Theories Of Parinama

SR No.: 023179
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Indukala H Jhaveri
Publisher: Gujarat University
Publication Year: 1990
Total Pages: 208
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 18 MB

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The Sāṁkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parināma
going activities, as if it were an objective reality. The moment falls under the head of reality and is maintained by succession. This succession consists in the sequence of moments. The Yogis who know time call this by the name of time.
Further two moments cannot co-exist. There can be no succession of two co-existent moments. It is impossible. The uninterrupted sequence of the first moment and of the one which follows, is what is called succession. For this there is but one moment existing in the present; the antecedent and postcedent moments do not exist; therefore, there cannot be any collection of them.
Further, the moments that have passed and those that have yet to come, should be described as existing in consequence of universal change in evolution. For this reason the whole world undergoes change every moment and all these characteristics are relatively established in that one moment of time. I
Vacaspati, while commenting on the concerned passage, adds no new idea. His remarks on the Skā. may be noted.
Therein he points out that according to the Vaiseșikas, Time being one (indivisible) it cannot admit of such divisions as “present and future' and hence they attribute these divisions to certain "accidents' (adventitious conditions) : but according to the Sāṁkhyācāryas, says Vacaspati, these same 'accidents' themselves may be regarded as the basis of the notions of 'future', ‘present". and 'past, and there is no need for the postulating of an inter- : vening entity as “Time'; this is the reason why time is not accepted as a distinct entity.
Vijñānabhikṣu in his YV. points out that though Time is defined as buddhi-nirmāņa, yet it may be taken as real. For it only means that Time has no real (objective) existence apart from the ‘noment. The latter is real being identical with the unit of change of the Guņas in phenomena. But, as Dr. Seal points out,
1 VB III, 51 2 ......afe T U ga att for faTreti; prentsa FTTTTTT