa.10 Though Jiva is aruvi, it acquires the size and form of the body which it comes to inhabit as a result of karmas. Its space-points 17 uvaogalakkhaNe NaM jIve / :8 jIvo uvaogalakkhaNo / 10 Bh Su. 13,4.481, 2.10.117 Ut. S. 28.10 nANeNaM daMsaNeNaM ca suheNa ya duheNa ya // 10 // nANaM ca daMsaNaM ceva caritaM ca tavo tahA / vIriyaM uvaogo ya eyaM jIvassa lakkhaNaM // 11 // Ut. Su. 28.10.11. Cf Also Bh. Su. 13.4.481 9 davvao NaM jIvatthikAe anaMtAI jIvadavvAI, khettao logappamANamette, kAlao na kayAi na Asi jAva nicce, bhAvao puNa avaNNe agaMdhe arase aphAse, guNao uvaogaguNe / " Bh. Su. 2.10.117. kevatiyA NaM bhaMte ! loyAgAsapaesA pannattA ? 'goyamA ! asaMkhejjA loyAgAsapaesA pannattA // " ' egamegassa NaM bhaMte / jIvassa kevaiyA jIvapaesA pannatA ?" 'goyamA ! jAvatiyA logAgAsapaesA egamegassa NaM jIvassa evatiyA jIvapaesA paNNattA // ' Bh. Su. 7.8.283. The terms Sankhyata ( saMkhyAta) Asankhyata (asaMkhyAta ) and Ananta

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Parinamavada in the Agamas (paesa) are capable of expansion and contraction according to the dimension of the physical body. In this respect it resembles a lamp which though remaining the same illumines the whole of the space enclosed in a small or big room in which it happens to be placed. 1 Jiva is both an experiencer and an agent. 12 It is eternal from the standpoint of substance and non-eternal from the standpoint of modes. 13 Its different states depending upon Karmas are as (ananta), it must be noted, do not possess their ordinary sense in Jain philosophy. They are technical and are explained by means of the simile of 'Palya' (a particular kind of vessel with specific m:asurements). The minimal ( jaghanya ) limit of Sankhyata is two, while its highest limit (utkRSTa ) is beyond our calculation. It is explained by means of 'palya', All the numbers between jaghanyasaMkhyAta and utkRSTasaMkhyAta are called madhyamasaMkhyAta. When one more is added to the highest (utkRSTa) Samkhyata it becomes the minimal limit of Asamkhyata which extends over a very wide range of numbers and cannot be calculated by us. Ananta begins when one is added to the highest (utkRSTa) Asamkhyata. Ananata, too, has the highest limit. Each of these, Sarkhyata, Asamkhyata and Anant, has various subdivisions. For details cf. Karma-grantha, Hindi, by Pandit Sukhalalji, Part IV, pp. 208 onwards. 11. 'se NUNaM bhaMte ! hatthissa ya kuMthussa same ceva ?' 'haMtA goyamA / hathissa kuMthussa ya, evaM jahA rAyappaseNaijja jAva khuDDiyaM vA mahAliyaM vA se teNaTTheNaM goyamA ! jAva same ceva jIve / ' Bh. Su. 7.8,293 'goyamA ! atthegaiyaM veei, 12. 'jIve NaM bhaMte ! sayaMkaDaM dukkhaM vedei ?" atthegaiyaM no veei / ' 'se keNaTuTheNaM bhaMte ! / ' 'goyamA ! udinnaM vers, aNudinnaM no veei, se teNaTTheNaM evaM vuccai atyegaiyaM ve i evaM ... ... ... 1 Bh. Su. 1.2, 21 13. 'jIvA NaM bhaMte ! ki sAsayA asAsayA ?" ... ... 95 'goyamA ! sAsayA siya asAsamA ' goyamA / davvaTTyAe sAsayA bhAvaTTyAe asAsayA / ' - Bh. Su. 7.2.272

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama follows: (1) Udie (af) Operative, or that which rises from the operation or fruition of karmas. (2) Uvasamie () Subsidential, arising from the subsidence of karmas. (3) Khaie (nf), arising from the destruction of karmas. Khaovasamie (3/4P$?fia) i.e. arising from the partial destruction, subsidence and operation of karmas. (5) Parinamie (ff), Natural, the soul's Own natural thought-activity, independent of karmas. (6) Sannivaie1 (fa) i.e. resulting from the association of two or more states. In the Pannavana (Ch. 13) and the Bh. Su. 14.4.514, we find the different kinds of Parinamas of the soul given as follows: gati-parinama, indiya-parinama, kasiya-parinama, lesa-parinama, joga-parinama, uvaoga-parinama, nana-parinama, damsana-parinama, caritta-parinama and veda-parinama. These are explained in detail hereafter. 96 Poggala: Poggala is distinguighed from all the other substances owing to its possessing rupitva i.e. colour, taste, and touch. 15 Its chief characteristic is said to be that of 'grahana' since it forms the basis of the bodies, senses, yoga, 16 and respiration of souls, 1 (i.e. by the vibratory activity of the soul, poggale matter - transforms itself in the form of body, senses etc.). From the standpoint 14. chavvihe bhAve paNNatte, taM jahA -- udaie uvasamie khaie khaovasamie pAriNAmie sannivAie / 15. Tha. Su. 6.537 Cf. Also Anuyoga dvara Satbhavadhikara and Bh. Su. 17.1.593. poggalAtthikAya rUvikAyaM ajIvakAyaM pannaveti / Bh. Su. 7.10.30 zn 16. This term is explained in the next chapter. 17. poggalAtthikAe NaM pucchA' 'goyamA ! poglAtthikAeNaM jIvANaM orAliyaveubviyaAhArae teyAkammae soiMdiyacakkhiM diyaghANidiyajibbhiMdiyaphAsiMdiyamaNajogavayajoga kAyajogaANApANUNaM ca gRhaNaM pavattati, gahaNa - lakkhaNe NaM poggalatthikAe / ' Bh. Su. 13.4.481

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Parinamavada in the Agamas of substance, it is infinite in number, from that of 'khetta ' ( ksetra ) it is co-terminous with the Logagasa, from that of time it is eternal and from that of 'bhava' it is possessed of taste, smell etc. It has five colours, five tastes, four kinds of odour and eight kinds of touch. 1 A paramanupoggala, however, possesses only one colour, one taste, one smell, and two kinds of touch 19 The different kinds of transformation of poggala are stated to be - sound, darkness, lustre (of jewels), light, shade, sunshine, colour, taste, smell, and touch.20 To these may be added its other Parinamas such as bandhanaparinama, gatiparinana, bheda-parinama and agurulahuya-parinama 2 1 which are classed under the general heading of 'ajivaparinamas' in the Pannavana (ch. 13 ) and the Bh. Su 14.4.22 Like the Jiva, Poggala also is eternal from the standpoint 97 18. 'poggalatthikAe NaM bhaMte ! kativaNNe katigaMdhe0 rate phAse ?' 'goyamA ! paMcavaNNe pa'carase dugaMdhe aTThaphAse rUvI ajIve sAsae avaTThie logadavve, se samAsao paMcavihe paNNatte, taM jahA - davvao khettao kAlao bhAvao guNao, davvao NaM proggalatthikAe aNaMtAI davvAI, khettao loyappamANamette, kAlao na kayAi na Asi jAva nicce, bhAvao vaNNamaMte gaMdha0 rasa0 phAsamaMte, guNao gahaNaguNe / ' Bh. Su. 2.10.117 19. 'paramANupoggale NaM bhaMte ! kativanne jAva katiphAse pannatte ? 'goyamA ! egavanne egagaMdhe egarase duphAse pannatte / ' Bh. Su. 18.6.631 20. ' saddandhayAra ujjoo pahA chAyA tave i vA / vaNNarasagandhaphAsA puggalANaM tu lakkhaNam // ' Ut Su. 28.12 21. cf. Appendix II 22. 'ajIvapariNAme NaM bhaMte ! katividhe pannatte ?" goyamA dasavidhe pannatte, taM jahA -- baMdhaNapariNAme 1, gatipariNAme 2, saMThANapariNAme 3, bhedapariNAme 4, vaNNapariNAme 5, gaMdhapariNAme 6, rasapariNAme 7, phAsapariNAme 8, agurula huyapariNAme 9, saddapariNAme 10 / Pannavana 13 ( pariNAmapada )

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98 The Sankhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinana of substance and non-eternal from the standpoint of modes, 2 3 Now a little about the classification of Poggala. In Tha. Su.82,2- it is stated that Poggala is of two kinds - Parmanupoggala and No-paramanu-poggala (i.e. the khandha or molecular aggregate) while a four-fold classification is also met with in the Visesa-pada of Pannavana (ekt. 5) thus : (1) Khandha, (2) Khandhadesa, (3) Khandapaesa, (4) Paramanu poggala -- i.e. (1) molecular aggregate, (2) a part of a molecular aggregate, (3) The smallest part of a molecular aggregate and (4) an atom. Then in the Bh. Su.8.1.309, we find a three-fold classification of Poggala based on two kinds of change or transformation - one, natural change (vIsasA) and the other involving conscious effort (paoga)25. The terms 'Tatar' and 'THAT' are not explained but subdivisions of each are given in detail in subsequent passages. These two kinds of change, as we shall have occasion to see, are elaborately treated in later works. It should be noted that the number of Poggala and atoms is infinite (ananta) but they occupy only the innumerable (asamkhyata) space-points of Logagasa. This is possible because of the peculiar power of penetration or occupation possessed by an atom as well as a molecular aggregate. Thus one space-point can be occupied 23. TRATTOO of ma fa HIHT TAS ?' 'goyamA ! siya sAsae siya asAsae / ' furegoi ?' 'goyamA ! davvaTThayAe sAsae vannapajjavehiM jAva phAsapajjavehiM asaase|' Bh. Su. 14.4.512 faet gramat di, d. -- Trautmar da datatamar da ! sfazi o wa III GT 9778T?' 'That ! fafael atat AT, taM jahA -- paogapariNayA mIsasApariNayA viissaaprinnyaa|' 24. 25.

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Parinamavada in the Agamas by an infinite number of atoms and molecular aggregates.2 6 Dbammatthikae and Ahammatthikae Both these substances are, from the standpoint of substance, one, from that of 'khetta', co-extensive with the Logagasa, from It of time, eternal and from that of bhava, devoid of colour. taste. smell and touch.27 The function of Dhammatthikae is to be the efficient cause in soul's all dynamic bhavas, such as gamana. gamana (going and coming), speech, unmesa (act of opening the eyes), vibratory activity through mind, speech and body (FTTTT) and similar others signifying motion2s as also in Poggala's motion. That is why Dhammatthikae is called 'gamana-gune'. Adhammatthikae on the other hand is thana-gune' in as much as it is the efficient cause of all the static bhavas of Jiva, like sitting, standing, sleeping, steading the mind etc. as well as of Poggala.:9 It may be noted here in passing that nowhere do we find, in the Agamas, specific mention of the Parinamas of these as in the case of Jiva and Poggala. Of the different Ajiva-parinamas mentioned in the Parinama-pada (ch. 13) of Pannavana noted above only one, viz., 'agurulahuya' is applicable to these two. 26. 'paramANupoggalA NaM bhaMte ! kiM saMkhejjA asaMkhejjA aNaMtA ?' 'goyamA ! no saMkhejjA no asaMkhejjA aNaMtA, evaM jAva aNaMtapaesiyA khaMdhA / ' 'egapaesogADhA NaM bhaMte ! poggalA kiM saMkhejjA asaMkhejjA aNaMtA ?' 'evaM ceva ...... evaM jAva asaMkhejjapaesogADhA / ' Bh. Si. 25.4.740 27. Ut. Si. 2.10.116 28. 'dhammatthikAe NaM bhaMte ! jIvANaM kiM pavattati ?' 'goyamA ! dhammatthikAeNaM jIvANaM AgamaNagamaNa bhAsummesamaNajogA vaijogA kAyajogA je yAvanne tahappagArA calA bhAvA savve te dhammatthikAeNaM pavatta ti, gailakakhaNe NaM dhmmtthikaae|' Bh. Su. 13:4.481 29. 'ahammatthikAeNaM jIvANaM kiM pavattati ?' 'goyamA ! ahammatyikAeNaM jIvANaM ThANanisIyaNatuyaTTaNa maNassa ya egattIbhAvakaraNatA je yAvanne thirA bhAvA savve te ahammatthikAe pavattaMti, ThANalakkhaNe NaM ahammatyikAe / ' Bh. Su. 13.4.481

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100 The Sankhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama Agasattbike Agasatthikae is composed of Logagasa and Alogagasa. The former contains Jiva, Poggala, Dhamma and Ahamma and Kala whereas the latter is devoid of these, an empty space, extending infinitely beyond the Logagasa.80 Its function is to give place to or serve as a substratum for other substances.s1 From the standpoint of substance, it is one, from that of khetta', co-extensive with loka and aloka, from that of time eternal, from that of bhava devoid of colour, taste, smell and touch.39 It has infinite number of space-points. Of the different Ajiva-parinamas, noted, above, only 'agurulahuya' is applicable to it like Dhamma. and Ahamma. Kala : It may be noted that nothing beyond a bare mention of Kala as a sixth substance is to be found in the Agamas. At one place, however, (Ut.Su.28-10), the characteristic or function of Kala is stated to be Vattana - vattaNAlakkhaNo kAlo' i.e. to help substances in their continuing to exist'.We do, often, get references to vyavahara-kala' or conventional time viz.. 'avalika' 'muhutta' etc. as in the Bh.Su.25-5, but these do not throw any light on 30 'kativihe NaM bhaMte ! AgAse paNNatte ?' 'goyamA duvihe AgAse pa0 taM jahA-loyAgAse ca aloyAgAse / ' _ 'loyAgAse NaM bhaMte ! kiM jIvA jIvadesA jIvapadezA ajIvA ajIvadesA ajIvapaesA ?' 'goymaa| jIvA. vi jIvadesAvi...ajIvAvi ajiivdesaavi...|' ____Bh. Su. 2.10.121 'alogAgAse Na bhaMte / kiM jIvA' ? pucchA taha ceva / 'goyamA ! no jIvA jAva no ajIvappaesA / ' ' Bh. Su, 2.10. 121 'logAloge ya AgAso / ' Ut. Si. 36.7 31 'AgAsatthikAe NaM bhaMte / jIvANa ajIvANa ya kiM pavattati ?' 'goyamA AgAsasthikAeNaM jIvadavvANa ya ajIvadavvANa ya bhAyaNabhae...avagAhaNAlakkhaNe NaM AgAsatthikAe / ' Bh. Su. 13.4.481 32 Bh. Su. 2.10116

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Parinamavada in the Agamas Kala as a metaphysical principle and its relation to the Parinamas of things. 101 The above account of the six dravyas culled from the Agama passages, presents the Jain view of metaphysics. This view in its outline is throughout maintained by the later writers, supplying of course logical framework and consistency. We may now turn to the theory of Parinama which can be formulated from the Agamas. Elements of Parinama as found in the Agamas At the outset, it may be pointed out that nowhere in the Agamas, have I succeeded in finding a passage which directly defines the concept of Parinama as such. We shall, therefore, endeavour to understand the Agama idea of Parinama by studying the passages relevant to the subject. Such passages by the very nature of the subject-matter get classified under three heads. viz., (A) Those bearing on the Pajjavas of Jiva and Ajiva, (B) Those bearing on the Parinamas of Jiva and Ajiva, (C) Those cocerning the eternal and non-eternal aspects of Jiva and Poggala. A The Pajjavas of Jiva and Ajiva The Pajjavas of Jiva and Ajiva are enumerated in the fifth chapter viz., the Visesa-pada of Pannavana and in the Bh.Su. 25.5.746. Therein at one place Jiva-pajjavas are stated to be infinite in number because the total number of individual Jivas (Jiva-vyakti) is infinite. Thus it considers the pajjavas of the Jiva category viewed in a general way. At another place the innumerable Neraiyas are said to have infinite pajjavas because the shades (degrees of transformation) of a certain quality like blackness are infinite (in their variation). Thus, here a different point of view is

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102 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama indicated in the explanation of the infinity of pajjavas, viz. the possibility of infinite variety in the individual shades (degrees of transformation) of a single quality: Ajiva-Pajjavas Bhagavatisutra and Pannavana first divide the Ajiva-pajjavas into ruvi and aruvi and each is then classified into four and ten kinds respectively. Of these ruviajivapajjavas are stated to be infinite in number because the total number of atoms as well as molecular aggregates of different kinds is infinite. The infinite pajjavas of an atom, as also those of the different molecular aggregates, are explained by showing the possibility of an infinite degree of variation in a single quality of an atom or a molecular aggregate (as was shown in the case of Neraiya-infernal being). No such calculus is, however, used in regard to the ten kinds of aruviajivapajjavas. The above-noted different pajjavas of Ajiva, show the different forms which the Ajiva-substances viz., Dhamma, Ahamma, Poggala, Agasa and Kala assume, as also the different limited aspects such as 'desa' and 'paesa' in which they present themselves. There is this difference, however, between Poggala on one side and Dhamma, Ahamma and Agasa, on the other, viz., that the former in its atomic as well as molecular form is infinite in number while the latter are each one (indivisable) in number. This difference, as seen above, characterises their pajjavas also. It is clear that, here too, the word pajjava indicates the various formations of Poggala as well as the different aspects under which Dhamma, Ahamma and Agasa present themselves. If we put together the passages concerning both Jiva and Ajiva, we can see that the Agama-writers used the word 'pajjava' to indicate the various aspects or phenomena in which things present themselves.

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Parinamavada in the Agamas B 163 The Parinamas of Jiva and Ajiva The Parinamas of Jiva and Ajiva are enumerated in the Parinama-pada (ch. 13) of Pannavana and the Bh.Su. 14.4. The Parinamas of Jiva as stated there are: 1 gatipariNAma, 2 indriyapariNAma, 3 kapAyapariNAma, 4 lezyApariNAma, 5 yogapariNAma, 6 upayogapariNAma, 7 jJAnapariNAma, 8 darzanapariNAma 9 cAritrapariNAma, 10 vedapariNAma. Various sub-divisions of each of these ten kinds of Parinamas are detailed in the subsequent passages of the same chapter of Pannavana. For us, however, it is necessary to note only these ten fundamental ones. The above enumeration of the parinamas of Jiva presents some difficulties as to how all the parinamas attributed to Jiva can belong to it. We can understand nana, damsana, caritta and uvaoga Parinamas, as representing the proper functioning or Parinamana-activity of Jiva but, how are we to understand indiya, joga, kasaya, lesa, veda and gati as the Parinamas of Jiva? The explanation of this lies in the peculiar Jain theory of bhavakarma i.e. psychic transformation and activity. The soul's original nature is supposed to be pure consciousness possessing the full powers of cognition but in its mundane existence, this pure faculty of cognition being clouded by karmic matter, functions only partially and piece-meal. Hence it is, that the soul has restricted or limited perception of the sensations received through different senses. In reality, however, all the sensations such as those of seeing, hearing etc., that we attribute to different senses belong to the congitive faculty of the soul. So, when one speaks of Jiva's indiya-Parinama, it is the bhava-indiyas, the limited psychic transformations, supplying in reality the cognitive aspect of the sensations received

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104 The Samkhya-Yoga-and the Jain Theories of Parinama through material senses, that are to be taken. When, however, on the disappearance of corresponding karmas, the obstruction disappears, the soul cognises all the sensations, otherwise supplied by material senses, without the latter's aid. The Jain psychologist, thus, assumes the bhava - psychic aspects corresponding to material aspects with which alone, ordinary people are familiar. What applies to the cognitive aspect or Parinama of the soul, applies also to other aspects, viz, damsana, caritta and uvaoga. In the pure state these are all concentrated on the self but in the mundane state, they are directed in various degrees to other things. This direction of the soul to other things, or to itself is regarded as the function of the soul. It is this direction of the soul to objects other than itself, that is responsible for the material collocation or dravya-karma that attaches to itself. Thus the 'Joga' (Yoga), which in Jain terminology means the vibratory activity of the soul through the association of body, mind and speech, is essentlally the Parinama of the soul. The kasayas which literally mean stains on a pure object, mean in the case of soul, so many stains on the pure consciousness. They are the different attitudes of the soul, towards the various objects of the world. They are four in number viz., anger, pride, deceitfulness and greed. Lesas (Sans.-lesyas) are the peculiar colour-shadows of the soul due to the influence of karmic matter and are determined by the soul's bhava-karma or psychic activity. Veda-Parinama is the sex transformation in the consciousness of Jiva due to the sex of the body which it pervades. Gati is the movement of the soul through the different worlds, such as Naraka, Deva, Tiryanca and Manusya on aecount of its karmas. In short, the functioning of the soul either self-directed and therefore pure or influenced by extraneous things and therefore

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Parinamavada in the Agamas directed towards them is all the Parinamas of the soul. As is made clear by later writers, 'Cetana' or 'Upayoga' being the main characteristic of the soul, all its Parinamas are really the Parinamas of 'Cetana' and/or 'Upayoga' due to extraneous influence or independent of it (ie. in the pure state). The Parinamas of Ajiva 105 The Parinamas of Ajiva are: 1 bandhanapariNAma, 2 gatipariNAma, 3 saMsthAnapariNAma, 4 bhedapariNAma, 5 varNapariNAma, 6 gandhapariNAma, 7 rasapariNAma, 8 sparzapariNAma, 9 agurulaghupariNAma, 10 zabdapariNAma. All these Parinamas of Ajiva, excepting 'agurulahuya' are applicable, as already said, only to Poggala and not to any other Ajiva-dravya. And even amongst the Poggala-parinamas, a paramanu can possess only gati, agurulahuya, vanna, gandha, rasa and phasa - Parinamas, and not others, as the latter presuppose the existence or presence of, at least, more than one Paramanu. The Poggala-Parinamas enumerated above, do not require any explanation which was necessary in the case of the Parinamas of the soul. They all, in short, represent the activity of Poggala and its results in different relations. If we take into consideration the Parinamas of Jiva and Ajiva, we find that they all represent the functioning or Parinamana of Jiva as well as Ajiva, particularly Poggala, which the Agama - writers could visualise. The problem of eternality and non-eternality with reference to Jiva and Poggala In his dialogue with Gotama & Jamali Lord Mahavira discusses this problem.

