Theories Of Parinama

Author(s): Indukala H Jhaveri
Publisher: Gujarat University
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/023179/1

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THE SANKHYA-YOGA AND THE JAIN
THEORIES OF PARINĀMA
by DR. INDUKALABEN H. JHAVERI
गत
Traine
SHOP
GUJARAT UNIVERSITY
AHMEDABAD-380 009

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About the Book
This is a comprehensive study of the Sankhya conception of Parināma (Change and evolution) and the Jain conception of reality. The treatment is critical, scientific and dispassionate. The work is based on extensive study and critical selection of relevant data. It presents a full and critical review of the entire subject-matter chosen for the study complete in all respects. The treatmeat of the evolution in Jain conception culminating in the adoption of the terminology and exposition sponsored by the advocates of Pariņāma furnishes the evidence of unbiased approach and evalution.
Price : Rs. 30-00

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THE SĀMKHYA-YOGA AND THE JAIN THEORIES OF PARINĀMA
by
Dr. INDUKALA H JHAVERI
GUJARAT UNIVERSITY
AHMEDABAD-380 009,

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first Edition]
Copies: 500
Gujarat University Ahmedabad-380 009
Price: 30/
Printer : S. T. Shastri
Narendra Printers
Kaloliawadi, Kankaria Road,
Ahmedabad-3800022
Publisher:
M. P. Jadia
Registrar Gujarat University
Ahmedabad-380009
[ 1990

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FOREWORD
It gives me great pleasure indeed in publishing, "The SamkhyaYoga and The Jain Theories of Parinama" By Late Dr. Indukala. ben Zaveri.
I am thankful to Prof. T. S. Nandi, Dept. Sanskrit, School of Languages of this University and Shri Naginbhai Shah, L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad for leading the script and for giving their vaiuable opinion for publication.
I am also thankful to the late Shri Niranjan J. Mehta, Chairman Sadguru Indukalaben Jhaveri Charitable Trust for giving script and financial assistance.
The book includes the comperative study of samkhya and Jain theory.
I hope that the students and teachers of Sanskrit and Philosophy and learned Scholers interested in this subject will find this publication of great value and interest.
Ahmedabad-9
Date 10-10-1991
(M. P. Jadia) Offg. Registrar

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PRE É A CE
· The title of my thesis is 'The Samkhya and the Jain theories of Pariņāma' based mainly on Sanskrit texts. 'In order to make the title more precise I have slightly changed it into 'The Samkhya -Yoga and the Jain theories of Pariņāma based mainly on Sanskrit texts.'
Modern scholars have studied both the Samkhya-Yoga and Jain systems in their various aspects. No one, however, so far as I know, has utilised the Samkhya-Yogi sources and ideas contained in them to formulate a systematic Samkhya-Yoga theory of Pariņāma, and the Jain sources to formulate the Jain theory of Pariņāma. What is more, the problem of relation bet. ween the Samkhya-Yoga and Jain systems has been touched by scholars like Garbe, Jacobi, etc., but no one has, I think, attempted a comparative study of these systems and their bearing on the theory of Parinama. Hence, this my attempt.
In preparing this thesis I have drawn upon important Sanskệt sources pertaining to Samkhya-Yoga system and Sanskțit and Prākệt souces pertaining to Jain, system, which all are referred to in the bibliography. I have also utilised translation of the same in European and Indian languages wherever available and necessary. At certain places, we have thought it proper to give only the gist of the passages. For modern criticism of the two theories I have also consulted the relevant journals and such works as Garbe's Sāmkhya-Yoga, Keith's Samkhya System, Dr. Seal's Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus etc., Jacobi's Studies in Jainism, Dr. Mookerji's Jain Philosophy of Non-absolutism etc. (cf. Bibliography)
I have divided my thesis in eleven chapters. In the first chapter, I have tried to show from Vedas - especially the Rgveda

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and Atharva-Veda – Brāhmaṇas and earlier Upanisads, how the philosophical tendencies of thought pertaining to the prbolems of One and Many and of the abiding and changing aspects of reality clearly foreshadow the theory of Pariņāma. Then I have drawn apon Yaska's Nirukta (600 B.C.) which is contemporaneous with the earlier Upanişads and the rise cf Jainism and Buddism. Even though grammatical works are not usually drawn upon for philosophical ideas, yet for us, the Nirukta has a special significance in so far as it precisely enunciates the concept of Vipatiņāma or Pariņāma for the first time, at so early an age. (faqftohet . $1847A1 ataifa70#). This shows that unless the concept was well known to and clearly grasped by the thinkers of the time in one form or the other, it could not have become a subjectmatter for definition in a treatise like the Nirukta. It can be said without hesitation that this idea of Vipariņāma or Parināmā must have been favoured by what we may call Proto-Samkhya and Proto-Jain thinkers. And we have already shown how the earlier Upanişads provide ground for the rise of such a concept. The reference to the term Vikára in the sense of Parināma in the Sūtras of Pāṇini is also noted. In the same chapter, I have refrerred to the Mahābhāşya of Patafijali (which is generally placed in the middle of the 2nd cent. B.C), as it is convenient to treat grammatical works together. This work not only clearly states the idea of Pariņāma but also makes a clear-cut distinct. ion between Kūțastha-nityata and Pariņāmi-nityalâ for the first time, and hence the significance.
Then, in the second shapter I have considered in brief the specific Samkhya ideas as found in the Mahabharata, the Smộtis, the Puranas and the Caraka. I may point our here that all the passages of the Mahabharata, the Smộtis and the Purāṇas referred to by me, do not necessarily precede Isvarakrạna but there being not enough evidence to discriminate between the various strata, I have followed the old tradition of taking the Mahabharata, the Smộtis and the Puranas together as constituting the Śmrti tradition to be distinguished from the Sruti tradition of the Vedas and the

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Upanişads. I have tried to show, in conclusion, that though in these passages explaining creation there is no explicit mention of Pariņāma, the idea may have been taken for grantd as implicit in the process, for as already noted, the concept was well-defined as early as the in Nirukta.
In the third and the fourth chapters I have attempted to study the theory of Pariņāma, in its various aspects, as discussed in the important works of the Sāṁkhya and the Yoga darśanas proper because there is no vital difference between the metaphysical theories of the Samkhya and the Yoga excepting that the latter accepts one puruşa as Išvara, not as the creator but as guiding the course of evolution. The fifth chapter is devoted to the critical exposition of the other topics related to Pariņāma. At the end of this chapter, I have given a resume of all these five chapters.
In the sixth chapter I have given an account of the main Jain sources on which our discussion is going to be based.
In the seventh chapter I have discussed the Jain theory of Parinama as found in the oldest extant Canonical literature of the Jainas, viz. the Āgamas.
In the treatment of the Agamas I have consulted only those that contain discussion of philosophical doctrines - such as the Bhagavati-Sūtra, Sthanamga, Prajñápana, Uttaradhyayana-sútra, Anuyogadvārasūtra, Jivabhigama etc. In this seventh chapter which deals with Parinama in the Agamas, I have tried to show that despite the absence of any explicit and precise definition of the theory of Pariņāma, there are in them, all the elements of it viz., Dravya, Paryāya and Pariņāma.
In the eighth chapter, I have examined the relevant passsages from the Tattvårtha-sútra, and its Svopajña-bhäşya by Umásváti and the important Prākst a works of the Digambarācārya Kudakunda - such as the Pañcâstikāya, the Pravacanasära, and the Sama

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yasara. I have shown how, in the Tattvartha the various concepts-viz., those of Dravya, Paryaya, Pariņāma and Sat receive precise definition, though there is yet no elaboration of the same. In the works of Kundakunda I have attempted to show the development of the theory of Parinama in its various aspects as well as its application to different Dravyas.
In the ninth chapter I have tried to give further exposition, application, analysis and justification of the doctrine of ParyayaPariņāma as found in the works of tarka-period- such as the commentaries of the Tattvärtha Sūtra and other dialectical works. At the end a resume is attempted.
Having thus discussed the Samkhya-Yoga theory and the Jain theory of Pariņāma I have attempted in chapter X critical and comparative study of the theory of Parinama, of these two systems, in its different aspects and discussed the problem of the historical relation between the two schools.
Some of the new points which I have attempted to work out in the thesis
(i) I have attempted a new study of the emergence of the idea of Pariņāma in early Vedic literature.
(ii) As far as I know, no scholar has drawn attention to the precise definition of Vipariṇāma or Pariņāma as given by Yaska.
(iii) I have attempted to throw new light on the problems of तत्त्वान्तरपरिणाम, the process of parimāma - ससृष्टविवेक and विशेषाfa-which all occur in the Samkhya-Yoga works.
(iv) The problem of the relation between Pajjava or Paryāya and Parinama, from the Agama passages is discussed for the first time in this manner.

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(v) A critical study of the Jain technical term 'agurulaghu' has been attempted for the first time here.
(vi) Similarly, further applications of Paryaya-Pariṇāma viz. Dravy paryaya and Guna-paryāya, Pariņāma and Parispanda, prayoga-pariņama and Visrasã-pariņama, Artha-prayāya and Vyañjana-paryaya, as found in later Jain dialectical works have not been, so far as I know. critically examined in the way I have done.
(vii) In the discussion of the nature of Pre-Isvarakṛṣna Sāmkhya and the historieal relation between Samkhya and Jain, I have tried a new approch in the study of the subject.
In this way, by putting forward in this thesis, a critical study of the views of India's ancient thinkers, of two imprortaut schools on Pariņāma, I have attempted to make a contribntion to the understanding of the concept of 'Permanence and Change,' a concept of great significance in the history of philosophy as well as in modern knowledge as a scientific principle.
In conclusion, I must express my thanks to Prof. R. C. Parikh for the guidance received from him during my studies. With his approval I have also consulted Pandit Sukhalalji Sangavi to whom I am grateful for his valuable help.
Indukala H. Jhaveri

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TRANSLITERATION
aa, ऋr,
आ, ऋ, अं
इ, ल1
ई, एe,
उu, ऐ ai
d, ओ ०,
अः ।,
गं g, ज्,
gh. jh, dh,
d,
दd.
AAR 6
4 44
- bb,
स् ,
ह. h.

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ABBREVIATIONS
AMI. Anu. Sū. AS. ASS. AV. AYD, Bh. Sū. Br. A. Chā. Up Dhs. HOS. PK. PS. Rāj. V.
RV.
SBE. Skā. SPB.
Āpta-Mimāṁsā of Samantabhadra Anuyogadvāra-Sūtra, Aştašati Aștasahasrı Atharvaveda. Anya-yogavyavaccheda-dvātrimśika Bhagavatī Sūtra. Brhadāraṇyakopanişad Chandogya Upanişad Dharma-Samgrahani Harward Oriental Series. Pañcastikāya. Pravacanasāra Raja-vārttika on the Tsū. Rgveda Sacred Books of the East. Samkhya-kārikā Samkhyapravacanabhāşya Samayasāra. Samkhya-sūtras. Sāṁkhya-tattva-Kaumudi. Syādavāda-mañjari. Sastra-vārtā-samuccaya. Sloka-vārttika Tattvartha-bhāsya. Thāņamga-sutra Tattvartha-sútra. Tattva-Vaiśāradi, Uttarādhyayana-sūtra Vyāsa-bhāşya Yoga-sūtras. Yoga-vārttika
SS.
Ssū, STK. SVM. SVS. SI. V. Tbh, Thā. Sū. Tsū. TVS. Ut. Sů.
VB.
Ysù. YV.

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CONTENTS
xii
Pages
1-21
22-31 32-43
1 Foreword 2 Preface 3 Scheme of Transliteration 4 Abbreviations 5 Contents Chapters I Seeds of Pariņāma in the Earliest Sanskrit
Literature (2500 B. C.-200 B. C.) II Samkhya Ideas in Pre-Isvarakļšņa Literature III Pariņāma in the Samkhya-Kärikä and its
Commentaries IV Development of Pariņāma in the Yoga-sūtras
And their important Commentaries and the
Samkhya-sūtras and their commentaries V Other Topics Related to Pariņāma VI Jain Sources VII Pariņāmavāda in the Agamas VIII Pariņāma in the works of Umāsvāti And
Kundakunda IX Pariņāma in Tarka-Period X Sāṁkhya-Yoga And Jain-A Comparison
Appendix on 'Agarulaghu’ Bibliography
44-62
63-80 81-91 92-115 116-132
133-169 170-183

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CHAPTER I
SEEDS OF PARIŅĀMA IN THE EARLIEST SANSKRIT
LITERATURE (2500 B. C.- 200 B. C.)
Introductory :
The earliest source of religion and philosophy as they have takeņ shape in Indian culture is the Vedas, especially the Rgveda. The theory of Pariņāma which I propose to study in the present thesis can be properly understood if we first attempt to discover from the earliest sources i.e. the Vedic sources, those tendencies of thought that helped in its emergence and development in the darśanic form. I shall, therefore, first take notice of those speculations in the Vedas, particularly the Rgveda, which can throw light on this topic.;
THE RGVEDA
(2000 or About 2500 B.C.):
Speculations as to how this whole world came into being are to be found scattered throughout the whole of the Rgveda. “The earliest speculations on the question”, as Prof. Belvalkar says, “are, as natural, mainly poetic with hardly any attempt at systembuilding. They name some god or gods Indra, Varuņa, Savits or Dyāvāpşthivi - and credit him or them with the work of creating the world”.: However, in the later portions of the Rgveda, espe
tures . Prof. Radhakri about
1 Winternitz, 'History of Indian Literature', Vol. I, p. 310.
Jacobi puts the Vedic hymns at 4500 B. C. Prof. Radhakrishnan assigns them to the 15th cent. B. C. Max Muller dates them about
1200 B.C. 2 History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 22.

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cially in the first and the tenth mandala, we find these speculations resolving themselves into definite types which are in character, both mythical and metaphysical. Thus, in the Rgveda X.190 as Prof. Radhakrishnan puts it, 'water is said to develop into the world through the force of time, year, desire or tapas. Sometimes water itself is derived from night or chaos or air as in the Rgveda X.168.'3 In the Rgveda. X.81,82 Višvakarmā, a personal deity, is said to produce Heaven and Earth through the exercise of his arms and wings. In the Rgveda, X.72. Brahmaṇaspati becomes the creater. At certain places Prajāpati and Hiranyagarbha occur as the lord of creatures as in the Rgveda X.85,43 and X.121..
. But such a conception of a personal supreme deity, as the source of all existence, could not for long satisfy the ‘metaphysical craving to use the term of Schopenhauer, of the more profound thinkers. For, as Max Muller aplty puts it, “every one of the gods called by a personal and proper name was limited ipso facto and therefore not fit to fill the place which was to be filled by an unlimited absolute power which they yearned for as the primary cause of all created things. No name that expressed ideas connected with the male or female sex, not even Prajāpati was considered as fit for such a being. And thus we see that as early as the Vedic hymns they arrived at the conception of That One’ "4 They applied to this central principle the neuter form ‘ekam' and 'sat' to show that it is a comprehensive entity subsuming the duality of sex. "That One' we come across in the Rgveda I. 164.6, wherein after asking who he was that established these six spaces of the world, the poet says, “Was it perhaps the One, in the shape of the unborn ?" "That One' is also referred to in X,82.6. Significant is the reference to this One at VIII.58.2 wherein the last quarter, 'It is the one that has severally become all this' clearly brings out the important ideas of One and Many, of Being and Becoming.
3 Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 99. 4 Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, p. 48

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>
Seeds of Parinama in the Earliest Literature
This concept of an abstract self-creative principle as the prius of the world is philosophically a definite advance over the previ-. ous one, of a personal creator, showing the operation of thought and abstraction.
We have so far left out two important cosmogonic hymns viz. the Nasadiya Sūkta (X.129) and the Puruşa Sūkta (X.90), since they deserve special notice. Prof. Macdonell sees in the former, the starting point of the natural philosophy which developed into the Samkhya system. According to Prof. Belvalkar, it contains the earliest germ of what later developed into the Pariṇāmavāda or the doctrine of evolution. But neither of these two views seems to be warranted by the actual wording of the hymn. The first two verses which run thus
I,
"There was not non-existent nor existent:
There was no realm of air, no sky beyond it.
What covered in and where ? and what gave shelter? Was water there, unfathomed depth of water?
II. Death was not then, nor was there aught immortal : No sign was there, the day's and night's divider.
That One Thing, breathless, breathed by its own nature: Apart from it was nothing whatsoever."
3
- bring out that the absolute reality which is at the back of the whole world cannot be characterised by us in any words. In the next three verses, the order of evolution is given :
III. "Darkness there was at first concealed in
- darkness this All was indiscriminated chaos. All that existed then was void and formless : By the great power of warmth was born that Unit.
:
5 Vedic Reader, p. 207.
6 History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II. p. 24.
7 The Hymns of the Rgveda, Griffith, Vol. II. p. 575. This hymn is translated by Muir, Max Muller, Madconell, etc.

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IV. Thereafter rose Desire in the beginning, Desire,
The primal seed and germ of Spirit. Sages who searched with their heart's thought discovered the existent's kinship in the non-existent.
V.
Transversely was their seyering line extended : What was above it then, and what below it ? There were begetters, there were mighty forces, Free actions here and energy up younder.”8
Immediately after this is brought out the mystery of the origin of the world in the last two verses :
VI. “Who verily knows and who can here declare it,
whence it was born and whence comes this creation ? The Gods are later than this world's production. Who knows then whence it first came into being ?
VII. He, the first origin of this creation, whether he
formed it all or did not form it,
Whose eye controls this world in highest heaven, He verily knows it, or perhaps he knows not”.9
Thus the hymn, although expressing the current ideas, regarding the first principle, has got a predominant note of agnosticism about it. It should, therefore, be looked upon as an agnostic. poem as Prof. Ranade does.10
Puruşa Sūkta :
Already in the hymn to Viśvakarmā, (Rgveda X.81,82), there appears the desire to parallel the creation of the universe with a sacrifice. Similarly in the later portions of the Rgveda, we come across as Prof. Belvalkar says, 11 the liturgical abstractions 8 The Hymns of the Rgveda, Griffith,, p. 575–576. 9 Griffith -p. 576. 10 'A Constructive Survey of Upanişa dic Philosophy' p. 3. 11 History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 24.

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Seeds of Parinama in the Earliest Literature
like Rta, Tapas or sraddha and even sacrifice which are conceived as cosmogenic principles - as in X. 190 where it is stated :
1.
“From Fervour kindled to its height, Eternal Law and Truth were born
Thence was the Night produced and thence the Billowy flood of sea arose.
I.
From that same billowy flood of sea, the year was afterwards produced,
Ordainer of the days and nights, Lord over all who close the eye.
III. Dhātā, the great creator, then formed in due order
Sun and Moon.
He formed in order Heaven and Earth, the regions of the air, and light”. 19
This idea of sacrifice is carried to its fullest extent in the Puruşa Sūkta of the Rgveda, one of its latest hymns. In it we have the idea of a cosmic being from whom proceeds this whole universe, along with its social order. The act of creation is treated as a sacrifice in which Puruşa is the victim. “Puruşa is all this world, what has been and shall be. He not only pervades the whole universe but transcends it too".' Thus we have the idea of both immanence and transcendence expressed here for the first time in clear terms. Again, the struggle between the two notions of 'permanence' and 'change' seems to have already taken hold of the minds of the vedic thinkers. We see it reflected in-" 97EISET
fãsatt vara faltegiąå fefe 1 - ‘all existing things are a quarter of him and that which is immortal in the sky is three quarters of him'. Here is an attempt to put together as it were the experiences of “permanence and ehange into one entity by saying 12 Griffith, Vol. II, p. 609.