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106 The Sankliya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinaina Jiva : I. "Are the souls, O Lord, eternal or non-eternal ?' 'O Goyama! The souls are eternal in some respect and noneternal in some respect. They are eternal from the standpoint of substance and non--eternal from the stand-point of 'bhava' i.e. modes'. 33(a) II. <Page #121
Parinamavada in the Agamas 107 IV. 'Is it, O Lord, that an unsteady or a transient thing changes, breaks (i. e. perishes), that a steady, persistent thing does not break (perish)? Is it that the child is eternal35 and childhood non-eternal, that the pandit is eternal and 'panditatva" non-eternal ? "O Goyama ! it is like that......'?36 All these passages, as can be seen, aim at showing the eternal aspect of the soul, from the standpoint of substance,by postulating its existence or persistence in all the three times and its noneternal aspect from the standpoint of bhava' i.e. modes, such as 'narakatva', 'manusyatva', 'devatva', childhood, panditatva' etc., which all are subject to change. It may be noted here in passing that 'bhava' in 'bhavatthahayae' has the sense of 'pajjava' (i.e. parinama), Poggala : 1. "Are the atoms, O Lord, eternal or non-eternal ?' 'Goyama ! The atoms are eternal in some respect and noneternal in some respect.' With what end in view, is it so said ?' 'Goyama ! they are eternal from the view-point of substance and non-eternal from the view-point of modes such as those of colour, taste, smell and touch 37 II. 'Can it be said, O Lord, that the Pudgala existed in the end less, eternal past ? 35 Here by child, its soul - as a substance is to te considered and by 'childhood'- its quality that is liable to change. 36 Bh. Su. 1.9.80. 37 Bh:. Su. 14.4.512

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108 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama "Yes, Goyama ! it can be so said. Can it be said, O Lord, that the Pudgala exists in the eternal present ? 'Yes Goyama ! it can be so said'. 'Can it be said, O Lord !' that the Pudgala will exist in the endless, eternal future ?' Yes, Goyama ! it can be so said'.3 8 III. 'Is it possible, O Lord, that a Pudgala, which may be arid (at one moment) in the endless, eternal past, may become cohesive (at another moment)? - or both arid and cohesive at one and the same moment with reference to its different parts (desas)? Again, is it possible, that it may undergo manifold varna(colour) - parinamas, either naturally or by some extraneous agency (cf. commentary of Abhayabheda - on Futot), or (undergo) only one varna-parinama on the destruction of the previous (manifold) parinamas ? "Yes, Goyama ! it is possible like that.39 As in the case of the Soul, the above passages point to the eternal and non-eternal aspects of poggala, from the standpoints of substance and modes respectively. There is a passage in the Bh.Su. 9.6.387 - which deals with these two aspects, eternal and non-eternal, with reference to loka or the universe as a whole. It is as follows : 'The world, O Jamali, is eternal for at no time was it nonexistent, is non-existent, will be non-existent. It existed (in the past), exists (now), and will continue to exist (in future). It is persistent, fixed, eternal, imperishable, undecaying, steady and nitya. It is 38 Bh. Su. 1.4.42. 39 Bh. Su, 14.4.570.

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Parinamavada in the Agamas non-eternal, O Jamali, in as much as after Osappini" there is Ussappini and after Ussappini, there is Osappini.'*1 109 In the above passage the words davvatthayae and bhavatthayac are not used as in the case of Jiva and Poggala. The dravyarthika standpoint is obvious in the first part of the passage concerning. the eternal aspect of the universe; but the non-eternal aspect that is sought to be established through Osappini and Ussappini is not quite clear. For the effect of these two eras, according to Jain philosophy, is limited to a part of the human world (Manusyaloka) only, and not to the whole of the loka, which comprehends much more than the human world and wherein the changes do take place but they are not adversely or favourably affected by Osappini and Ussappini respectively. The statement, therefore, seems to have been made from a general point of view, to convey that though the universe as a whole never perishes and is thus eternal, yet as changes, due to time, constantly take place in them, it is non-eternal to that extent. Thus, the two aspects of 'permanence' and 'change' with reference to the loka, seem to be broadly aimed at. In all the above passages, what is meant is that things are eternal from the standpoint of what persists in them and noneternal from the standpoint of what is evanescent in them. What is permanent or persistent is technically the 'dravya' of a thing while what is evanescent or passing the 'paryaya' or 'bhava' of that thing. Now, in order to have a clearer understanding of the doctrine of change and permanence, as it might have been held by the earlier Jain writers, it will be necessary to study comparatively Pajjavas and Parinamas of Jiva and Ajiva, noticed above. 40 These two terms we have already explained. 41 Bh. Su. 9.6,387

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110 The Sarrkhya-Yoga and the Jain. Theories of Parinama The different Parinamas of Jiya and Ajiva, as we saw, represent various kinds of Parinamana-activity or functioning of Jiva and Ajiva respectively, as a result of which they assume particular formations - states, at particular moments of time. All these Parinamas can co-exist in a substance at a time, but none of them, taken singly, permanently abides in it (Jiva or Ajiva). Thus, for instance, take a particular gati-parinama viz., the human state. This Parinama of Jiva is not everlasting but will be replaced after a time by another gati-parinama say, the Naraka-state, the Tiryancastate or the Deva-state. Similar is the case with each Parinama of Jiva and Ajiva. These particular states-formations which a substance assumes in succession as a result of the process of change (parinamana-activity), are also designated as 'pajjavas' as is evident from the use of such terms in the Agama as nanapajjava, damsanapajjava, vannapajjava, rasapajjava, phasapajjava etc. with reference to these parinamas.*Nevertheless the fact that the word does not exclusively signify the result of the Parinamana activity, but something in addition, is borne out by a careful study of the first set of passages, bearing upon the pajjavas of Jiva and Ajiva. The title 'visesa-pada' given to the fifth chapter of Pannavana (containing the pajjavas of Jiva and Ajiva), and the treatment of the pajjavas and parinamas in two different chapters are further indicative of a wider connotation of the term Pajjava. Let us see how this is. When in the first instance, the Jiva-pajjavas are stated to be infinite, it can be seen that the pajjavas there represent the different kinds of bhedas - visesa avasthas of the Jiva category viewed as one, from the standpoint of Samgraha-Naya (which takes a collective view of things). Here, we must carefully note that we cannot regard from the Jain standpoint, the different pajjavas of the Jiva-category as due to the Parinama of one Jiva because the Jains do not believe in one Jiva from which the various Jivas have come out, as certain schools of Vedanta like those of Ramanuja or Vallabha seem to think. Similarly another kind of 42 Bh, Su. 14.4.512. Pannavana, ch. V.

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Parinamavada in the Agamas bheda or Visesa is denoted by the term pajjava when the infinite (ananta) pajjavas of innumerable (asamkhyata) Narakas, and other groups of beings as well as those of atoms and different kinds of molecular aggregates are explained. One quality like blackness is supposed to have infinite degrees of variation i.e. infinite kinds (ananta-bheda or Visesa), on account of which the dravya possessing that quality is said to have infinite pajjavas. In the case of aruviajivapajjavas, the word pajjava is used to signify such bhedas as desa, and pradesa which are only subjective, for as already noted, Dhamma, Ahamma, Agasa being each, one indivisible whole, cannot admit of any real division as such. It, however, is possible in the case of Poggala as its pajjavas viz., khandhas - molecular aggregates and atoms, can actually unite and become separate. 111 It becomes clear, therefore, that the word pajjava is used in a wide sense, comprehending all the possible kinds of aspects ( dravyabheda, guNabheda, kAlakRtabheda, dezakRtabheda etc.) under which Jiva and Ajiva substances could be conceived. The word Parinama, on the other hand, is limited to signify only one of such manifold aspects i.e. those pajjavas which are the results of the Parinamana-activity. Thus the word Fajjava includes the pajjavas of Parinamana as well as of others. This is clearly seen in the passages discussing the question of eternality and non-eternality with reference to Jiva, Poggala and loka, wherein the standpoint of bhava-modes clearly refers to the results of the Parinamana-activity. The above discussion on Pajjava, Parinama, Sasayasasayatta (zAzvatAzAzvatatva) helps us to formulate the concept of change as it must have been explicitly or implicitly understood by the ancient Jain thinkers. As said in the beginning of this chapter, even though there is no explicit definition13 of Parinama to be found in the 43 It may be noted that the Ut. Su. 28.6, attempts to define for the first time, Dravya. Guna and Paryaya thus:

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112 The Sanklya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama older Agamas, yet in the passages given above we see all the different elements of the theory of Parinama, viz., Dravya, Paryaya 'guNANamAsao davvaM egadavvasiyA guNA / - lakkhaNaM pajjavANaM tu ubhao assiyA bhave // ' Substance is the substrate uf qualities, the qualities are those that inhere in one substance; but the characteristic of modes (pajjavas) is that they inhere in at least two substances'. Further on in st. 13 of the same chapter, the characteristic of pajjavas are given thus : 'egattauM ca puhuttaM ca, saMkhA saMThANameva ya / / saMjogA ya vibhAgA ya, pajjavANaM tu lakkhaNaM / ' The characteristic of pajjava i. e. mode is sigleness, separateness, number, form, conjuction and disjunction.' There is however a difference of opinion regarding the interpretation of "ubhao' in ubhao assiyA bhave / The commentator Santyacarya, takes by '34317' to imply both Dravya and Guna - '3991: : 970acata Joy TUTUITTEXTAT: 1 But this interpretation is not possible in the light of st. 13 which describes Pajjava. Singleness separa teness etc. are not possible between Dravya and Guna but only between two or more Dravyas. What is more, the word 'g' seems to suggest contrast to 'T COTTEETAT.' Hence scholars like Pt. D. Malvania (Nyayavatara-varttikavrtti' Introduction p. 106-107.) whom I have followed, wouid interpret 'FH311? as meaning 'two or more Dravyas'. Apart from the divergence of interpretation, the difinition and characteristic of pajjava given above, do not throw any greater light on the concept of Parinama than that thrown by the passages which we have already noted and discussed. They only point to the distinction of Pajjava from Guna, viz., that which inheres in two substances is not to be called a Guna, but, Pajjava. That is why we have not included and considered the above definition of Pajjava in our discussion of Parinama in the Agamas. Another reason why the above passages from the Ut.Su. are not considered is that the use of the word Guna is of a distinctly late age.

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Parinamavada in the Agama 113 and Parinamana. Similarly the discussion of the permanent and the changing aspects of reality from the Dravyarthika and Paryayarthika standpoints respectively, clearly visualises the theory of Parinama. We might say here that the later definition of reality in terms of 'utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya' is derived from these earlier discussions. We may, now, consider an interesting problem, important both historically and philosophically, arising from the above discussion, in connection with the usage of the terms Pajjava (Paryaya) and Parinama. Paryaya - Parinama Both the words Paryaya and Parinama, grammatically mean one and the same thing and, therefore, can be used as synonyms. In fact, they are actually used as synonyms in the earlier and later Jain philosophical literature. The problem, now, arises, whether we are to regard both terms of equal status historically in Jain literature or, whether there are any considerations, which would make us think, that the term Parinama might have been taken from common usage to elucidate the doctrine of Change and Permanence. One consideration, which immediately changes to our view is, the word Parinama is of common usage in the Jain and other darsanas while, the term Paryaya in this particular sense, is a Jain For Dravya and Paryaya, as we know, were already too familiar to the older Agamas, but the word Guna in the sense of a 'quality' seems to be unknown to them. Guna, in the Agamas (as we have already seen) is generally used in the sense of so many 'fold' or 'times'. The above passage of the Ut. Su., however, introduces the category of Guna for the first time in the Agamas in the specific sense of quality', pro bably due to the Vaisesika influence.....

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114 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama technical word. Another consideration which weighs with us is, that the word Paryaya, as seen above, has a wider connotation, including all the possible aspects due to Parinama and others, independent of it. I am, therefore, inclined to suggest that the earlier Jain thinkers viewed the problem of reality from the Paryaya point of view. They saw that the different phenomena of the world (paryayas) show certain persistent elements. They classified these persistent elements into five or six categories which are their five or six Dravyas. They, thus, viewed reality as consisting of Dravya and Paryaya and when they developed their dialectic for discussing metaphysical problems, they did it, accordingly in the form of Dravyarthika-Naya and Paryayarthika-Naya. It may be noted that we do not meet with such a usage as Parinamarthika-Naya, which clearly proves that Paryaya was traditional with them. However, in the general philosophical discussions of their contemporaries, there was another word almost a synonym of Paryaya, viz., Parinama. This word, however, had an important connotation. It referred to an activity which brings forth various states. Philosophically it was necessary for the Jain to have a concept which would explain why the Dravyas tcok on different Paryayas. Parinama could explain it, and so the term which could be a synonym of Paryaya and which at the same time, had the further advantage of explaining how the Paryayas form themselves, was brought into service and made a current coin by the Jain thinkers. Nevertheless, the stuck to their original word Paryaya, and allowed it to have a wider connotation of aspects, which could not be brought under the Parinama-activity. That shows the strength of the traditional usage. That the word Parinama was more or less used to suggest activity or functioning, in addition to being a synonym of Paryaya, is not only brought out f.om the passages referred to above but also by the use of such verbal forms of pari + nam (qft + 7)+ wherever 4 44 Bh.Su. 14. 4. 510-511. 12. 5. 452.

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Parinamavada in t 115 activity is to be indicated. It is only rarely that the verbal forms of pari + i (9f7 + ) are used for that purpose. These considerations lead me to think that the earlier Jain thinkers, even before the nucleus of the Jain Agamas was formed, in which both the terms Paryaya and Parinama are found, might have brought into service the term Parinama, of common usage, to elucidate their doctrine of Dravya and Paryaya. I, however, do not suggest that there was any conscious borrowing from one school by another. It only suggests the historical process of phidosophical development of the Paryaya doctrine, with the help or impact of the current ideas of Parinama-activity.

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CHAPTER 1X PARINAMA IN THE WORKS OF UMASVATI AND, KUNDAKUNDA The Tattvartha-Sutra with its svopajna Bhasya (About the 3rd or 4th cent A. D.) Coming to the post-Agama period, we take up, first, the TSu. of Umasvati. As already said, this work occupies a unique position in Jain literary history, because it is a work which is accepted as authentic both by the Svetambaras and the Digambaras, which is not the case with the Agamas. Let us, first, study the relevant passages from this work, bearing on our problem, and then consider what development we can detect in them. We saw, in our discussion on the Agama-material, that the Paryaya-Parinama theory is intimately connected with the concept of Dravya. So here also, we must, first, try to understand what Dravya means. We saw that older Agamas, nowhere, clearly define Dravya. It is only, later, in the Ut. Su., that we get the definition of Dravya, Guna, and Paryaya. In the Tattvartha, Dravya is. defined, as an entity possessing Guna and Paryaya. This definition, by bringing in the aspect of Paryaya, makes the concept of Dravya, more consistent with the Jain tradition than that of Dravya given in the Ut. Su. The latter defines substance as the substratum of qualities. The analysis of reality into Dravya and Paryaya is a Jain concept, while the analysis of reality into i quet4qc FUH I V. 37 2 Torpareat conti

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117 irinama in the works of Umasvati and Kundakunda Dravya and Guna is a Vaisesika concept. Philosophically consiered, these two approaches are distinct. One takes reality as it ssumes different forms, or views reality, through its transformtions; while the other statically analyses it into substance and ualities. When, however for whatever reason, the analysis of Dravya and Guna was accepted by the Jains, (following the Taisesikas), they had to find a place for it, along with their Dravya-Paryaya analysis. And Umasvati defines gunas as residing n the substance and having no quality (guna) in themselves." Here, however, we are primarily concerned with the explanaion of Paryaya that is given in the bhasya on. V. 37. Paryaya s another bhava(state) and another name, i.e. the Paryaya of a Dravya is a distinct transformation, bearing a distinct name. In this definition, the idea of another name seems to be due to a desire to incorporate the common meaning of Paryaya viz, a synonym. Philosophically, one might say, that a Dravya may have a distinct Paryaya yet it may not always have been possible to name it differently, though one may concede that for the purpose of discourse, one has to have a distinct name, to indicate a distinct state. This is because, we can speak of a Paryaya when it is recognised as such by our thought and to pin it down our thought would require a word. However that may be, the concept of Paryaya is made clearer by Umasvati, by defining it as a distinct state (formation) to be recognised by a distinct name. Now, let us take the definition of Parinama. The Bhasya states that Parinama is the nature, the 'thatness' of each substance (dravya) and its qualities (gunas), in other words, if we regard reality as the sum-total of the five or six substances 5 3 dravyAzrayA nirguNA guNAH / V. 40 4 bhAvAntaraM saMjJAntaraM ca paryAyaH / 5 tadubhAvaH pariNAmaH / (V. 41 ) bhASyam - dharmAdInAM dravyANAM yathoktAnAM ca guNAnAM svabhAvaH svatattvaM pariNAmaH /

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118 The Sankhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama (dravyas) and their qualities (gunas), Parinama is the nature of all these. In short, it is the nature of dravyas-cum-gunas to transform. Umasvati has taken a further step in the development of Jain philosophy by defining reality as such under the term Sat (which was not so far used in the earlier Jain literature). He defines sat (reality) as characterised by origination, decay and permanence. This definition and its explanation give us two important ideas - one, viewing all the Dravyas under the term Sat, and the other - the nature of this Sat, which is stated to be Parinama in the sutra V.41, is analysed into the three aspects of utapada-origination, vyaya-decay, and dhrauvya-permanence. In short, it gives us an analysis of Parinama, and its identification with reality as such. This analysis of Parinama, it may be noted, comes to be the same in substance as the definition of Viparinama, given by Yaska in his Nirukta. Not to be deprived of this triple nature of origination, decay and persistence is the definition of eternity (nityata). This definition points out that, that is to be called eternal which does not become apart from the state of being Sat or real. Now, the nature of Sat, as already noted, is to originate, to decay and to persist. Thus to be eternal is to originate, decay and persist. This is the source of the doctrine of 'parinaminityatva.' There are three sutras (V. 42-44) in the Tattvartha, at the end of the fifth Adhyaya which present a new kind of classification of Parinamas into 'adiman' i. e. having a beginning and 'anadi' i. e. beginningless. They further state that the anadi 6 JAGoTaloyati I V.29 7 Tograronai facut 1 V.30 74# - 2425 HT Hann safa 7 stofa 3 afecafeHIN I V.42

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Parinama in the works of Umasvati and Kundakunda parinamas take place only in the arupi dravyas, such as Dharma, Adharma, Akasa and Jiva, while, the rupi dravyas undergo adiman-parinamas, like those of colour, taste, smell and touch.10 One exception to this is however pointed out, viz. that though Jiva is arupi, and therefore, liable to anadi-parinamas only, as stated before, yet there are certain adiman-parinamas like those of Yoga and Upayoga taking place in it, along with anadiparinamas.11 With reference to the above three sutras, it should be noted that they are omitted by the Digambara commentators of the Tattvartha, viz. Pujyapada and Akalamka. They, however, do refer to this classification in the commentary on the Sutra, ': afm: ', but, do not follow Umasvati in the explanation of the same. According to them, all the Dravyas rupi and arupi - have anadi-parinamas from the Samanya or Dravyarthika standpoint, and adiman-parinamas from The Visesa-Paryayarthika standpoint.12 It is important to note that even the Svetambara commentator Siddhasena too, does not seem to follow rigidly Umasvati's explanation. He maintains that everywhere - i. e. in all the dravyas there are certain anadi-parinamas and certain 9 bhASyam - tatrAnAdirarUpiSu dharmAdharmAkAzajIveSviti / V.42 10 rUpiSvAdimAn / V.43 bhASyam - rUpiSu tu dravyeSu AdimAn pariNAmo'nekavidhaH sparzapariNAmAdiriti / yogopayogI jIveSu 1 V.44 11 119 - 12 The two terms yoga and upayoga are explained later on. sadvividho'nAdirAdimAMzca / tatrAnAdirdharmAdInAM gatyupagrahAdi: sAmAnyApekSayA / sa evAdimAMzca bhavati vizeSApekSayA / Sarvarthasiddhi V.41. dravyArthikaparyAyArthikanayadvayavivakSAvazAt sarveSu dharmAdidravyeSu sa ubhayaH pari PPP: | Raj-varttika V. 41.