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The Sankhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Pariņāma
that one quarter of the puruşa is all this changing world while his three quarters are immortal-i.e. permanent in the highest heaven.
However all these ideas, which are still in a rudimentary stage only and therefore vaguely stated, attain their gradual development in the Upanişads as we shall see below.
THE ATHARVA - VEDA
The Atharva-Veda is a collection of hymns whose significance varies from the highest metaphysical and mystical ideas to the jugglery of magical charms. The ideas which we are investigating are to be found in X.7, XI.4, XIX.53-54, - where the very same supreme deity or All God and “Tadekam’ found in Rgveda occur under the new names of Skambha, Prāņa and Kāla.
Special notice, however, should be taken of the two hymns. of Kala because it is the concept of Kala or Time that is at the basis of all theories of change.
The following verses from the two hynins may be noted :
I
कालो अश्वो वहति सप्तरश्मिः सहस्राक्षो अजरो भूरिरेताः । तमा रोहन्ति कवयो विपश्चितस्तस्य चक्रा भुवनानि विश्वा ।।१।।
IF सप्त चक्रान्वहति काल एष सप्तास्य नाभीरमृत न्वक्षः ।
स इमा विश्वा भुवनान्यजत्कालः स ईयते प्रथमो नु देवः ।।२।।
II पूर्णः कुम्भोऽधि काल आहितस्त' वै पश्यामो वहुधा नु सन्तः ।
स इमा विश्वा भुवनानि प्रत्यङ्काल तमाहुः परमे व्योमन् ।।३।।
IV स एव स भुवनान्यारभत्स एव सं भुवनानि पयत् ।
पिता सन्नभवत्पुत्र एषा तस्माद्वे नान्यत्परमस्ति तेजः ॥४॥
v कालोऽमू दिवमजनयत्काल इमाः पृथिवीरुत । ___ काले ह भूत भव्य चेषित ह वि तिष्ठते ।।५।।'

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Seeds of Pariņāma in the Earliest Literature
VI कालो भूतिमसृजत काले तपति सूर्यः ।
het fa al maila wie aufê azafat 11811 AV. XIX. 53 VII इम च लोक परम च लोकं पुण्यांश्च लोकाविधतीश्च पुण्याः । सर्वा लोकानभिजित्य ब्रह्मणा कालः स ईयते परमो नु देवः ॥५॥
AV. XIX. 54.5 I Time carries (us) forward, a steed, with seven rays, a thou.
sand eyes, full of fecundity. On him intelligent sages mount; his wheels are all the worlds.
ІІ
This Time moves on seven wheels; he has seven navės; immortality is his axle. He is at present all these worlds. Time hastens onward, the first god.
III
A full jar is contained in Time. We behold him existing in many forms. He is all these worlds in the future. They call him Time in the highest heaven.
It is he who drew forth the worlds, and encompassed them. Being the Father, he became their son. There is no other power superior to him. .
Tine generated the sky and these earths. Set in motion by Time, the past and the future subsist.:
VI
Time created the earth; by Time the sun burns; through Time all beings (exist); through Time the eye sees.
VII
Having through divine knowledge conquered both this world and the highest world, and the holy worlds, and the holy ordinances, yea all worlds, Time moves onward as the supreme god.13
The rest of the verses, describe more or less mystically the different things of the universe such as mind, breath, name, waters, winds, regions, sky, Rk verses, Yajus ...etc. which all are under: the dominant influence of Kala. 13 Muir's Original Sanskỉ Texts, Vol. V, p. 408-409

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8
The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama
From our point of view, what is noteworthy in the hymns is the association of Kala with dynamic ideas or ideas signifying movement. These are prominently brought out in the metaphors of a 'horse' and 'wheels'. Just as a horse carries forward a chariot, similarly the Time-horse carries forward all the worlds - i. e. all the things of the universe - which are imagined as the "wheels' of Time. This is how the movement of the universe in time is visualised.
Of course, we have not here as yet any conscious or systematic philosophy of change. Its importance for us, however, lies in the fact that it represents an attempt of the ancient thinkers to visualise the cause of all changing world - phenomena.
From the above survey of the tendencies of thought that prevailed in the Rgveda and the Atharvaveda, it can be seen that the spirit of philosophic enquiry had already seized the minds of the Vedic thinkers and that by setting up the queries concerning the first principle and by seeking to solve them, they had, no doubt, unknowingly broached the problems of the One and Many, of the abiding' and the 'changing' aspects of reality. These, passing through the Brāhmaṇa period, were to gather force and emerge into certain definite concepts in the Upanisadic period.
THE BRAHMANAS
(1200 B.C. to 1500 B.C)14
When we come to the Brahmaņas we find the cult of sacrifice acquiring predominance to an amazing degree. There are, however, two aspects of the development of this idea of sacrifice. One is that of a complex and complicated sacrificial ritual, whereas the other is that of giving a mystical meaning to the entire act of sacrifice. This latter aspect, as seen above, was already foreshadowed in the later portions of the Rgveda (X.90) wherein we have,
14 Prof, Belvalkar, 'History of Indian Philosophy', Vol. II, p. 37.

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Seeds of Pariņāma in the Earliest Literature
as Prof. Belvalkar puts it, “the most thorough-going elevation of the Sacrifice into a world-principle. The only advance beyond this made by the Brāhmaṇas was the substitution of Prajāpati in place of the Virāt Puruşa”. 15 The life-activity of this Prajāpati is symbolised as a continuous process of sacrifice, which exhausts him and takes the juice out of him which loss is made up again and again through the sacrifice.16 What is more Prajapati himself is often identified with the sacrifice, and the latter again with the universe - thus - The soul of all beings, of all gods, is this the sacrifice'.17 In this way by elevating the sacrifice into an omnipotent world-principle – the Creative Force, and by indentifying it with Prajāpati and the universe, a sort of mystical unity between the three was sought to be established. Such mystical interpretation of the sacrifice greatly tended to divert the minds of the thinking people from the actual performance of the sacrifices to the inner sacrifice in the form of meditations. Thus, in the Br. A. I.1 we find that instead of a horse-sacrifice, the visible universe is conceived as a horse and meditated upon as such.
This transformation of Yajña (47), it is significant to note, is responsible for another important development. We know that the word 'brahman' (neuter) was used in the sense of a 'prayer' in the Rgveda. As this simple prayer assumed the importance of a magical or mystical formula, in the AV, the word 'brahman' also came to have that sense. In the Brāhmaṇa age we find the word used for the sacrificial act and mystery. So when the identity of Prajāpati, yajña and the whole universe came to be mystically postulated, the word 'brahman' came to have this connotation also i.e. signifying the identity of the three). This development, one might say, paved the way for the brahma' philosophy of the Upanişads, traces of which already begin to appear in the later part of the Brāhmaṇas - as for example in the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa XI.2.3.1. where 'brahma' is mentioned as the prius of the world
15 History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 25. 16 Tāņdya -Brāhmaṇa, IV. 10.1. 17 Satapatha-Brāhmaṇa, XIV, 3.2.1; III, 6.3.1.

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Pariņāma and in the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa III. 12.9 and Satapatha X. 6.3. where the 'brahman' and the omnipresent 'Atman' are identified.
10
In this way from being merely a ritual act, yajña develops the significance of an act which symbolises world-creation and on the meditative side emerges into the mysticism of 'brahma' philosophy..
THE UPANIȘADS
(700 B.C. 600 B.C.)18
-
The number of Upanisads that have come down to us is very great indeed, nearly two-hundred, but all are not equally old. A great many of them belong to comparatively recent times and hence cannot be used as sources for the history of the earlier Indian philosophy. We shall therefore consider, here, only those Upanisads - viz. Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chandogya, Iśa, Kena, Aitareya, Katha, Mundaka, Śvetāśvatara, Praśna, - which are generally regarded as pre-buddhistic. Even amongst these, we shall for the most part, confine ourselves to their older portions only. 19
General remarks20
The subjective or the meditative way of thought already fore-shadowed in the Brahmanas in the conception of the inner
18 Das Gupta, 'A History of Indian Philosophy', Vol. I. p. 28. This is the generally accepted date of the earlier Upanisads.
20
19 The classification of old and new stratá is given by Prof. Belvalkar, 'History of Indian Philosophy' p. 135. Cf also 'A Constructive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy' by Ranade, p. 16. According to Deussen. and Winternitz, however, Isa and Kena belong to a period later than that of Aitareya, Taittiriya and Kauṣitaki.
The earlier Upanisads. as is well-known, do not teach one single, uniform doctrine, as Indian commentators have all along held. There is yet a great latitude, freedom of thought and want of a connected system. This is quite natural since the Upanisads are not the works. of a single hand or a single age but of a series of teachers existing

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Seeds of Pariņāma in the Earliest Literature
ir
sacrifice', seems to have appealed very much to the Upanişadic thinkers and almost accepted as a method of discovering the truth about reality. With the ascendency of this kind of outlook, it is but natural that the conception of an extraneous personal creator should pale into the background and that of an abstract absolute principle like "Brahman' already foreshadowed in the “Tadekam' of the Rgveda, should assume considerable prominence. Thus the very same "Tadekam' comes to be variously expressed as 'Brahman', 'Ātman' or 'Sal' around which centres the whole of the Upanişadic philosophy. What is more, the important problem of "One' and ‘Many' - which was raised in the later part of the Rgveda but for which no satisfactory solution was found, assumes a more coherent and determinate form in so far as the nature of the ‘One' and its relation to the 'Many are more clearly brought out. Next, the terms like, brahman, śāśvata, dhruya, puruşa, atman, which are a rarity in the Rgveda and the Brāhmaṇas find frequent mention here and express some of the fundamental concepts of the Upanişads. They have not yet assumed the character of technical concepts of the later philosophical systems but are nonetheless significant as furnishing the basis for the same.
With these general observations we may turn to the passages themselves which throw light on the nature of the 'One and the *Many', and their relation. I 'तद्धेदं तमु व्याकृतमासीत्तन्नामरूपाभ्यामेव व्याक्रियतासौ नामाऽयमिदंरूप
इति... । स एष इह प्रविष्ट आनखाग्रेभ्यो यथा क्षुरः क्षुरधानेऽवहितः FITRI HII ai faire
que l' Br. Up. I. 4. 7.
| 'वो देवोऽग्नौ योऽप्सु यो विश्व भुवनमाविवेश ।
37 379ig gargfag ../ S've. Up. II 17.
।
at different periods of time. Hence it is that we find divergent currents. of thought often contradictory in nature in one and the same Upanişad. In our above account of the Upanişads, however, we have not considered all these varied currents of thought that are reflected in them, but only those that bear upon Qur problem:

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Pariņāma
III 'यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन्पृथिव्या अन्तरो य पृथिवी न वेद यस्य पृथिवी शरीरं यः पृथिवीमन्तरो यमयत्येष त आत्माऽन्तर्याम्यमृतः । अप्सु, अग्नौ, अन्तरिक्षे वायौ, दिवि, आदित्ये, दिक्षु, चन्द्रतार के, आकाशे, तमसि, तेजसि, सर्वेषु भूतेषु तिष्ठन्वेभ्योऽन्तरो य सर्वानि भूतानि न विदुर्यस्य सर्वाणि भूतानि शरीरं यः सर्वाणि भूतान्यन्तरो यमयत्येष त आत्माऽन्तयम्यिमृतः ।' Br. Up. III. 7
12
IV'sकामयत । बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति । स तपोऽतप्यत ।
स तपस्त वेदं सर्वमसृजत । यदिदं किंच । तत्सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत् । तदनुप्रविश्य सच्च त्यच्चाभवत् । निरुक्तं चानिरुक्तं च । निलयनं चानिलय' च । विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं च । सत्यं चानृतं च । सत्यमभवत् । यदिदं किंच तत्सत्यमित्याचक्षते ।'
Taittiriya Up. II. 6
'स वा अयमात्मा सर्वेषां भूतानामधिपतिः सर्वेषां भूतानां राजा तद्यथा रथनाभौ च रथनेमौ चाराः सर्वे समर्पिता एवमेवास्मिन्नात्मनि सर्वाणि भूतानि सर्वे देवाः सर्वे लोकाः सर्वे प्राणाः सर्व एत आत्मानः समर्पिताः । ' Br. Up. II 5.15 VI ' स यथेोर्णनाभिस्तन्तुनेाच्चरेद्यथाऽग्नेः क्षुद्रा विस्फुलिङ्गा व्युच्चरन्त्येवमेवास्मादात्मनः सर्वे प्राणाः सर्वे लोकाः सर्वे देवाः सर्वाणि भूतानि व्युच्चरन्ति तस्योपनिषत्सत्यस्य सत्यमिति प्राणा वै सत्य तेषामेष सत्यम् ।'
Br. Up. II. 1.20
V
VI तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः संभूतः । आकाशाद्वायु । वायोरग्निः । अग्नेरापः । अद्द्भ्यः पृथिवी । पृथिव्या औषधयः । ' 1
VIII 'थोर्णनाभिः सृजते गृह्यते च यथा पृथिव्यामौषधयः संभवन्ति । यथा सतः पुरुषात् केशलोमानि तथाक्षरात्स' भवतीह
Taittiriya Up. II. 1
विश्वम् ॥' Mundaka Up, I.1.7.
IX . ...............................सत्त्वेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् । तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति तत्तेजोऽसृजत तत्तेज ऐक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति तदपोऽसृजत ।

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Seeds of Parinama in the Earliest Literature
13
...... 1 al 3719 Teen 964: 5914... al pahaa za 121
Cha. Up. VI. 2. 1 to 4.
Verily, at that time the world was undifferentiated. It became differentiated just by name and form, as the saying is :
"He has such a name, such a form'.
He entered in here, from top to toe, as a razor is entirely closed up within the razor-box or again as a bird is pent up within its nest. Him they see not”.22 Br. Up. 1.4.7.
II
“The God who is in fire, who is in water, who has entered into the whole world, who is in plants, who is in trees'.
III
“He who, dwelling in the earth, and within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who controls the earth from within - He is your soul, the inner controller, the Immortal. The inner controller is He who is immanent likewise in waters, fire, air, in the heavens, in the sun, in the quarters, in the moon, in the stars, in space - (in short) in all things and within all things, whom these things do not know, whose body these things are, who controls all these things from within'. Br. Up. III.7
IV
'He desired : ‘Would that I were many ! He performed austerity. Having performed austerity he created this whole
21
22
For similar creation-accounts - from 'Asat', 'Ātman', 'Brahman' cf. Tattiriya Up. II. 7,- Aitareya Up. I. 1--2 and Br. Up. I. 4. 1--4, Br. Up. 1. 4.11 respectively. We have translated the passage 'fa u hit an fare!
H o according to Prof. Ranade (Constructive Survey of Upanişadic Philosophy. p. 261 ). The other passages are translated according to Hume. Hume, following Sankarācārya, translates it thus: 'as fire would be hidden in a fire--holder'. In the foot--note, he gives other references, of this simile and interpretation of Whitrey and Lanman. (Hume. Thirteen Upanişads, p. 28.)
D
enn: Shume

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina- Theories of Parināma
world, whatever there is here. Having created it, he entered into it. Having entered it he became both the This and the That, the Defined and the Undefined, the Supported and Supportless, Knowledge and Not-knowledge, Reality and Unreality - yea, he became the Reality, it is for this reason that all this is, verily, called the Real. Taitt. Up. II.6
Verily this soul is the overlord of all things, the king of all things. As all the spokes are held together in the hub (navel) and felly of a wheel, just so in this all things, all gods, all worlds, all these selves are held together'.
VI
“As a spider might come out with his thread, as small sparks come forth from the fire, even so from this Soul come forth all prāņas, all worlds, all gods, beings. The mystic meaning thereof is, 'the Real is of the real. Prānas verily are the real. He is their Real'. Br. Up. II.1.20.
VII
“From this Soul, verily, space arose, from space, wind; from wind, fire; from fire, water; from water, the earth; from the earth, herbs etc'. Taitt. II.1.
VIII 'As a spider emits and draws in (its thread),
As herbs arise on the earth, As the hairs of the head and body from a living person, So from the Imperishable arises everything here.
Mundaka Up. I.1.7.
IX.
......... In the beginning this world was just Being, one only without a second. It bethought itself : "would that I were many! Let me procreate myself”. It created fire...... Fire created water......... Water created food'.
Ch. Up. VI.2. 1-2.
The above passages point out that this universe is a real transformation of the first principle, Brahman, Ātman or Sat and that it (the first principle) is thoroughly immanent in every object

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Seeds of Parinama in the Earliest Literature
of this universe. According to Prof. Ranade, the Passages I, II & III (noted above), speak of the thorough immanence of the first principle. The fourth one not only declares the immanence of God in all things, whatsoever but also tells us that what thus. comes to exist is the Real.24
23
The different metaphers like the spinning of the web by the spider attempt to bring out the intimate relationship between the first principle and its derivatives. The external world is not something separate existing side by side with the Atman but is permeated through and through by the latter. Referring to the passage I.1.7 of the Mundaka Up., Deussen points out that 'the inner dependence of the universe on 'Brahman' and its essential identity with him was represented as a creation of the universe by and out of Brahman. 25
In short, Brahman is looked upon as the sole substratum of the universe, the principle that runs like a thread through the whole plurality, thereby binding it (i.e. the plurality) into a single unity. This plurality, having its basis in the highest reality Brahman, is real (and not illusory). 26
15
The above may be regarded as describing the Upanisadic thought with regard to the derivation of the world-phenomena from one principle. There is a divergence of views amongst the ancient and modern writers regarding the reality of derivatives. Some Upanisadic thinkers speculate in a way which opens the
23 'Constructive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy' p. 262.
24
'Constructive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy' p. 212.
The reality of the universe is also shown in the Passage No. VI (above) also in the Br. Up. II 3. 1--6.
235
26
Philosophy of the Upanisads, p. 164.
3..
It may be noted that, just as the passages quoted above point to the immanence of the first principle in the universe, even so passages like V. 9. 10 in the Katha, III. 9 and 14 in the Svetasvatara point to its transcendent character in the manner of the Puruşa--Sukta of the Rgveda.

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door for the doctrine of Māyā or Avidya in the sense of illusion. These passages 37 are seized by Sankarācarya and his followers in ancient and modern times as purporting to give the essential doctrine of Upanişads. It may be conceded that the possibility of the above passages implying Mayā is not excluded, but that at any rate, does not justify the claim of Sankara that all the Upanişads consistently uphold the doctrine of Māya28 (in the sense understood by him). For, we have seen above, that there are a number of passages which clearly imply the reality of the objective world. 29 This trend of thought which takes the world.
27 I 'यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति तदितर इतरं जिघ्रति तदितर इतरं पश्यति तदितर
इतरं शृणोति.....यत्र वा अस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्तत्केन कं जिघेत्तत्केन के
पश्येत्तत्केन कं शृणुयात्... | Br. Up. II 4.14 II 'यत्र वा अन्यदिव स्यात्तत्रान्योऽन्यत्पश्येदन्योऽन्यज्जि दन्योऽन्यद्रसयेदन्यो
ऽन्यद्वदेत्.....विजानीयात् ।' Br. Up• IV. 3.31 II 'मनसैवानुद्रष्टव्य नेह नानास्ति किंचन ।
मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति ॥ Br. Up. IV. 4.19
& Cf also Katha Up. IV. 11. VI 'यथा सोम्यै केन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्व मृण्मय विज्ञात स्याद्वाचाऽऽरम्भणं विकारो
नामधेय मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् ॥' Cha. Up. VI. 1.4 v. '...तदेतदृषिः पश्यन्नवोचत् । रूपं रूप प्रतिरूपो बभूव तदस्य रूपं प्रतिचक्षणाय । इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते युक्ता ह्यस्य हरयः शता दशेति ।'
Br. Up. II. 5.19 VI 'मायां तु प्रकृति विद्यान्मायिन तु महेश्वरम् ।।
Sve. UP. IV. 10 28 What is more the word Māyā does not exclusively connote the illu
sory nature of phenomena. In some passages it is distinctly used to suggest the power of God, which is real and which is responsible for the existence of world--phenomena as in the Sve. Up. IV. 10. and Br. Up. II--5.19. One might say that the independent entity of Prakrti in the Upanişads becomes the Māyā of Isvara. It is a sort of Upani
şadic approriation of the Sāṁkhya Praksti. 29 "These passages are clearly repugnant to the doctrine of Māyā' Thibaut,
Vedānta Sūtras, Part I, SBE, Vol. XXXIV, p. cxviii. 'The doctrine of

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Seeds of Parinama in the Earliest Literature
17
evolved out of Brahman as real, foreshadows the development of the theory of Pariņāma.
YĀSKA (about 600 B.C.)30, PĀŅINI (500 B.C.): 1, PATANJALI: 2
It has been customary with historians of Indian Philosophy like Das Gupta, Radhakrishnan and others, to pass from the Upanişads to the epics, early Buddhism, Jainism, Sāmkhya and other Vedic darśanas. This is quite a justifiable process in the ordinary course of things. But it should be noted that in our culture, as early as the Upanişadic period, the first thing upon which scientific reason was exercised was language, so much so that it was pursued as an independent discipline and various systematic treatises were also written on it. What is important for us to note is that scientific or philosophic outlook - for in the earlier stages it is difficult to distinguish clearly between science and philosophy - often got
Māyā is not to be derived in any reasonable way from a system which was pantheistic or cosmogonic and in which, therefore, the assumption that the world was illusory would have been ridiculous. A pantheism and still more a cosmogonism are under the danger of falling to the level of materialism but not of evoking an illusionism'. Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and the Upanişads' by Keith, Vol. II, p.531. - 'Is there anything in the early Upanişads to show that the author. believed in the objective world being an illusion ? Nothing at all.' Hopkins, J. A. O. S. xxii, p. 385. "The opinion expressed by some eminent scholars that the burden of the Upanisad teaching is the illusive character of the world and the reality of one soul only is manifestly wropg and I may even say is indicative of an uncritical judgement. R. G. Bhandarkar - Vaişnavism and Saivism. p. 2. foot-note. According to Prof. Belvalkar, Yaska is not later than 700 B. C... 'History of Indian Philosophy', Vol. II, p. 37. Macdonell (History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 22) places him in the 5th cent. B.C. Goldstucker, R.G. Bhandarkar, place him in the 7th cent. B. C. Macdonell assigns him to the 4th cent. B.C. - Middle of the 2ad cent. B. C. cf. Keith's Samkhya System, p. and Das Gupta, History of Indian Philosop'y, 'Vol. I, p. 212. 2 -
30
31

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama
effectively expressed in thoughts and theories about language. So it would not be out of place if I draw upon for the theory of Pariņāma what the Nirukta, the Aştādhyāyi of Pāṇini and the Mahabhāşya of Patañjali have to say about it.
Yaska mentions six modes in which bhava or action in general) is classified by Vārşyayaņi. -
Of these six bhāva-vikaras, we are concerned only with “vipariņamate'. It is defined as the modification of a being that does not fall away from its own self or essential nature'. 33
The evidence of Nirukta is significant from two points of view. The age of its composition, as said above, is contemporaneous with that of earlier Upanişads and the rise of Jainism and Buddhism, if not earlier.
The second point which gives significance to this reference in the Nirukta is the character of the work. Even though it is a Vedānga and in that sense, sacred, yet it contains discussions pertaining to language which was a common property of the people, especially of men of learning. In fact, linguists had to give precision to words in order to clarify ideas which must have formed the subject matter of discussion amongst thinkers.
Thus the Nirukta reflects current and older philosophical ideas. There can be no doubt that various types of change were analysed and put into precise terms of which Yåska has taken notice in the above passage. Of these, change in a thing without its original nature being lost, was indicated by the word vipariņāma and this, as we shall see, is precisely the idea underlying the metaphysical concept of pariņāma of the Sārkhya and the Jain system. In the Nirukta, of course, vipariņāma is not meant to be a philosophical doctrine but one of the modes of bhava and is thus more a category of grammar. Nevertheless, unless this.
16h1af$iti wanalfa aszfafor: 1...... विपरिणमते इत्यप्रच्यवमानस्य तत्त्वाद्विकारम् ।

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concept of vipariņāma or pariṇāma was well-known to and clearly grasped by the thinkers of the time in one form or the other (whether as a metaphysical or a grammatical concept), it could not have become a subject-matter for definition in a treatise like the Nirukta. We can, therefore, without hesitation say that this idea of vipariņama or pariņāma must have been favoured by what we may call proto-Samkhya and proto-Jain thinkers. We have also seen how the earlier Upanisads provide ground for the rise of such a concept.
19
PĀŅINI
Panini in his Aṣṭādhyāyi mentions the word vikara in the sūtras, तस्य विकारः । ( 4 / 3 / 134 ) and तदर्थ विकृतेः प्रकृतौ । ( 5/1/12). Patanjali, the author of the Mahabhāṣya, does not say much on these sutras by way of explanation, especially of the word vikära. However, Kaśikā, a late commentary on the sutras of Panini, written by Vamanajayaditya, a Buddhist, (about the 9th cent. A. D.) explains these respectively, as follows: 'vikāra is the change of state of the original.' 'Prakṛti is the original cause while Vikṛti is its subsequent change of state'.34
It may be noted that the Jain grammarian Hemacandra (12 th cent. A. D.), too, explains 'vikara' in a similar manner, thus 'Vikāra is the change of state of the substance. '95
However, as Pāṇini himself has not explained the term, we cannot exactly say what he meant by 'vikara'. Nevertheless, considering the fact that Vamanajayāditya takes 'vikara' to mean pariņāma and that Hemacandra also follows the same traditional interpretation, we can reasonably presume that Panini also must have implied pariņāma by the word "vikara' which, otherwise, is a wider term. What is more, there has generally been 34 'प्रकृतेरवस्थान्तरं विकार: ।' and 'प्रकृतिरुपादानकारणं, तस्यैव उत्तरमवस्थान्तरं विकृतिः । '
35 द्रव्यस्यावस्थान्तर विकासः । 6-2-30

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an unanimity of view, amongst grammarians, in regard to the traditional interpretation of grammatical terms, whatever may be their other dogmatic differences.
PATANJALI
Patañjali clearly explains the concept of parināma at two places, one, while defining the concept of dravya in his bhāşya on the Pāṇini Sūtra 5/1/119, and the other while distinguishing two types of nityatā, viz., kūțastha-nityata and pariņāma-nityata.
Dravya is defined as that whose thatness' is not destroyed even on the manifestation of new qualities. And 'thatness' is the essential nature of a thing. Thus, for example, the qualities like redness, yellowness etc. appear in amalaka etc., but yet the latter is recognised to be the same (amalaka). 36
Here it can be easily seen that the words 'तत्वं न विहन्यते'. occurring in the passage under discussion are only a paraphrase of 'तत्त्वादप्रच्यवमानस्य' of the Nirukta,
Next, in the discussion of the ‘nityānityatva' of sabda in the first Adhyāya (1/1/1), while trying to show that the meaning of the word 'siddha' in fe gorg#Fare' is synonymous with that of nitya, Patañjali points out incidentally that 'nitya’ signifies that which is eternal, absolutely steady, immoveable, not subject to growth, decay or destruction, unchanging, beginningless and imperishable,37 in other words, kūțastha-nitya. But this, according to him, does not constitute the sole definition of nitya. That also is 'nitya' in which the 'thatness' of a thing is not destroyed.38 This is made clearer by the illustration of ‘ākṣti'. When an ‘ākrti' 36 'यस्य गुणान्तरेष्वपि प्रादुर्भवत्सु तत्त्वं न विहन्यते तद् द्रव्यम् । किं
पुनस्तत्त्वम् । तद्धावस्तत्त्वम् । तद्यथा आमलकादीनां फलानां रक्तादयः
पीतादयश्च गुणाः प्रादुर्भवन्ति आमलकं बदरमित्येव भवति ।' 37 ध्रव कूटस्थमविचाल्यन पायोपजनाविकार्यनुत्पत्त्यवृद्धयव्यययागि । 38 aafa farqi arta rata' faecual

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Seeds of Parināma in the Earliest Literature
or from disappears in the case of one dravya, it does not altogether cease to exist but is seen to subsist in another dravya.39 What is meant is that inspite of undergoing change, akṛti never totally abandons its essential nature (tattva) of 'akṛtitva'.
This obviously refers to the concept of pariņāmi-nityatā.
Thus Patanjali not only explains and illustrates the concept of pariņāma which was for the first time enunciated in the Nirukta, but also makes for the first time a precise and clearcut distinction between two types of nityatā viz., kūṭastha-nityatā and parinami-nityatā.
21
39 '..... निश्याssकृतिः । कथम् । न क्वचिदुपरतेति कृत्वा सर्वत्रोपरता भवति । द्रव्यान्तरस्था तूपलभ्यते ।'
..... किं पुनस्तत्त्वम् । तस्य भावस्तत्त्वम् ।
आकृतावपि तत्त्व न विहन्यते । I. 1. 1
sense of
It should be noted that akṛti is here understood in the akṛti-sāmānya compared to which the different dravyas in which ākṛti comes to inhere become visesas.

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CHAPTER II
SĀNKHYA IDEAS IN PRE-ISVARAKRSNA LITERATURE
SAMKHYA IN THE UPANIŞADAS
Though we are in this thesis primarily concerned with the study of the theory of pariņāma in the Samkhya darśana, we cannot understand it without a knowledge of its other doctrines. We have seen, in the previous chapter, the early formulations of pariņāma ideas. Now let us study the early occurrence of otherSamkhya ideas. So I propose to give a brief account of Samkhya ideas as found in per-īśvaraksșņa literature.
SĀMKHYA IDEAS IN THE UPANIŞADS
In one of the oldest Upanişads viz. the Cha.Up., the passage (VI. 4) which states that behind all things there are really three primary colours, the red, the white and the black which may really be said to exist, while all other things that are constituted out of them are merely a word, a modification and a name.' contains according to scholars like Prof. Ranade, the rudiments of the Samkhya Guņa Theory. The names Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, however, it may be noted, get the earliest mention in the Maitrayaņi, a late Upanișad.
According to Das Gupta, a comparison and combination of the two passages of the Chā. Up. viz. - one noted above (VI. 4) and the other (VI. 1.4) stating, “as by one clod of clay, all that is made of clay is known, the difference being only in name, arising from speech, so it is only the clay that is true' -practically give the evolution - Pariņāma theory of the Sāmkhya school.3
1 A detailed account of the same is given in 'Sāmkhya System' by
Keith, Ch. I. p. 1 to 19 and in 'Yoga Philosophy' by Das Gupta,
p. 17 to 34. 2 'A Constructive Survey of Upanişadic Philosophy' p. 182. 3 'Yoga Philosophy in relation to other systems of Indian Thought
p. 33-34.

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Sārkhya Ideas in Pre-īśvarakrşņa Literature
23
In the Katha Up. we are told that "the objects are higher than the senses, mind than the objects, the Buddhi than mind, the great self than Buddhi, the Avyakta than the Great Self, the Puruşa than the Avyakta and that beyond and above the Puruşa there is nothing else'.4 In the same Up. a similar account is given. Here the mind stands above the senses, Sattva above the mind, over that the Great Self, over that the Avyakta, and over that the Spirit.5 Here we find terms like (54197' and 'fe' used in the classical Samkhya. Thus these passages give us important categories of the Sāmkhya philosophy.
A much more developed form of Sāmkhya is to be found in the Sve. Up. This Up. abounds in the Samkhya categories. In this work the words Sāṁkhya and Kapila are to be found for the first time. It may be noted that the various categories of the classical Samkhya viz., Vyakta, Avyakta, Jña, Pradhāna, Prakrti, Pariņāmayet also find mention in the same Upanişad.?
One should bear in mind that all these Samkhya categories are related to one supreme God, Brahman or Rudra.
Again, therein the three-coloured she-goat is said to refer to the three Gunas of the Sāṁkhya Praksti and the two he-goats, to the t:vo kinds of souls, one still in the enjoyment of Prakști and the other, who, after having enjoyed her, has left her.8
The passage, V. 5. of this Upanişad deserves special notice as it uses the word 'pariņāmayet' for the first time in the earlier Upanişads.
Šamkarācārya does not explain the word "pariņāmayet.' 4 1. 3. 10-11 5 II. 6. 7-8 6 aa fircut AIETÈTIFTITIT 1 (VI. 13) and to gai afaris
PETAI (V. 2). 7 1. 8-10, 1V. 10, 1, 13, V. 7., VI. 4, V. 5, V. 8. 8 अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां बह्वीः प्रजाः सृजमानां सरूपाः ।
371 a. gaisgata grigi YHTIATISFA: ? (IV.5)

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Pariņāma
May not 'parinamayet' here be used in the sense of a process similar to the one which turns the digested food into blood. Thus, the sense here might be akin to that found in medical works. The general meaning of 'carrying a thing to another state', is of course implied but here it seems to have this specific sense.
24
In the Praśna Up.9 we have an account of how all things are resolved into the Imperishable in the order of the five elements with the corresponding matras or subtle elements and this distinctly refers to the elements of the Samkhya. Again as Prof. Ranade10 points out, the conception of Linga-sarira of the later Samkhya philosophy is already adumbrated for us in the Praśna which reiterates from time to time the nature of the Purusa with sixteen parts. Thus, one passage, VI. 2. says that 'in this body verily is that Being who is made up of sixteen parts.' Another passage VI. 4 gives us the constituents of this Person such as breath, space, air etc. which are more or less mythological but which nevertheless point to the similarity of idea.
-
The Maitrāyaṇi Up. is assigned a very late date and is often not included in the thirteen Upanisads. The mention of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas by name, the exposition of the five subtle elements, the enunciation of the five gross elements and reference to the Samkhya categories. viz. Kṣetrajña, Sāṁkhya, adhyavasaya and linga all occur in this Upanisad.11
From the foregoing review, it would appear that general ideas underlying Samkhya philosophy such as those of change and permanence, derivation of the world from one principle, three colours etc, occur in the earlier portions of the Śrauta
9 ‘पृथिवी च पृथिवीमात्रा चापश्चापोमात्रा च तेजश्च तेजोमात्रा च वायुश्व वायुमात्रा चाकाशश्चाकाशमात्रा च एतत्सर्वं परेऽक्षरे आत्मनि
संप्रतिष्ठते । ' IV. 8
10 'Constructive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy' p, 183.
11 A detailed account of Samkhya ideas in this Upanisad is found in Keith's Samkhya System, p. 13-14 and Das Gupta's Yoga Philosophy, p. 29 to 31.

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Samkhya Ideas in Pre-īsvarakrạna Literature
25
literature; while specific Sāṁkhya terms find mention in the later portions : what bearing this fact has on the history of Sāmkhya darśana, we shall study, later on.
SĀMKHYA IN THE MAHĀBHĀRATA13
(400 B.C. to 400 A.D.) 13
After the Upanişads, our next sources for studying the development of Samkhya ideas are the works like the Mahābharata, the Smộtis and the Purānas. It should be pointed out here that by putting this discussion before Isvarakrşna's Sāmkhya, I do not wish to imply that all these works preceded in time to the Samkhyakārikā. While some portions of these works dealing with Sāmkhya might have very well preceded Isvarakațşna, there might be others which would be due to the influence of Isvarakļşņa. As, however, there is not enough evidence to discriminate between the various strata of these works, I have thought it proper to follow the old tradition of taking the Mbh., the Smộtis and the Purāņas together as constituting the Smộti tradition to be distinguished from the Srauta literature.
In the Mbh. at XII.318, three schools of Samkhya are mentioned viz. those who admitted twenty-four categories, those who admitted twenty-five and those who admitted twenty-six categories. The school of twenty-four, according to Das Gupta, agrees with the views of Pañcasikha found in the Mbh. XII.219 as also with those of Caraka, a work on medicine which will be noticed hereafter, The school of twenty-five categories, Das Gupta identifies with the well-known orthodox Samkhya System of Isvarakļşņa.14 This, however, is not exactly the case. The one that would identify the twenty-fifth category with that of the Purusas, regarding the latter
12 For a detailed account of Sainkhya in the Mbh., vide Samkhya System
by Keith, Ch. III, and Great Epic of India by Hopkins p. 97 onwards. 13 'The Great Epic of India', p. 398
Hopkins gives different stages of additions to the (pic. According to
him, the didactic matter was included about 200 B.C. 14 History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 216-217.

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama
as ‘nirguņa’ would be representing the view of Isvarakļşna. This kind of doctrine is to be found at XII. 194, XII. 306, XII. 314315, XIV. 50.8. The other that takes the twenty-fifth principle to be one Ātman who is sometimes called Vişnu, Vasudeva, Narāyaṇa etc. and derives Praksti from him or regards him as an Adhişthātā should be regarded as different. This view is mentioned in XII. 303, XII. 302.38, XII.339. In the school of twenty-six categories, the twenty-fifth category is that of Puruşas and the twenty-sixth is Brahman, Vişnu or Nārāyaṇa as in XII.350, 25-26 and XII. 351, XII. 217, XII. 308. It may be noted that the Gitā throughout upholds the last view and takes Krsna as the twentysixth principle. What is more, the Mbh. (XII.318) recommends. this view and explicitly denounces the view of twenty-four and twenty-five categories as unsatisfactory:15
Just as there is no uniformity in the Mbh. in regard to the number of fundamental categories, so also there prevails a variety of views on the different evolutes of the series. Thus in XII.298, 7 the following eight categories are given - viz. the five senses, mind, Buddhi and Kşetrajña. 16 At another place XII. 275, 16-18, for the Spirit, Citta is substituted and the Spirit is reckoned as the ninth element. In XII.313, the following are derived from Nature the five organs of perception, the five organs of action, mind, Individuation and Buddhi. This, it can be seen, in its substance, corresponds with the products of the classical Samkhya.17 In XII. 306, the eight Prakrtis are mentioned in the manner of the classical Samkhya with this difference that instead of the five Tanmātras, five Bhūtas are substituted. The order of development is thus stated. From the Avyakta Praksti is produced the Mahat, from 15 7 ggfå ea na ughafaqfti: Mbh. XII 318.74 _ 'तेनैतान्नाभिनन्दन्ति पञ्चविंशकमच्युतम् ।
जन्ममृत्युभयागीता योगाः सांख्याश्च काश्यप ।
gefa Ta97a: 172479714011: ll' Mbh. XII 318.79 16 PETIT 77 957 qoy' J 4 gota i
Atarf TIC: 77TEAH I'Mbh. XII 248. 17 17 Vide Chapter III.

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Samkhya Ideas in Pre-Isvarakrșna Literature
27
it Individuation, from it the five Elements. The Vikaras are said to be sixteen but after that only five višeșas and five senses, i. e. in all ten vikāras are mentioned. In XII. 310.10-17, five organs of perception - eye, ear, etc., their five objects, five organs of action, speech, hands etc. and mind are mentioned as the sixteen vikāras. The evolutionary series given in the Anugita (XIV, 40-42) agrees in many respects with that of the classical Samkhya. It is stated that from the Avyakta 'is produced the Mahat, from it Individuation, from it the five Elements, from them on the one hand the qualities of sound etc. and on the other the five vital airs, while from Individuation arise the eleven organs of sense - five of perception, five of action and mind.
It may be noted that nowhere in the Mbh. do we get a reference to the five Tanmātrās (which in the classical Sāmkhya are derived from Individuation) and to the division of Individuation into Vaikārika, Taijasa and Tamasa found in the Sāṁkhyakārika.
With the exception of these two, the Mbh. records the categories of the classical Samkhya in a variety of ways. Nevertheless the important concepts of the classical Sāṁkhya, like those of the three Guņas, the distinction between Puruşa and Prakști, the plurality of passive Puruşās etc. are clearly mentioned.
From the above, it is clear that the Mbh.-Samkhya provides a cosmology with a God. Though the terms like ‘vikurvānāḥ' and "Vikuste', Vikriya' do occur in the Mbh. (XII.313.15, 302.21.42, 308.2)18 yet we do not find any explicit mention of parināma as explaining creation. It may be that the idea of pariņāma was taken for granted as implicit in the process.
SĀŇKHYA IDEAS IN THE SMRTIS AND PURĀŅAS
The Smặtis and the Purānas adopt the Mbh. tradition of theistic Samkhya in one form_or another. In the Manu-Smộti which is contemporaneous with the main body of the didactic
18 Cf. also 307, 13

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Pariņāma epic,19 references to the Samkhya terms, viz. Mahat, Ahamkāra, and the three Gunas are to be found.20
28
The Yajnavalkya Smrti, however, alludes to the categories of the Samkhya in greater detail.21
It gives a more systematic account of the Samkhya categories than the one found in the Manu-Smrti. It gives twenty-four categories viz., Avyakta - Atma, Buddhi, Individuation, eleven senses (five of preception, five of action, and mind), five Arthas (objects) and five Elements, pṛthivi etc. which agree in almost all the details with those of the classical Samkhya, except the substitution of the Arthas in place of the Tanmatrās of the classical Samkhya and the absence of the recognition of Prakṛti, the 24th principle, as distinct from the Puruşa, the twenty fifth principle. It is noteworthy that the whole series is said to evolve from the Avyakta ātmā who thus ceases to be a mere passive spectator as in the classical Samkhya. The Atma is said to have got entangled in the three Gunas. The same Atma freed from the bondage of the three Gunas is called ::, the highest self (st. 174), wherein takes place the dissolution of all the principles. This account, it may be noted, closely resembles the Mbh. view of twenty-four categories as well as the one given in the Caraka.
--
The cosmogonic accounts of the Purānas mention all the categories of the classical Samkhya, by including the Tanmātrās
19 'Samkhya System' Keith, p. 44.
20 'उद्ववर्हात्मनश्चैव मनः सदसदात्मकम् ।
मनसश्चाप्यहंकारमभिमन्तारमीश्वरम् ||१४|| Manu Smrti 1.14
21
#gızaĦa ac81a' aaffù fagonfà a 1 विषयाणां ग्रहीतृणि शनैः पञ्चेन्द्रियाणि च ॥ १५॥ तेषां त्ववयवान्सूक्ष्मान् षण्णामप्यमितौजसाम् । सन्निवेश्यात्ममात्रासु सर्वभूतानि निर्ममे ||१६|| '
The three Gunas are elaborately described in XII. 24-52. II. 168-174

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Samkhya Ideas in Pre-Isvarakṛṣṇa Literature
and the three kinds of Individuation viz. Vaikārika, Taijasa and Tamasa I that were so far omitted in the accounts of the Samkhya categories. However these Samkhya ideas are given a mould which would be consistent with the view of the sectarian schools, like the Bhāgavata, Pasupata etc. That is why in all the accounts we find a God postulated as the Creator and ten Devas as the presiding deities of the ten senses22. The personification of the three Gunas as Brahma, Vişņu and Śiva in the Matsya Purāṇa also points to the same things. This way of looking at trinity, it may be noted, became a popular dogma as can be seen from the mangala verse of Kadambarî.24
-
CARAKA (78 A.D.)25
Just as we drew upon grammatical works for understanding the history of Samkhya doctrine, similarly we may draw upon the medical work viz. the Caraka26. This work, gives an elaborate account of the twenty-four categories of the Samkhya27. It enumerates not only the twenty-four categories of the Samkhya but also states the order of evolution, which is the same as the one found in the classical Samkhya (st. 63, 64, 66). The twenty-four categories are, Avyakta, Buddhi, Individuation, five gross Elements, (these eight are 'bhūtaprakṛti') the five organs of
29'
22 Visnupuraṇa, I.2. 19-57. All the other Puranas give more or less similar account of creation.
23 गुणेभ्यः क्षोभमाणेभ्यस्त्रयो देवा विजज्ञिरे ।
एका मूर्तिस्त्रयो देवा ब्रह्मविष्णुमहेश्वराः ।
( एका मूर्तिस्त्रयो भागा ) Matsya P.I.3.16
24 रजेाजुष' जन्मनि सत्त्ववृत्तये स्थितौ प्रजानां प्रलये तमः स्पृशे । अजाय सर्गस्थितिनाशहेतवे त्रयीमयाय त्रिगुणात्मने नमः ॥२॥
25 'History of Indian Philosophy, Das Gupta, Vol. I, p. 212. 26 This work is generally not dealt with in the study of the Samkhya.
Attention to it was drawn by Prof. Das Gupta in his 'History of Indian Philosoyhy', Vol. I, p. 213.
27 Katidhapuruşiya Prakaraṇa, Carakasaṁhitā, p. 287. ff.