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120 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama adiman-parinamas.13 Thus these sutras make an attempt to understand Parinana in some detail. The foregoing discussion based on the sutras of the Tattvartha along wilh the bhasya shows a distinct philosophical advance cver the Agamas, both in a wider generalisation, clarification and method. The concept of Sat as comprehending the whole reality, has been reached under the term Sat, and clearly defined. Similarly Dravya, Guna, Paryaya and Parinama receive precise difinitions. Kundakundacarya (About the 5th cent. A. D) Kunda kundacarya occupies a prominent place in the Digambara hierarchy of scholar-saints. From our point of view, bis importance lies in the fact that he is a philosopher of Parinama, par excellence. We can study and understand Parinama theory nowhere better than in the works of this great acarya. He tries to explain and elucidate the theory of Parinama in its various aspects, by means of its analysis and application to the different Dravyas. In the TSu., as we saw, Umasvati took a step in the development of Jain philosophy, by postulating Sat, and identifying it with utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya. Kundakunda carries forward that step and describes Sat or Satia in greater detail,14 identify 13 ye tu manyante rUpiSvevAdimAn pariNAmo bhavati, nAmUrteSu, teSAmarUpidravya paryAyAzrayavyavahAralopAdutpAdAdilakSaNAyogAt . pariNAmAbhAva:...... tasmAt 797 #fagarar: #fazifahre: qfaunar fa 5914: 1 V. 43. P. 440 14 JTI HOT7an Afanear Bylawsuit i n sicgraaf cafcatar gafa gert II PK. 8

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121 Parinama in the works of Umasvati and Kundakunda ing it with Dravya, 15 and pointing to it as 'living' in everything.16 Thus Kundakunda imagines Satta almost in the terms of ekam sad vipra bahudha vadanti. He qualifies it a sappadivakkha. This clearly indicates the Jain Anekanta or relative position. Nevertheless, if the aim of philosophy is to reach wider and wider generalisations, then this is the statement of the widest imaginable generalisation. Another point, that may be noted, is the derivation of the word Dravya, as one that flows and reaches out to all its Paryayas, which beautifully explains the operation of Parinama (Pk.9).17 Next, in the TSu., we noticed that Parinama was, by implication, analysed into utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya. Kundakunda explicitly states this position, in PS II. 7. He says that the Pari nama characterised by permanence, origination and decay of Dravya with reference to qualities and modes, is its (Dravya's) nature. Kundakunda, further, elucidates this point, by explaining the relation of invariable concomitance between the three aspects of Parinama, viz. utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya, in PS II. 8. where he states that there is no origination without decay, nor is there decay without origination; origination and decay are not possible without the aspect of permanence. Kundakunda further describes a thing (18 i, e. anything about which we can predicate is), as lying in substance (), 15 daviyaM taM bhaMte aNNaSNabhUdaM tu sattAdo || PK. 9 ! 16 iha vivihalakkhaNANaM lakkhaNamegaM saditi savvagayaM / PS II. 5. 17 daviyadi gacchadi tAI tAI sambhAvapajjayAI jaM / daviyaM taM bhaNNaM ........ PK 9 18 Artha' employed in the gatha-signifies substance, quality, and mode but here it is taken to mean quality and mode with reference to substance. Ps II 14

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122 The Saikhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama quality (Tot), and mode (9719), and shows the inseparable connection between Artha and Parinama.19 This means that there is in this world not a single object which does not undergo modification, and no modification without an object as its substratum, implying thereby that the two, 'the Real' and the 'Parinama' are so inseparably connected with each other, that the very concept of one is impossible without that of the other. This stanza, it can be seen, identifies, on one side, Artha with Dravya, Guna 2nd Paryaya and on the other with Parinama. The TSu., as already seen, mentions Dravya, Guna and Paryaya but does not identify them with Artha. Similarly, Parinama was said to be the nature of the reals (Dravyas), but the metaphysical identity of Parinama with reality was. not so explicitly stated as here. The definition of Dravya in the TSu. makes clear that there cannot be any Dravya apart from Guna and Paryaya. It is also stated in the bhasya on I. 520 that such a Dravya, severed from Guna and Paryaya, can only be imagined, through abstraction in thought; but this does not clarify, whether Guna and Paryaya can exist apart from Dravya. Kundakunda clarifies this point, and explains the mutual relationship betwen Dravya, Guna and. Paryaya in the following manner : I "There is nothing as quality nor as modification in the absence of a substance.' II. There is neither substance without mode nor mode without substance. The one cannot be without the other, so say the 'sramanas. 19 patthi viNA pariNAmaM attho atthaM viNeha pariNAmo / davvaguNapajjayatyo attho atthittaNivvatto / 20 dravyajIva iti guNaparyAyaviyuktaH prajJAsthApito'nAdipAriNAmikabhAvayukto jIva JETTI

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Parinama in the works of Umasvati and Kundakunda 123 JII. There is neither quality without substance, nor substance." without quality, hence these two are not incompatible in their nature'. 'The substance which is not different from Sat, modifics: itself through change of quality; therefore, modificationsin qualities are further called the substance only'. A substance is said to be identical with that (bhava or state) in which it is transformed for that much time (i. e.. as long as that state remains).' Vi. 'If the substance is entirely separate and distinct from its , qualities, then it may change into infinite other substances. or again if the qualities can exist apart from their substance, there will be no necessity for a substance at all'. 21 In the above passages, we see that Kundakunda is at pains to establish the material (or objective) identity between Dravya,Guna and Paryaya as well as Parinama. However, in philosophical analysis, all these concepts of Dravya, Guna, Paryaya and Parinama are to be grasped as distinct and separate from one another. This raises the problem of identity and difference. Kundakunda renders a definite service to Indian philosophy by clearly enunciating the two types of differences - one which is made by thought and the other which is objective. For the for.. mer he uses the term 'anyatva' and for the latter, 'prthaktva'.. He defines and explains them as follows : 1. 'It is the dictum of Mahavira, tha separateness (prthaktya). consists in having separated space-points; non-identity (anyatva) is the absence of identity.' II. 'Really speaking, what is substacee is not quality, nor what: 21 PS I1. 8; PK 12, 13; PS 11. 12; PS 1. 8; PK 50

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124 III. The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama is quality is substance; this is a case of non-identity and not of absolute negation; so it is pointed out.' 'The difference between Dravya and Guna may be determined by appellation, form, number, or locality. These determinants are various, They hold good among things and their qualities, whether these are considered different or identical'. IV-V. 'Colour, taste, smell and touch are the qualities of the primary atom. They are not said to be really distinct from their material substratum, though they are undoubtedly distinguishable from it as regards name, form, etc. In the same way, perception and knowledge are really inseparable from the self and are not distinct from it, though from the viewpoint of name, form, etc. they may be spoken of as distinct from the substratum. In short, though distinguishable in thought, thay are not really distinct.'2" Thus with the help of the distinction between 'anyatva' and 'prthaktva' Kundakunda avoids the confusion, which is likely to occur in the discussion of 'bhedabheda". After having made this distinction, Kundakunda further analyses the concept of Parinama into its two components, viz., 'change' involving utpada and vyaya, and 'permanence' involving dhrauvya, by relegating utpada and vyaya to Paryaya and dhrauvya to Dravya.23 The above discussion makes clear the contribution of Kundakunda to the clarification of the concepts of reality and Parinama. 22 PS II. 14 & 16; PK 52; PK 57-58 .23 PK. 15, PK 11, PS II. 11

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Pa rinama in the works of Umasvati and Kundakunda 125 Application of Parinama to Kala, Pudgala and Jiva as found in the works of Kundakunda. At the outset, it must be pointed out that, of the six Dravyas, Kundakunda, like his predecessors, omits Dharma, Adharma and Akasa and applies the doctrine of Parinama to Kala, Pudgala and Jiva only.2+ Kala : In the Agamas, we saw, that Kala was mentioned as a sixth: Dravya, but its paryayas were not given.? 5 Similarly, the Tsu. devotes only two sutras to Kala, stating that it is accepted by some as a separate Dravya and that it has infinite samayas.96. Kundakunda, however, clearly explains the nature and functions. of Kala and shows the application of the doctrine of parinama to it as follows. That on account of which the five Substances undrero changes is called Real Time or Kala-dravya. It is devoid of physical qualities like colour ete. Samaya, Nimisa, Kastha, Kala, Nali, day and night, month, season, Ayana (half-year) and Samvatsara (year) are all Vyavahara or conventional time. These are determined by other objects. Duration of time, either long or short, is impossible apart from a standard of measurement. The standard of measurement also has no meaning apart from material objects. Hence, conventional or relative time is brought about by extraneous conditions. Relative time is determined by changes or motion in things. These changes themselves are the effect of time 24 There is only one stanza in the PK. (91) which seems to refer to the Parinama of the Dharma Dravya. It is as followsagurulaghugehiM sayA tehiM aNaMtehiM pariNayaM niccam / gadikiriyAjuttANaM karaNabhUyaM sayamakajjam // The Dharma Dravya which is eternal constantly undergoes infinite modification of the quality 'agurulaghu'. It is unaffacted by movement, but it conditions the motion of those that can move. 25 In the Bh. Su. 25.5.747, the notion of conventional time, viz., avalika, muhurta etc. is there but it is not clear whether these pusat HUT are to be understood as referring to the paryayas of Dravya-Kala. 26 FTCTROCTE' v.38. Sarat4:' V.39.

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126 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama absolute. The former is momentary, i.e. having beginning and ende. The latter is eternal. The duration that an atom reguires to mov from one spatial point to the next one is called samaya (moment). This samaya is liable to origination and destruction. No two samayas are co-existent. 37 Appliction of Parinama to Pudgala Matter exists in four main modes; skandhas, skandhadesas, skandhapradesas and primary atoms. The complete molecule of matter is skandha; a half of it is skandhadesa; a half of that half is skandhapradesa; and what cannot be divided is the primary atom. Skandhas are of two kinds - those that can be perceived by the senses and the minute ones beyond sense - perception. These also are called matter conventionally. These manifest them-selves in six different modes by which the three worlds are completely filled. An atom has physical qualities and it itself is unable to produce any sound whatsoever. All the atoms are homogeneous and capable of being the cause of any of the four physical elements - earth, water, fire and air. Skandhas, when strike one another, produce sound. An atom has a single taste, colour and smell and two contacts. Whatever is perceived by the senses, the sense-organs, the various kinds of bodies, the physical manas, the karmas (subtle material forces affecting soul) etc. are material (i.e. the modes of matter). Colour, taste, touch, smell and sound are the qualities of matter while structure, conglomeration (composites) and sound are the modes of matter. The primary atom has no space-points; it is an unit of space-point. 'When conjoined with other atoms due to its being arid or cohesive, it comes to have two or more space-points. The degrees of aridness or cohesiveness of an atom increase from one to infinity gradually one by one. Two atoms form an aggregate only when there is the difference of two degrees (points) in the cohesiveness or aridness that they possess, the minimum degree being excepted. The aggregates having two or more space-points and the subtle and gross elements of carth, water, fire and air come into existence 72 PK 23-26, 107-108; PS II. 47, 49-51

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Parinama in the works of Umasvati and Kundakunda 127 when different numbers of atoms combine themselves with one another on account of the different degrees of their cohesiveness and aridness. The molecules, capable of becoming karmas, coming into contact with the (passional) conditions of the Soul, are transformed into Karmas. The soul (as a direct agent) does not transform the molecules into the Karmas in the same manner as a potter moulds clay into a pot.?! Jiva : Compared to the somewhat sketchy treatment of Parinama with reference to Kala and Pudgala, the treatment with reference to Jiva is elaborate and comprehensive. This is but natural. The Jain darsana, being a Moksa-darsana, should be more concerned with those topics which have a direct bearing on the problem of liberaticn of the scul. Parinama, being a guiding principle, it is quite in the fitness of things that Kundakunda should give a detailed application of it, with reference to Jiva. The Agamas and the Tsu. give a good account of bondage (bandha), its cause (asrava), the means to liberation (samvara and nirjara) and liberation (Moksa), which constitute important problems of Jain spiritual philosophy. Kundakunda also, discusses these topics, but does it, in the light of the theory of Parinama, i. e, by viewing them as results of the operation of Parinama. Before we come to the application of Parinama to Jiva, we should note the consistency of the Parinama theory, with the principle of Dravya. The five or six Dravyas are by their very definition, absolutely distinct from one another. This distinctness, as we shall see, is consistently maintained in their Parinamas. Kundakunda, however, refers only to Jiva and Pudgala, because it is the Parinamas of these, that are primarily his concern. Here, naturally, the question arises, as to how Jiva and Pudgala ever <Page #142
The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama lutely distinct from each other. The answer to this will be found in the Jain theory of karma, which is discussed by Kundakunda in his application of Parinama to Jiva. 128 The nature of Jiva is said to be constituted of sentiency (cetana) and manifestation of consciousness (upayoga).29 The Parinamana-activity of this Cetana is said to present itself in three aspects, with reference to knowledge, karma and the fruit of Karma.30 Knowledge is the comprehension of objects, whatever is initiated by the soul is Karma, the fruit of Karma is either happiness or misery.31 Kundakunda, further, indentifies in the next stanza, parinami with Parinama and speaks of Atman itself as Parinama and of knowledge, Karma and the fruit, as Atman, of course in the sense of having aprthaktva. 32 What is meant is that it is the evolving Cetana which has always these three aspects and that we name it as knowledge (jnana), Karma (karma) and fruit (phala), only on account of the predominance of one over the others. It also follows from the above that these three aspects of Cetana are to be found in any state of the soul, either mundane or liberated. Of course, the nature of these three differs in the two states. In order to understand this difference, it is necessary to know first the nature of bondage, its cause, the means to freedom, and the nature of freedom, according to Jain philosophy. 29 jIvaH punazcetanopayogamaya : Ps. II 35. 30 pariNamadi cedaNAe AdA puNa cedaNA tidhAbhimadA / sA puNa NANe kamme phalammi vA kammaNo bhaNidA // PS II. 31 ... 31 NANaM aTThaviyappo kammaM jIveNa jaM samAraddhaM / tamagavidhaM bhaNidaM phalaM ti sokkhaM va dukkhaM vA // PS. II. 32 32 appA pariNAmappA pariNAmo NANakammaphalabhAvo / tamhA NANaM kammaM phalaM ca AdA muNedavvo / PS. II. 33

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Parinama in the works of Umasvati and Kundakunda 129 Kundakunda explains the nature of bondage and its cause thus. He says that when the soul functions in an 'otherward' attitude as 'I am this', 'this is mine', identifying itself with things other than itself, through its Parinamas of raga (attachment), dvesa (aversion), moha (delusion), it comes to have the state of bondage.33 This is the same thing as to say that it is through raga-dvesa-moha Parinamas, that the soul becomes 'otherward' in its attitude, which is responsible for the influx of karmic matter which clings to it. Another important thing, that is pointed out is that the soul is the direct agent of its own modifications only, and not of those of matter, but maiter being transformed into karmas by reason of the soul's thought-activity, the soul is called an auxiliary cause of the modifications of matter into karma. Similarly, matter is the direct cause of its own modifications only, but being responsible in producing thought-activity (ragadi) in Jiva, it is regarded as the auxiliary cause of the latter's modifications, 4 Thus, the Jain provides a causal nexus or rather a nexus of action and reaction between Jiva and Pudgala. The means to liberation and the nature of the state of liberation, are described by Kundakunda.35 There he aims at showing that when the soul, by its properly directed process of Parinama, through Samvara-blocking and nirjara-shedding of Karmas, totally destroys its passions, viz. raga-dvesa-moha, and the consequent infiux of karmic matter, its attitude becomes 'self-ward' i. e. it realises its own true self which is the state of liberation. In this state, the soul does not cease to function altogether, but continues to modify itself into pure infinite jnana, darsana, 33 PS I. 84, see also PS II. 85, PS 11. 96, PK 135-137 34 PS II. 92, SS-87 35 PK 149; PS I. 80; PK 152, 157, 159; PS I. 19 & 60. .

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130 The Sarikhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinania caritra, 3 0 virya (energy) and sukha (bliss). We can now understand the difference in the nature of the three aspects of Cetana, viz.jnana, karma and phala in the state of bondage and liberation. Kundakunda explains this from an ethical point of view. He refers to three kinds of upayoga, viz., auspicious (subha), inasupicious (asubha), and pure (suddha).37 This term, upayoga, is peculiar to Jain philosophy. Along with Cetana, it is regarded as the differentia of a soul. It is not easy to distinguish between Cetana and Upayoga unless we regard former as a static abstraction and the latter, the concrete Cetana, or Cetana as it functions, Kundakunda defines Upayoga which is indentified with Jiva, as Jhana-cumdarsana.38 It is the different Parinamas or transformations of 36 'Caritra' ia the worldly state is translated as 'conduct' which may be right (samyak) or wrong (mithya). In the state of liberation, however, there being no body, 'caritra' signifies 'sama' i. e, manifestion of pure consciousness or self-realisation. svarUpe caraNaM cAritraM svasamayapravRttirityarthaH / tadeva vastusvabhAvatvAd dharmaH / Taarupaigafacatt: Ametacandra on PS. 1. 7. The terms 'jnana' and 'darsana' are explained hereafter 37 PS. II. 63-66, PS. I. 70, 11, 12, 14, 15 38 39317 UTT HUT #foret... PS II. 63 Jrana and darsapa are also called sakara Upapoga and anakara Upayoga respectively. (cf. Tsu. II. 9 and the bhasya). Of these the first is the specific or differentiated knowledge while the second (darsana) represents the primary grasping of a thing, i. e. the undifferentiated knowledge. It may be noted that the term darsana has, in Jain philosophy, another sense also, viz., faith in truth or right belief (cf. Tsu. I. 2. faraleist17 #GY171'). For want of precise English equivalents, the Sanskrt terms, 'jnuna' and 'darsana' have been retained.

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Parinama in the works of Umasyati and Kundakunda 131 this Upayoga which are responsible for the varied states of bondage and the final state of liberation. It must be noted that Upayoga' primarily denotes jnana and darsana i.e. refers to the aspect of knowledge only, but, when viewed from the ethical standpoint, it comes to be classified as subha, asubha and suddha. Of these first, as seen above, refers to the subha-parinama of the soul, which causes the meritorious influx of karmas and happiness, as its fruit. Asubha pertains to asubha-parnama (thought-activtity), leading to the sipful influx of karmas in the soul, and the fruit of which is the experience of misery. Both these Parinamas occur in the worldly state of bondage. On the other hand, that Upayoga which is free from the worldy dualism of good and evil, happiness and misery, in other words, from raga, dvesa and moha is called suddha or pure. This ultimately leads the soul to moksa or self-realisation. In this state, jnana, karma and phala cannot evidently be understood, as in the state of bondage, The soul in this state is steady in its own self, and non-attached to anything alien to itself. So, we have to understand that its jnana, karma and phala are all 'self-ward' (directed to the self). It is only from this point of view, that the Jain can consistently hold the view that the soul in suddhopayoga realises its nature of infinite jnana, dargana, caritra, sukha etc. Thus, Kundakunda, through the principle of Parinama, explains the different transformations of the soul from the various mundane states to the pure state of liberation, the cause of the mundane states and the means of achieving liberation. Through his theory of karma-parinama, he makes an attempt to explain how the two absolutely distinct entities come to influence each other, and make this world as it is. In short, the principle of Parinama has been useful in explaining metaphysics and ethics, as well as the mundane phenomena of the world, in which, a man, or for the matter of that, every living being, finds himself

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132 The Satkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama The foregoing discussion on the different aspects of Parinama and its application to the Dravyas, particularly the Jiva Dravya, enables us to gauge Kundakunda's philosophical acumen which has gone a long way in contributing to the deve. lopment of Jain philosophit thought.