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Pariņāma perception, the five of action, mind and the five Arthas (these sixteen being called vikaras as in the classical Samkhya). The place of Tanmatrās of the classical Samkhya is here taken by the five Arthas (as in the Mbh. and Yajñavalkya Smrti).
30
By a conglomeration of the Avyakta with its later evolutes, Rasi-puruşa or Jivatma comes into existence (st. 35). All karma, good or evil, pleasure, pain, cognition, birth, death, bondage, liberation etc. (st. 39,40,41) belong to this Raśi-puruşa, i e. to say, he, on account of his delusion, desire, aversion and karma, is the cause of all these things (st. 53). When, however, the Sattva Guna predominates (st. 36) and the true knowledge dawns, the conglomeration ceases to exist and the Puruşa comes to have the pure state. This free Puruşa is called Bhūtātmā or Paramātmā (st. 84, 57,53). It must be noted here that this pure Purușa, Bhūtātmā, is not given a separate existence from the Avakta-prakṛti but is only regarded as a state of Prakṛti i. e. Avyakta and Atmā or Kṣetrajña are identified and the very same Atmā when in union with its later products is called Rasipuruşa or Jivatma. The utlimate state of liberation is characterless absolute existence and is spoken of as the Brahma-state (aaa) (St. 154-155).88
In the above account what is important for us to notes is that the plurality of passive purusas, reckoned as the twentyfifth principle in the Samkhya of Isvarakṛṣṇa is assimilated here in the Avyakta, the twenty-fourth principle. Consequently, the Puruşa no longer remains a passive spectator but an active agent responsible for his bondage and liberation which in the classical Samkhya are effected by the non-sentient Prakṛti. On the other hand, the non-sentient Prakṛti, the twenty-fourth principle, the prius of the world phenomena, in the classical Samkhya becomes a sentient principle having the same functions (as those vested in the Prakṛti of the classical Samkhya).
28 For a detailed account of Caraka cf. 'History of Indian Philosophy' Vol. I, Das Gupta, p. 213 onwards.

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Samkhya Ideas in Pre-Isvarakṛṣṇa Literature
31
REVIEW
The numerous references to the Samkhya ideas noted above both in the religious and secular literature make it abundantly clear that the Samkhya ideas must have been widely prevalent then. That they must have been greatly authoritative and must have powerfully influenced the contemporary thought is brone out by the explicit statement in the Mbh. to that effect. 'In the Mbh.', as Hopkins puts it 'Kapila is authoritative in all philosophical matters and that his name covers every sort of doctrine. He is in fact the only founder of a philosophical system known to the epic'.29 The best evidence', in the words of Hopkins, 'of the authority of Kapila is given not by express statement but by implication in the praise of other systems which, an important point, are by the same implication looked upon as distinct from that of Kapila, although his name is used to uphold them. Thus Kapila's own system is called generally the Samkhya-Yoga or specifically the Kapilam. The Samkhya-Yogins are said to be the models even in teaching of other tendency as in XII. 347.22. and nothing better can be said of the Bhagavatas, here extolled, than that their system is equal to the Samkhya-Yoga', not, be it observed, the same but as good as the system of Kapila. In the Gitā, too (I, 75) the Samkhya is cited alone as the one system of Salvation'.30 It is also significant to note that Kapila's treatise is repeatedly regarded to be the oldest.81
All this leaves no doubt as to the antiquity and supremacy of the Samkhya thought in ancient india.
29 Great Epic of India, p. 97, 99, 100.
30 Great Epic of India, p 100
31 Great Epic of India, p. 98, (Mbh. X1I. 350, 6)

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CHAPTER III
PARIŅĀMA IN THE SAMKHYA-KARIKĀ
AND ITS COMMENTARIES
Introductory :
Our discussion of the theory of Pariņāma in Samkhya-Yoga is based mainly on the Skā. of Iśvarakļşņa, the Sāmkhya-sūtras, and the Yoga-sūtras of Patañjali with their important commentaries. and sub-commentaries
The Samkhya-karikā of īśvarakļsna is the earliest available: work of the Samkhya system. Scholars have held divergent views as regards the date of this work.1 It may be assigned to the 2nd or 3rd cent. A. D. Isvarakrsna describes himself as being in the succession of disciples from Kapila, through Asuri and Pañcaśikha. Thus Kapila becomes the original ‘seer' of this system. Various mythical accounts are to be found in regard to Kapila? but according to Prof. Radhakrishnan it may be accepted that a historical individual of the name of Kapila was responsible for the Samkhya tendency of thought. It will not be wrong, in his opinion, to place him in the century preceding Buddha.3
According to Max Muller, however, the oldest text-book of the Sāmkhya is the Tattvasamāsa, but this view has now been
1 Prof. A. B. Dhruva (cf. his paper in the proceedings of the First
Oriental Conference) and Gopinath Kaviraj (cf. his introduction to Jayama ngala, p. 8) place it in the 1st cent. B. C. Dr. Belvalkar in the 1st cent. A.D. or the 1st half of the 2nd cent. A. D. (Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume, pp. 175-178). According to Prof. Das Gupta (History of Indian philosophy, Vol. I, p. 212) and Radhakrishnan (Indian philosophy, Vol. II, p. 255) it is a work of the 3rd cent. A.D.
Keith places it in the 4th cent. A.D. (Sankhya System, p. 69). 2 Mbh. XII. 340. 67, Rāmāyaṇa, I. 40-41, Bhagavata, III, 24. 36. Šve.
Up. v. 2, 3 Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 254, 4 Six Systems of Indian Philosophy', p. 318-319.

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Parinama in the Samkhya-kārikā and its Commentaries
33
rejected by scholars like Garbes, Keith, Das Gupta etc., who place it after 1400 A.D.
Commentaries on the Skā. : Prof. R.C. Parikh, after having examined the arguments of Prof. Belvalkar, Keith and Takkasu in regard to the date of Mātharavștti, as also the internal evidence of the same, concludes that it can be placed in the beginning of the 4th cent. A. D. or the latter half of the 3rd cent. A. D. Thus Māgharavștti can be said to be the earliest commentary of the Skā.
Next Gaudapáda and Rājā wrote commentaries on the Skā. There is, however, dispute about Gaudapada's date and personality. He is generally placed before Vācaspati (9 th cent. A.D.). According to Das Gupta, Rāja's commentary on the Skā. was the same as Rājavārttika quoted by Vācaspati and is probably now lost.8
The Buddhist monk Paramartha translated the Skā. into Chinese and also wrote a commentary on it in the 6th cent. A.D. We have consulted its English translation by S.S. Suryanarayanan.
Next, attention may be drawn to an anonymous commentary on the Ska. viz. the Yuktidipikāwhich is recently discovered and is assigned to the 6th Cent. A.D. by Dr. Mookerji. 10
Finally, we may mention the most important commentary viz. Tattva-kaumudi of Vacaspati on the Skā. which is placed, without dispute, in the 9th cent. A.D. Jayamangala, in the opinion of Dr. Gopinātha Kaviraj, is wrongly attributed to Šamkarácarya. Kaviraj
5 Sankhya Philosophy, pp. 68-70. 6 Sámkhya System, p. 68, 89. 7 'Purātattva' (Gujarāti quarterly), Year I (1923), Vol. 2, pp. 152-160. 8 History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 212. 9 This work has been edited by Pulinbih āri Cakravarti and published in
1938. 10 'Sámkhya-Yogi System', History of Philosophy-Eastern and Western,
Vol. I. p. 292

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Pariņāma presumes Samkararya to be the author and places him about 1400 A D.11
34
Pariṇāma in Iśva rakṛṣṇa's Kārikā
we
As our main concern is with the theory of Pariņāma, shall here consider those Karikas which have a direct or indirect bearing upon it. Pariņāma, however, being a metaphysical concept can only be understood in relation to other metaphysical concepts of the Samkhya. Hence we shall have to take notice of these also.
Isvarakṛṣṇa analyses the whole universe into twenty-five principles, of which twenty-four, from the Avayakta-Prakṛti down to the gross Elements represent the mental and material creation, while the twenty-fifth, the Purusas, is distinct from these. The order of evolution of the twenty-four Principles is as follows: From the Prakṛti proceeds the Mahat, thence Individuation; from the Vaikṛta Individuation proceeds the group of eleven senses (five of knowledge, five of action and mind) characterised by Sattva; from the Bhūtādi Individuation proceed the subtle elements which are characterised by Tamas; from the Taijasa Individuation proceed both. Thus out of Individuation a group of sixteen is produced. Lastly from the five subtle elements arise the five gross elements. 12
Of these twenty-four principles the primal Prakṛti is not an evolute but an evolvent only as it becomes the cause of later principles and is itself not caused by anything. The group of seven, viz. Mahat, Individuation and the five subtle elements,
being the cause of some and the effect of others is called both the evolvent and the evolute, while the eleven organs and the five gross elements, being only the effects and not the causes of further
11 Introduction to Jayamangalā, p. 9.
cf. also Literary Gleanings in Q. J. of the Andhra Hist. R. S., Oct, 1927.
12 प्रकृतेर्महांस्ततोऽह‌ङ्कारस्तस्माद् गणश्च षोडशकः ।
तस्मादपि षोडशकात् पञ्चभ्यः पञ्च भूतानि ॥
Skā. 22.

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35
principles, are designated as vikaras or evolutes only. The Purusathe Subject, the twenty-fifth principle, is neither an evolute nor an evolvent as it is not caused by anything, nor does it become the cause of anything 13
!
The twenty-five principles are also classified as Vyakta (Manifest), Avyakta (Unmanifest) and Jña (the Subject). It is the knowledge of these three that liberates man from wordly misery. 14 Of these three, the Vyakta15 is stated to be caused, non-eternal, non-pervading, mobile (i.e. capable of movement in space),16 manifold, dependent, mergent,17 conjunct and subordinate. The Avyakta is the reverse of this.18 The Vyakta and Avyakta are similar19 in so far as both are possessed of the three Guņas, are indistinguish
सात्त्विक एकादशक: प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहकारात् ।
भूतादेस्तन्मात्रः स तामसस्तैजसादुभयम् ॥ Ska 25... 13 मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिर्महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त ।
षोडशकस्तु विकारो न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥ Skā. 3 14 तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान् व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात् । Ska. 2 15 हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् । __सावयवं परतन्त्र व्यक्तं विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ॥ Skā. 10 16 'सक्रियम्' – परिस्पन्दवत् । यथा हि बुद्ध्यादयः उपात्तमुपात्तं देहं त्यजन्ति
देहान्तरं चोपाददत, इति तेषां परिस्पन्दः । शरीरपृथिव्यादीनां च परिस्पन्दः प्रसिद्ध एव।' STK on Ska 10 'लिङ्ग' however is differently explained by Vacaspati as : यथा चैते बुद्धयादयः प्रधानस्य लिङ्ग तथोपरिष्टाद्वक्ष्यति । प्रधानं तु न प्रधानस्य लिङ्गम अनुमितिकारणम् । .... ...' i.e. STK on Ska. 10. Yuktidipika gives the same meaning, Jayamangala notes both the senses, viz. 'mergenti
and the mark leading to the inference of Pradhāna’. 18 Note that the reverse of 'सक्रियत्व' in the Avyakta is to be understood
in the sense of the absence of 'parispanda' only for "सदशपरिणाम is there cf. STK on Ska 10. निष्क्रियम् ... यद्यप्यव्यक्तस्यास्ति परिणाम
लक्षणा क्रिया तथापि परिस्पदो नास्ति । 19 त्रिगुणमविवेकि विषय: सामान्यमचेतनं प्रसवमि । ___ व्यक्तं, तथा प्रधानम्, तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान् ॥ Skā 11.

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The Sarikhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Pariņāma
able,20 objective, common, insentient and productive. The Jña is. the reverse of these two and yet also similar to them in some respects. Thus like the Avyakta, the Jña is uncaused, enternal, allpervading, independent, non-mergent, non-conjunct and like the Vyakta, multiple, As distinguished from the two, He is devoid of the three Gunas, distinguishable (Viveki), non-objective, non"general, sentient, non-productive and absolutely passive (i.e. devoid of both parispanda and pariņāma).
Thus, Išvarakrşna, in the ultimate analysis, recognises twofundamental principles, one of unchanging conciousness which is multiple and the other, an entity which is the source of the remaining phenomena of the world. In short, all changes, mental21 and physical are relegated to Prakrti and the unchanging aspect of our experience is called the Puruşa - the Subject.
The Prakrti is made of the three Guņas, i.e. the three constituents, viz. Sattva, Rajas and Tamas which on the material side are: responsible for shining (prakaśa), energy (pravștti), obstruction or mass (niyama) respectively, and on the mental side for pleasure. sorrow and dullness. 22 These three, though not causally related, are yet absolutely dependent upon one another. They are found to co-operate in spite of their natural opposition in every object physical or mental. Just as the wick, fire and oil combine to produce illumination, so these also always co-operate throughout 20 Vācaspati gives an additional meaning of ‘aviveki’ as follows :
'अथवा सम्भूयकारिताऽत्राविवेकिता। न हि किंचिदेकं पर्याप्तं स्वकार्य, 379 T FTTT ...I i.e. 'non-separativeness'. One thing is not adequate by itself to produce its eftect but can do so only when in co-operation
with other things. 21 It is this characteristic of Prakřti viz. that it is an evolvent of bo
mental and material phenomena and particularly the fact that the first evolute is Mahat or Buddhi and everything else, mental and physical, is derived from it - which has induced Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar to look upon the Sāṁkhya as an idealism which he compares with that of
Fichte, 'Indian philosophical Review', Vol: II, pp, 201-209, (1918-1919), 22 प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादात्मकाः प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः ।
artufarmerafaelaran TUT: 11 Skā 12

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the course of evolution. 23 The preponderance of one and the subordination of the others in different manner and proportion give rise to the plurality of phenomena in their infinite complexity.
Isvarakṛṣṇa describes the functioning of Prakṛti through the Parinama of the three Gunas. He uses the word pariņāma in the Ska. 16 and 27. In the sixteenth, he says that the Avyakta operates through the three Gunas by blending and modification, like water, on account of the difference arising from the predominance of one or the other of the Gunas. In the second half of the Ka. 27, he points out that the diversity of the organs arises from the specific modifications of the Gunas, and from the diversity of their objects.25
37
The evolutes of Prakrti which arise from the pariņāma of the Gunas and which constitute the Vyakta are considered as karyas (effects) of Prakṛti. Isvarakṛṣṇa tries to prove the existence of the Avyakta, the prius, through the Vyakta-karyas by the principle of causation.26 His pirnciple of causation, however, is not of the same type as that of the Vaiseșikas in which one thing causes another thing which is non-existent (asat), to come into being. Iśvarakṛṣṇa's
...
23
प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः ॥ Ska 13 24 कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तं प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणतः समुदयाच्च । परिणामतः सलिलवत् प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात् ।। Ska. 16
25 गुणपरिणामविशेषान्नानात्वं ग्राह्यभेदाच्च ।
I have adopted the reading of Mathara viz.
i. c. विषय
as it suits better in the context. Gauḍapada, Vācaspati, and the Chinese version of Parmaratha readi.e. the external diversities. Vācaspati explains the second half thus: 'the diversity of organs is due to specific modification of the Gunas like the external diversity'. The reading of Yuktidipika is altogether different. It is fanefaqui तस्मादुभयप्रचारं तत् ।' This reading is also adopted by Bhattotpala in his commentary on the Bṛhat Samhita, p. 7.
26 भेदानां परिमाणात् समन्वयात् शक्तितः प्रवृत्तेश्च । कारणकार्यविभागादविभागाद् वैश्वरूप्यस्य ।। Ska. 15

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Pariņāma
causation is a manifestation of what already pre-exists. This theory is called the Satkaryavāda, while that of the Vaišeşikas is called the Asatkaryavada. He establishes it in the following manér.
'The effect is existent (in its cause), since non-existent cannot be produced; since - there is a definite relation of the cause (with the effect); since all is not possible; since the efficient can do only that for which it is efficient and lastly since the effect is of the same essence as the cause. 27
Such a theory of causation can be understood only on the basis of Pariņāmavāda according to which everything evolves out of a primary substratum and, therefore, in a sense existing in it i.e. in the primary substratum and only becoming manifest through the process of pariņāma.
Thus, on one hand, we see that the Avyakta becomes Vyakta through pariņāma and on the other, the existence of Avyakta is inferentially proved through the principle of Satkāryavada. Now remains the problem of relating the Avyakta-Praksti to the Puruşa (Jña). īśvaraksýna explains it as follows :
From the union of Puruşa and Praksti the insentient 'Evolute' appears as if ‘sentient and similarly, from the activity really belonging to the Guņas, the Spirit (Purusa) which is neutral, appears as if it were active. For the perception of Nature (Prakrti) by the Spirit and for the isolation of the Spirit, there is the union of both, like that of the halt and the blind; and from this union proceeds evolution. This evolution from the Mahat down to the specific elements is brought about by the Prakṣti. This work is done for the emancipation of each Spirit and thus is for another's sake, though appearing as if it were for the sake of Nature herself. As the insentient milk flows out for the growth of the calf so does Nature act towards the emancipation of the Spirit.18
27 369. UTGITT UTE HATHTETET I
शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् कारणभावाच्च सत्कार्यम् ॥ 28 Skā, 20, 21, 56, 57.

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This, however, must be understood as follows. In the Samkhya theory, Prakṛti evolves by itself. No sentient agent is thought necessary. Nevertheless, a philosopher cannot rest content without discovering the purpose of Prakṛti. This he does in t'e 'bhoga' and 'mokṣa' of Purusas. Here we must bear in mind that neither the Purusas can, by definition, have any purpose, nor the Prakrti, being non-sentient, can have one. So we cannot say that the evolution of Prakṛti is teleological in the ordinary sense of the word. We should, therefore, regard it as achieving a purpose without meaning it and look upon the teleological expressions as only a way of explaining the relation between Prakṛti and Puruşa.
39
Development of the Theory of Pariņāma in the Commentaries of the Samkhya-Kārikā
I, here, deliberately leave out the Samkhya-sutras with the Pravacana-bhāṣya of Vijñānabhiksu and the Yoga-sutras of Fa añjali with their commentaries since these works present certain differences of interpretation on some of the important topics of the Samkhya philosophy. They will be treated in detail hereafter.
The commentaries on the Ska. will be examined in their chronological order.
We first take up the commentaries on the Skā. 9. It may be here pointed out, at the outest, that Mathara, Gauḍapada and Paramartha's Chinese version, while commenting on the Skā. 9, simply paraphrase what is stated in that Kärikä itself, adding illustrations for the sake of clarity. Thus they do not contribute much to the understanding of Parināma.
In the Yuktidipika, we find the problem of Pariņāma in relation to the Satkaryavāda receiving further elucidation. While refuting the Asatkāryavāda of the Nyaya-Vaiseṣika school, the author of the Yuktidīpikā defines and explains Pariņāma.
'Pariņāma is the manifestation or appearance of another aspect and the disappearance of the previous one, in a substrate, which

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The Sāmkhya-Yoga and the Jaing Theories of Parimāna
is being favoured by other requisite concomitant conditions. These appearance and disappearance are not production and destruction. This answers the objection that the terms 'birth’ (FFA) and 'existence' (aa) will be synonymous on the assumption of the Satkāryavāda. For when the different kärakas by their activity cause to manifest the cloth which is nothing but the threads themselves arranged in a particular way, it is said by the people in vyavahāra that the cloth is made, produced or is born. When, on the other hand, these kārakas cause to disappear the existing state by a different form owing to the manifestation of other potentialities, the previous form is said to be destroyed. Really speaking, however, there is no production of anything nor destruction of anything?.29
Vacaspati Misra in his STK says almost the same thing, adding only the different proofs (FHTUT) establishing the nondifference between cause and effect.
This shows that according to the Samkhya the so-called production is only the manifestation of what already exists and is not a new creation. The so-called beginning of an object', as Prof. Hiriyanna puts it, is only an event in its history; the object itself is not and cannot be made. Similarly the destruction means only change of form for there can be nothing like absolute annihilation'.30 Thus, as Keith correctly observes, 'causality in Samkhya, in its ultimate essence, is reduced to change of appearance in an abiding entity'.31 The causality of the Satkaryavada, as is 29 साधनानुगृहीतस्य धर्मिणो धर्मान्तरस्याविर्भावः पूर्वस्य च तिरोभावः
परिणामः । न चाविर्भावतिरोभावावुत्पत्तिनिरोधौ । .. ... ... ... एतेनारम्भोपरमोत्पन्नविशेषप्रसङ्गो जन्म-सच्छब्दः प्रत्युक्तः । कथम् ? आत्मभूतं हि तन्तूनां पटाख्यं व्यूहस्थानीयं सन्निवेशविशेषं यदा कारकाणि स्वेन व्यापारेणाविष्कुर्वन्ति तदा क्रियते उत्पद्यते जायते इत्येवमादिर्लोकस्य व्यवहारः प्रवर्तते । यदा तु कारकाणि शक्तयन्तराविर्भावात् संस्थानान्तरेनौत्सुक्यर्तितामवस्थामुपसंहरन्ति तदा प्रागुपलब्धं संस्थानं विनाशशब्दवाच्यतां प्रतिपद्यते।
परमार्थतस्तु न कस्यचिदुत्पादोऽस्ति न विनाशः । 30 Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 273. 31 Samkhya System, p. 73.

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apparent from the above, is only a natural and logical deduction from the postulate of Pariņāmavāda, just as that of Asatkāryavāda, is from that of the Arambhavada.
Māthara's explanation of the word 'afzucht:' occurring in the Skā. 16 points out that there are two kinds of causation. One is the production of effect by automatic transformation, as for instance the transformation of milk into curd. In the other case the effect does not come out by automatic transformation of the material, but it is made out of the material with the help of extraneous .agency, as for example the manufacture of pot from clay with the help of rod, thread, water etc. Of these two kinds of causation, Mathara says that, the first kind operates in Pradhana since it is transformed into the Vyakta, viz. Mahadādi, of its own accord.38
This kind of distinction is not to be found in the Gaudapadabhāşya, Yuktidipikā, STK and Jayamangala. The Yuktidipikā, however, tries to elucidate pariņāma in a different way by raising the objection that the Prakrti being immobile (farfoza) will not be able to put forth the different effects. This is met by pointing to two kinds of kriyā viz, TRGETATOTT activity involving flow i.e. movement and gf ||HTETUT activity of the nature of simple transformation in a thing. Of these two, the first is denied in the Pradhāna, as it is too subtle (apa). It is the second kind of 32 - pilot fafaat Air cu afeunty feetcafeumaticaloa I 0717
परिणामकत्वाद् मृत्पिण्डसूत्रोदकविदलान्पश्यामः । परिणामतश्च क्षीरं दधीति । तत्र प्रधानं कथं कारणमित्यत्रोच्यते-परिणामतः । यथा क्षीरं दधिभावेन परिणमति, यदेव क्षीरं तदेव दधि, एवं प्रधानं व्यक्तभावेन परिणमति दधिवद् व्यक्तं क्षीरवत् प्रधानमित्यर्थः । यदेवाव्यक्तं तदेव व्यक्तमिति । तस्मादुच्यते प्रधानं कारणमिति ।
This passage distinguishes two types of causality, one, that of pariņāma, i. e. natural causation and the other involving extraneous agency. Note that Paramartha's version gives this passage verbatim but cites the example of 'parcots giving birth to a child' while explaining the sccond kind of causation.

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama
kriya - viz. Pariņāma-lakşaņā, that produces the various effects. This pariņāma is then defined thus : When the substrate without leaving its essential nature, puts on another aspect, giving up the previous one, it (i.e. this whole process) is called Pariņāma. Just as a leaf without abandoning its essential nature assumes yellowness, on the disappearance of its previous dark green colour, on account of such causes as heat etc, similarly is this to be understood.33
Jayamangala explains pariņāma as the change of state. Just as a big tree manifests itself from a subtle seed through the growth of roots, branches, sub-branches etc., similarly the Avyakta transforms itself into the Vyakta. 34
__The last quarter of the Ka. 16 viz. 'सलिलवत्प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात्' which deals with the question as to how one Prakrti can bring about diverse manifestations, is explained by all the commentators in more or less the same manner with variation in the illustrations. We give below Vācaspati's explanation since it is somewhat elaborate.
.. Just as the water falling from the clouds though naturally of itself having one taste, becomes sweet, sour, saline, bitter, pungent etc according as it comes into contact with different modifications of earth and becomes transformed into the juice of fruits such as cocoanut, plam, wood-apples and so forth; in the same manner, the Gunas of the Pradhāna come to be predominant one
33. जहद्धर्मान्तरं पूर्वमुपादत्ते यदाऽपरम् । तत्त्वादप्रच्युतो धर्मी परिणामः स
उच्यते ॥ यदा शक्त्यन्तरानुग्रहात् पूर्वधर्म तिरोभाव्य स्वरूपादप्रच्युतो धर्मी धर्मान्तरेणाविर्भवति तदवस्थानं अस्माकं परिणाम इत्युच्यते । यथा पालाशं पलाशादप्रच्युतं निमित्तान्तरस्यातपादेरनुग्रहाच्छयामतां तिरोभाव्य पीततां व्रजति,
तथेदं द्रष्टव्यम् । 34 पूर्वस्यामवस्थायामवस्थान्तरं परिणामः... । यथा कणिकायाः सूक्ष्माया मूलकः(?)
शाखाप्रशाखादिप्रवृद्धो महान्वनस्पतिर्व्यक्तो भवति एवमव्यक्ताद्वयक्तं परिणमति ।

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by one and thereby bring about various modifications in the form. of various products.35
43°
The commentaries on Kā. 27 ' गुणपरिणामविशेषान्नानात्वं' do not. throw any more light than the passages noted above. They simply seek to show that the diversity of the organs and the external: diversity are not caused by God, Buddhi, Ahamkara, Pradhana or Svabhava but by the specific modifications of the Guņas.36
Thus we see that Mathara distinguishes pariņāma as an automatic change by assuming two types of causation and constrasting parṇāma-kāraṇa with apariņāma-karaṇa. The Yuktidipikā and STK. explain pariņāma in relation to Satkāryavāda. The Yuktidipika alone, however, defines pariņāma.37
35 यथा हि वारिदविमुक्तमुदकमेकरसमपि तत्तद्भूविकारानासाद्य नारिकेलताल-तालीबिल्व..............................कपित्थफलरसतया परिणमन्मधुराम्ललवणतिक्तकषायकटुतया विकल्प्ले एवमेकैकगुणसमुद्भवात्प्रधानगुणाः परिणामभेदान् प्रवर्तयन्ति । तदिदमुक्तम्... 'प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात् । एकैकगुणाश्रयेण यो विशेषस्त-मादित्यर्थः ।
36 cf. Mathara and Gaudapāda, on the Ska. 27. 37 Yuktidipika on Ska. 16

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CHAPTER IV
DEVELOPMENT OF PARINĀMA IN THE YOGA-SŪTRAS AND THEIR IMPORTANT COMMENTARIES AND THE
SANKHYA-SŪTRAS AND THEIR COMMENTARIES
Sources
The yoga-works : Indian traditioni identifies Patañjali, the author of the Mahābhāşya with Patanjali, the author of the Yogasūtras. If this tradition can be relied upon, then the date of the Yoga-sūtras, will be the middle of the 2nd cent. B. C. which is the generally accepted date of the Mahabhāșya. But Scholars like Keith and Woods do not subscribe to this traditional view and regard the two Patañjalis as different. Prof. Wood places the Yoga-sūtras in the 4th or 5th cent. A. D. However, they are not later than the 3rd cent. A. D.4 The earliest commentary on the Yoga-sūtra is the Vyāsa-bhāşya (4th cent. A.D.): Vācaspati and Vijñānabhikṣu wrote commentaries on the Vyāsa-bhāşya, called Tattva-Vaišaradī, and Yoga-varttika respectively. Bhikṣu has also written Yogasārasamgrah and Vijñānāmộta-bhāşya, a commentary on the Brahmasūtra. The commentaries of Bhoja (10th cent. A.D.)6 and Nāgesa (17th cent. A.D.)? on the Yoga-sūtras, are respectively called Bhojavștti and Chāyāvyakhya.
1 cf. The commentary of Bhoja on the Yoga-sūtra. Introduction st. 5. 2 Samkhya System, p. 59-57. 3 The Yoga System of Patañjali, Harward Oriental Series, Introduction
P, xv. 4 cf. Prof. R. C. Parikh's article in 'Purātat tva' Year I, Vol. 2, p. 158. 5 Radhakrishnan, Indian philosophy, Vol. II, p. 341-342
cf. Prof. R. C. Parikh's article in “Puratattva', Ycar I, Vol. 2, p. 159. 6 Das Gupta, History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 212. 7 Dās Gupta, History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 212.

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Development of Pariņāma in Yogasūtras
The Samkhya-sūtras are traditionally attributed to Kapila. But they are assigned to the 14th cent. A.D. by modern scholars chiefly on the ground that Mādhava's Sarvadarsanasangraha does not refer to it but bases his account of the Samkhya on the Kārikā.8 Aniruddha was the first to write a commentary on the Sāmkhya-sūtra in the latter half of the 15th cent. A.D. The important commentary on the Sāṁkhya-sūtras is, however, that of Vijñanabhikṣu, called the Samkhyapravacanabhāşya ( 16th cent. A. D.). Bhiksu also wrote an independent work called Samkhyasāra. There are two other works on Samkhya, viz. Şimānanda's (or Kşemendra's) Samkhyatattvavivecana and Bhāvāganesa's Samkhatattvayāthārthyadipana, both of which are later than Vijñānabhiksu.
Pariņāma in the Sūtras of Patañjali and the V.B.
The sūtras of Patañjali do not define" or explain parinām as. such. They seem to take for granted the idea of pariņāma. They explain the different pariņāmas of the Citta and only incidentally refer to those of the Elements (bhūtas) and Senses (indriyas). The word pariņāma, however, is used in ten sūtras viz. III. 9, 11, 12, 13. 15. 16. IV. 2, 14, 32, 33, of which only the relevant ones are considered here. Sūtras III. 9, 11, and 12 explain the nirodh-parināma, the samādhi-pariņāna and the ekagratā-pariņāma of the Citta. The suppressive modification (nirodh-pariņāma) is the conjunction of the mind with the moment of suppression (nirodh), when the outgoing and suppressive potencies disappear and appear respectively.9. The trance modification of the mind (samādhi-pariņama) is the destruction and rise of all-pointedness and one-pointedness, respectively.10 It is the mental modification of one-pointedness when the subsiding and rising cognitive acts are similar, 11 It is clear that these indicate the different stages of development of the mind.
8 "Indian Philosophy', Radhakrishnan, Vol. II, p. 255. १ व्युत्थाननिरोधसंस्कारयोरभिभवप्रादुर्भावौ निरोधक्षणचित्तान्वयो निरोधqfUITH: 1
. - - 10 apránticat: apulaut faire facuta: 11 Ja: gat: Ariasi_grarerut fartei atuatefeuita: 1

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- 46
The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parināma
III. 13 just refers to dharma-pariņāma (change of charactristic), lakşana-pariņāma (a technical term denoting pariņāmas dependent on time-variation) and avastnā-pariņāma (change of state or condition) of the Elements (bhūtas) and the Senses.18 III. 15. points out that the distinctness of succession is the reason for the distinctness of modifications.18
Let us now consider what Vyāsa, Vācaspati, Bhoja, Vijñānabhikṣu and Nāgeśa have to say on pariņāma, while commenting on the Ysū.
Vyāsa developes the theory of Pariņāma while explaining the relevant sūtras. He gives a comprehensive view of the three aspects of pariņāma, viz. dharma-laksana-avasthāpariņāma in his bhasya on the Ysū. III. 13 thus : Dharma-Pariņāma is the change of characteristic in the characterised or the substance, as for instance, the disappearance and appearance of the characteristic of the Vyutthāna (outgoing activity) and Nirodha (suppression) respectively in the characterised (i.e, the Citta here). LakşaņaPariņāma refers to the three time-variations, viz. past, present and future of the same characteristic. Thus the characteristic of Nirodha, having given up the first time-form (adhvā) which consists of the time-variation (Lakşaņa) not yet manifested (anāgata), attains the present time-variation, without overstepping its essential nature of Dharmatva.' It is in this time-variation which manifests in the present that the true nature of Nirodha is manifested. This is its (Nirodha's) second time-form (adhvā). It is not severed from the past and the future time-variations (Lakşaņa).
Likewise Vyutthāna-characteristic has three time-variations and is connected with three time-forms. Having givien up the present time-variation, it (Vyutthana) passes over into the past time-variation, without, however being apart from its nature of 'Dharmatva'. This is its third time-form (adhvā) and it is not severed from the future and the present time-variation (Laksana). 12 एतेन भूतेन्द्रियषु धर्मलक्षणावस्थापरिणामा व्याख्याताः । 13 HACE furthtrata

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Development of Pariņāma in Yogasūtras
Similarly, inclining again to Vyutthāna it gives up the future time-variation without leaving its essential characteristic and attains the present time-variation (Lakşaņa). This is its second time-form and it is not severed from the past and the future time-variations. Similarly Nirodha again and Vyutthāna again.14
Thus the Laksana Parināma considers the three stages of a characteristic, the unmanifested when it exists in the future, the manifested moment of the present and the past when it has been manifested, now lost to view but conserved and kept in all the onward stages of the evolution. As Prof. Das Gupta puts it, 'it records the history of the thing in future, present and past which are only the three different moments of the same thing according to its different characters, as unmanifested, manifested and manifested past but conserved.'15
In the Avasthā-Pariņāma, during the moment of Nirodha, the suppressive potencies become powerful and the Vyutthāna potencies become weak. It, thus, refers to the change of state or condition.
These three aspects of Pariņāma are also illustrated in the bhūtas by the example of clay. When the substance clay undergoes a change of characteristic from the form of lump to that of pot, it is its Dharma-Pariņāma. This characteristic viz. the ghata-form may be thought to have itself undergone a change in as much as it has now come into being from a state of relative non-being or latency. This is called the Lakşaņa-Pariņāma of the Dharma or characteristics as constituting ghața. This ghața is again suffering another change as new or old as it is just produced or is gradually
14 तत्र व्युत्थाननिरोधधर्मयोरभिभवप्रादुर्भावौ घर्मिणि धर्मपरिणामा लक्षण
परिणामश्च । निरोधस्त्रिलक्षणस्त्रिभिरध्वभिर्युक्तः । स खल्वनागतलक्षणमध्वानं प्रथमं हित्वा धर्मत्वमनतिक्रान्तो वर्तमानलक्षणं प्रतिपन्नः । यत्रास्य स्वरूपेणाभिव्यक्तिरेषोऽस्य द्वितीयोऽध्वा । न चातीतानागताभ्यां लक्षणाभ्यां वियुक्तः ।
तथा व्युत्थानं त्रिलक्षणं त्रिभिरध्वभिर्युक्तं...एवं पुनव्युत्थानमिति । 15 Study of Patafijali, p. 73...---

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Pariņāma running towards its decay. This is its Avastha-Pariņāma or change of condition. 16
Having explained these three aspects of Pariņāma, Vyāsa clarifies that it is from the view-point of distinction (bheda) between the charasteristic (Dharma) and the characterised (Dharmi), that this three-fold change is to be understood. Again, it is from this point of view that it is said that the substance has neither past nor future but that it is the characteristics only that are manifested in time by virtue of which the substance is spoken of as varying and changing temporally just as a line remains unchanged itself but acquires different significances as one or two zeroes are placed on its right side. 17
48
In reality, however, (i. e. from the standpoint of non-distinction between Dharma and Dharmi) there is but one change because the characteristic is the very being itself of the characterised; and it is the change of the characterised alone that is detailed by means of the characteristic. Thus it is that the threefold change, Dharma, Laksana and Avasthā, does not overstep the being of the characterised substratum and it is for this reason that there is but one change which runs through all these specialisation thereof. This change, Vyasa defines as the manifestation of another characteristic on the removal of the previous characteristic of a substance which remains constant.18
16 तथाऽवस्थापरिणामः । तत्र निरोधक्षणेषु निरोधसंस्कारा बलवन्तो भवन्ति दुर्बला व्युथानसंस्कारा इति । एष धर्माणामवस्थापरिणामः । परमार्थतस्वेक एव परिणामः । धर्मिस्वरूपमात्रो हि धर्मो धर्मिविक्रियैवैषा धर्मद्वारा प्रपञ्चयत इति । तत्र धर्मस्य धर्मिणि वर्तमानस्यैवाध्वस्वतीतानागतवर्तमानेषु भावान्यथात्वं भवति न तु द्रव्यान्यथात्वम् । यथा सुवर्णभाजनस्य भित्त्वा - ऽन्यथा क्रियमाणस्य भावान्यथात्वं भवति न सुवर्णान्यथात्वमिति ।
धर्मिणोऽपि धर्मान्तरमवस्था धर्मस्यापि लक्षणान्तरमवस्थेत्येक एव द्रव्यपरिणामो भेदेनोपदर्शित इति । ... न धर्मी त्र्यध्वा धर्मांस्तु त्र्यध्वानस्ते लक्षिता अलक्षितास्तत्र लक्षितास्तां तामवस्थां प्राप्नुवन्तोऽन्यत्वेन प्रतिनिदिश्यन्तेऽवस्थान्तरतो न द्रव्यान्तरतः । यथैका रेखा शतस्थाने शतं दशस्थाने दश ।...... 18 परमार्थतस्तु एक एव परिणामः । धर्मिस्वरूपमात्रो हि धर्मो धर्मिविक्रियैव एषा
धर्मद्वारा प्रपञ्चयत इति । त एते धर्मलक्षणावस्थापरिणामा धर्मिस्वरूप
17

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Dcyclopmcit of Pariņāma in Yogasūtras
Thus Vyāsa explains the three aspects of Pariņāma and shows how these are to be comprehended from standpoints of distinction between Dharma and Dharmi and non-distinction between the two. The latter' seems to be the real, proper philosophical view according to Vyāsa. .
Next, while commenting on the Ysū. IV. 33, Vyāsa makes more explicit the Sārkhya concept of Pariņāma, more properly of Pariņāminityatā by distinguishing it from the other type of nityatā, viz. the Kutasthanityata.
Permanence is two-fold, the absolutely unchanging permanence and permanence amidst change. Of these the first belongs to the Puruşa and the second to the three Guņas. The Permanent or Eternal is that in which the substance or the essence is not destroyed by changing appearances. Both are permanent because their substance or essence is never' destroyed. Now with regard to the characteristics of the Gunas viz. Buddhi, etc., succession has., an end which is cognised by the cessation of the changes. In the eternal Guņas, however, it has no end. In the case of the absolu- : tely permanent ones, the existence of the released Puruşas who are established in their own natures is also known by succession. In their case too, therefore, it has no end. The succession here is. abstracted from the act of existence and is based upon words only.10
19
मनतिकान्ता इत्येक एव परिणामः सर्वानमून्विशेषानभिप्लवते ।...अथ कोऽयंः परिणामः । अवस्थितस्य द्रव्यम्य पूर्वधर्मनिवृत्तौ धर्मान्तरोत्पत्तिः परिणाम इति । द्वयी चेयं नित्यता कूटस्थनित्यता परिणामिनित्यता च । तत्र कूटस्थनित्यता पुरुषस्य । परिणामिनित्यंता गुणानाम् । यस्मिन्परिणम्यमाने तत्त्वं न विहन्यते तन्नित्यम् । उभयस्य तत्त्वानभिघातान्नित्यत्वम् । तत्र गुणधर्मेषु बुद्धयादिषु परिणामापरान्तनिर्माह्यः क्रमो लब्धपर्यवसानो नित्येषु धर्मिष गुणेष्वलब्धपर्यवसानः । कूटस्थनित्येषु स्वरूपमात्रप्रतिष्ठेषु मुक्तपुरुषेषु स्वरूपास्तिता क्रमेणैवानुभूयत इति तत्राप्यलब्धपर्यवसानः शब्दपृष्ठेनास्तिक्रियामुपादाय कल्पित इति ।

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50.
The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Pariņāma.
Another important development, to be noticed for the first time in. Vyāsa, pertains to the elucidation of the nature of the process of Parinama of twenty-three principles from Praksti. Ahankāra and five tanmātras are the six unspecialised modifications of Pure Be-ness, the Great Principle, the Mahā Ātmā. That which is prior to the unspecialised forms is the undifferentiated Mahat Principle. Remaining in the Mahat of pure Be-ness, these (six aviseșas) grow up to their highest capacity. On involution, they pass back into the state of Pure Be-ness, the great principle; and thence they pass into the state which neither is nor yet is not, that in which it exists and yet does not; that which is Real, the Unmanifested, the background of all. This is their undifferentiated phenomenal modification; and that which neither is aor yet is not, is the noumenal modification,
The undifferentiated phenomenal (Linga) is the next after the Noumenal (Alinga). Existing therein, it becomes distinguished from it (Aliaga), because the law of the order of appearance is inviolable. Similarly the six unspecialised modifications have their being in the undifferentiated phenomenal and are distinguished from that by the order being inviolable. Likewise, are the elements and organs having their being in these unspecialised modifications, distinguished from them, as has been already described. There is no other tattva appearing in succession after the specialised modifications. So there is no evolution into any other principle beyond the visegas. But their Dharma-Lakşaņa-Avasthā-Parināma will be explained later on.20
20 एते सत्तामात्रस्याऽऽत्मनो महतः षडविशेषपरिणामाः । यत्तत्परमविशेषेभ्यो
लिङ्गमात्रं महत्तत्त्वं तस्मिन्नेते सत्तामात्रे महत्यात्मन्यवस्थाय विवृद्धिकाष्टामनुभवन्ति । प्रतिसंसृज्यमानाश्च तस्मिन्नेव सत्तामात्रे महत्यात्मन्यवस्थाय यत्तन्नि:सत्तासत्तं निःसदसन्निरसदव्यक्तमलिङ्गं प्रधानं तत्प्रतियन्ति । एष तेषां लिङ्गमात्र: ofeullet FATHATHEİ arfar suferre fa ........FETE="HTT+F प्रत्यासन्नं तत्र तत्संसृष्टं विविच्यते क्रमानतिवृत्तेः । तथा षडविशेषा लिङ्गमात्रे संसृष्टा विविच्यन्ते परिणामक्रमनियमात् । तथा तेवविशेषषु भतेन्द्रि