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CHAPTER X PARINAMA IN TARKA-PERIOD Exposition of Parinama as found in the commentaries on the relevant sutras of the Tattvartha In the history of Indian philosophy, we find that the development of ideas in later periods, has taken place not so much through original works as through commentaries on the sutras, bhasyas etc. of the different darsanas. This holds good for the Jain darsana also. So, to study the further exposition of the doctrine of Parinama,, we shall have to take recourse to the important commentaries on the relevant sutras of the Tattvartha, which we discussed before. The Digambara Acaryas seem to have particularly applied themselves to the exposition of the Tsu. in a number of commentaries. The Svetambaras seem to bave satisfied themselves with the bhasya and it is only at a comparatively late period that an able commentary viz. that of Siddhasena, both on the Tsu. and its bhasya, was written. We shall first take the Digambara commentators, Pujyapada, Akalamka and Vidyananda and then the Svetambara commentator Siddhasena even though Vidyapands is later than Siddhasena. Pajyapada's comment on the sutra, TFTvAvyayaM nityam deserves study. The Tattvartha blasya explained, 'Tadbhava' as simply 'Satobhava' wherein Sat referred to utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya; Pujyapada explains it as 'pratyabhijnanahetuta,' i.e. the cause of the recognition this is that.' We see here a distinct progess in philosophical thought. In the bhasya, the principle of identity 1 5th cent. A. D. to 17th cent. -A. D. **

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134 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories Parinama is merely grammatically and objectively explained as the "state of being that', while Pujyapada explains it subjectively or rather epistemologically on the basis of knowledge of recognition, thus : 'Identity is that in a thing, which is responsible for the recogni. tion of a thing, as identical with something that we had formerly known. This would be impossible, if there were a total destruction of the thing formerly experienced or if it were merely a new phenomenon. Thus, that which retains this trait, i.e. literally, does not become apart from this trait, is nitya or eternal.'? Akalamka, in his Raj. V. (p. 239-240), and Vidyananda, in his Sl. V. (p. 434), essentially, follow Pujyapada in the explanation of 'Tadbhava', but make more explicit and clear what was suggested in Tet tefte afastoupi (Pujyapada). Thus, Akalamka attempts to explain away the contradiction that may be alleged against the three aspects of reality viz., utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya, by bringing into service the doctrine of relative standpoints, i.e. of Dravyarthikan aya and Paryayarthikanaya, which will be noted fully later on when we consider the defence of Parinama by later writers. Vidyananda, by raising the question as to what is that nitya-aspect of reality, which is possessed of dhrauvya' and what, the anitya-aspect, which is possessed of 'utpada and vyaya' - seeks to, respectively, explain them in the two satras, viz. tadbhAvAvyayaM nityam and atadbhAvena savyayamanityam the latter sutra being derived from the former. He explains "Tadbhava' in the same way as Pujyapada does, while 'Atadbhava' is explained 2 pagta: ? TETHETIEgar i agafafa FATUT TAPATHI tadakasmAnna bhavatIti yo'sya hetuH sa tadbhAvaH / tasya bhAvastadbhAvaH / yenAtmanA prAdRSTaM vastu tenaivAtmanA punarapi bhAvAttadevedamiti pratyabhijJAyate / yadyatyantanirodho'bhinavaprAdurbhAvamAtrameva vA syAttataH smrnnaanuppttiH| tadadhIno lokasaMvyavahAro virudhyate / tatastadbhAvenAvyayaM nityamiti nizcIyate / tata. kathaMcidveditavyam / sarvathA nityatve'nyathAbhAvAbhAvAtsaMsAratannivRttikAraNaprakriyAvirodhaH syAt / - Sarvartha Siddhi

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Parinama in Tarka-period 135 as that which is the cause of knowledge of otherness' or 'this is not that's Siddhascna's commentary is, somewhat, more elaborate and. contains other discussions also, in addtion to the clucidation of the sense of the sutra, We explain the comment as follows: The sattva which is the common characteristic of all the five astikayas indicates those qualities of each, which persist; for example, consciousness, incorppreality etc. of the soul. He explains 'nityatva' as signifying the 'dhrauvya aspect' of reality. But having done that he finds it difficult to find room for utpada and vyaya, which as a process are also essential to reality. He solves this difficulty by stating that utpada and vyaya have one substratum viz. dravva or dhrauvya and that the word 'bhava in the sutra indicates the utpada--vyaya aspect implying at the same time the rejection of kutasthanityata or absolute non-change, which can never be the nature of a real. Had it not been so, the sutra would have been "Tadavyayam pityam'.' It can be seen from the above that in substance there is not much difference between Siddhasena and his predecessors. 3 atadbhAvo'nyatvaM pUrvasmAdanyadidamiti anvayApratyayAdavaseyam / 4 ...tasya sato bhavanaM bhAvastadbhAvaH, tadeva hi sat tathA tathA bhavati jIvAdi devAdirUpeNa, na jAtucit sattvatyAgenAnyathA bhavati, tadbhAvAdavyayaM avinAzi nityaM ; nityagrahaNAd dhrauvyAMzaparigrahaH, sahyanvayI dravyAstikAMzaH sarvadAsarva tra na vicchidyate, sadAkAreNAnutpatteravi nAzAcca, bhAvazabdopAdAnAt pariNAmanityatA gRhyate, kUTasthanityatA tyajyate, anyathA 'tadavyayaM nityamiti sUtraM syAt / yat tu na kenacidAkAreNa vikriya te, tadanupAkhyameva bhavet / sattvaM ca sarveSAmanvayinAM dharmANAM sUcakam, paJcAstikAyavyApitvAt tu sattvaparigrahaH, sAkSAjjIvastAvat sattvaM caitanyamamUrtatvamasaMkhyeyapradezatvaM cAjahat tathA tathA pariNAmAnna vyagAt na vyeti na vyeSyatyavinAzyavyayo nitya ucyate, na punardevAdiparyAyeNApyananvayinA nityatA dhrauvyamasya vidyate, tathA pudagala: ... ... / '

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136 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama While explaining the sutra tadbhavah parinamah' Pujyapada states that the nature by which substances transform themselves is Parinama." Akalamka does not add anything to the above explanation. Vidyananda elaborates the statement of Pujyapada by saying that 'Tadbhava' is the way in which substances like the soul etc. exist in their particular states. This is Parinama, their nature, which is experienced by us as existing in the present." Siddhasena attempts a further explanation of the same by pointing out that Parinama is to be understood as 'sAmAnyarUpa ' because it involves the persistent aspect also ( dhruvAMza) and not mere change exclusively, and by illustrating Parinamanityata through its application to the different Dravyas. This question of application will be treated in the next section. Pujyapada in his comment on the sutra 'utpAdavyayadhrauvyayuktaM sat' explains the three terms utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya, according to Jain philosophy, in the following way. 'evamanvayyaMzo nityatvena lakSito dravyanayasvabhAvaH / paryAyanayasvabhAvI sthityaMzapratibaddha | sthitirapi paryAyapratibaddhA, sarvadA saMsargarUpatvAd vastunaH, ekamekAdhikaraNAvutpAdavinAzau jaina evaM zAsane sAGgatyamanubhavato'nyatra tu vyadhikaraNAvevotpAdavinAzau niyato veti / ' p. 391, 392 (V, 30) 5 dharmAdIni dravyANi yenAtmanA bhavanti tadbhAvaH tattvaM pariNAma iti vyAkhyAyate / 6 jIvAdInAM dravyANAM tena pratiniyatena rUpeNa bhavanaM tadbhAvaH teSAM dravyANAM svabhAvo vartamAnakAlatayAnubhUyamAnastadbhAvaH pariNAmaH pratipattavyaH / 7 ... tasyeti dravyaSaTkasyAbhisambandhaH, tadeva hi dharmAdidravyaM tena tenAkAreNa bhavati, gatisthityavagAharUpatvAt, anuvartate hi sarvatra gatyAdiSu dharmAdidravyaM svarUpamajahat dharmo hi ganturgatyupagrahAkAreNa pariNamate svarUpAparityAgena, sthityupagrahAkAreNa sthAturadharmaH, vyomA'pyavagADhuravagAhadA yitvenopajAyate, pudgalA: zarIrazabdAdirUpeNa, AtmA jJAnadarzanopayogavRttyA nArakAdibhAvena ca, kAlo'pi vartanAdiprapaJcena pariNamate / ...... ******

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Parinama in Tarka-period 137 Utpada or origination is the attainment of another state, due to internal and external causes by a sentient or a non-sentient substance, whithout abandoning its essential nature. As for example, the attainment of another state, viz. that of a jar, by clay, is the latter's Utpada.8 Vyava or decay is the abandonment of the previous state, as, for example, the abandonment of the form of pinda, on the origination of another form, viz. that of a jar.' On account of the beginningless Parinama-nature of reality, there is an clement in it which persists because it is neither produced, nor does it become extinct. This is the persistent or dhrauvya aspect of reality as, for instance, the persistence of clay, in its different states such as those of pinda, jar etc. Akalamka and Vidyananda have nothing more to add, by way of explanation of these terms. They discuss another question, namely, that of the identity or difference between Dravya on one hand, and utpada-vyaya-dhrauvya on the other, which will be considered at its proper place. Siddhasena, in the proper anekanta style, says that from the standpoint of substance (Dravyarthikanaya), utpada and vyaya are merely appearance and disappearance. In reality, nothing is produced or destroyed. This is in short the Kutasthanityata. But, he takes care to add that from the standpoint of modes (Paryayarthikanaya) utpada and vyaya are real. The question of the conflict between these two points of view is sought to be 8 cetanasyAcetanasya vA dravyasya svAM jAtimajahata ubhayanimittavazAbhAvAntarAvA ptirutpAdanamutpAdaH / mRtpiNDasya ghaTaparyAyavat / 9 pUrvabhAvavigamanaM vyayaH / yathA ghaTotpattau piNDAkRteH / 10 anAdipAriNAmikasvabhAvena vyayodayAbhAvAt dhra vapti sthirIbhavatIti dhra vaH / yathA mutpiNDaghaTAdyavasthAsu mRdAdyanvayaH / . .

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138 The Sariskhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinana solved by saying that the two standpoints are not independent but are controlled by each other.11 The above three sutras of the Tattvartha and their exposition given by the Svopajna-bhasya_and the different commentaries, attempt to analyse and bring out the nature of Parinama. The eternal nature of reality is to persist in such a way, that it continuously assumes new forms, giving up the old ones. In other words, the five or six Dravyas which constitute reality change in such a way that in every change, one can recognise the element of selfidentity.12 One question, however, arises from the above, as to whether 'nitya' is to be taken as suggesting that the Parinama nature of things consisting of utpada-vyaya-dhrauvya is nitya (eternal) or merely as referring to their permanent aspect (dhrauvya). The Svopajna--bliasya of the Tattvartha seems to take the former view, whereas the later commentators seem to incline towards the latter 11 '.....tatra dravyanayAbhiprAyeNAkArAntarAvirbhAvamAtramutpAda aupacArikaH, paramArthato na kiJcidutpadyate satatamavasthitadravyAMzamAtratvAt, tathA vyayaH tirobhAvalakSaNaH, pUrvAvasthAyAstirodhAnaM vinAzaH, yato dravyameva tathA tathA vivartamAnamutpAdavinAzavyavasthayA vyapadizyate ...... / ' '.....nanu ca dravyaparyAyanayau svatantratvAt dvAvapi vijigISu (pU)svavijayopamarda parasparaM na sahete, ...... / ucyate-paryAyanayasya tAvadutpAdavyayalakSaNasya svAtantryaM nAsti dravyAstikenAGkuzitatvAt / na hya tpAdo nAma kazcid dhrmo'stybhuutbhvnaatmkH......|' p. 383 (on Tsu. V. 29) 12 'The three clements, of origination, cessation and persistence, as con stituting a reality, are a natural deduction from the reality of change.. The Jain believes in the dynamic nature of reals and, in deference to the demands of reason and experience alike, he sums up the three clements as the component factors of the constitution of reality. One can avoid this triple charactristic only by the declaration of change as appearance which is the position of Vedanta'. Dr. Mookerji, Taim Philosophy of Non-absolutism'.

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Parinaina in Tarka-period 139 view. Nevertheless by adding ' faal' to 'nitya', they seem to make their explanation practically identical with that of the bhasya. Application of the doctrine of Parinama to Dharma, Adharma and Akasa. We have noticed, in the treatment of Kundakunda, the appli-- cation of Parinama to Jiva, Pudgala and Kala. The later writers attempt to apply the doctrine of Parinama, to Dharma, Adharma and Akasa that were so far left out. Let us see how this is done. It is objected that if the Dharmadi substances are devoid of kriya (kriya here signifies movement), then their utpada-origination will not be possible. For utpada of pot, etc. is always seen to be preceded by kriya or activity. In the absence of utpada, there will be no vyaya or decay. Consequently, the doctrine of the utpada-vyaya-dhrauvya holding good about all the substances - (Dravyas), will be contradicted. This is met by saying that it is possible in a different way. Despite the absence of utpada, due to kriya, in these Dharmadi substances, it is imagined or thought of in a different manner. Utpada is of two kinds, one due to one's own agency (of the thing itself) and the other due to extraneous agency. The varying degrees of increase and decrease in the 'agurulaghu' qualities (of these dravyas), which are infinite and which are accepted on the authority of the Agamas, represent their utpada and vyaya which are due to their own agency (svanimitta). The utpada and vinasa due to their being passive instruments in the motion, staticity and occupation respectively of horse, etc. are generally regarded (54afgua) as their 'parapratyaya' utpada and vinasa (i.e. due to extraneous agency). Owing to the distinctness, at every moment, of motion, staticity and occupation of horse, etc. there follows the distinctness of their cause also: (i. e. Dharmadi). 12 12 HORAS Tsu V. 6 .

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama Akalamka in his Raj. V., gives the above enplanation verbatim. Vidyananda in his S. VI. points out that though Dharma and Adharma, are devoid of Parispanda Kriya (of the nature of movement) owing to their pervasive character, yet they are possessed of Parinama kriya, (i.e. internal transformation of qualities). Otherwise, i.e. if this is not accepted, the concept of reality will be stultified.18 140 Siddhasena, in his comment on the Tsu. and its bhasya (V. 30) more elaborately explains the application of Parinama to Dharma, Adharma, and Akasa thus: The substance Dharma abides(i.e. is eternal) from the standpoint of its essential characteristics, viz., sattva (existence), amurtatva (incorporeality), asamkhyeyapradesavattva (possessing innumerable space-points), lokavyapitva (pervading the universe) etc., but is not eternal from the standpoint of its helping the motion of the movers like atoms, Devadatta etc. The function of helping the movement becomes distinct, because of the distinctness of the gantr (goer). Thus the subsequent Parinama becomes different from the previous one. The 'gatyupakaritvaparinama' that is first produced, does not last for ever, because it is produced by the association of things different from itself like pot etc. Similarly, Parinamitva' should be understood in the Adharma substance. The notion of 'anityatva' (non-eternality) therein, is to be understood, from the standpoint of its helping the staticity of things. Akasa, however, is eternal from the point of view of its essential characteristics, viz., sattva (existence), incorporeality (amurtatva), anantapradesavattva (possessing infinite space-points) etc., and non-eternal, from the standpoint of its giving room to things. Even where, there are no substances viz. Jiva and Pudgala, i.e. in the Alokakasa, 'anityata' should be necessarily understood through the modes (paryayas) of the qualities like 'agurulaghu' etc. These modes become different (every moment). Otherwise, (i.e. if this kind of 'anityatva' is not acce 13 dharmAdharmo parispandalakSaNayA kriyayA niSkriyo sakalajagadvayApitvAdAkAzavat / pariNAmalakSaNayA tu kriyayA sakriyAveva, anyathA vastutvavirodhAt / P. 398

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Parinama in Tarka-period pted) there will not be (in the Alokakasa) either independent utpada-vyaya (i.e. due to its inherent agency), or even dependent (or relative) utpada-vyaya (i.e. due to the agency of extraneous things). Consequently, the definition of Sat will become narrow (in so far as it will exclude Alokakasa from its pale). Thus, Siddhasena completes the application of Parinama, by extending it to Alokakasa too. It may be noted that in the SVM of Mallisena, the application of Parinama i.e. utpada-vyaya-dhrauvya, to Akasa is explained, in two ways, as follows : When souls and material objects, which occupy space, travel from one point of space, to another, they become separated from one portion of Akasa, and get united with another portion of Akasa. These separation and union, being contradictory dharmas, must belong to two different dharmins, according to the rule, (6377 f t Wegaf afgTAFETTA: Tutaxafa l i.e. those things must be regarded as distinct, which possess contradictory predicates, or spring from different causes. Akasa comes under the first part of the rule, and is thus shown to be two - one that is destroyed, and the other that is produced, the former being the one from which the previous samyoga is destroyed, and the latter being the one with which a new samyoga is produced; and yet, in another way, both the Akasas are one. Thus Akaga may be. shown to be both nitya and anitya. When 'ghata' is gone and 'pata' takes its place, 'ghatakasa' is replaced by 'patakasa'; thus one Akasa is destroyed and another is produced. It may be objected, that this is mere `upacara' j.e. Akasa is not really produced or destroyed, but by a transference of predicates, it is said to be produced or destroyed according to the production or destruction of ghata, pata, etc., which condition it. To this objection, it is replied : the transference of predicates takes place in an 'upacara' owing to something being

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama common to the primary and the secondary subject. Thus, 'upacara' does not take place without some connection of the predicate, with the primary object. For example, Akasa is primarily all-pervading, but, in accordance with the ghata, pata, etc, which reside in it, it has different supposed parts' with reference to which it may be said to possess a 'parimana which covers a particular space or spot, and the Akasa is thereby known as 'ghatakasa', change of that to 'patakasa' etc. This change of states means which the states belong. Thus, the production and destruction of ghata', 'pata' etc., and through them, of 'ghatakasa', 'patakasa' etc., amount to the production and destruction of Akasa itself. Thus Akasa is shown to be 'parinami-nitya' in another way. 14 142 From the above elucidation, it is clear that when the later Jain writers were confronted with objections regarding the application of parinama to Dharma, Adharma and Akaja, they had to answer them and explain the application, in order to maintain consistency with their fundamental dogma that parinama characterises every existent real. But these entities, being abstract in character, their parinamas cannot be explained in so smooth a manner, as those of Jiva and pudgala and hence have to be explained through those of Jiva and pudgala which exist in Space and move or remain steady by Dharma and Adharma respectively. The use of such expressions as 'kalpyate' and 'vyavahriyate ' in Pujyapada is evidence of the difficulty of smoothly explaining the parinamas of these three substances and of the far-fetched character of the explanation. 15 Further Application and Analysis of Paryaya-Parinama (1) Dravya-Paryaya and Guna-Paryaya The distinction between Dravya and Guna is important for us as giving a further elaboration of Parinama and Paryaya in 14 Prof. A. B. Dhruva, SVM. p. 15, 16 and Notes, p. 42, 43, 45 45 With reference to Dharma, Adharma and Akasa Dr. Jacobi remarks

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Parinama in Tarka-period 143 to Dravya paryaya and Guna-Paryaya. We saw that the older Agamas did not make this distinction but a late passage in the Uttaradhyayana-sutra, Umasvati and Kundakunda, have recognised Dravya and Guna as two distinct categories. The recognition of Guna as a distinct category over and above Dravya category led to the discussion as to whether this Guna should be considered as different from paryaya or identical with it. The distinction between Guna and Paryaya has not been unanimously accepted by later writers. I give below the views of those writers who accept it as well as of those who do not, in order to study their arguments and see if they reflect any development of philosophic thought. Siddhasena Divakara? 6 regards them to be non-different on the following grounds. In the Agamas only two view-points are mentioned, viz., Dravyastika and Paryayastika. They should have mentioned the third view-point viz., Gunastika if they really wanted to give guna, the status of an independent category. Secondly, Guna is identical with Paryaya and not something independent of Paryaya as the former is synonymous with the latter. Guna differentiates one (universal) into many individuals); Paryaya differentiates one (individual) into many (states). Of course, the shades of meaning of these two words are different. Yet, in the that 'the function of space, as we conceive it, is by the Jains, distributed among three different substances; this seems highly speculative, and rather hyperlogical' (Studies in Jainism. p. 18). Dr. Jacobi, further, compares Dharma and Adharma with Rajas and Tamas of the Samkhya. He says, 'Rajas is necessary for motion and immobility is caused by Tamas. Immobility or rest is, however, but one aspect of Tamas; another is 'iniquity' adharma. This character of Tamas, consisting in Adharma, proves the near relation between Samkhya Tamas and Jain Adharma and, explains at the same time, why the substratum of immobility has been named by the Jains, by the strange name Adharma'. (Studies in Jainism, p. 85). 16 This Siddhasena is different from Siddhasena, the commentator of the Tsu and its Bhasya

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144 The Sankhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama Agamas at all places the employment of the term Guna is avoided. Thirdly, the meaning of the word Guna used in the Agamas is not quality but number. For example, the term Guna in the phrase- 'eka-guna, "dasa-guna"- means number (of states or degree) and not quality. All this conclusively proves that Agamas do not accept Guna as an independent category over and above Paryaya."? Thus siddhasena, on the basis of the authority of the Agamas, establishes the position that Guna is not a distinct category apart from Paryaya but is identical with the latter. Pujyapada recognises Guna as different from Paryaya. The Gunas, according to him, are those that always accompany the Dravya while the Paryayas are those that do not accompany the Dravya (throughout its career of parinama). Thus, for example, knowledge etc., are the Gunas of Jiva which always accompany the latter. Similarly colour, etc., are of Pudgala. The specific transformations of these Gunas, such as the knowledge of ghata, pata etc., anger, pride etc., in the case of Jiva, strong and mild odour, dark and faint colour etc., in the case of Pudgala are the Paryayas of Jiva and Pudgala respectively.18 Akalamka in his Raj. V. maintains both the views viz., the non-distinction between Guna and Paryaya as well as the distinction between the two.19 The first view is similar to that of Siddhasena Divakara while the second to that of Pujyapada. Vidyananda, following Pujyapada, explains Guna and Paryaya thus. The Gunas co-exist in Dravya, while the Paryayas are different from them in so far as they take place in succession.30 . 17 Sanmati-Tarka II. 9-14. 18 Sarvarthasiddhi on Tsu V. 38. 19 p. 243--244 20 Slokavartika on V. 42 (p. 440)

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Parinama in Tarka-period 145 Siddhasena, the commentator of the Tsu. and its bhasya, clearly endorses the view of Akalamka. According to Siddhasena, from the empirical standpoint, Gunas are distinguished from Paryayas. The Gunas have simultaneous existence in a Dravya, whereas the Paryayas have not. In reality, however, the Paryayas themselves are the Gunas i. e. are identical with the Gunas?! Vadideva, in his Syadvada-ratnakara, accepts the distinction between Guna and Paryaya but defends it more cleverly by regarding Guna and Paryaya as two types of Visesas. Visesa or particular, he says, is of two kinds, Guna and Paryaya. Guna is a coexistent characteristic, as for instance, the potentiality of the manifestation of consciousness etc. in the Atman; and the Paryaya, on the other hand, occurs in succession one after another-as for example, happiness, unhappiness etc. in the Atman.22 : Haribhadra, in his SVS, seems to follow Siddhasena Divakara. by accepting only two categories, viz. Dravya and Paryaya. He assimilates the Gunas in the category of Dravya ? 8 Yasovijayji, in his commentary on the SVS, not only follows Siddhasena Divakara's view but also discusses it, in detail, giving the same arguments as were given by Divakara.54 The same view is put forward by Yasovijayaji in his Gujarati work, 'Dravya-Guna-Paryaya Rasa', wherein he siates that the view of some who uphold that Guna, as potentiality, is a distinct category and that it is the cause of Guna-paryaya just as Dravya is the cause of Dravya-paryaya is not correct 25 The above discussion gives us some idea as to how the Jain Acaryas extended the principle of Paryaya to Guna. Once when 21 Siddhasena's Commentary on V. 37 (p. 428) 22 Syadvadaratnakara, Ch. V., p. 735 23 SVS VII. 31 24 Commentary of Yasovijaya on SVS p. 261 25 'Dravya-Guna-Paryaya Rasa' II. p. 10. 10

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama they accepted the analysis of reality into Dravya and Guna, they must have felt the difficulty of showing the relation between Guna and Paryaya. This they solved by having two types of Paryayas viz., Dravya-paryaya and Guna-paryaya. But, while doing this, they defined Gunas as 'anvayinah' i, e. the persistent elements of a thing. After such a definition of Guna, it is difficult to see what would be left of Dravya, for a Parinamavadin. However, with the ever helpful Anekanta dialectic, the Jain Acaryas will justify it, by having recourse to 'bhedabheda'. It appears, however, that Siddhasena Divakara, Haribhadra and Yasovijaya are not only more consistent with the teaching of the Agamas, but philosophically more sensible also. 26 146 (2) Parinama and Parispanda The later works analyse Parinama into Parispandatmaka parinama and Aparispandatmaka parinama. The first being change due to movement in space and the second internal change of qualities in a thing. Sometimes these two are also viewed under the concept of kriya. This distinction, it must be noted, is not to be found in Jain philosophical literature before Pujyapada. Let us see how Pujyapada and the later Jain philosophers distinguish them. According to Pujyapada, the change in a thing, of the nature of origination of a new characteristic and disappearance of the old one, is to be called Aparispandatmaka-parinama. For example, anger etc. in Jiva, changes of colour etc. in Pudgala, the change 26 Jacobi, correctly, observes that 'the mention of Gunas seems to be a later innovation, due to the influence which the philosophy and terminology of Nyaya-Vaisesika, gradually, gained over the scientific thoughts of the Hindus. For, at the side of Paryaya, there seems to be no room for an independent category 'quality', since Paryaya is the state in which a thing, Dravya, is at any moment of its existence and this must therefore include qualities, as seems to be actually the view, embodied in the oldest text'. (SBE. Vol. XLV. pp xxxiv)

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Parinama in Tarka-period 147 in the 'agurulaghu' quality of Dharma, Adharma and Akasa-all these represent Aparispandatmaka-parinama. Kriya, however, is distinguished from this kind of Parinama and is called Parispandatmika though Parispanda is not defined. 87 Akalamka refutes the view that like 'sthiti' (staticity), kriya too gets included under Parinama. He points out that a substance (dravya) possesses two bhavas (states)-Parispandatmaka and Aparispandatmaka; to indicate the former, the term kriya is employed and to indicate the latter the term parinama is employed as Vidyananda points out that only that paryaya or parinama of a Dravya which is the cause of the attainment of another place is to be called Kriya and not all.To At another place he includes both Parispanda and Parinama under kriya.30 Siddhasena, the commentator of the Tsu. and its bhasya, at one place, states that the change in a substance (dravya) without abandoning its essential nature is parinama; and hence parinama does not include in its fold parispanda, i. e., kriya,31 while at another place he states that kriya is a particular kind of parinama.32 This suggests that he is not opposed to the view that includes kriya under the head of parinama. Thus, Pujyapada and Akalamka distinguish between Kriya and Parinama by defining the former as Parispandatmika (i. e. movement in space) and the latter as internal change of qualities 27 Sarvartha-siddhi on V. 22 28 RajV p. 227 29 OPEL FE agradariaeg: quft: fet, 7 fra SI. V. p. 357-398 30 qfE9rG274091 FFTTT...... qfUTASTATUTAT $201...1 Sl. V. p. 398, See also ASS p. 178 31 Fahrrafata ofertraCETATTURUFTECHTA: affitta..... commentary, p. 350 32 fafaragiar ga aiaf ar afa i Ibid, p. 353

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148 The Samkhya-Yoga and the fain Theories of Parining in a thing. Akalamka uses the word 'bhava' to include both kriya and Parinama. Vidyananda uses the word kriya in the same sense (i. e. Parispanda), but, while applying Parinama to Dharma and Adharma, he uses the word kriya, in a wider sense, to include both Parispanda and Parinama, 1. e. in the sense in which Akalamka uses the word 'bhava'. Siddhasena also follows the distinction made by Pujyapada and others in the passage quoted in fn. 31. However, what is to be noted is that Vidyananda calls kriya a Paryayavisesa of Dravya, and Siddhasena too calls it a Parinativisesa. This is likely to cause some confusion. For, if we follow the distinction between Parinama and kriya (gatikarma or Parispanda), it would not be quite proper to include either, Parinama and kriya or Parispanda, as two varieties of Kriya as Vidyananda and Siddhasena do or to cali kriya a paryaya. visesa as Vidyananda and Siddhasena do. If we confine the word Paryaya to denote a state due to Parinama, then it cannot be used to denote Kriya, which is distinct from parinama. But the Jain Acaryas seem to have allowed this looseness to remain on purpose because Parinama-Paryaya express the nature of realty as such. Hence every kind of change, either internal (of qualities of a thing) or due to movement in space, has to be regarded as a case of Parinama-Paryaya. Akalamka tries to avoid the difficulty, by using the word bhava to include both Parinama and Kriya but if he be asked to define 'bhava', he would have to include Parinama as a part of his definition. The narrower meaning that is sometimes given by the commentators is scientifically more useful in as much as it clearly distinguishes between the change which we call transformation or evolution, and the change due to movement in space, which may not affect the internal qualities of a thing. But philosophically, it delimits the principle of Pari. nama, which was supposed to characterise the whole of reality, and therefore, kriya also. So, the Jain Acaryas could not help being loose and indefinite in the usage of these terms.

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Parinania in Tarka-Period 149 (3) Prayoga-Parinama and Visrasa-Parinama The analysis of Parinama into Prayoga, Visrasa and Migra is, as we have seen, mentioned in the Bh. Su., with reference to Pudgala. The Tattvartha-bhasya refers to the same, as subdivisions of gati or kriya. But these are not explained either in the Bh , Su. or in the Tbh. There is, however, no uniformity in the treatment of this topic in later works. Sometimes these are mentioned in relation to Parinama, sometimes in relation to utpada-vinasa, and some times in relation to kriya or gati. What is more, while certain works mention further subdivisions of Prayoga and Visrasa, such as 'Samudayaksta', 'Aikatvika' etc. (which we shall presently see), others simply explain these, in a general way, without referring to the subdivisions. Lastly, it may be noted that Misra-Parinama is more often than not, omitted. All this will be clear from what follows. Siddhasena Divakara, in his Sanmati-tarka, mentions prayoga and visrasa in relation to utpada and vinasa and gives the subdivisions thereof. According to him, utpada (origination) and vinasa (destruction) are of two kinds-one brought about by sentient agency (prayoga) and the other natural (visrasa). Origination or destruction brought about by sentient agency is also called samudayavada or aparisuddha. And natural origination or destruction is also of two kinds-samudayakst and aikatvika. Aikatvika origination (one-sided) is seen in Akasa, Dharma and Adharma. It is due to external causes and is not seen invariably. Regarding samudayakrt destruction, it is said that it could be brought about in two ways, viz. by the separation of aggregates and by the transformation into another mode. 33 33 Sanmati-tarka, III, 32-34

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama The only extant commentary on Sanmati is by Abhayadeva (11th cent. A. D). It explains the meaning of the concerned Sanmati gathas in detail, the gist of which may be stated as follows: 150 "Both origination and destruction are of two kinds, viz.,. 'prayogajanita' i. e. brought about by human efforts and 'vaisrasika', i. e. natural. Now, both the artificial origination and destruction and natural origination and destruction are Samudayakrta i. e. aggregational. When the disjoined members unite to make up a thing, it is an instance of aggregational origination. It is also termed 'impure origination' (aparisuddha), as it does not depend on one particular substance (but more than one). Aggregational destruction (both artificial and natural) is of two kinds, one, arising from a disjunction or division of the compo nent parts of an aggregate and the other resulting from the transformation of a thing from one state to another. The example of the former is the destruction of cloth, on the disjunction of its component parts viz., the threads, while the transformation of clay into a pot is the second kind of destruction. Natural origination and destruction, has besides the above, one additional division, viz., Aikatvika, which is not found in the artificial utpada and vinasa. This Aikatvika Utpada and Vinaga are confined only to those single entities viz., Akasa, Dharma and Adharma which are indivisible wholes. Again, they are simply natural. For Akasa, Dharma and Adharma cannot give scope to effort as they are, unlike atom, devoid of the motion, though they undergo a modificatory change. The utpada and vinasa of these three, is or can be simply this that they disinterestedly become a receptacle and passive instruments in effecting motion or stability from the viewpoints of Time and Space for the atom or the Soul which has the dynamic power. But such utpada and vinasa, being dependent on others are 'aniyata' or 'irregular.' (or not invariable).34 34 dvibheda utpAda:- puruSetarakA rakavyApArajanyatayA adhyakSAnumAnAbhyAM tathA tasya

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Parinama in Tarka-Period 151 Siddhasena, the commentator of the Tsu. and its bhasya,36 and Yasovijayaji3G also discuss in detail the above subdivisions of Prayoga and Visrasa. The gist of their discussion is essentially the same, and so we do not repeat it here. Pujyapada, Akalamka and Vidyananda do not allude to the above mentioned divisions of Prayoga and Visrasa, but explain them in general. Pujyapada mentions Prayoga and Visrasa, as two kinds of Parispandatmika kriya. The movement of cart, etc. and that of clouds etc. are given as illustrations of the two kinds of kriya37 respectively. He does not explain Prayoga and Visrasa pratIteH / ...... tatra prayogeNa yo janita utpAdaH mUrtimadravyArabdhAvayavakRtatvAt sa samUdAyavAdaH, tathAbhUtA''rabdhasya samudAyAtmakatvAt / tata evAsAvaparizuddhaH, sAvayavAtmakasya tacchabdavAcyatvena abhipretatvAt // English translation by A. S. Gopani, f. 143-146 svAbhAvikazva dvividha utpAdaH - ekaH samudAyakRtaH prAkpratipAditAvayavArabdho ghaTAdivat / aparazcai katviko'nutpAditA'mUrtimadravyAvayavArabdha AkAzAdivat / AkAzAdInAM ca trayANAM dravyANAmavagAhakAdighaTAdiparadravyanimitto'vagAhanAdikriyotpAdo'niyamAd anekAntAd bhavet avagAhaka-ganta-sthAtR dravyasannidhAnato'mbara-dharmA-dharmeSvavagAhana-gati-sthitikriyotpattinimittabhAvotpattirityamiprAyaH / vigamasyApi epa dvirUpo bhedaH - svAbhAvika: prayogajanitazceti...... / tatra samudAyajanite yo vinAzaH sa ubhayagAmi dvividhA - ekasamudayavibhAgamAtraprakAro vinAzaH yathA paTAdeH kAryasya tatkAraNapRthakkaraNe tantuvibhAgamAtram, dvitiyaprakArastvarthAntarabhASagamanaM vinAza: yathA matpiNDasya ghaTAntarabhAvanotpAdo vinAzaH / .. Sanmati, Vol. V. p. 641, 643 35_p. 383, 384; 385 36 Syadavadakalpalata a Commentary on SVS. VII 7 by Yasovijaya, p. 219, 220, 221. cf. also 'Dravya-Guna-Paryaya Rasa', p. 97, 98, 99 37. 'kriyA prispdvaatmikaa| sAdvividhA prAyogikavaisasikabhedAt / tatra prAyogikI zakaTAdInAM vainasikI meghAdInAm / Ssi on Tsu V 22

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama as such. But Akalamka explains them as such in the following manner. 152 The modification, of the nature of Prayoga and Visrasa, of a Dravya without giving up its essential nature, is Parinama. The "aupasamikadi states' (i. e. those states in which passions are being subdued) of the soul, being dependent upon the suppression of Karmas and not upon the efforts of a sentient agent, represent the natural Parinama of the soul, while the states (bhava) of knowledge (jnana), conduct (sila), and thought-activity (bhavana), being dependent upon the efforts of Acaryas etc, constitute the Prayogaja or artificial Parinamas of the soul. In the case of nonsentient substances, like clay etc., the Parinama of the form of 'ghata' etc. being the result of the efforts of sentient agents like potter, etc. is the artificial one, while that of rainbow etc., is the natural Parinama. Similarly, the Parinama of Dharma etc. should be understood, a s Thus, Akalamka understands Prayoga and Visrasa as two types of Parinama and applies them particularly to Jiva and Pudgala. Vidyananda applies Prayoga-Visrasa to Dharma, Adharma and Akasa, besides Jiva and Pudgala. The natural Parinama of Dharma and others, he states, is the state of their possessing innumerable space-points, of their being the cause etc. of particular movements of things, while their being the cause etc. of movement of machines, etc. is their 38 dravyasya svajAtyaparityAgena prayoga visrasA lakSaNo vikAraH pariNAmaH / tatra cetanasya dravyasya aupazamika / dirbhAvaH karmopazamAdyapekSo'pauruSeyatvAt vaitrasika ityucyate / jJAnazIlabhAvanAdilakSaNaH AcAryAdipuruSaprayoga nimittatvAt prayogajaH / acetanasya ca mRdAdeH ghaTasaMsthAnAdipariNAmaH kulAlAdipuruSaprayoga nimittatvAt prayogajaH / iMdradhanurAdinAnApariNAmo vaisasikaH / dharmAMderapi pariNAmo yojyaH / Raj, V. p. 22 tathA

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Parinama in Tarka-Period 153 artificial Parinama because it depends upon human effort. 50 Siddhasena, the commentator of the Tsu and its bhasya, while commenting on the Tsu. V. 22 gives Prayoga, Visrasa and Misra as the varieties of 'gati' or 'kriya. 4 0 It must be noted that he does not refer to those varietes viz., Samudayaksta, Aikatvika etc., which he discusses in his tika on the Tsu. V. 29. From the above, it can be seen that while Siddhasena Diva. kara, Abhayadeva, and Siddhasena the commentator of the Tsu. and its bhasya, apply the two types of Parinama, Prayoga and Visrasa, chiefly to changes of Pudgala, Dharma, Adharma, and Akasa i. e. to Ajiva substances only, Akalamka and Vidyananda .extend them to Jiva also. The above analysis of Parinama into Prayoga and Visrasa is an attempt to explain two types of causation, one natural and the other invloving human agency. This obviates, for the Jain, the necessity of postulating a Creator, because he is able to explain all the happenings in the universe by these two types of Parinamas. (4) Artha-Paryaya and Vyanjana-Paryaya The distinction or analysis of Paryaya into Artha--Paryaya and Vyanjana-Paryaya is to be found for the first time in the Sanmati-Tarka of Siddhasena Divakara. 39 dharmAstikAyAdidravyasya tu vaisasiko'saMkhyeyapradezitvAdiranAdiH pariNAmaH pratiniyatagatyupagrahahetutvAdiH / AdimAn prayogajo yaMtrAdigatyupagrahahetutvAdiH gauitara I SI. V. on V. 22 .40 tatra prayogagati: jIvapariNAmasaMprayukttA zarIrAhAravarNagandharasasparzasaMsthA naviSayA, visrasAgatiH prayogamantareNa kevalAjIvadravyasvapariNAmarUpA, paraHIU VIgaFT: fagifi fafiqade I ...... | P. 353

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154 The Sainkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parigrama' Siddhasena Divakara uses the term vyanjana-Paryaya to signify a series of changes which has such similarlity as to allow it to be called by one name, and the term Artha-Paryaya, to indicate those minute or subtle divisions in the change-series, which are or appear to be further indivisible and which, therefore, cannot be given any name. 41 . This distinction is referred to at various places in the works of the Tarka-period like those of Akalamka, Vidyananda, Yaso. vijaya etc, and is explained in a similar manner.s? Yasovijayaji, it may be noted, gives in detall various subdivisions of Artha-- Paryaya and Vyanjana-Paryaya such as 'Dravya-vyanjana-paryaya' "Guna-vyanjana-paryaya', Dravya-arthah-paryaya', 'Guna-arthaparyaya', Vibhava-dravya-vyanjana-paryaya', 'Svabhava-dravyavyanjana-paryaya', 43 etc. which are generally not to be seen in other works. It is noteworthy that a late work (15th cent. A. D.) ,Panca. dhyayi, by Rajamalla alludes to Artha-Paryaya and VyanjanaParyaya in an altogether different sense. According to him, GunaParyaya is Artha-paryaya and Dravya-Paryaya is Vyanjana-Pary. aya; what is more, Dravya-Paryaya is, specifically, taken to mean minute spatial parts of indivisible wholes, like Dharma, Adh 41 Sanmati-tarka, I. 31, 32, 34 42 dRzyAH sthUlA vyaJjanaparyAyA: adRzyAH sUkSmAH kevalAgamagamyA arthaparyAyAH / sthalo vyaJjana paryAyo vAggagamyo nazvaraH sthira: / sUkSmaH pratikSaNadhvaMsI paryAyasaria : 1 ASS on ka. 11 Tippana p. 112 Cf also SI. V. pp. 129-130 dharmAdharmanabhaHkAlA arthaparyAyagocarAH / vyaJjanena tu saMbaddhau dvAvanyau jIvagaurant i Bataafa of Devasena st. 2. sthUlAH kAlAntarasthAyinaH zabdAnAM saMketaviSayAH vyaJjanaparyAyA iti / / fra aftasta: 1 munata p. 64 43 'Dravya-Guna-Paryaya Rasa', p. 149, 151 Naya-pradipa, p. 47

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Parinama in Tarka-Period 155 arma,as etc. which can only be imagined, and which are, therefore, not real but subjective. 4 5 This sense of Dravya-Paryaya reminds us, of such Paryayas of Dharma, Adharma and Akasa, as desa, pradesa, which we noticed in the Agama section. Anyway, it is clear that Pancadhyayi does not follow Siddhasena Divakara and others, in the interpretation of the terms Artha-Paryaya and Vyanjana-Paryaya. It is also not clear as to whom the words, 'Kecit Budhah.' (I 63) refer. For, in no other work, do we find this kind of meaning given to Artha-Paryaya and VyanjanaParyaya. Defence of Parinama So far we have considered the elucidation of Parinama and its progressive application to the Dravyas from various points of view. Now we have to consider the various arguments advanced by the later dialectical writers, in defence of Parinamavada. This is done by showing the logical impossibility in the realm of metophysics as well as ethics of holding absolute changelessness of reality, (Kutastha-nityata), or absolute change-fulness without any persistent element (Ksanikavada). In this section, as the arguments of the different Svetambara: and Digambara writers on this topic show a substantial unifor. 44 guNaparyAyANAmiha kecinnAmAntaraM vadanti budhAH / artho guNa iti vA syAdekArthAdarthaparyayA iti ca / / api coddiSTAnAmiha dezAMzairdravyaparyayANAM hi / vyaJjanaparyAyA iti kecinnAmAntaraM vadanti budhAH // I, 62763. 45 aMzavibhAgaH syAdityakhaNDadeze mahatyapi dravye / .. viSkambhasya kramato vyomnIvAyaliktistihastAdiH // prathamo dvitIya ityAdyasaMkhyadezAstato'pyanantAzca / aMzA niraMzarUpAstAvanto dravyaparyayAkhyAste // 1. 24-25

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156 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama mity, I have drawn upon those authors whose exposition is detailed and clear. Other references are quoted in foot-notes. (1) Defence of Parinama on Metaphysical grounds The metaphysical problems concern the operation of causality (karyakaranabhava), arthakriyakaritva, recognition (pratyabhijna), and memory. The Jain writers mainly show that all these three would not be possible if their Parinamavada is not accepted. (a) Karyakaranabhava : If a thing is regarded as unchanging in an absolute sense, there would be no causation, as causation is possible in time and is therefore possible in that which is temporal. An unchanging eternal has no temporal character and so cannot be a cause. On the other hand, if a thing is supposed to be momentary, in an absolute sense, the question arises, as to whether the two momentary reals that are supposed to cause one the other are simultaneous or successive. If the former, one of them cannot produce the other, any more than the left horn can produce the right horn. If the latter, there can be no causal relation between them, in as much as one (i. e. the cause) has already passed away when the other (i. e. effect) springs into existence. And if the latter can come into existence even in the absence of the cause at the moment of its origin, there is no reason why it should not come into being at the other moments (even before the production of the effeet) when the cause is absent likewise, 6 The Jain, however, maintains that causation can easily fit in with his view of reality, as it fulfils the necessary condition of 46 AMi 37, 43; DhS 237-244; AYD 16, SVM on AYD 16 It must be noted that many more arguments on the basis of dialectical reasoning are set forth in the works noted above, to show the impossibility of causation on the assumption of absolute non-change or absolute changefulness, but we have noticed only the important ones. I have followed the same method in the following discussion also.