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Development of Parinama in Yogasulfassnis:.
જેીઝીસિંહની તી
gerdefinition
tic and laborate
Thus in the Vyasa-bhāṣya we of the theory of Parinama but also a exposition of the various aspects of Parinama and of the process of Parigams which is not to be found in earlier Samkhya-Yoga literature
Vacaspati, Bhoja, Vijñānabhikṣu and Nāgeśa add nothing new in the explanation of the passages pertaining to dharma-lakṣaṇaavastha pariņāma and twofold permanence. Vacaspati and Bhiksu, however, attempt to throw further light on the passage dealing with the Tattväntara-pariņāma and Samsṛsta-viveka, by giving their own interpretations which deserve special notice. So we consider them independently.
The Tattväntara-Pariņāma
Vacaspati attempts to explain Tattväntara Pariņāma in his commentary on the Ska. 3, though he does not elucidate the point while commenting on the Vyasa-bhaşya. There he arrives at the conclusion that the absence of equal degree of grossness and perceptibility is the criterion of tattväntaratva. Let us see how he arrives at this conclusion.
...The five gross elements and the eleven sense-organs are mere products or modifications, not productive. Though the cow, the jar, the trees and the rest are the products of the earth, and so are curd and sprout, of milk and seed respectively, which latter are the products of the cow and the tree, yet these facts do not touch our position; since trees etc., do not differ from earth, in their essence, and it is the productiveness of something different in essence, for which the term Root, 'Prakṛti' stands; and that the cow, the tree etc, do not differ from each other in their
याणि संसृष्टानि विविच्यन्ते । तथा चोक्तं पुरस्तात् । न विशेषेभ्यः परं तत्त्वान्तरमस्तीति विशेषाणां नास्ति तत्त्वान्तरपरिणामः । तेषां तु धर्मलक्षणावस्थापरिणामा व्याख्यायिष्यन्ते ।

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The Sankhya-Yoga und the Jaina Theories of Pariņāma”
essence, is proved by the fact that they have the same degree of grossness and perceptibility'. 31 Vijñānabhikṣu's explanation of the same is as follows:
'तत्त्वत्वं च द्रव्यत्वं तत्त्वान्तरत्वं च स्वावृत्तिद्रव्यत्वसाक्षाद्वयाप्यजातिमत्त्वम् ।'
“Tattvatva consists in the possession of substantiality (dravyatva), and tattvántaratva i.e. distinctness of tativa consists or lies in the possession of the generality (jātimatva, as e.g. 'puruşatva') which is directly pervaded by the generality ('dravyatva' i.e. substantiality which chəracterises the twenty-five tattvas) and which does not reside or inhere (Fatalet) in the other tattvas (as c.g. other twenty-four,.than the Puruşa).'
Thus according to Bhikṣu, the twenty-five principles of the Sāmkhya are distinct tattvas because each one possesses a distinct: *Jāti'. But this is only explaining away in the terminology of Vaiseșika, what is accepted as a dogma. Vacaspati, however, may be said to have attemptec a sort of rational explanation of 'tattväntaratva..22
;
21 पञ्चमहाभूतानि एकादश इन्द्रियाणीति षोडशको गणो विकार एव, न
प्रकृतिरिति । यद्यपि पृथिव्यादिनां गोघटवृक्षादयो विकाररा: एवन्तहिकारभेदानां पयोबीजादीनां दध्यकुरादयः, तथाऽपि गवादयो बीजादयो वा न पृथिव्यादिभ्थस्तत्त्वान्तरम् । तत्त्वान्तरोपादानत्वं च प्रकृतित्वमिहाभिप्रेतन , इति न
दोषः । सर्वेषां गोघटादीनां स्थूलतेन्द्रियग्राह्यता च समेति न तत्त्वान्तरम् । 22 Das Gupta's interpretation of the same is as follows: "The produc--
tion of these Višeşas and Aviseşas is called tattvāntaraparinäma, as distinguished from the changes that take place among the visesas themselves. Thus for example when the tanmātras are produced from ahamkära, the state of teirg, involved in the tanmātrās, is altogether different from the state of being of ahamkära. It is not merely a mere change of quality, but a change of existence or state of being. Thus though the tanmātrās are derived from mahat through ahamkāra, the traces of abámkāra caprot be easily found in them. This derivation is not such that the ahamkāra remains principally unchanged and there is only a c harce of qualis 0 ite ilirikala, lut it is a different exis.

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The above discussion regarding the twenty-four principles being distinct tattvas, points to one fact, viz,, that the Samkhyas either reduced all the world-phenomena to these twenty-four distinct elements or regarded all the world-phenomena as resulting from the association and dissociation of these elements The hypothesis that the Samkhyas were so called because they accepted a particular samkhyā of elements, receives support if we regard that *the Samkhyas regarded this particular samkhyā as indicating so many distinct elements. In this matter, the 'tattvāntaras' can be compared with the Astikayas of the Jain, the difference, however, being that the Jainas do not attempt to derive them from any one principle. One may regard the evolution of these twentythree elements from Prakrti as so many Distinctions which Praksti put forth through the process of Parināma and which, later on, by mutual association and dissociation, gave rise to the multifarious world-phenomena.
We may now turn to the next problem, which attempts to describe the process of Pariņāma, Samsrsta-viveka.
The Process of Pariņāma - samsrsta-viveka
Before, however, we proceed to understand the process of Pariņāma (HX6T-1927), it is necessary to take notice of Vijñāna'bhikṣu's view regarding the nature of the three Guņas because his interpretation of Samsýsta-viveka can ouly be understood in the light of his conception of the three Guņas.
According to Vijñānabhikṣu, the Guņas are super-subtle
tence altogether, and has properties which differ widely from that of ahajnkāra. So it is tattvāntarapariņā na, i.e. evolution of the different categories of existence. The evolution of the senses and the five gross ele mets cannot be o? this nature, for they are the višeşas which have been too much specialised to allow the evolution of any other substance of a grade of existence different from themselves. With them there is en end of all emanations and the changes or modifications that they sufför are brought under the dharma, laksana and avasthā-par ņāma.
Yoga Philosophy, p. 178–179.

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The Sarkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Pariņāma
substances, 23 infinite in number according to the diversity of individuals.
Prakşti according to Bhikṣu is a conglomerate (sanūka) of an infinite number of subtle Guna-seals. It is not correct, according to this view, to say that the universal Guņas produce a diversity of effects on account of their varying combinations since such a view cannot account for the appearance of minor differences, increase, decrease etc, and for the initial disturbance in the Praksti.24
It is, however, not possible to find endorsement of this view of Bhikṣu in any of the earlier Samkhya works. 25 On the contrary, the express statement of the Skā. 10.26 that the Avyakta is not sāvayava (having parts) seems to go against Bhiksu's view. Moreover, it is not clearly stated in any earlier work as to whether the Gunas are to be regarded as subtle substances infinite in number. On the (ther hand, in consonance with the nature of Prakrti, as cne lorogeneous and integrated whole, the
23 igreifar scanfit at azifaat TTT: jatifqu1a6917 | SPB 1.61 24 'सत्त्वादित्रयमपि व्यक्तिभेदादनन्तम् । अन्यथा हि विभुमात्रत्वे गुगविमर्दवैचि
व्यात् कार्यवैचित्र्यनिति सिद्धान्तो नोपपद्येत । विमऽवान्तरभेदासंभवात् । ....... Tutai Arasta f ar afzuS 717752 तथा परिच्छिन्नत्वे च तत्समूहरूपस्य प्रधानस्य परिच्छिन्नत्वापत्या श्रुतिस्मृति---
HGÄFGTSETTILITETIT 719777 | SPB 1.127 25 Pol. Das Gupta opines that "there is nothirc, however, in the inter
pretation of Gaudlapāda and Vācaspati which would militate against the interpretauon of Bhiksu, tut yet while they were silent as to any definite explanations regarding the nature of the Ganas, Bhikṣu cefintely came forward with a very satisfactory and ratioral interpretation of their rature......... Bhikṣu's interpretation slits excec dingiy wet all that is known of the manifestations and workirgs of the Gunas in all carly documeris". History of Indian Philosoj hy, Vol. I., p. 224..
We, cannot, however, agree with this vicw, for reasors stated above. 26 Cf. STK on SKä. 10.

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Development of Parinama in Yogasutras
three Gunas seem to indicate the three universal powers or potentialities of Prakrti which bring about various manifestations in this universe.
Now, let us understand Bhiksu's interpretation of the process of Pariņāma sa msṛṣṭa-viveka, in the light of his theory of the Gunas, as given by him in his YV. (II. 19).
1
27
: 55
According to Bhiksu, when the process of creation starts, there occurs only a partial, not a total disturbance in the equilibrium of Prakṛti, the equilibrium being maintained for ever in a certain part of Prakṛti. Otherwise, i.e. on the assumption of a total disturbance of the equilibrium, the different stages (vise sa, aviseṣa, linga) in the order of cosmic evolution, will not be possible. The transformation of the subsequent categories (tattvas) takes place successively from only a part of the preceding categories, like that of foam taking place in part of the ocean and not like that of milk into curd which is a total pariņāma of the previous state. The existence of the preceding tattvas, the causes, as pervading the subsequent ones, their effects, after the production of the latter, comes to be established by the fact that the deficiency of the reals in the cause, consequent upon the production of the effect, has to be made gocd by the preceding tattvas successively by a process of refilling. 21
27
अथवा सर्वदा सत्त्वरूपं नित्यत्वमेवात्राप्यर्थोऽस्तु सर्गेऽपि गुणासास्यस्वात्यन्ततोऽनुच्छेदात्, अंशत एवं वैषम्येणावरणरूपस्य गुणसाग्यस्य सर्वदा सत्त्वात्, अन्यथा साम्यावस्थाया अन्यन्तोच्छेदे पर्वत्वानुपपत्तेश्च । तस्य च वंशतुल्यस्य गुणवृक्षस्यावरणाला पूर्वपूर्व तत्त्वानामंशत एवोत्तरतत्त्वरूपेण परिणामो भवति समुद्रस्यांशतः फेनादिरूपतावद् न तु दध्ना दुग्धस्येव पूर्वपूर्वतत्त्वस्य सर्वशिन परिणाम, उत्पन्नकार्यस्य कारणेन पुनरापूरणार्थं तु कारणांना स्वकार्यावरकतयाऽवस्थानं सिध्यति, तस्मात् सर्गकालेऽपि बहिरलिङ्गावस्थाव
...........
a
fazafafa.........I'
Dr. Seal and Das Gupta, accepting the above interpretation of Bhiksu regarding the nature of the Guns and the process of Pariņāma give an capition of the same in modern terms as follows: "This evolution in its

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama
From the above, it is obvious that the problem of the nature of the process of pariņāma, depends upon the view that we take
formal aspect is defined as differentiation in the integrated. In other words, the process of Evolution consists in the development of the differentiated within the undifferentiated, of the determinate within the indeterminate, of the coherent within the incoherent. The evolutionary series is subject to a definite law which it cannot overstep. The order of succession is not from the whole to parts, nor from parts to the whole, but ever from a relatively less differentiated, less determinate, less coherent to a relatively more differentiated, more determinate, more coherent whole. That the process of differentiation evolves out of homogeneity as separate or unrelated parts, which are then integrated into a whole, and that this whole again breaks uɔ by fresh differentiation into isolated factors for a subsequent reintegration, and so on ad infinitum, is a fundamental inisconception of the course of material evolution. That the antithesis stands over against the thesis, and that the synthesis supervenes and imposes unity ab extra on these two independent and mutually hostile moments, is the same radical misconception as regards the dialectical form of cosmic develop nent. On th: Sāmkhya view, increasing differentiation proceeds pari passu with increasing integration within the evolving whole, so that by this two-fold process what was an incoherent indeterminate ho.nogeneous whole evolves into a coherent determinate heterogeneous whole." Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, p. 7-8.
Das Gupta, after quoting the above passage from Dr. Seal, adds, "The meaning of such an evolution is this, that all the changes and modifications in the shape of the evolving collocations of guņa reals take place within the body of the Prakrti. Prakrti consisting of the infinite reals is infinite, and that it has been disturbed does not mean that the whole of it has been disturbed and upset, or that the totality of the gunas in the Praksti has been unhinged from a state of equilibrium. It means rather that a very vast number of gunas constituting the worlds of thought and in atter has been upset. These guņas, once thrown out of balance begin to group themselves together first in one form, then in another, then in another, and so on. But such a change in the formation of aggregrates should not be thought to take place in such a way that the latter aggregates appear in supersession of the formere ones, so that when the former comes into being the latter ceases to exist. For the truth is that one stage is produced after another; this second stage is the result of a new aggrega tion of some of the reals of the first stage. This deficiency of the reals of the first stage which had gone forth to form the new aggregate as the second stage is made good by a refilling from the Prakrti. So also, as the third stage of aggregation takes place frum out of the reals of the se

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Development of Pariņāma in Yogasūtras
57
of the nature of the contitution of Prakști. If we imagine Praksti to be a homogeneous, integrated whole, as the Skā. seems to understand in our opinion, then the disturbance at one point should disturb the whole, i.e. when the parināma-process starts, the whole of the Praksti must become active. This seems to be the view of the Skā, as well as of Vyása (who, it must be noted, simply refers to it as a process of differentiation in the integrated' without touching the question of the total or partial Pariņāma) though neither the Skä. nor Vyāsa has stated the position in clear terms as regards the process of Pariņāma, (total or partial).
The interpretation, given by Bhiksu, becomes intelligible in the light of his view of the constitution of Praksti which, as we have already noted, is a conglomerate of an infinite number of the Guņa-reals. It seems to me that this view of Bhikṣu, if not contradictory of the view of the orthodox Samkhya, is distinctly different from it 28
Consistently with the concept of Prakrti as held by the old Sāmkhya writers, it does not stand to reason to assume that the disturbance in the equilibrium of the Gunas affects only a certain part of Prakặti and not the whole of it. The view of Bhikṣu can, however, be reconciled with the Sāmkya view proper, if we interpret his ima: TUTTA' as 319a: furra og for 'Fruifpoufti' i.e.
siage, the deficiency of the reals of the second stage is made good by a refilling from the first stage and that of the first stage from the Praksti, Thus by a succession of refilling the process of evolution proceeds, till we come to its last limit, where there is on real evolution of new substance, but mere chemical and physical changes of qualities in things which had already evolved.” History of Indian Philosophy, Vol.I., pp. 246-247. 'Evolution in Sāmkhya (aratrasnfOTTA) moans the development of categories of existence and not mere changes of qualities of substances (physical, chemical, biological or mental). Thus each of the stages of evolution remains as a permanent category of being and offers scope to the more and more differentiated and coherent groupings of the succeeding stages. Thus it is said that the evolutionary process is regarded as a diferentiation of new stage; as integrated in previous stage. 23 Radiakrishnan too, calls the view of Bhikṣu regarding the nature of
the Guņas different view." Indian Philosophy, Vol. II. p. 265.

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to say the disturbance taki ng place in the whole of Prakṛti but the manifestation of effects occurring partially or rather gradually. For even on the view of ho mogeneous, integrated Prakṛti in which the slightest disturbance is a disturbance of the whole, the 'abhivyakti' or actual manifestation or what we might call its assuming of particular stages such as Buddhi, Ahamkara etc., is gradual.
58
Study of Parinama from another point of view
Let us now study parināma from the point of view of its operation in regulating the creation or manifestation of different things.
Amongst modern writers Dr. Seal and Dr. Das Gupta have tried to give a sort of exposition of the above problems in an able and lucid way. It will be better, therefore, to study this problem in the words of these scholars.
'Considering the cosmic changes as a whole, the gunas remain for ever as their permanent substrata. The chages come and go, the combinations break and form but the reals remain ever the same, though they may seem to appear in diverse characters. The characters and qualities are the results of the diversity of their combination. Thus the totality of the mass and energy also remains constant if we take account of both the manifested and the unmanifested, the actual and the potential. Such is the bond of teleological relation between the gunas and the purusas, that the course of evolution follows an unalterable definite law, not only as regards the order of succession but also about the appearance and mutual relations of the separate units of like and unlike energies. Had there not been such a definite order, the world would have been a chaos instead of cosmos, in spite of all the three gunas. All things being composed ultimately of the three gunas, there are no intrinsic differences amongst them (sarvam sarvātmakam). The only difference is the difference in the constitution of the collocation of the gunas, or as expressed in the phenomenal world of matter as the collocations of the atoms. It is theoretically therefore possible to change anything in the world to any

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Development of Parinama in Yogasūtrus
59
other provided the necessary collocations of the atoms could be arranged. The changes or modifications only give expression to the latent varieties of the substance. As the atoms change their position by their innate rajas or energy, the substance changes its form and manifests diverse new qualities which could not be perceived before. But still such a change is not possible to an unlimited degree, for in the constitution of the relations of the gunas there are limitations and obstacles which cannot be overstepped. These limitations may generally be counted in the phencmenal world of change, as being of the nature of time, space, form and disposing cause. Thus Kashmere being the country of saffron, it does not grow in the Pāñcāla country, even though the other causes of its growth may be present there. Similarly there are no rains in the summer season, therefore the growth of rice is not possible in that season; so also the form of a man cannot take its rise from that of a deer. Thus, though all things are intrinsically the same yet the obstacles to change, of the constitution of the gunas in the formation of different substances in certain directions, are such that these cannot be removed, and so those modifications though theoretically possible will ever remain a practical impossibility.
This brings us to the relation of case and effect and the part which is played by concomitant conditions in transforming the cause into the effect. We know that there is no other difference between cause and effect than this that the former is only the po. tential state of which the latter is the actual. The sum of material causes is only the vehicle of the power which is eficient in the production. The concomitant conditions are said to help the effectuation of this transformation from the potential to the actual state. Thus the work of the sculptor may be regarded as the concomitant condition which transforms a piece of marble into a statue. The oilman has helped the oil which was already in existence in the mustard to manifest itself as such. Thus, looked at from this point of view, all concomitant causes may be regarded as helping the passage of the effect from its potentiality as the cause, into the effect as an actuality'.29
29 Yoga Pilosophy, Das Gupta, pp. 209-211.
This expo.ition is based on VB. III. 14, TVS III. 14, YV IV. 12 and

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama
"These mechanical examples of the Kapila-Sankhya have the merit of simplicity, but the Patanjali-Sāṁkhya brushes them aside, and explains causation on the basis of the conservation and transformation of Energy advancing it as the liberation of potential Energy existing stored up in a Guna collocation (the sum of material causes), the liberation following on the action of the proximate efficient cause, or concomitant condition.
60
The causal operation of concomitant conditions (efficient causes) lies only in this, that they supply a physical stimulus which liberates the potential Energy stored up in a given collocation. Everything in the phenomenal world is but a special collocation of the ultimate Reals (Energy, Mass and Essence). The sum of (material) causes potentially contains the Energy manifested in the sum of effects; and in the passage from potency to actualisation, the effectuating condition (the concomitant cause), when it is itself accom
SPB 1. 20.
(1) सर्व सर्वात्मकमिति । यत्रोक्तम् - जलभूम्योः पारिणामिकं रसादिवैश्वरूप्यं स्थावरेषु दृष्टम् । तथा स्थावराणां जङ्गमेषु जङ्गमानां स्थावरेष्वित्येवं जात्यनुच्छेदेन सर्व सर्वात्मकमिति । देशकालाकारनिमित्तापबन्धान्न खलु समानकालमात्मना - मभिव्यक्तिरिति । VB on III. 14.
(( 2 ) यद्यपि कारणं सर्वं सर्वात्मकं तथाऽपि यो यस्य कार्यस्य देशो यथा कुङ्कुमस्य काश्मीरः । तेषां सत्त्वेऽपि पाञ्चालादिषु न समुदाचार इति न कुङ्कुमस्य पाञ्चालादिष्वभिव्यक्तिः । एवं निदाघे न प्रावृषः समुदाचार इति न तदा शालीनाम् । एवं न मृगी मनुष्यं प्रसूते न तस्यां मनुष्याकारसमुदाचार इति । एवं नापुण्यवान्सुखरूपं भुङ्क्ते न तस्मिन्पुण्यनिमित्तस्य समुदाचार इति । TVS. on III. 14
( ( 3 ) दृष्टं च कारणव्यापारेण सदेवाभिव्यज्यत इति यथा पाषाणेषु सतामेव प्रतिमापद्मादीनां लौकिकव्यापारेणाभिव्यक्तिमात्रमिति... | YV on IV. 12.
+ (4) ......अभिव्यक्तिर्वर्तमानावस्था । कारणव्यापारोऽपि कार्यस्य वर्तमानलक्षणपरिणाममेव जनयति । यथा शिलामध्यस्थप्रतिमाया लैङ्गिकव्यापारेणाभिव्यक्तिमात्रं तिलस्थतैलस्य च निष्पीडनेन, धानस्थतण्डुलस्य चावघातेनेति ।
SPB on I. 120

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plished, is only a step in the evolutionary series, which adds a specific stimulus, and renders determinate that which was previously indeterminate. When the effectuating condition is added to the sum of material conditions in a given collocation, all that happens is that a stimulus is imparted which removes the arrest, disturbs the relatively stable equilibrium, and brings on a liberation of Energy together with a fresh collocation.
Describing the production of bodies (organic vehicles') for individual souls out of matter of Praksti, under the influence of their merit and demerit, as concomitant conditions, Patañjali points out that non-material concomitant like merit and demerit do not supply any moving force or Engery to the sum of material condi... tions, but only remove the arrest (the state of relatively stable equilibrium) in a given collocation, even as the owner of a field removes the barrier in flooding his field from a reservoir of water. This description is intended to represent the super-physical influence of non-material concomitants (or causes) like volition, merit. and demerit, etc., but the causal operation of a material concomitant condition is essentially the same; there is the same reservoir of stored-up Energy in a given collocation, the same condition of arrest or relatively stable equilibrium, the same liberation of the stored-up potential Energy which flows along the line of least resistance, the only difference being that in the case of material concomitants the stimulus which removes the arrest is physical, instead of being transcendental as in the case of non-meterial causes like will, merit and demerit, etc.
The Vyasa-Bliāșya helps us to a clear mental representation of the details of this process : As-the owner of many fields can irrigate, from a field which is already flooded, others of the same or a lower level, without forcing the waters thereto with his hands, and merely by making an opening in the barrier or dyke, on which waters rush in by their own force; or, further, as the same person cannot force these waters, of the earthly matters held in solution therein, into the roots of the rice plants, but only removes : the obstructive grasses and weeds, on which the fluids of their

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the aina Theories of Pariņāma
own power enter the roots - such is the action of effectuating condition added to a sum of material causes or conditions'. 30
Thus we see that the energy conserved in one form naturally passes into another by manifesting consequent changes or transformations designated by the name of evolution. As natural flow is obstructed in various ways by the resistance offered by space, time, form and causality, it has naturally to take the course in which there are no impediments and obstacles; at each stage new impediments may come in and interfere with the evolving process and compel the flow to change the direction of its course at every stage; so it is that we find that the evolutionary process has naturally to take a curvilinear line rather than the straight one. It is this resistance against the eovlutionary flow which compels it to reject thousands of courses open to it and select a particular one in which there is no resistance. It is this, there-fore, that gives niyama or a regulation (pariņāmakramaniyama)'1.
30 Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus. B. N. Seal, pp. 14-16. 31 Yoga Philosophy, pp. 212-213.

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CHAPTER V
OTHER TOPICS RELATED TO PARIŅĀMA
Introductory
In this Chapter I propose to treat other topics of Sāmkhya philosophy which are directly or indirectly conditioned by the concept of Pariņāma or which in some way throw light on the character of Pariņāma. These pertain to the concept of Akaša and Kūla, the derivation of the different categories from Prakrti, their character, the nature of the relation between Prakrti and Puruşa, the purpose guiding pariņāma and the function given to, Isvara by Yoga in it.
Concept of. Ākāśa and Kala in Sāmkhya-Yoga
The foregoing discussion of the different aspects of parināma especially the last one viz., its relation to causality brings us to the consideration of the problem of Time (Kāla) and Space (Akāśa) in the Samkhya-Yoga system. The Skā. does not say anything on the concept of Kāla. . Amongst its commentaries only the STK. incidentally touches it. The VB., the TVS., and YV. deal with it at some length. Vyāsa explains it as follows:
As an aton is a substance in which minuteness reaches its limit, so a moment is a division of time in which minuteness. reaches its limit. Or a moment is that much of time which an atom takes in leaving the position in space it occupies and reaching the next point. The succession of moments is the noncessation of the flow thereof. The moments and their collection do not fall into a collection of actual things. The Muhurta, the day and night are all aggregates of mental conceptions. This time which is not a substantive reality in itself, but is only a mental concept, and which comes into the mind as a piece of verhle knowledge only, appears to people whose minds are given to out

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The Sāṁkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parināma
going activities, as if it were an objective reality. The moment falls under the head of reality and is maintained by succession. This succession consists in the sequence of moments. The Yogis who know time call this by the name of time.
Further two moments cannot co-exist. There can be no succession of two co-existent moments. It is impossible. The uninterrupted sequence of the first moment and of the one which follows, is what is called succession. For this there is but one moment existing in the present; the antecedent and postcedent moments do not exist; therefore, there cannot be any collection of them.
Further, the moments that have passed and those that have yet to come, should be described as existing in consequence of universal change in evolution. For this reason the whole world undergoes change every moment and all these characteristics are relatively established in that one moment of time. I
Vacaspati, while commenting on the concerned passage, adds no new idea. His remarks on the Skā. may be noted.
Therein he points out that according to the Vaiseșikas, Time being one (indivisible) it cannot admit of such divisions as “present and future' and hence they attribute these divisions to certain "accidents' (adventitious conditions) : but according to the Sāṁkhyācāryas, says Vacaspati, these same 'accidents' themselves may be regarded as the basis of the notions of 'future', ‘present". and 'past, and there is no need for the postulating of an inter- : vening entity as “Time'; this is the reason why time is not accepted as a distinct entity.
Vijñānabhikṣu in his YV. points out that though Time is defined as buddhi-nirmāņa, yet it may be taken as real. For it only means that Time has no real (objective) existence apart from the ‘noment. The latter is real being identical with the unit of change of the Guņas in phenomena. But, as Dr. Seal points out,
1 VB III, 51 2 ......afe T U ga att for faTreti; prentsa FTTTTTT

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'even this is real only for our empirical (relative) consciousness (f), which intuits the relation of antecedence and sequence into the evolving Reals (Gunas), in the stage of 'empirical intuition' (सविचारा निर्विकल्पप्रज्ञा ). The intellectual intuition' (निर्वि• a fafa), on the other hand, apprehends the Reals as they are, without the imported empirical relations of Space, Time, and Causality'.3
6.5
From the above it is clear that the Samkhya-Yoga accepts kāla, not as a distinct eternal entity, like the Vaiseṣikas, but only as the one present moment which is identical with the unit of change of the Guņas.
Ākāśa
In Samkhya-Yoga works earlier than Bhiksu's, we are given to understand Ākāśa as a gross evolute produced from the Sabdatanmātrā (sound-potential). This means that the evolution of the categories upto Ākāśa takes place without the latter. Bhiksu seems to have experienced this difficulty and hence his clever innovations in the SPB & YV.
We elucidate his innovations as follows. At one place he states that Eternal Space (Dik) and Time (Kala) are of the form of Prakṛti or the root cause of the (produced) Ākāśa, and are only the specific qualities of Prakṛti. Hence the universality of Space and Time is established. But these, space and time, which are limited, are produced from Akāśa through the conjunction of this or that limiting object.4
At other place he writes that the notion of eternal Dik should be understood to be unreal, for generally there is no Dik-Vyava
3
4
इति कस्यचित् प्रलापस्तु भाष्यार्थाविवेकमूल इति, यत्त, पूर्व देशासंयोगाद्यवच्छिन्नः परमाणुक्रियाऽऽदिरेव क्षणः कालस्तु तदतिरिक्तो नित्य इति वैशेषिका : आहुः, तन्न......अस्माभिस्तादृशस्यैव गुणपरिणामस्य क्षणत्ववचनात्......।' YV
on III 51.
Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, p. 21.
SPB. II. 12.
5

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hāra.5 The notion of pūrva-đik etc. is due to the limiting adjuncts of Dik which is accepted (as an entity) by others (e.g. the Väise. şikas). So, even though ordinarily there is the vyavahāra of Kala and Dik, yet the two are to be explained through Ākāśa only. There is however a difference between Time and Dik in as much as the latter is absolutely illusory (having no real existence at all), whereas, the former is admitted to exist as moments.
At the third place he anticipates an objection that if Ākāśa is allpervading, it can neither be an effect of something nor can it be described as atomic as is done by the Bhāșyakāra. His reply to the objection is as foliows : Ākāśa is of two kinds. one original and the other, derivative like the earth-element of the Vaiseșikas. The original or Kāraṇākāśa is "the undiffe. rentiated formless Tamas (mass in Prakrti, matter-rudiment. Bhūtādi), which is devoid of all potentials and is merely the allpervasive seat? or vehicle of the ubiquitous original Energy (Rajas)”. This Kāraṇākāśa, on the association of the other Guņas first modifies itself partially as the sound-potential, and then the gross Akāśa is produced by a conglomeration of the Ākāśa-atoms like the gross earth (of the Vaiseșika). This gross Ākasa is limited from the point of view of Ahamkara (the preceding evolute) and serves as the medium for air (वायोरावरणम्).
Thus, we see that, Bhikṣu, having before him the full-fledged discussions of Space and Time of the Nyāya-Vaiseșika, has felt the difficulty of thinking anything without postulating Ākāśa and Kāla. With the help of Vaišeșika ideas, he imagines two types of Akāśa and Kāla, primary or original and derivative or empirical. He looks upon the primary or Kāranākāśa as being identical with Tamoguņa in Prakști and regards, the eternal Dik and Kāla as the specific qualities of Praksti. Empirical dik-kāla, he explains, through the association of Ākāśa with limiting adjuncts.
5 6 7 8
i.e. simply "dik' without any qualifications like, 'purvā' etc
YV. III, 51 Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, p. 27. YV. III 40.

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It is clear that this has no textual justification for it (and even philosophically its value is doubtful because the Samkhya concept of Prakṛti is beyond Time and Space). We may, however, say that this Prakṛti, in as much as it brings forth the empirical Time and Space, has the potentialliy of that Time and Space. And if we consent to call this potentiality of Time and Space as Kāla and Kāraṇākāśa respectively, we may have reason to agree with Bhiksu.9
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On the Derivation of the different Categories from Prakṛti
The Ska, and its commentaries, as already noted, describe the order of evolution of the different categories from Prakṛti as follows: From Prakṛti is derived the Mahat, from Mahat Ahamkāra, from the three-fold Ahamkara- eleven senses and five Tanmātras and from the five Tanmātrās the five Bhūtas. The SSu. too gives the same order. However, a different order is given by VB and TVS. Here two parallel lines of evolution start from the Mahat which, on one side, develops into the Ahamkara and eleven
9
It may be noted that Ṣimānanda in his Samkhyatattvavivecana, points out that the Vaiśeşika view which regards Kāla as an independent eternal entity and, the Samkhya view which regards the notion of the Maha-Kala (i.e. the eternal Time) and the moment as being due to the conjunction of the Akāśa with the limiting adjuncts-are not endorsed by the Yoga. According to the latter, the moment alone is the real Kala and that Pradhana (i.e. its pariņāma) is the cause of the Kala-vyavahāra and not the Akāśa. Thus, Ṣimānanda makes a distinction between the Samkhya view and the Yoga-view. He, however, does not say anything regarding the Concept of Akāśa, in Samkhya-Yoga (i.e. as to whether it is to be identified with the Tamas in Prakṛti or regarded as produced from the Sabdatanmatra only).
Note that Vijñānabhikṣu, while commenting on the Ssu. II. 12, (दिक्कालो आकाशादिभ्यः । ) says that the notion of 'खण्डकाल' is the result of the association of the Akāśa with the limiting adjuncts. But, in his Yoga-Varttika, as we have seen, he identifies Kala (ie. the moment) with the unit of change of the Gunas in accordance with Vvāsa-bhāṣya.

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senses and on the other into the five Tanmātrās and the five Bhūtas. 10
10 VB. and TVS. on Ysū. II. 19.
Dr. Seal remarks that the first order given by the Skā. and others, is literally correct but misses the significance of the doctrine of SamSrşta-viveka or differentiation in the integrated', according to which the Tanmātrās are all evolved through the medium of Ahamkāra, in the cosmic matter of Experience (Mahat). Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, p. 12.
It may be noted that Bhikṣu who comments on the VB. and the SSū, points out that, truly speaking, the genesis of the Tanmatrás from Mahat takes place through the Ahamkāra and in association with it for it has been so described in the VB. on the Ysū. I. 45 (YV. on Ysū. II. 19). Thus both Bhiksu and Seal purport to convey the same thing from Vyasa's statement though in different way.
Incidentally we may note here other differences of view between the earlier and later works as regards the derivation of other categories.
It may be noted that nothing is stated about the manner of the order of evolution of the Tanmātrās from Ahamkāra, in any of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga works excepting those of Vijñānabhikṣu. In his YV. (on II. 19) and SPB. (I. 62), he points out that the same order of evolution is to be followed in the case of the Tapmātrās as is followed in the case of evolution of the Bhūtas from the Tanmātrās. Thus Ahamkāra gives rise to Sabda-tanmātrā, the Sabdatanmātră in association wtth Ahamkāra, to Sparśa-tanmātrā, and so on. (For a detailed discussion of the different views of the derivation of Tanmātrās as found in the Smrtis and Purāņas, cf. Dr. Seal's Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus p. 28 onwards).
As regards the mannner of the derivation of the Bhūtas from the Tanmātrās, the Skā. says nothing. The Matharavrtti, STK, Jayamangalā (Skā. 22), VB. and TVS. hold that one i.e. the first Tapmātrā combines with one, two, three or four to produce the more complex Bhūtas with the correspoding number of qualities. According to Gaudapāda and the author of Yuktidipikā, however, the Tapmātrās can singly produce the Bhūtas. According to Bhiksu Akāśa-atom is generated from the Sabdatanmātrā with an accretion from bhūtādi, (YV. on Ysū. I. 43). According to Nāgesa, to produce the gross atoms from the Tanmātrās, an accretion of bhūtādi as an accompanying agent is necessary at every step. Thus

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The more important problem, however, is not the order of evolutes but the character of differentiation. This is the problem of Višeşāviseșa. In the Skā. 38, the term Aviseșa is applied to the five Tanmātrās and Viseșa to the Bhūtas. The VB. applies the term Aviseşa both to the Ahamkāra and Tanmātras and Visesa to the eleven senses and five Bhūtas. But what is meant by these two terms is not made clear either in the Skā. or in the VB. However, the commentaries on the Skā. and on the VB. attempt to explain these terms as under.
According to Māthara and Gaudapād the Tanmātrās are Aviseșa because they all give pleasure to gods owing to the predominance of Sattva, 'even though the Rajas and Tamas are there. The Rajas and Tamas do not produce their painful and deadening effects respectively. The five Bbūtas are Viseșas because they become objects of enjoyment for men and produce pleasure, pain and delusion in them. 11
Let us see how Vācaspati in his STK. explains them. The Tanmātrās, says he, are Avisesa because they are subtle and therefore their 'specific character' consisting of the realmness, turbulence and delusiveness' is not patent enough to be enjoyed. On the other hand, he points out that the Bhūtas are called Višeşa because
Vāyu-atom is produced from these three-Sabda + Sparśa + accretion from bhūtādi. Similarly Tej, Āp and Prthivi atoms are produced.
It may be noted that the introduction of 'atom' as an additional stage between Tanmātrā and Bhūta occurs only later on, in the VB, TVS and YV. probably due to the influence of the Nyäya--Vaišeşika school.
There is a difference of view in regard to the derivation of the eleven senses. According to the Skā (25) all the senses emerge from the SättvikaAhamkära with the help of Rajas. The same view is endorsed in its commentaries. According to The TVS and Nāgesa-vrtti (Ysū. II. 19), the five organs of perception arise from the Sättvika- Ahamkāra, the five of action from the Rājasa-Ahamkāra and the mind from both. Bhikṣu in his SPB. (II. 18), holds that the ten_senses, five of perception and five of action, are produced from the Rājasa-Ahamkāra and the mind alone is produced from the Sättvika-Ahamkāra. 11 Māthara and Gauậapāda on Skā. 38.

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they are calm, turbulent and deluding; they are thus perceived to be distinguished from one another while the Tanmātrās cannot be similarly distinguished by us and hence they are Aviseșa and subtle 12
The same explanation is given by Vācaspati and Vijñānabhikṣu while commenting on the VB. (Ysū. II, 19) with this difference that the explanation of Aviseșa is made applicable to Ahamkāra also since Ahamkāra along with the Tanmātrās, is called Aviseșa in the VB.18
It must be noted that the expression 'grifafasiqa' occurring in the concerned passage in YV. does not mean that the Tanmātrās are all absolutely devoid of Teccaifa' 'but only that they are so subtle that these can neither be felt not perceived in any way by the senses. The expression 'Suresirgefarfetarefaa', also occurring in the same passage, with reference to Ahamkāra should be similarly understood,
From the above interpretations of Vācaspati and Bhikṣu, the criterion of Visesavišeşa comes out to be, the capability or otherwise, respectively of becoming the objects of ‘upabhoga' which,
12 See STK. 30. Yuktidipikā gives quite a different explanation of the
term Aviseșa. It is as follows: The five Tanmäträs viz., śabda, rūpa, rasa, gandha and sparsa are called Aviseșa because each of them is not differentiated into its particulars such as Sabda into udāttānudātta etc., rūpa into white, black etc. and so on. This explanation, it can be seen, is on the Vaiseșika line of Sāmānya and Visesa. Jayamangala explains these terms in a still different way. The Tanmatrās are called Avisesa because they are not capable of being particularly qualifying anything on account of their subtleness. The Bhūtas are
called Visesa because through them the Tanmātrās get differentiated. 13 TVS II.19; YV II, 19.
3fahamuti raat 4652T FENTFİ fagia.... TVS II 19 आकाशादीनि भूतानि-शब्दादितन्मात्राणां शान्तादिविशेषशून्यशब्दादिधर्मकसूक्ष्मद्रव्याणामत एवाविशेषसंज्ञकानां-विशेषा अभिव्यक्तशान्तादिविशेषकाः परिणामा:... यथाक्रममिति शेषः तथेति । ...अभिमानमात्रधर्मकस्य श्रवणस्पर्शनदर्शनादिरूपfasiatfagfIE ATTFifa 19: 1 YV II. 19 Nagesa too gives a similar explanation.

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21
in Sāmkhya, denotes both cognition and conation. Here, it may be noted that the commentators are silent on the question as to whether the Mahat and the Ahamkāra (in the first order of evolution which is given in the Skā.) are Aviseșa or not. Bhiksu touches this point by saying that though ‘Aviseșatva' does belong to Mahat and Praksti, yet the term Aviţeşa is conventionally fixed for the six categories (Ahamkāra and five Tanmātrās) only, like the word 'pankaja'. This is just explaining away the thing and the question therefore still remains as to whether Mahat and Ahamkāra are Aviseșa or not.14
Vacaspati, however, approaches this problem of Višeşāviseşa' from another point of view, viz. that of causality. Thus he says: The five Tanmātras have the Buddhi as their cause because they are the unspecialised modifications, just like the principle of Individuation Aviseșatva (non-specialisation) consists in being the cause of further vikäras or modifications; this characteristic is common to both the Tanmatrās and Asmitā. Visesas, on the other hand, are the final modifications which do not become the cause of further tattvas.15
Thus, according to this interpretation of Vācaspati ‘farefittaca' (wherein, 'vikāra' signifies “vikāramātra") is the criterion of
14 Probably they must have been regarded as having the character of the
'subject' of 'upabhoga' rather than the object. Though, in Samkhya philosophy the subject is the Puruşa, yet the Buddhi must do the activity of being the subject for Puruşa and therefore, in this sense we cay say that the Mahat and Ahamkāra are equal to what in ordinary psychology would be called consciousness which cognises and feels and which, therefore, cannot be an object. If this explaration is correct, we can say that ‘Viseşāvisesa' cannot be applied to Bucdhi (and Ahamkāra) in the sense in which the terms are applied to the
Tanmatras and Bhūtas. 15 ...अत्र च पञ्चतन्मात्राणि बुद्धिकारणकानि अविशेषत्वाद् अस्मितावद् इति ।
विकारहेतुत्वं चाविशेषत्वं तन्मात्रेषु चास्मितायां चाविशिष्टम् । ...विशेषा... faalt Ta 7 g Tratatu: 1 TVS on II. 19.