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Parinama in Tarka-Period 157 causation viz. change through persistence (the cause being both permanent and fluxional). (b) Arthakriyakaritva The most important criterion of Sat or reality is given as 'arthakriyakaritva', i. e. the the quality of serving a purpose. The theories of kutastha-nityata and ksanikatva are criticised from this point of view. The impossibility of arthakriyakaritva,' in an unchanging eternal is shown by the following dilemma : Does the thing that is supposed to be unchangingly eternal exercise arthakriya step by step or all at once ? It cannot do so step by step for that invo. Ives the loss of nityatva - the thing having already changed i. e. ceased to be nitya, the moment the first step has been taken. If the thing continues to be the same even after the first step is taken, there will be no cessation of the activity suited to the first step, and thus there will be no possibility of a second step ever being taken. If, on the other hand, the thing is supposed to change by the first step, it loses its nityatva by so doing. For, to be no longer in the former state, means to be anitya. If it be said by way of defence that the thing remains the same all along the steps but awaits the arrival of an auxiliary - sahakarin - cause in going from step to step and thus the changes are rung out, not on the original thing which retains its sameness and therefore nityatva, but only on the series of sahakarins, that does not really obviate the difficulty but only pushes it a little further on. Thus if the thing remains the same in spite of the arrival of the sahakarin, it means the latter has exercised no influence upon the original cause, and if for influencing, another sabakarin is needed, then the fallacy of regressus infinitum (anavastha dosa) will occur. The other alternative of 'yaugapadya' too is impossible. No. thing can put forth activity in all directions, and accomblish its effects all at once, in a single moment of time. Supposing it can, -

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama all its work will be finished in the first instant of time, leaving the thing without kriya and, therefore, different from what it was before, which amounts to a confession that the thing is anitya. #58 In the same way, if all things be momentary, the cause and effect will fall on two different moments of time, and so, at the moment when one is, the other is not. Now how can that which is, act upon that which is not? And if a thing cannot act, it cannot be, for to be is to act or accomplish. Thus the things, can never be momentary in the absolute sense. This is, further, shown by the following dilemma: Is the momentary thing sat, while it acts, or is it asat? Not the former. For, in that case, it would be operating upon its contemporaneous effect which is impossible; for if that were possible, all things being contemporaneous with one another, would be causes of one another, which is absurd. The latter alternative also will not do, for how can a thing, that is asat, possess causal power any more than the hare's horn? And no third alternative is possible. Therefore the original hypothesis of momentariness breaks down17 For the Jain, however, there is no difficulty as the things, under syadvada hypothesis, can act, while they possess the threefold charactieristic of abandonment of previous form, acceptance of a new form, and retention of its own identity. (c) Pratyabhijna Smarana In an absolutely unchanging thing, there being no antecedence and sequence, recognition of the sameness in change, is not possible; similarly recollection is impossible, on the assumption of momentariness of things. For, knowledge, that is, experience has passed away and there is nothing to connect it with the knowledge that is memory. If the author of experience and that of memory were not required to be identical, A would experience a 47 SVM on 26

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Parinama in Tarka-Period 159 thing and B would remember it. In other words, any man would remember any thing, irrespective of the need of previous experience. And if recollection is impossible, recognition becomes impossible too, as it involves recollection in addition to experi ence. 4 $ (2) Defence of Parinama on ethical grounds All the darasanas, excepting Carvaka, believe in liberation as the final goal of life and consequently the possibility of achieving it through human behaviour. Now, the Jains try to prove that on the assuption of either absolute non-change or absolute change, all human behaviour becomes meaningless. If Atman be regarded as absolutely nitya, the experience of happiness and unhappiness, which is a felt fact, will be rendered impossible. For, to be nitya means to be unchangeable and there cannot be experience of happiness and unhappiness one after another unless Atman could pass from one state to another. It will be possessed of either happiness or unhappiness for all time, if it be absolutely nitya. If it be urged that the Atman does not change, only its states change, it is asked, 'do the states remain separate from the Atman or are they one with the Atman?' In the former case, how could they be associated with Atman ? In the latter case, they are as good as not, and the difficulty of accounting for change, consistently with the absolute nityatva of Atman, remains the same. Furthermore, punya and papa too are impossible on the hypothesis of absolute nityatva. For, the experience of happiness and unhappiness are brought about by punya and papa, which means that they should exercise a certain activity and this is impossible, if Atman is unchangingly eternal. Next, bondage and liberation will be similarly inexplicable on the hypothesis of exclusive nityatva. Bondage is a kind of sam 48 SVM on 18 (P. 125)

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160 The Sankhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama yoga between Atman and karma, and samyoga is 4379197771 afat: i.e. obtaining what has not been obtained already. Thus, there are two distinct states involved in the notion of samyoga, the previous absence and the later presence-which are inconsistent with the hypothesis of absolute nityatva. Moreover, it will be asked, "How does a changeless and uniformly enduring Atman suddenly happen to incur bondage ? Again, was it not free before the chains of bondage came to be put on it ? Then, does the bondage make any change in the Atman or not? If it does, it is anitya, like any other mortal thing such as a piece of hide. If it does not, so as to keep it nirvikara, the presence or absence of the bondage matter nothing to it who remains as unaffected as Akasa by change.*9 The opposite absolute view of anityatva of Atman is shown to be untenable thus. If the Atman is so absolutely anitya, as to undergo change every moment, the law of Retribution which requires personal identity of the doer and the enjoyer, would not hold good, i.e. the doer of the act will be one while the enjoyer of the fruits thereof will be quite a different person. Similarly such Atman cannot be the author of punya and papa. For, the single instant is the length of time just sufficient for it to come into exisience and there is nothing to spare for doing of punya and papa. If it be urged by way of defence that the Atman of the first moment produced the Atman of the next moment, and so on, so that there is a continuity, not the identity, of being, this defence will be of no avail. The law of homogeneity of cause and effect would require that a happy Atman should beget only a happy Atman, and so the vicissitudes of happiness and unhappiness in the Atman would become impossible 50 49 SVM pp. 155-156 50 SVM. by Prof A. B. Dhruva, Notes, pp. 272, 273, 274 Cf. Similar arguments in DhS 194, 195 etc.. 218, 220-222, 228-231 etc. Sanmati-tarka I. 17-20 Ami 40-41 and AS and ASS on them. SVS. III. 32, 33, 35, 36. IV. 7-10

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Parinama in Tarka-period 161 The bondoge and liberation will have no meaning also, as they cannot be predicated of one and the same Atman. If the Buddhist were to explain all the aforementioned problems by substituting samtana for Atman, i.e. continuity for identity and thus making not the identical Atman, but the continuous stream of consciousness, which we call Atman, both the doer and the enjoyer, - karma being transmitted from one life to another in the shape of karma-vasanas i.e. as impressions left on the Atman by karmas on the analogy of a colour which transmits itself from one piece of cloth to another - the Jain declares this explanation to be without substance and cogency; according to him, samtana and vasana have no reality. This is shown by this dilemma : Is the samtana the same as the samtanin or different? In the former case, the position remains the same (as in the view of momentariness). In the latter case, a question may be put whether the distinction of the samtana and the samtanin is real or unreal. If it is unreal, the position remains status in quo ante. If it is real, it may be asked whether the samtana which is supposed to be really distinct from the samtanin, is itself momentary or otherwise (i.e. nitya). If the former, all the fallacies, shown in the doctrine of momentariness, stand as they are. If the latter, the samtana will be only another word for a permanent Atman, and this would be contradicting the assumption of momentariness. The unreality of vasana is thus shown. The two, viz., vasana and the stream of different moments (Ksanasamtati) cannot fit in with each other as identical interese. For if they be identical, they are either vasana or ksanasamtati; one must be merged in the other. If there is vasana alone and no vasya on which vasana is to operate, the vasana would be no vasana. If, on the other hand, ksanasamtati be regarded as the sole reality, the old difficulties stand as before. If the two, vasana and samtati, are different, 11

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. 162 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama then the question is, whether the vasana is momentary or otherwise. If the former, there is no reason for its recognition. The only reason for its recognition is to supply the principle if permanence, which is lacking in the ksanasamtati. If, it is nitya, it violates the doctrine of universal momentariness. The third alternative of anubhayapaksa too is impossible. There must be either bheda or abheda between vasana and ksanasamtati; because bheda and abheda are mutually exclusive, and if one is not, the other must be there. Besides if the relation is neither bheda nor abheda, it means it is unreal. According to all those who do not endorse the anekantavada of the Jains, a thing must be either bhinna or abhinna, a third alternative is not possible. It is, therefore, concluded by the Jain that the opponent must endorse the Jain doctrine of both bheda and abheda." Thus the aforementioned metaphysical and ethical problems, as also uncontradicted verdict of experience necessitate, maintains the Jain, the recognition of the doctrine of Parinama, which represents the synthesis of the two extremes of absolute nityatva and absolute anityatva. It is the doctrine of identity-in-change, of unity-in-difference. After having justified the doctrine of Parinama on metaphysical and ethical grounds, the Jain sets himself to the task of answering the arguments advanced against the doctrine of Parinama. 13) Jainas answer the objections raised by others It has been contended, by the opponent, that there is inconsistency in the doctrine of Parinama, as it involves the attribution of opposite properties of 'permanence' and 'change to one and the same entity For, utpada is the birth or origination of some SI SVM P. 126-128

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Parinama in Tarka-Period 163 thing, that did not exist before, and vinasa is the opposite of it i.e. the abhava or destruction of that which existed. 'Dhrauvya', on the other hand, is devoid of both these traits viz. utapada and vinasa. How can these be in an entity at a time."2 The objection is answered by the Jain by an appeal to experience, as also by having recourse to the anekanta dialectic thus: The experience favours the view that things are multiform in character, and so, the only doctrine which tallies with experience and, therefore, with truth is that things are neither exclusively nitya, nor anitya, but are, in reality, both. It is also averred that the statement of utpada, vyaya, and dhrauvya is made from two different standpoints viz., the Paryaya standpoint and the Dravya standpoint respectively. It, thus, refers to the two aspects of reality, the Dravya referring to the dhrauvya aspect, and Paryaya to the utpada-vyaya aspect; so, there remains no scope for the alleged inconsistency which would be justifiable, if the two opposite properties were predicated, in one and the same breath, of one and the same aspect. 53 Another objection concerns the relation of the triad of utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya, to the thing (reality) of which they are predicated. This objection is stated and answered by Vidyananda in this ASS.55 As this portion of ASS has been very lucidly explained by Dr. S.Mookerjee in his Jain philosophy of non-Absolutism" (p. 74-76) we quote his words below. 52 atrApyabhidadhatyanye viruddhaM hi mithastrayam / gaaanal Haeci meafa angfag 11 utpAdo'bhUtabhavanaM vinAzastadviparyayaH / dhrauvyaM cobhayazUnyaM yadekadaikatra tatkatham ? // 53 SVS VII 10-14; RajV on V. 30 (p. 239) 54 cf. Raj V. on TSu V. 29. P. 239. Sl. V. p. 434. SVM, p. 133-136. 55 ASS p. 112-113 (on Ami 11.)

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164 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama 'If persistence, cessation and birth were, each of them, identical with substance of which they are predicated, then being identical with the same substance, all of them would be identical with one another. Thus, persistence would be the same thing as cessation and birth, cessation would be identical with persistence and birth, and birth would be identical with cessation and persistence. So the triple character is reduced to an identical single mode. And if, each of these modes were regarded as numerically different from the substance and also from one another, and if each of them were believed to be real, then again each of these modes would have triple character. An infinite vicious series would be inevitable, as each of the triple modes, would have another triple character and so on to infinity, unless the triple mode were severally and jointly asserted to be unreal characterization. Either a single mode, in the place of the triple character, or an infinite series, or its unreaiity, is to be asserted. But, the Jain answers the critic, by asserting the non-absolutistic position. So far as persistence etc are regarded as identical with the substance, it is. legitimate that persistence and cessation and birth should be regarded as identical. And if attention is concentrated on the aspect of difference of those modes, from the substance, and from one another, then each of them would have a triple character. There is no reason for the infinite series, as difference is not absolute. The modes are identical with the substance only so far as the substance is focussed in the modes. The modes are not absolutely different from substance, as, in that case, the modes would not belong to the substance. The mode is a mode of the substance, because the identity of substance is focussed in it and, is not annulled. So a mode is identical with substance in that respect. To take an example, clay is transformed into a jar, and so the former is regarded as the cause of the latter. The jar is different from clay, no doubt, but the jar could not be a jar unless it were the same substance as clay. So difference and identity, both being inseparable moments in the relation, a mode as identical with the substance may have the same predicates with the substance, and as different from the substance may each of them

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Parinama in Tarka-Period 165 behave as an independent reality and such may have the triple characteristic. The reduction of the triple character to a unitary character is also a matter of point of view. The mode and the substance may be viewed as identical and also as different, as they are both in one. Thus the consequences, alleged to be inevitable by the opponent, are not inevitable, as they are based upon exclusive identity and exclusive difference. But the identity is not exclusive of difference and vice versa as both are the attested traits of reality. A mode and a substance are different because they are two, and they are identical because one is not independent of the other. If identity is to be asserted on the evidence of experience, difference also should equally be asserted on the strength of the same evidence. The compartmental way of looking at things leads to the affirmation of one and to the nega. tion of the other, since it concentrates on one and ignores the other. The besetting sin of philosophers has been the habit to put the telescope upon the blind eye and then to deduce that the other aspect is not real. The Jain philosopher voices the necessity of using both the eyes and of seeing the obverse of the coin of reality Recapitulation Agamas frequently refer to Paryaya and Parinama. As in the Samkhya-karika, here also the terms are not clearly defined and probably for the same reason viz. that the terms were too wellknown to require explanation. The elements of Parinama are, however, clearly mentioned, viz. Dravya - the permanent or abiding element, Parinama - the process of transformation, and Paryaya, the state of Dravya. Only these are not put together to form a definition, The term Paryaya, however, has a wider connotation signi'fying both a state due to Parinama or any other aspect due to division in space such as desa and pradera of Dharma, Adharma and Akasa.

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166 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama: This consideration as well as the greater frequency of the term Paryaya leads one to believe that Paryayavada must have been. the original doctrine of the Jains, particularly so when we bear: in mind that the term Paryaya does not occur in the sense in other darganas. On the other hand, the concept of Parinama was. a common property and so must have been used by the Jain thinkers to explain their doctrine of Paryaya. The Tattvartha-Sutra shows a more philosophical develop- ! ment, reflecting the influence of other darsanas. In the fashion of the Vaisesikas, Dravya is defined as consisting of Guna (quality). in addition to the orthodox Paryaya (mode). The word sat is used to denote reality and is defined as consisting of origination, decay and permanence. This pature of reality is called Parinama in: 'agyta: qfCOTA: 1? This approach leads to the application of Utpada, Vyaya and Dhrauvya to anything about which existence can be predicated. Amongst the Jains, Kundakunda may be called the philosopher of Parinama, par excellence. He describes reality - Satta as. HTTGFIT, 571, 3.ragafar, startufat etc.' and in that way puts together all the elements of reality which were teft loose by Umasvati. The nature of reality is clearly stated to be Parinama which becomes analytically defined as utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya. Again, by showing invariable concomitance between utapada, vyaya and dhrauvya, he clarifies the concept of Parinama as a unitarily related process. This unitary character is also brought out by pointing to two types of bhedas Has - viz. Psthaktva i.e. distinction due to separate space-points and Anyatva. i.e. distinction based upon subjective analysis - and stating that Dravya, Guna and Paryaya are not 'prthak' but only 'anya'. He compares and shows the relation between the two triplets of utpada-vyaya-dhrauvya on one side, and Dravya-Guna-Paryaya on the other, by declaring , that utpada and vyaya belong to Paryaya while Dravya is what, is dhruva or permanent in a thing.

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Parinama in Tarka -Period .167 Kundakunda has applied the theory of Parinama to his metaphysics of Jiva, Pudgala, and Kala. His remarkable contribution, however, lies in his philosophy of the Parinama of Jiva. The introduction of category of Guna, in addition to Dravya and Paryaya, as constituting reality made the later Jain writers assume two types of Paryayas viz. Dravya-Paryayas and GunaParyayas. The later works of the Tarka-period attempt to apply the doctrine of Parinama further to Dharma, Adharma and Akasa, and in that way make it a universal principle. In this attempt, however, they have not shown the Parinamas of these Dravyas as such but through the Parinamas of Jiva and Pudgala. This difficulty is due to the peculiar view of the nature of Dharma, Adharma and Akasa which are all-prevading and indivisible wholes.' The application of Parinama to Dharma, Adharma and Akasa compelled the Jain thinkers to relate properly the concepts of Kriya and Parinama. Sometimes they would take kriya as a wider concept and understand, movement of a thing in space (Parispanda) and material change in time as two types of kriya. Sometimes they would bring these two, viz. Parispanda and Parinama under Parinama, calling the former a Paryaya-visesa (qufafago) and thus understand Parinama as a wider concept. From a different point of view, they would analyse Parinama into two types, viz. Prayoga and Visrasa, the first brought about by sentient agency and the second by natural transformation (i.e. without the aid of any sentient agency). The experience of the fact of human personality which is a Paryaya and yet abides from birth to death, made the Jain thinkers classify Paryayas into Vyanjana-Paryaya and Artha- .. Paryaya. As long as we can roughly indicate a Paryaya by one:

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168 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama word, so long it appears as having a sort of abiding quality. This type of Paryaya is Vyanjana-Paryaya. The actual transformation which goes on continuously every moment is the Artha-Paryaya which is not cognisable to ordinary intelligence and therefore not capable of being named. The theory of Parinama is explained in greater detail, in the commentaries on the relevant sutras of the Tattvartha. What we have to note is that the word 'agira' in the definition of nitya (amatoud facea' 1) which was explained objectively in the Tattvartha-bhasya as 'Tra' comes to be explained by Pujyapada, Akalamka and Vidyananda as formaat on the basis of our experience which vouches for the knowledge of recognition of the identity in a thing. In the same way, Vidyananda adds that utpada and vyaya refer to that which is the cause of the knowledge of difference, - 'This is different from that, i.e. the previous one'. Siddhasena, the commentator of the Tbh., explains utpada and vyaya in terms of manifestation (stfaufa) and non-manifestation (faratha) like the author of Yuktidipika and Vacaspati. Lastly, the Jain thinkers of this period, defend the doctrine of Parinama on various grounds and try to answer the objections of the rival schools of thought. This is done by showing how the principle of causality, the facts of memory and recognition and dogmas of kartstva, bhoktatva, sukhaduhkhanubhava, bandha, moksa etc. - which are the accepted postulates of almost all the darsanas - will not hold good on the assumption of absolute permanence or absolute change without anything abiding. All these postulates, avers the Jain, can be properly explained only on the acceptance of the doctrine of Parinama, i.e. utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya. To conclude, the Jain analysed reality, first into Dravya and Paryaya and then into Dravya, Guna and Paryaya. The relation between Diavya and Paryaya (i.e. the state of Dravya) is explained

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Parinama in Tarka-period 169 by the process of Parinama. Here too, Parinama has the same meaning as given by Yaska. The Jain assumes five or six ultimate entities - Dravyas. All these have their Paryayas through Parinama. Thus, in Jain philosophy, Parinama is a universal principle, applying to the whole of reality.

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CHAPTER X SAMKHYA-YOGA AND JAIN-A COMPARISON Philosophical Both the Samkhya-Yoga and Jain seem to have followed Yaska's definition of Viparinama in their doctrine of Parinama,. i.e. they have viewed the world-process as change in an abiding. entity or entities (vipariNamate ityapracyavamAnasya tattvAdvikAram 1 ) Umasvati analyses the Parinama nature of reality into utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya. Vyasa defines Parinama as f pUrvadharmanivRttau dharmAntarotpattiH / These two views are, in substance, identical.1 Vyasa has analysed Parinama into Dharma-Parinama, LaksanaParinama and Avastha-Parinama. The Jaina has not analysed Purinama in this way. Nevertheless, these become expressed in his Dravya-Paryaya and Guna-Paryaya. Every Dravya-Parinama (such as a pot in the case of Pudgala and manhood in manuSyatva the case of Jiva) and Guna-Paryaya (such as darkness or yellow-ness in Pudgala and Jnana-paryaya in Jiva) of the Jain represent Dharma-Parinama or change of aspect. When the same is viewed from the standpoint of its time-variations of past, present and future, it is Laksana-Parinama. The oldness and newness or *tivrata-mandata' (ia- in the case of Jiva) which a Dravya 1 Cf Yuktidipika: jahaddharmAntaraM pUrvamupAdatte yadA'parat / tattvAdapracyuto dharmI pariNAmaH saH 3 on Ska. 16 and Sloka Varttika : pUrvasvabhAvaparityAgAjahadvRttotpAdo dravyasyottarAkAraHpariNAmaH sa eva paryAyaH /

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Surkhya-Yoga and Jain-A Comparison 171 Paryaya or a Guna-Paryaya suffers as a result of time-process is its Avastha--Parinama. This Avastha-Parinama, it must be noted, is possible only in the Vyanjana-Paryaya of the Jain which abides. for a certain length of time. There cannot be such AvasthaParinama in the Artha-Paryaya as the latter is momentary. Both the Samkhya and the Jain understand: Parinama as a: wide concept including the material change in time (Aparispanda-- tamaka-parinama)as well as physical movement in space technically called Parispanda. Both of them, sometimes, bring these two kinds of changes under two types of Kriya, viz. afrontarfar ffar and qfefqetfHAT ft. In the Jain view, the Parispanda is possible only in Jiva and Pudgala, as each Java and Pudgala i.e. atom is limited and therefore capable of movement. In Dharma, Adharma and Akasa which are indivisible wholes and pervade this loka ( i.e. the universe), there is evidently no scope for Parispanda. In the Samkhya, Parispanda has to be negated in Prakrti which is one: homogeneous whole and all - pervading. It becomes possible in. the different products of Praksti, from Buddhi onwards, which are limited compared to their cause, the Praksti. There is, however, one difficulty in understanding Parispanda. in the Samkhya, viz. that it has to be visualised without Akasa.. : Vijnanabhiksu felt this difficulty and hence he clarified that Prakrti subsumes Akasa. But this interpretation, as already seen, is not vouchsafed by the older Samkhya texts which derive Akasa from the Sabda-Tan-matra, So we must understand Parispanda in Samkhya before the production of Akaga as something which is possible without Space. For the Jain, however, there is not such difficulty as Akasa is accepted as an underived entity, The Samkhya and Jain show certain affinity in regard to the concept of Kala. The Samkhya does not recognise Kala as an independent entity. It is only an aspect of Prakrti, i.e. identical with the parinamas of Praksti. A moment is identified with the

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172 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama unit of change of the Gunas. In the Jain system, there are two divergent views on Kala since the Agama period. One regards it as an independent entity, a sixth Dravya while the other identifies it with the changes of Jiva and Ajiva. The second view is similar to that of the Samkhya. Next, the Samkhya-Yoga view of the regulation of Parinama 'from the point of view of deza (place), kAla (time), AkAra (form) and fafa (extraneous cause) finds a certain parallel in the Jain view according to which the Parinama of every object is conditioned by dravya (substance), kSetra (place), kAla (time) and bhAva ( the essential characterstics which constitute a thing). This is illustrated by means of an illustration of a pot, in the Raj. V., thus ghaTo dravyataH pArthivatvena utpadyate na jalatvena / dezata ihatyatvena na pATaliputrakatvena / kAlato vartamAnakAlatayA nAtItAnAgatAbhyAm / bhAvato mahattvena nAlpatvena (or bhAvato raktatvAdinA ) / pp. 180-182 'From the standpoint of substance, a pot is produced from the earth and not from the water. From the standpoint of place, it is produced here (i.e. at the particular place where it is produced) and not elsewhere, in Pataliputra etc. From the standpoint of time, it is produced in the present (and not in the past or future). From the standpoint of bhava, it comes to have the qualities of mahat-parimana and not the alpa-parimana (or it comes to have the qualities of redness etc.)' We have already explained the Samkhya-Yoga view in this respect and so, here, we do not give it again. The causal theory of the Samkhya is the Satkaryavada which is deducible from the doctrine of Parinama. It means that the effect pre-exists in the cause and is only manifested by causal operation. There is no new creation or production of the effect as such. The Jain, even though,accepting the doctrine of Parinama, calls his causal theory Sadasatkaryavada, i.e. the effect is both pre-existent and pre-non-existent. It is existent in so far as it

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173 Samkhaya-Yoga and Jain-A Comparison potentially pre-exists in the cause and non-existent in so far as its actual manifestation is a novel emergence. Thus the Jain too in the way of the Samkhya regards effect as manifestation of the abiding entity but the phrase Satkaryavada being suggestive of 'Ekantism', the Jain as an 'Anekantist' brings in Asat along with Sat. He also seems to be influenced by the Vaisesika logic which emphasises the newness of the effect, though he would not regard manifestation as new creation in the Vaisesika sense. For the Samkhya too, it must be noted, the manifestation is (abhivyakti) non-existent (3) and is brought about by the operation of the Karakas but he does not use the term Asat, Vidyananda in his Astasahasri draws attention to this by stating that the Jain view is really meant by the Samkhya even though he does not profess it and that the Samkhya cannot maintain his Satkaryavada in an absolute sense without stultifying his whole scheme of metaphysics. 2 The differences in the application of the theory of Parinamas between the Samkhya and the Jain are due to their differences of view regarding the nature, number and derivation of the original entities. The Samkhya analyses reality in two ways. One, on the ... 2 tadAvirbhAvasya kAdAcitkatvAdapekSitapara vyApAratvaM, na tu ghaTAderiti cet koyamAvirbhAvo nAma ? prAganupalabdhasya vyaJjakavyApArAdupalambha iti cet tarhi prAgasan kAraNa : kriyate na punarghaTAdiriti svarucivacanamAtram / atha tasyApi prAktirohitasya sata eva kAraNairAvirbhAvAntaramiSyate tarhi tasyApyanyattasyApyanyadAvirbhAvAntaramityanavasthAnAnna kadAcid ghaTAderAvirbhAvaH syAt / athAvirbhAva -- syopalambharUpasya tadrUpAvirbhAvAntarAnapekSatvAt prakAzasya prakAzAntarAnapekSatvavannAnavastheti cet tarhi tasya kAraNAdAtmalAbhobhyupagantavyaH, tataH kAryamAvirbhAva iti / tadvaddhAdikamapi, apekSitaparavyApAratvAvizeSAdAtmalAbhe / na hyalabdhAtmalAbhasyopalambhaH zakyaH katu, sarvathAtiprasaGgAt / tadevaM pradhAnapariNAmatayApISTaM ghaTAdikaM kArya dravyamApAdyate / tasya ca prAgabhAvApahnave'nAditvaprasaGgAtkAravyApArAnarthakyaM syAditi sUktaM dUSaNam / prAktirobhAvasyopagame vA sa eva prAgabhAva: siddha:, tasya tirobhAva iti nAmAntarakaraNe doSAbhAvAdutpAdasyAvirbhAva iti nAmAntarakaraNavat / ASS. p. 104

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174 The Samkhya--Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama principle of 'Sentience' (ar) and Non-sentience (73) and the second way is to view. reality as Parinami and Aparinami or Kutastha. He identifies the sentient with the Kutastha and all change physical and mental is relegated to the Non-sentient i.e. the Prakrti. The Jain dualism accepts the first principle of division only, viz. Sentience (Jiva) and Non--sentience (Ajiva) and rejects the second. This is the fundamental difference between the Samkhya and the Jain. The latter regards the soul also as undergoing Parinama. For him, all reality - Sat has the characteristic of utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya and so both the Jiva and Ajiva must possess this characteristic. Next, the Samkhya regards the transforming Prakrti as responsible for all changing phenomena. To make his cosmology systematic, he first derives in a fixed order the twenty-three tattvas from Praksti and then regards all phenomena as the result of the qualitative and the quantitative combination and separation of the twenty-three tattvas. The primary derivation is, in Samkhya phraseology, called Tattvantara-Parinama; while the subsequent parinama is called Dharma-Laksana-Avastha Parinama. For the Jain it was not necessary to have Tattvantara-Parinama because he starts with the five or six Tattvantaras as fundamental and underived entities. The Jain is really a pluralist because in addition to the category of Jivas, he assumes four underived Ajiva catego. ries viz. Pudgala, Dharma, Adharma and Akasa. He explains all psychic phenomena as resulting from the parinamas of Jivas, all material phenomena, from the parinamas of Pudgala, consisting of infinite atoms, while Dharma, Adharma and Akasa make possible the movement ( gati ), static ty (sthiti) and occupation (avagAha) respectively of Jiva and Pudgala. As just said, the essential difference between the Sankhya and the Jain lies in the fact that the principle of Parinama is not applied to Purusus by the Samkhya while the Jain would apply it to both Jivas and Ajivas. From this difference ensue various differences of view between the Sankhya and the Jaia.

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Sam't haya-Yoga and Jain-A Comparison The denial of Parinama in the Purusas has made it highly difficult for the Samkhya to relate them to the changing Prakrti and has prevented them to play any substantial role in the world -phenomena. In fact, Prakrti, having the inherent power to change, could very well function in the absence of such Purusas whose existence, however, makes the natural movement of Prakrti teleological. This is difficult to grasp because we are accustomed to associate purposive activity, with sentient beings. 175 . Another consequence of this assumption is that jnana, bhoga, bandha, moksa etc. which appear as of Purusa become really so many transformations of Prakrti. Purusa is never bound and therefore has never to be free. He merely witnesses all the transformations of Prakrti. Thus, in Samkhya, truly speaking, bandha and moksa are the transformations of Prakyti. The above difficulties do not confront the Jain. The application of Parinama to Jivas enables him to smoothly relate the two, viz., Jiva and Pudgala, and explain their mutual influence and inter-action. The Jain theory of Parinama which in the case of Jiva takes the form of bhava-karma and in the case of Pudgala, dravya-karma, makes it possible to attribute jnana, bhoga, bandha, moksa etc. to Jivas directly. Thus the infinite variety of phenomena and their significance to Jives as objects of knowledge, enjoyment and as objects from which Jivas have to be free are consistently explained by the Jain theory of Parinama. The only difficulty that the Jain will have to face is that, if by definition, Jiva and Pudgala are fundamentally different from each other, how the transformations (parinamas) of the one can ever be related to those of the other. In the case of the Samkhya there is no such difficulty because the Purusas and Prakrti are always distinct from each other and never come in real contact. The bhoga and moksa in the Purusa are always aupacarika (i. e. only a way of speaking). The Samkhya is thus metaphysically in a stronger position while the Jain's position is empirically more comprehensible.

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176 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama Historical ... Many divergent views are held by scholars on the question of the nature of pre-Isvarakrsna Samkhya. According to Garbe, the Samkhya was thought out by one seer as a complete and well-knit system, such as we have in Isvarakrsna's Karika, in non-Brahmanic circles, in pre-Buddhist period. This original Samkhya came to be perverted in the Upanisads and the epic, the Gita, and later still in the theistic Yoga and the several sectarian Puranas; but, in spite of such deliberate attempts outside, the doctrine in its own school was maintained singularly unalloyed, all through its long career extending over more than a dozen centuries. Jacobi* assigns the origin of the Samkhya to 800 B. C. approximately and before 500 B. C. it became fixed up in a systematised form which agreed with the classical form in being dualistic and atheistic but differed from the classical in other details such as the following :- (1) The 'pre-classical Samkhya, as differing from the later system which has only a metaphyical interest, had a didactic and practical purpose, being addressed to the masses rather than to trained dialecticians. (2) Its original dogma of Satkaryavada or the continual reality of the products sub specie aetenitatis was more allied to the contemporary Jain doctrine of the indesructibility but qualitative indefiniteness of matter, rather than to the Vedantic 'satkaranavada', with which it later came to be identified. (3) It did not fully develope the doctrine of the three-fold pramanas right from the very start. (4) The similarity between the Samkhya and the Jain view as regards the nature of matter the size of the individual souls. belief in Karm an and 3 4. Die Samkhya Philosophie' first edition, 1894, second edition 1917. (As Prof. Belvalkar has noted in History of Indian Philo sophy, Vol. II. p. 414). cf. His two reviews of the two editions of Garbe's book in 'Gottingensche Gelehrte Anzeigen', 1895, pp. 202-211 and 1919, pp. 1-30. cf, also ZDMG, Vol. I ii, pp. 1-15, other smaller papers contributed to 'Kuhn Festschrift, Lichtdes Ostens,' etc. (Prof. Belvalkar, p. 416).

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Samkhya-Yoga and Jain-A Comparison transmigration, the doctrine of Ahimsa etc. suggests an origin of both these systems, by degrees, from out of a common cultural and philosophical heritage. (5) The pre-classical Samkhya, so far from making a tirade against the Srutis, endeavoured to interpret them to support its own views, as seems clear from the data in the Brahma-sutras. 177 Oldenberg's view differs from those of Garbe ond Jacobi.". He sees the beginnings of the Samkhya in the Katha and especially the Svetasvatara Upanisads. His pre-classical Samkhya is a triune-unity as set forth in the first chapter of the Svetasvatara. Lastly, seeing that the Samkhya of the Katha and the Sve. Upanisads affords a close similarity to the Samkhya of the Gita and the Epic generally, Oldenberg is not ready to regard the 'Epic Samkhya' as belonging yet to the formative, pre-classical stage, because the Epic invariably speaks of the Samkhya as well as the Yoga as two systems of long standing (). He would go so far as to regard the Epic form of the system as one self-consistent line of development taken by the 'original' Samkhya, just as its classical form with its pronounced dualism and its negation of the Absolute may very well have been another independent line of development. Dr. Belvalker, after criticising these endorses in the end the view of Oldenberg. different views, Dr. Keith' also seems to incline more to the views of Oldenberg. According to him the classical Samkhya is a natural 6 7 5 cf. his 'Die Lehre der Upanishaden and die Anfange des Buddhismus.* 1915. Also 'Zur Geschichte der Samkhya-philosophic' in NGGW, 1917, pp. 218-253. (Belvalkar, p. 418).. History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 426, Samkhya System, p. 52-53. 12

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama growth from the philosophy of the Upanisads which show traces of the Samkhya doctrine. 178 At the outset I may say that owing to lack of sufficent evidence, one cannot come to a definite conclusion on any one of the above views. I shall, however, try to put forth my hypothesis which, though not agreeing entirely with any of the views stated above, finds support piece-meal in them. The Samkhya that is known to the darsanic tradition of India is the Samkhya of Isvarakrsna. It is dualistic, 'parinamistic' and atheistic in its philosophical outlook. The Indian darganic tradition takes no notice of those Samkhya ideas of the Upanisads and the Mahabharata which differ from the Samkhya of Isvarakrsna. 8 Let us consider first the evidence supplied by the Karikas of Isvarakrsna, According to Ka. 69, 70, 71, 72, the tradition which Isvarakrsna has followed and the works which he has summarised are as follows. This abstruse knowledge for the fulfilment of the purpose of the Spirit, wherein the origin, duration and dissolution of beings are considered, has been expounded by the Great Sage (Paramarsi). The Sage imparted this supreme purifying doctrine to Asuri, who taught it to Pancasikha who elaborated the doctrine. Handed down through a long tradition of pupils, it has been briefly written up in Arya metre by Isvarakrsna. The subjects that are treated of in the 'Saptati' are those of the complete 'Satitantra' excluding illustrative tales and omitting the doctrines of other schools.. 8 Sarvadarsanasamgraha of Madhavacarya and Saddarianasamucaya of Haribhadra. 9 pUruSArthajJAnamidaM guhyaM paramarSiNA samAkhyAtam / feregenfersmenfazzard 44 garang 11

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Samkhya-Yogu and Jain-A Comparison 179 From this one may reasonably conclude that the tradition and the works referred to by Isvaraksina must have held the views which are reflected in the Karikas. We have no reason to doubt this tradition which would carry the Samkhya of Iivarakrsna to carlier centuries. Whatever else we may say, we cannot deny that there was an earlier Samkhya school which held the views embodied in the Karikas. Isvarakrsna docs not mention the name of the Scer of his system, whom llc refers to merely by the word 'Paramarsi'. This *Paramarsi' is identified with Kapila by the commentators. 1deg This Kapila, as already said, may be regarded as historical and placed in the century preceding Buddha." Sa etatpavitramaNyaM munirAsuraye'nukampayA pradadau / Asurirapi paJcazikhAya tena ca bahudhA kRtaM tantram / / ziSyAraMparayA''gatamIzvarakRSNena caitadAryAbhiH / saMkSiptamAyaMmatinA samyagvijJAya siddhAntam // saptatyAM kila ye'rthAste'rthAH kRtsnasya SaSTitantrasya / AkhyAyikAvirahitAH paravAdavivajitAzcApi // 10 It may be noted that Sarkaracarya distinguishes the Kapila of Sanikhya from the Kapila mentioned in the Sve. Up. 11 'There seems to be no reason to doubt that Kapila was a real (human) philosopher, and not a more shadow of a divinity'. Hopkins, The Great Epic of India, p. 98. As regards the antiquity and authority of the Samkhya thought, cf. p. 50-51 "Besides the tradition recorded in the Buddhacarita that the Buddha had his schooling under Alara Kalama lends additional support to the theory of its pre-Buddhist origin. The anitquity of Sankhya philosophy is further attested by the fact that the fundamental doctrines of Sainkhya School have been elaborately criticised in the NyayaSutra and the Brahma-Sutra,... lu Asvaghosa's Buddhacarita also, similar Sankhya doctrines have been expounded. In the AhirbudhnyaSamhita also we find a representation of Samkhya doctrines with necessary adaptations and variatinos.' The Saro khya-Yoga' by Dr.

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189 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama Another important point to be noted is that Isvarakssna puts on a par the Srauta (anusravika) remedy with that of the empirical (drotavat) so far as the achievement of the final goal is concerned. This attitude towards the Sruti could not have been an innovation on the part of Tavaraklsna. We must regard it as the attitude of the original Samkhya thinkers. This would go to show that the early Samkhya tradition was not completely bound down to srauta tradition and was independent enough to differ from the Srauta tradition, at least from its karma-mimamsa." If this were the only evidence, the question would have been easy to settle, but we find the Samkhya ideas referred to in the Upanigads and the Mahabharata. The Mbh. mentions three types of Samkhya, two of which derive Prakrti from Brahman, Visnu or Narayana. These are decidedly theistic in their outlook. One of the schools of twenty five categories, agrees with KapilSakhya. This complication has given rise to the controversies noted Mookerji, a chapter in History of philosophy, Eastern and Western, p. 243. 12 Again in Mbh. XII. 268. 6-10 "Kapila appears as a teacher of unor thodox non-injury and maintains to the end (so that his view is presented as really correct) that not the Sacrifice of animals but the "Sacrifice (worship) of knowledge" is the best. Great Epic of India, Hopkins, p. 99, Also cf. Gita II. 42, 43, 44 wherein the Jaana-less ritualists are condemned by the Samkhya-Yoga. yAmimAM puSpitAM vAcaM pravadantyavipazcitaH / vedavAdaratA: pArtha nAnyadastIti vAdinaH // 42 // kAmAtmAnaH svargaparA janmakarmaphalapradAm / kriyAvizeSabahulAM bhogaizvaryagati prati // 43 // With reference to the Samkhya and Yoga in the Mbh S. K. De says that 'the Yoga was perhaps more orthodox, but the Samkhya is the philosophy of knowledge par excellence which did not adhere strictly to traditional views'.' History of philosophy, Eastern and Western, (p. 87).

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Samkhya-Yoga and Jain-A Comparison above, about the original Sakhya being theistic or atheistic, monistic or dualistic, 181 Under the circumstances, the only proper way seems to be to rely upon the tradition of Isvarakrsna for the history of his darsana and explain the occurrence of Samkhya ideas in the Upanisads and the Mbh. on that basis. It is possible to do so in the following way. Even though all the darsanas claim to be complete systems, yet each one of them is known to the Indian tradition for its particular contribution. Thus, Purvamimamsa's contribution lies in its rules of interpretation and the doctrine of Karma, while Vedanta is known for its Adhyatma-vidya. One goes to the Vaigesika darsana for the theory of atomism and the theory of causation involving agency of God. Nyaya darsana's main object is to teach the means of valid knowledge. The Yoga-school teaches ethical psychology. Viewed thus, the Samkhya darsana is more or less synonymous with its doctrine of the Gunas, and its doctrine of Utpatti, Sthiti and Laya of the world i.e. its cosmology. These ideas of the Samkhya school appealed most to the thinkers of India and so whenever cosmological ideas are alluded to in the Upanisads, the Mbh., the Smrtis and the Puranas, they bear the impress of this Samkhya thought. They are sometimes specifically called Samkhya and sometimes merely incorporated as common property. As noted above the Upanisadic monism explained the world-phenomena in two ways; the one adopted by Yajnavalkya which regarded the world-phenomena as chimerical and the other which regarded them as real and explained it in such Upanisads as the Sve. by having recourse to Samkhya ideas expressed in such words as Aja, Maya, Prakrti, Pradhana etc. However, the Upanisadic thought being monistic, this Pradhana, Prakrti, etc,, would be looked upon as the creative aspect of the first principle. Thus, the Upanisadic thought which is developed

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182 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinnama in the Mahabharata, remained true to its original inspiration of monism and to support its (i.e. Upanisadic) cosmology adapted the cosmological ideas of Samkhya, with which the latter must have been identified amongst thinkers. We would not, therefore, agree with the opinion of those who regard the Samkhya in the Upanisads, the Mbh., the Smrtis and Puranas as mere perversion of the classical Samkhya or with the opinion of those who regard the Kapila Samkhya as derived from the Upanisad-Mbh. view. We would rather regard these Samkhya ideas as adaptations of the classical Samkhya. The Samkhya proper remained true to its position of dualism, 'Parinamism' and atheism15 just as the Vedanta remained true to its Upanisadic monism. Whether Kapila-Samkhya had some affiliation with any of the numerous early Vedic schools or whether it was like the Sramana sects, a school of non-vedic Parivrajakas, we cannot definitely say, though Isvarakrsna's contemptuous reference to 'anusravika' in the Ska. and other such references in the Mbh. and the Gita (noted above) leave room for the possibility that in the beginning, it might have been non-Vedic. As we have seen, these two schools (viz. Samkhya and Jaina) have many points of agreement between them such as (i) the dualism of sentience (cetana) and non-sentience (jada); (ii) the infinite number of purusas; (iii) the explanation of world-phenomena through Parinama and achievement of salvation through 13 Garbe and Jacobi. 14 Keith. 15 The fact that the Mbh. mentions a school of Samkhya agreeing with that of Isvarakrspa and the express statement of the Mbh. that the Samkhya unlike the Yoga, does not believe in a supreme personal God, point out that the dualistic and atheistic Samkhya had its existence then. The statement in the Mbh. of the Cenial of Isvara by the Samkhya (Mbh. XII. 300) seems to indicate that it might have been atheistic from the beginning.

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Sarkhya-Yoga and Jain-A Comparison 183 discriminative knowledge (viveka-jnana, bheda-jnana). Their outlook of life that it is nothing but suffering in the last analysis, is also common. The fundamental difference, however, lies in the concept of the nature of Purusa and Jiva. The Samkhya purusas are, as seen above, kutastha-nitya i e, not undergoing any change, whercas the Jivas, in Jain philosophy, undergo Parinama. From these similarities and differences, we cannot say whether one was derived from the other. Historically, if we place the rise of Samkhya in 800 B.C, as some scholars To do, we have also to take into consideration the historicity of Parsva (800 B,C.) which is now generally accepted. Thus the question of derivation of one from the other must remain unsolved till some pew evidence comes forth. However, one consideration may be put forward. Jainism might represent the more primitive outlook, which regarded the Jivas also as changing like other material things. The Samkhya view of relegating all change to one entity, viz. Prakrti and regarding the Purvsas as absolutely unchanging is philosophically more advanced and, therefore, might have been a later view. However that may be, it appears that earlicr than Yaska, there must have been a school of Parinamists, whose concept has been explained in the Nirukia. This school of Parinama-thinkers might have been the original inspirers both of the Proto-Samkhya and Proto-Jain thinkers-Jaina thinkers who were in the habit of looking at things as the Paryayas of some original entities, especially of one and the same Jiva becoming manusya, tiryanca. Daraka etc. The attempt to find out whether these Proto-Samkhya and Proto-Jain Parinama-thinkers were sramanas or Vedic Brahmanas is again bound to be futile for the simple reason that there is no evidence whatsoever to decide this issue. 15 Jacobi, Studies in Jainism, p. 80.

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APPENDIX AGURULAGHU The term 'agurulaghu' is technical in Jain philosophy. It seems to have been used in more senses than one.1 Firstly, it is used in the karma-sastra in two ways--one, one of the varieties of Nama-karma (a) which itself is one of the kinds of eight basic Karmas viz. Jnanavaraniya etc. and the other, as an attribute of the soul, obscured by the Gotrakarma. On account of the 'agurulaghu-karma' the soul comes to possess a body which is neither too heavy nor to light to do anything, i.e. a normal body, capable of carrying on the requisite functions in life. Next, the attribute agurulaghu' is regarded as one of the eight attributes of the soul viz., jnana, darsana, caritra, etc. which are supposed to be obscured or veiled by the respective karmas viz., Jnanavaraniya etc. This particular attribute is said to be obscured by the gotra-karma as a result of which the soul comes to be looked upon as high (T) or low () as regards its birth, family etc. In reality, however, all the souls are alike, neither high nor low. When the gotra-karma is annihilated, this attribute "agurulaghu' of the soul manifests itself." Thus, the 'agurulaghu' here indicates the inherent similarity of all the souls." 1 cf. Tsu. VIII. 12. Gujarati edition by Pt. Sukhalalji. p. 335. 2 The eight attributes, on the annihilation of the eight kinds of karmas, fully manifest themselves in a soul. These are then called the eight attributes of a siddha. 3 Cf. Tattvartha Sutra - Gujarati Edition, p. 400. It may be noted that the term 'agurulaghu' is also used in a purely spiritual sense with reference to Jiva. That soul who is engrossed in sinful activities, viz. violence, falsehood, stealing etc., is called 'guru-karma', while

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Agurulaghu 185 The third usage pertains to our ordinary notion of heavy weight and light weight. That which is heavy and has a tendency to go down is 'guru', e.g. stone etc. Laghu is light, like smoke etc. whose nature is to go up. Vayu is called 'gurulaghu', as it tends to move across. That which is neither light nor heavy is 'agurulaghu' as for instance, Akasa. Thus, "agurulaghu', here, signifies the negation of the different degree of lightness and heaviness of weight. From this point of view, all the arupi incorporeal Dravyas viz., Java, Dharma, Adharma and Akasa are called 'agurulaghu'. In the rupi Pudgala, atoms and those subtle molecular aggregates (skandhas) which possess four kinds of touch are called agurulaghu, and the rest of the rupi substances, viz., the gross molecular aggregates, possessed of the eight kinds of touch, etc. are 'gurulaghu'. Thus, the molecular aggregates which constitute the Audarika, Vaikriya, Aharaka and Taijasa bodies are called 'gurulaghu', while those which form the Karmana body, mind and speech are "agurulaghu'. Now, of the three usages given above, the first twe, as can be seen, refer specially to Jiva and karma. Though the term itself is negative (3T+TETET) its import is positive in these two cases. The third meaning of the term, as applied to all the fundamental Dravyas, seems to indicate the negative character of the attribute. The question, now, is, whether the 'agurulaghu-paryayas or parinamas', which are frequently referred to in the Jaina philosophical literature, are to be understood as the Paryayas of this attribute (as applied to all the ultimate Dravyas). The negative character of the attribute, however, makes it difficult to understand them (the paryayas) that way. So, what could be the meaning of 'agurulaghu', as an attribute - undergoing Parinama - of all the the one who refrains from them and leads a pious life is called 'laghu-karma'. The liberated soul is beyond these two. Thus, 'gurulaghu' and 'agurulagbu', here signify the different degrees of spirituality. cf. Bh. Su. 1. 9. 73. 4 cf. Bh. Su. 1. 9. 74. and its commentary by Abhayadeva.

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186 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama fundamental Dravyas? We are here primarily concerned with this 'agurulaghu'. Pandit Sukhalalji and Baraiya have attempted to explain it as follows: Each Dravya is Parinami in Jaina philosophy. In fact, Parinama is regarded as the very nature of reality. It is quite likely, therefore, that each Dravya, being possessed of the inherent power to change, may in the absence of a controlling factor, transgress its limit of Parinama and change in such a way as to give up its essential nature svabhAva, jAti altogether and become a totally different Dravya. Hence, in order to avoid this contingency, this attribute agurulaghu seems to have been recognised, as controlling and regulating the Parinama of each Dravya and thereby keeping it within its specific limits." The above explanation was formulated, as Sukhalalji says, without any textual authority in support of it. However, I have been able to discover its corroboration, in Amrtacandra's commentary on the Paficastikaya (st. 84-Nirnaya Sagar edition and 91 in the Eng, edition) of Kundakunda. It is as follows: af agurulaghubhirguNairagurulaghutvAbhidhAnasya svarUpapratiSThatva nibaMdhanasya svabhAvasyAvibhAgaparicchedaiH pratisamayasaMbhavat SaTsthAnapatitavRddhihAnibhiranaMteH sadA prinnttvaat......|' Thus, 'agurulaghu' is that element in the five or six ultimate Dravyas, which keeps them in their own nature in spite of continuous transformation. To put it in modern terms, it is what constitutes the 'thatness' of an ultimate entity. cf. Tsu. Gujarati Edition, p. 401, 402. 5

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BIBLIOGRAPHY SANSKRT-PRAKRT Abhidhanaa Rajendra Kosa (Praket) Akalavkagranthatrayam-edited by Pt. Mahendrakumar Sastri, Singhi Jain Granthamala, 12. Alapapaddhati of Devasena, (in Nayacakradisangraha-Manika candra Granthamala, 16, Bombay.) Anuyogadvara surra, Nirnaya Sagar Press, 1924. Anya-Yoga-Vyavaccheda-Dvatrimsika of Hemacandra (with Malli sona's Syadavadamanjari) Apta-mimarisa of Samantabhadra, (with Asta sats of Akalamka and Astasabasri of Vidyananda) Nirnaya Sagar Press. Astadhyayi of Panini. Atharvaveda-Satavalekar's edition. The Bhagavati Surra in Three Parts, with the commentary of Abbayadeva, Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1921 Bhojavriti, a commentary on the Yoga-sutras. Bahadaranyaka Up., Chandog, a Up., Isa ,Kena, Katha, etc. Anan dasrma Sanskrt Series, Poona. Brahma-Sutras with the Bhasya of Samkara and Ramanuja Caraka Samhita, Nirnaya Sagar Press, 1935, Dharmasangrahani of Haribhadra, (in two parts) with the comm entary of Malayagiri, Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1916. Dravya Guna-Paryaya Rasa of Yagovijaya, Gujarati, published in Gurjara Sahitya Samgraha, Part II, 1938. Jayamangala, a commentary on the Ska, Calcutta Oriental series, No. 19.

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188 The Sankhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama Jiyabhigama Karma Grantha in four parts, (Kasi, 1922) with Hindi translation and notes by Pandit Sukhalalji. Kasika, a commentary on Panini's Astadhayi, by Vamanajayaditya. The Mahabharata, Citrasala Press, Poona, 1932. The Manu Smrti Mahabhasya of Patanjali, Keilhorn Matharavrtti on the Samkhya-Karika, Chowkhamba Sanskrt Series, No. 296. Naya Pradipa of Yasovijayaji, Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay. Nagesavrtti on Yoga Sutras, edited by Javanatha Misra, Banaras, 1908 Nirukta, edited by Rajwade, with introduction and notes in English. Niyamasara of Kundakunda (Jain Grantha Ratnakar Karyalaya, Bombay). Nyayadarsana of Gautama, Chowkhamba Sanskrt Series, Kasi. Nyayakumudacandra, of Prabhacandra part I & II, edited by Pt. Mahendrakumar, Bombay Nyayayatara Varttikavrtti of santisuri, with Introduction and notes in Hindi, edited by Pt. Dalsukha Malvaniya, Singhi Jain -Series, 20. Pancadhyayi of Rajamalla, edited by Phulcandra Siddhantasastri. Pancastikaya with Amrtacandra's Commentary, Paramasruta Prab Lavaka Mandala, Bombay. Parisistaparvan, edited by Jacobi. Prajnapana (Pannavana), with Gujarati translation by Bhagavandas Pandit. Pravacanasara of Kundakunda, with Amotacandra's Commentary, Nirnaya Sagar Press. English translation, notes and Introduction by A. N. Upadhye, M. A.

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Bibliography 189 Rgveda Samhita with the commentary of Sayana (Vedic Research Institute, Poona, 1946.) $addarsanasamuccaya of Haribhadra, in Haribhadragranthasamgraha, Jain Grantha Prakasaka Sabha Samavapanga Sutra Samayasara, of Kundakunda (translated into English by J. L. Jaini in the Sacred Books of the Jains, Vol. VIII). Sankhya Darsana Ka Itihasa (Hindi), by Udayavira Sastri, Delhi, 1950. The Sankhya-Karika Of Isvarakrana, with Gaudapada's bhasya, edited with Englisb Introduction, Notes, etc by Dr. Haradatta Sharma (Poona) Samkhyasara of Vijnanabhiksu Samkhya Sutras with the Pravancanabhasya of Vijnanabhiksu, The Chowkhamba Sansket Series, 1928. Samkhya Sutras with Aniruddha's Commentary edited by Richard Garbe. Sankhya-Tattva-Kaumudi of Vacaspati, translated by Ganganath Jha, Poona. 1934. Samkhyatattvavivecana of Simananda and Sarnkhyayatharthyadipana of Bhavaganega, (published in Samkhya Samgraha Chowkha. mba Sanskst Series, No. 246.) Sanmati Tarka Prakarana of Siddhasena Divakara with Abhaya deva's commentary (Gujrata Puratattva Mandira, Ahamedabad). Sanmati Tarka with introduction, translation and explanation in Gujarati by Pt. Sukhalalji (Gujarat Vidyapitha, Ahmedabad, 1952. second edition.) English Translation of the same by A. S. Gopani. Sangayogadarsana-Patanjala Darsana Including the Vyasabhasya, the Tattvavaisaradi of Vacaspati and the Yoga-Varttika of Vijnanabhiksu, Chowkhamba Sanskst Series, 1934. Sarvadarsanasangraha of Madhavacarya, Sansket College, Calcutta.

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190 The Sanskhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama Saervarthasiddhi of Pujyapada, a commentary on the Tattvartha sutra. Siddhahemacandranusasana-Brhadirtti Ahmedabad. Sthananga-Sutra, Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1918. Syadvadamanjari of Millisena-with English introduction and notes, by Prof. A. B. Dhruva (Bombay Sanskrt and Prakst Series, LXXXiji) Syddvadaratnakara of Vadideva, (Motilal Ladhaji) Satapatha Brahmana, Weber's edition. Sastravartasamuccaya of Haribhadra, Devacanda Lalbhai, Grantha 16. Sramana Bhagavan Mahayira by Muni Kalyanavijayaji. Taittiriya Brahmana, Anandasrama Sanskrt Series. Tattvarthabhasyavrtti by Siddhasena, (Part I & II) No. 67, 76. edited by Hiralal, M. A. (Devacanda Lalbhai Jain Pustako ddhara Fund, 1926). Tattvartha Rajavuritika of Akalamka. Sanatina Jain Granthamala, 4, Kasi. Tattvarthaslokavaritika of Vidyananda, Nirnaya Sagar Press, 1918. Tattvarthasutra of Umasvati with the Svopajna-bhagya, Nirnaya Sagar Press. Tattvarthasutra-Introduction, notes etc. in Gujorati by Pt. Sukha lalji, 1949 (3rd edition). Tandy. Brahmana, Kasi Sanskat Series Uttaradhyayana-Sutra sdited with notes by J. Charpentier. Vaisesika Darsana, Kasi Sanskrt Series, 1923. Vijnanamftabhasya, a commentary on the Brahmasutras by Vijna nabhiksu. Vira Nirvana Samva. Aur Juin Kala Ganana, (Hindi) by Muni Kalyanavijaya. Visnu Purana, Gorakhapur Yajnavalkya Smrti, Trivandrum Sanskst Series, No. LXXXi, 1924. Yukridipika, edited by Pulinabilaari Cakravarti, Calcutta Sanskrt Series, No. 23.

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191 Bibliography ENGLISH Cambride History of India, by Rhapsen, (Vol. 1.). Constructive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy, by R.D. Ranade, M.A. Critical Study of The Samkhya System, by V. V. Sovani, Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics Gita Rahasya, Vol I & II, hy Tilak. The Great Epic of India, by Hopkins. History of Pre Buddhist Philosophy, by B. N Barua, (Calcutta, 1921). History of Philosopiiy, Eastern and Western, vol. I (Sponsered by the Ministry of Education, Government of India, 1952.) A History of Indian Philosophy by Das Gupta, vol. I. History of Indian Philosophy, by S. K Belvalkar & R. D. Ranade, Vol. II. History of Indiais Literature by M. Waternitz (in two Volumes). History of Indian Literature, by Weber, London, 1904. Hymns of the Rgvedu translated by Griffith. Introducton To Philosophy, by Chatterji anid Dutta, Indian Philosophy, by S. Radhakrishnan, Vol. I & II. The Jain Philosophy of Non-Absolutism. by Dr. S. Mookerji. Jain Sutras. Part I and II, by Jacobi SBE, Vol. XXII and XLV. The Jains in the History of Indian Lierature, by M Winternitz, (Abmedabad, 1946). Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution, by W. Mcdougall. Original Sanskrit Texts by J. Muir, Vol. V. Outlines of indian Philosophy by M. Hiriyanaa. M. A. Pancastikaya of Kundakunda, transated into English, by Prof. A. Chakravarti, M. A, L. T. (in the Sacred Books of the Jains, Vol. III). Parmaratha's Version Of The Sankhya-Karika (translated into English by S. S. Suryanarayana). Philosophy of Ancient India, Richard Garbe. Philosophy of the Uranisads by Deusson. Positive Sciences of The Ancient Hinds, by Dr. B. N. Scal.

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192 The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama Religion And Philosophy of Veda and Upanisads, by Keith (in two Vols). Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. IV, (The Yoga sutras of Patanjali). Samkhya Conception of Personality by Majmudar. Samkhya or the Theory of Realism, by J. Mukerji. Samkhya and Modern Thought, by J. Ghosh. A Sanskrt English Dictionary by Sir Monier Williams, Oxford, 1899. The Samkhya System by Keith Six Systems of Indian Philosophy by Max Muller Some Problems of Indian Literature, M. Winternitz (Calcutta, 1925) Studies In Jain Philosophy by Nathamal Tatia, M. A., D. Litt. Study of Patanjali by Das Gupta. Studies In Jainism by Herman Jacobi (Jain Sahitya Samsodhaka Karyalaya, Ahmedabad). Thirteen Principal Upanisads, by Hume (second edition, 1931) Vedanta Sutras, Part I, by Thibaut. Vaisnavism and Saivism and Minor Religious Systems by R. G. Bhandarkar (Poona) Vedic Age by R. C. Majmudar and A. D. Pusalkar, London 1951. Vedic Reader, by A. Macdonell. Yoga Philosophy, in relation to other Systems of Indian Thought Calcutta University, by Das Gupta. The Yoga System of Pantanjali, HOS. Vol. XVii. JOURNALS Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona Bharatiya Vidya, published by Bhartiya Vidaya Bhavan, Bombay Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume Bulletins (Hindi) of the Jain Cultural Research Society, Banaras. Indian Antiquary Indian Philosophical Quarterly Indian Philosophical Review Journal of the American Oriental Society Proceedings of the Oriental Conference. Puratattva, a Gujarati Quarterly, Gujarata Vidyapitha. Ahmedabad. eview of Philosophy And Religion.

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About the Author Late Dr. Indukala H. Jhaveri (19281983), a scholar, had conceived this work as her research project, which later earned her Ph.D. from Gujarat University. Apart from this thesis entitled, 'Sankhya-Yoga and Jain Parinamavada' her other publications include the edited Prakrit work 'Yogasataka' of Haribhadra enriched by Gujarati translation, exposition and comprehensive introduction; the English translation of Pt. Sukhlalji's introduction (Hindi) to Pramanamimamsa and Gujarati translation of the second part of Outlines of Indian Philosophy by Prof. M. Hiriyanna. Dr. Ms. Jhaveri's sundry research papers were published in journals like Aryanpath, The Journal of Oriental Research Institute and Vidya. Dr. Jhaveri began her teaching career at B. J. Institute of Learning and Research and later taught at Shri H. K. Arts College, Ahmedabad.

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10-00 gujarAta yunivarsiTI dvArA prakAzita thayela pustaka a. naM. pustakanuM nAma lekhakanuM nAma | kiMmata 1. Rveda tRtIya ma DaLa Da, jayadeva zukala 2 puruSottamadevanI laghuparibhASA vRttinuM hai. vI. ema, bhaTTa 32-00 vivecanAtmaka adhyayana 3. sAMkhya sativRtti vi. 1 I. e. solomana 6-00 4 sAMkhya saptativRtti vi 2 I. e. solomana pa--00 5, dhvanyAloka locana Do. tapasvI nAndI 18-00 6. devanyAlaka DolararAya mAMkaDa 10-00 7. aya dikSIta-kavi ane Do.bhagavatI prasAda DI 30-00 aliMkArika paMDayA 8. alaMkAra vicAra pI. jI. zAstrI 5-00 9. bharatanuM nATayazAstra Do. TI. esa. nAndI 16-00 10. A Critical Study of the Do.ela. vI joSI 30-00 Partyaksha Particcheda of Bhasarvajna's Nyayabhusana 11. The Origin & Devp. of the Do. TI. esa. nAndI 20-00 Theory of Rasa and Dhvani in Sanskrit Poetics 12. kAdambarI pUrvArdha je. eca. desAI 17-00 13. zrI harSakata khaMDana khaMDakhAdya pro. estara solomana 60-00 paranI zailya hitiSaNI TIkA yunivarsiTInAM prakAzane kevI rIte meLavazo ? yunivarsiTInAM pustaka-pustakanI ki'mata tathA jarUrI TapAla kharca agAuthI yunivarsiTI kAryAlayanA " nANAM svIkAra kendra" upara kAryAlayanA kAmakAjanA divasee 11-15 thI 2-00nA samaya daramiyAna bharI athavA rajisTrArazrI, gujarAta yuni. ( hisAba vibhAga), amadAvAda-380009ne DimAnDa DrAphuTathI nANAM mokalI prakAzane meLavI levAnAM raheze. DimAnDa DrAphTa sAthe pUrepUruM nAma, saranAmuM, prakAzana vagerenI pUrI vigato jaNAvavA vinaMtI che. yunivarsiTI dvArA prakAzane vI. pI. thI mokalavAmAM AvatAM nathI.