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Aviseṣa. The Ahamkara and five Tanmātrās being the cause of further modifications or the tattvas (i.e. of the last sixteen vikāras) are termed 'Avisesa', while the eleven senses and five Bhūtas are called 'Viśeşa' because they do not possess this characteristic viz. 'fa', ie. they do not become the cause of further tattvas. (These sixteen represent the final stage of evolution of the tattvas). This interpretation, it can be seen, is free from the difficulties which faced us in the first interpretation. It is precise and avoids the fallacy of being too narrow (avyāypti).
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The Nature of the Relation between Prakṛti and Puruşa
Divergent explanations are given by later commentators in regard to the nature of the relation between the changing Prakṛti and unchanging Puruşa. In the Ska. (20), it is simply stated that the non-sentient Linga becomes as if sentient on account of its contact with the Purusa.16 But nothing is said as to the nature of this contact. Neither Mathara nor Gauḍapada enlightens us much on this point. Nevertheless, this problem is indeed a crucial one for the Samkhya and hence could not be evaded especially when the opponents made it the target of thier attack and demanded its clarification. Hence the attempts of the later commentators to elucidate the same. Let us see how far they succeed in the solution of this problem.
According to Vacaspati there is no samyoga or contact of the Buddhi with the Puruşa but a reflection of the Puruşa is caught in the states of Buddhi by virtue of which these become intelligised and transformed into consciousness. But this view is said to be open to the objection that it does not explain how the Puruşa can be said to be the experiencer of the conscious states of the Buddhi, for its reflection in the Buddhi is merely the image and there cannot be any experience (bhoga) on the basis of that image merely, as actually there is no connection of the Puruşa with the Buddhi. The answer of Vacaspati is that there is no contact
16 तस्मात्तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् ।

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between them in Space or Time but the 'sannidhi' or proximity, here means 'yogyata' or passive capacity of being treated and by virtue of it the Puruşa, though it remains aloof, is yet felt to be united and identified with the Buddhi, and as a result of that the states of the Buddhi appear ascribed to a person. 17
Bhoja maintains that just as the proximity of a magnet manifests the power of movement in a piece of iron, so by the mere proximity of the Puruşa, the cit which exists in a potential manner as it were in the sattva, becomes manifest and this manifestation of cit which illumines the whole vṛtti or state becomes the object of Purusa's experience partly because of the closest proximity of the Puruşa and partly because the whole process of Prakrti's transformations is for the experiences and the liberation of the Purusa. Prakṛti is not conscious that it will serve the purpose of the Puruşa but its forward and backward transformations are called its tendencies for the services of the Purusas. As both the Prakṛti and the Puruşa are omnipresent, there cannot be any actual contact or samyoga. 18
Vijñanabhikṣu points out that yogyata or capacity, which Vacaspati speaks of, on the part of the Puruşa by virtue of which even though it may not be in touch with the Buddhi, yet the states of Buddhi can continue to be expressed in terms of an experience, will continue even in the state of emancipation; for it is the nature of the Puruşa and so the experience will continue even in the emancipated state. Second, if the beginningless experience of states be said to be serving the purpose of samyoga or contact, then the assertion of the VB that this seeming union is due to avidya potency breaks down. Thirdly, the objection of Vācaspati that samyoga of the Buddhi and the Puruşa will necessarily mean that the Puruşa is exposed to change is groundless, for samyoga and change are not synonymous. The Akāśa has also samṁyoga, but it is not by virtue of that called pariņāmin or changing. Change means the rise of new qualities. It is the
17 TVS. II. 17 and 1.4.
18 Bhojavṛtti IV. 22 and II. 23.

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Buddhi which knows or forms its states and when this is reflected in the Puruşa, there is the notion of the person or the experiencer in the Purușa and when the cit is reflected in the Buddhi, there is the knowledge as conscious state in the Buddhi. The notion of the knower as 'I', the experienter cannot be generated in the Buddhi by the reflection of the cit; for the mere reflection cannot be said to be of any purpose. It is when by the reflection of the cit, the states of Buddhi become intelligised, that the Puruşa shines forth through their reflections as the coniser of those states. 19
In all these explanations, it can be seen, attempts are made to remove the defects of the earlier ones and keep the kūțasthanityatva of the Puruşa in tact. But while one explanation removes one drawback, it creates a number of other difficulties which have to be explained away somehow.
In fact, the real source of the difficulty is in regarding the Purușa and the Prakrti as absolutely distinct in character and then finding out some way of bringing them together because in empirical experience this is a felt fact.
The Purpose guiding Pariņāma and the function given to īśvara by Yoga in it
All the Yoga-works hold Isvara responsible for the removal of all barriers in the way of Prakrti's development. 20
Thus, 'the Yoga philosophy differs from the Sāmkhya in this that the Puruşārtha or serviceability to the Puruşa is only the aim or end of the evolution of Prakrti and not actually the agent which 19 YV, on II. 17, SPB. I. 19.
These views summarised from 'Yoga Philosophy' by Das Gupta. 20. SAJTETTO affaizrarei sfaara19774 52 347977: 1 TVS IV. 3. Cf. also 'PATET HEEFTTIHTEETTfqarac i çatai
YV. and Nāgesa vşitti, IV. 3

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removes the obstacles of the Prakṛti in such a way as to deter-mine its course as this cosmical process of evolution. Puruşartha is, indeed, the aim for which the process of evolution exists; for this manifold evolution in all its entirety affects the interests of the Puruşa alone; but that does not prove that this its teleology can really guide the evolution in particular lines so as to ensure the best possible mode of serving all the interests of the Puruşa,. for this teleology being immanent in the Prakṛti is essentially non-intelligent.21
The Samkhya, however, hopes that this immanent teleology in Prakrti acts like a blind instinct and is able to guide the course of its evolution in all its manifold lines in accordance with the best possible service of the Puruşa. The Patañjala view, as we have seen, maintains that Iśvara removed all obstacles of Prakṛti in such a way that this teleology may find scope for its realisation. 22
It may, however, be noted in passing that even the theism of Yoga is a halting sort of theism because according to it the only thing that God does is to remove the obstacles from the move-ment of Prakṛti. Then Prakṛti moves according to its inherent directive energy. In this view, God cannot really be said to direct Prakṛti as such.
Recapitulation
In this section I propose to consider the various stages of the development of the idea of Parinama and its application to the different categories.
In some of the later hymns of the Rgveda, we find the Vedic seers visualising certain general principles about the world, its.
21 a a geareitsfa nada: farg agêña far: 1 उद्देश्यतामात्रेण पुरुषार्थो प्रवर्तकः TVS. IV. 3.
22 Study of Patanjali, Das Gupta, pp. 89-92.

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nature and its relation to man. The world in its manifold aspects seems to be a created thing. They, therefore, searched the creator and the substance out of which it must have been created, on the analogy, say, of a carpenter or a potter creating his artifacts. In the earlier stages such gods, as Indra, Agni, Varuņa etc. are regarded as creating the world. Later, Hiranyagarbha, Viśvakarmā and Prajāpati perform this function. As to the original substance water seems to have a preference over others. Sometimes, however, Tamas, Tapas and Sraddhā are regarded as the original entities. Some of the Vedic thinkers alight upon such distinctions as one (97) and Many (a) Sat and Asat i. e. Being and Non-being and get perplexed as to what must have been the first principle from
the manifold might have come forth. Some of the thinkers appear to have grappled with the difficulty of relating One and Many, Being and Non-being, Permanence and Change. Those who could not resolve the contradiction assumed one of these as the ultimate principle according to their predilections. Sometimes Sat was posited as the original principle, sometimes Asat and sometimes That One, Tadekam.
We are interested in understanding these later principles viz. Sat, Asat and Tadekam. These terms suggest an approach different from that of the creationist thinkers. They suggest what we might call a metaphysical tendency seeking for a general principle in the multifarious phenomena of the world,
In the terms Sat and Asat, the Vedic thinkers seem to have embodied their ideas of Permanence and Change. In their attempt to find something which would comprehend the 'dvandvas' (opposites) or to discover a principle from which these could be derived, they alight upon the idea of Puruşa who can give birth to the phenomenal world and yet remain permanent or immortal. This idea is expressed by saying that a part of the Puruşa becomes the world while its three parts are immortal in heaven. Thus the problem of the existence of the world is solved by regarding it as merely worked out from a part of Puruşa. Anyway, here is an

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attempt to combine in one entity the divergent ideas of One and Many, Permanence and Change.
We find a new development in the search of the first principle in the Atharva-Veda in the conception of Kāla. This Kāla which is viewed as movement on the analogy of a horse is the creative principle of the universe. This is a distinct advance in the philo. sophy of change.
In the Brāhmaṇas Prajāpati is firmly established as the creator of the world. In the identification of Yajña, universe and Prajāpati, we see the assumption of a world-ground which not only provides the material for world phenomena but also the energy and agency which bring forth and preside over the world-phenomena. In some portions of the earlier Upanişad, 28 we find the thinkers still struggling with the 'dvandvas' (opposites) of earlier thinkers.
The result of this diverse thinking seems to be reflected in the Vedānga, viz. the Nirukta. In its discussion of the six bhavavikāras, we find bhāva or kriya as such, analysed and given precise momenclature as jāyate, asti, viparinamate, vardhate, apakșiyate and vinaśyati. Of these 'vipariņamate' deserves special notice because it is a clear enunciation of the principle of Permanencein-change which, as we see, governs all later Pariņāma-thinking.
The Upanişads, as a whole, show a clear tendency towards "Sentient Monism which seems to take two forms. One regards multiplicity and change as real - a precursor of the philosophy of the Svetāśvatara Up., of the different schools of Sāmkhya mentioned in the Mahabhārata, of the creationist theories of the Smộtis and Purāņas, of Sāmkhya in the Caraka and of the Visiştādvaita of Ramānuja which all unanimously uphold the theory of Pariņāma, whatever may be the other divergences regarding the nature of the first principle. The other form is that of Yājñavalkya who seems to regard all change and diversity (faxraera) as chimérical - a precursor- of Gaudapāda and Šamkarācārya. 23 Chā. Up. VI. 2.-44 and Taittiriya Up. II. 7

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Pariņāma
All the thinkers of the time, however, were not monists. "There were dualists both amongst Vedic and non-Vedie thinkers. They regarded the distinction between the 'sentient and the ‘nonsentient' as fundamental and so, in their opinion, one could not be derived from the other. The Samkhyas, the Vaiseșika and the Mimāṁsakas were such amongst Vedic thinkers and the Jains and the Buddhists, amongst Non-Vedic thinkers. They all tried to explain the genesis of the world by various theories. The Vaišeşika view was the creationist one, God creating the material world out of atoms and dispensing the goods of the world to the different souls according to their actions. They adopted the principle of causation as explaining the regulated creation of things. 'The Samkhyas adopted the principle of Pariņāma to explain the material creation or change in the world.
Both the Vaiseșikas and Samkhyas regard the Puruşas as kūtastha-nitya with the difference that the former would allow changes in their guņas or qualities which are absolutely distinct from their permanent substrates whereas the latter would not allow the slightest change in them.
The Jains adopt as we shall see the principle of Pariņāma as governing both the Jivas and the material world. The Buddhists accept the principle of flux without accepting any abiding entity.
It is, however, the grammarians who supply us with references which enable us to study the development of the concept of Parināma. Panini refers to vikāra in all probability in the sense of 'RUTH'. Patañjali in his Mahābhāşya reflects the development of Parināma in a proper philosophical manner. He follows, in essence, Yaska's definition of vipariņāma' while defining 'dravya', and posits two types of nityatā-viz. pariņāmi-nityatā and kūțasthanityatā,
All these ideas had assumed more or less definíte conceptual forms before Iśvarakrsna summarised the tenets of the Sārkhya in his work

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Otner topics related to Parinama
Isvarakṛṣṇa refers to Pariņāma only twice, in the Kā. 16 and 27. Kā, 16 brings out the idea of Pariņāma by stating that the functioning of Prakṛti is Pariṇāma and this Pariṇama is characterised by the predominance of the one or the other of the Gunas. The same is applied in Ka. 27 to explain the mutual distinction between the eleven senses.
This lack of further elaboration of Parinama can be explained on two grounds viz. that Iśvarakṛṣṇa might have felt that the idea was too well-known to require any elaborate explanation and secondly we see the same idea worked out in the theory of Satkāryavāda.
If it were possible to identify the author of the Yoga-sutras with that of the Mahabhāṣya, we could have said that Patanjali had before Iśvarakṛṣṇa clearly visualised and defined Pariņāma in philosophical terms. The Yoga-sutras define the different Pariņāmas of the Citta such as the Vyutthāna, Nirodha and Samadhi Pariņāmas and only incidentally refer to the Dhrama-LakṣaṇaAvastha Pariņāmas of the bhūtas and senses.
Mathara elucidates Parināma by distinguishing two types in transformation. One is of the nature of creation or manufacture like that of a pot. This he calls : . The other is natural transformation like that of milk into curd. This he calls f: '. He identifies the process of Prakṛti's Pariņāma with the latter. This makes clear the idea that Pariņāma is a sort of material evolution and not of the nature of anything created or made on the analogy of human work.
Vyasa not only defines but also explains in detail the three aspects of Pariņāma, viz. Dharma-Lakṣaṇa-Avastha Pariņāma, the process of Parinama (a) of the twenty-three categories, called the Tattväntara-Pariņāma, show how the course of evolution is regulated in a certain fixed manner owing to the limitations of space (देश), time (काल), form (आकार) and other extraneous causes (faf) and distinguishes between kūṭastha-nityatā and pariņāmi

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Fariņāma nityatā. He elucidates for the first time the concept of kala as it is conceived in Samkhya-Yoga.
80
Yuktidipikā also attempts a definition of Pariņāma which is essentially the same as that given by Vyasa. Both the Yuktidipikā and STK. explain pariņāma in terms of Satkaryavāda.
Vijñānabhikṣu has attempted a different interpretation of the nature of Gunas and of the process of Pariņāma fa which has created a new problem in the understanding of the nature of the constitution of Prakṛti and its Pariņāma-process. The older view seems to regard Prakṛti as one homogeneous whole, as undergoing Pariņāma but manifesting itself in the form of effects. gradually. Bhiksu would regard Prakṛti as consisting of an infinite number of the 'Guna-reals' undergoing Parināma only in part and maintaining at the same time the state of equilibrium in the other part, on the analogy of the Parinama of foam in the ocean. The deficiency caused by the production of different effects is said to be supplied by the process of re-filling from the remaining infinite reals. 24
Thus the world-process according to the Samkhya is the continuous mutual interaction of the three Gunas to which has been applied the concept of Pariņāma as defined by Yaska. The Yogaschool attempts to understand primarily the mental processes in the light of Pariņāma and so refers incidentally to the Parināmas of the bhūtas and the senses. They, however, bring in God to remove the obstacles in the way of the evolution of Prakṛti.
24 This reminds us of the Puruşa-sukta of the Rgveda, wherein the one part of the Purusa constitutes this world while its three parts remain immortal in heaven, and of the first principle of the Upanisads which is both immanent and transcendent. This may also be compared to the Jain concept of Lokākāśa and Alok ākāśa. Changes, both similar and dissimilar. take place in the former whereas the latter which extends infinitely beyond the Lokākāśa, undergoes homogeneous pariņāmas only (Viz., agurulaghu-pariņāma).

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CHAPTER VI
JAIN SOURCES
History of the Jain Church
According to Jain tradition, Jain religion is eternal and it has been revealed again and again in every one the endless succed. ing periods of the world by innumerable groups of twenty-four Tirthamkaras. In the present Avasarpiņıl period, the first Tirthamkara was Rşabha and the last, the twenty-fourth was Vardhamāna Mahavira. According to Jacobi, “all the Tirthamkaras except the two last, viz., Pārsva and Mahavira, belong to mythology rather than to history”? The Svetāmbara tradition places the death of Mahāvīra in 527 B. C. Jacobi, however, gives 477 B. C, as the date of Mahavira's death. The death of Pārsva is placed at the reasonable interval of 250 years before that of Mahāvīra. This fact, viz. that the Jain Church existed before Mahāvira and that the latter was only a reformer and propagator of the old religion
1.
Tim, in Jain philosophy, is infinite; but there are cycles in it, each cycle having two eras of equal duration described as the Avasarpiņi and the Utsarpiņi - a metaphor drawn from the revolving wheel. The former is the descending era in which virue gradually decreases; and the latter, the ascending in which the reverse takes place. The present era is stated to be the former. Studies in Jainism, p. 9. The Gujarāti translation of his article in German - published in the Journal 'Bhartiya Vidyā', 1945, (Singhi Smāraka Grantha), p. 182. This is his last article discussing the probable dates of the death of Mahā. vira and Buddha (1930). In a previous article which is published in ERE, Vol. VII. pp. 465-474 as well as in 'Studies in Jainism', he held a different view, about the dates of the Nirvāņa of Mahāvira and Buddha - according to which Mahāvira died before Buddha's death. Now, he is of the opinion, that Mahavira lived seven years after the death of Buddha which is assigned to 484 B.C. .

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Pariņām a
-
-
is attested not only by the Jain Agamas* but also by the oldest Buddhist texts. Thus, the antiquity of the root-ideas of Jain philosophy may be said to date back, at least to the time of Parsva, i, e. 800 B. C.
The Jain church, as it is well-known, is divided into two sccts the Svetāmbara and the Digambara. According to Jacobio this schism originated in the second or the third century after Mahāvira’s death, although as Charpentieri says, the final divison did not take place till a later date in either 79 or 82 A. D., according to varying traditions. There are however no essential dog. matic differences between the two sects though, as we shall see, there prevails a divergence of view about the existence of the original Jain canon.
Jain Sources
Before proceeding to study the concept of Pariņāma, as discussed in Jain works, it would be necessary to give first a brief
A
References to the followers of Pārśva are to be met with in the Jain canonical works, such as the Bh.Sū. V.9.1.9., Ut. Su. XXIII. Next Mahavira's parents are said to have been followers of the tenents of Pārsva in Ācārānga--Sūtra 11-15. That Mahāvira was only a reformer of old religion is further testified by Ut. Sū. xxiii st. 12-13 wherein we are told that Pārsva enjoined on his followers four great vows. viz., not to injure life, to be truthful, not to steal, and to possess no property, while Mahavira added a fifth requisition, viz. that of chastity. Next, Parsva allowed his disciples to wear an upper and an under garment. Mahāvira, on his part, followed the more rigid rule which forbade totally the use of clothes for an ascetic. After a detailed examination of the Buddhist texts, Jacobi concludes that "as it is now here said or even merely implied that the Niganthas were a newly-founded sect, we may conclude that they had already existed a considerable time before the advent of the Buddl a". SPE, Vol. XLV, p. xii. For details of the Buddhist evidence cf. SBE. Vol. XLV, pp. xxi, xxii. xxiii. Jain Sūtras, Part I, SBE, Vol. XXII. The Uttaradhyayanasútra, Introduction, p. 15. Archives D'Etades Orientals, Vol. 18.
5.
6. 7.

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Ja in Sources
account of the main sources on which our discussion is going to be based.
83
Our material is drawn from both the Svetambara and Digambara works. The source-books are spread over three periods viz., (A) the oldest or the Agama period, (B) the period of Umasvāti and Kundakunda, i.e. the period of transition from the Agama to Tarka period, and lastly (C) the Tarka period from Siddhasena and Samantabhadra to Yagovijayaji.
A
The Agama Period
(About 4th cen. B. C. to 4th cent. A. D.)8
As mentioned above, there is a difference of opinion about the authenticity of the extant Jain canon between the Svetambara and the Digambara sects. According to the former the extant bulk of the canon, consisting of the forty-five texts is authentic in character and is really based on the older one that had been compiled at the Council of Pataliputra (300 B.C.) and it can be
9.
8. We have taken into account only those Agamas that precede Umäsvāti.
The usual list is as follows:
A. The twelve Angas - 1. Ayara (Acara); 2. Sūyagaḍa (Sūtrakṛta); 3. Thāņa (Sthāna); 4. Samavāya; 5. Viyahapanṇatti (Vyakhyāprajñaptimostly called Bhagavati); 6. Nāyādhammakahão (Jñātādharmakathāḥ); 7. Uvasagadasão (Upāsaka daśāḥ); 8. Antagaḍadasão (Antakṛddaśāḥ); 9. Aṇuttarovavaiyadasão (Anuttraupapātikadaśāḥ); 10. Paṇhāvāgaraṇāim (Praśna-vyakaraṇāni); 11. Vivägasūya (Vipākaśṛuta); 12. Ditthivaya (Dṛṣṭivāda).
B. The twevle Uvamgas (Upangas) - 1. Uvavāiya (Aupapātika); 2. Rāyapasenaijja (Rajapraśniya); 3. Jīvābhigama: 4. Pannavaṇā (Prajñāpanā); 5. Suriyapannatti (Suryaprajñapti); 6. Jambuddivapannatti (Jambudvipa-Prajñapati); 7. Candapannatti (Chandraprajñapti); 8. Nirayāvalī; 9. Kappavadaṁsião (Kalpavatamsikāḥ); 10. Pupphião (Puspikāḥ); 11. Pupphaculião (Puspaculikah): 12. Vanhidasão (Vṛṣṇidaśāḥ). C. The ten Painņas (Prakirņas) : 1. Causarana (Catuḥsarana) 2. Aurapaccakkhāṇa (Aturapratyakhyana); 3. Bhattaparianna (Bhaktaparijñā); 4. Samthara (Samstara); 5. Tanḍulaveyaliya (Tandulavai

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The Sāṁkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Pariņāma:
traced back to Mahāvīra and his disciples. 1o The Digambara, however, repudiate the existing canon as spurious, merely a late
tālika); 6. Candävijjhaya (Bühler gives Candāvija); 7. Devindatthava (Devendrastava); 8. Gaņivijjā (Gaņividyā); 9. Mahāpaccakkhāņa. (Mahā-Pratyākhyāna); 10. Viratthava (Virastava). D. The six Cheya-Suttas (Cheda-sūtras) :- 1. Nisiha (Nisitha); 2. Mahānisiha (Māhā-nisītha); 3. Vavahāra (Vyavahāra); 4. Ayäradasão (Ācāradasāh) or Dasāsuyakkhandha (Daśāśrutaskandha); 5. Kappa (Bịhat-kalpa); 6. Pañcakappa (Pañca-kalpa.) E. Individual texts :- 1. Nandisutta (Nandi-sūtra); 2. Aņuogaddāra (Anuyogadvāra). F. The four Müla-suttas (Mūlasūtras): 1. Uttarājjhayaņa (Uttaradhyayana); 2. Avassaya (Avaśyaka); 3. Dasaveyāliya (Daśavaikālika); 4. Pinda-nijjutti (Piņda-Niryukti). According to the Śvetāmbaras, there were originally two kinds of sacred books, the fourteen 'Purvas' and the eleven 'Angas', the fourteen Purvās were, however, reckoned, to make up a twelfth Anga under the name of Dithivaya. The knowledge of the fourteen Pūrvas continued only down to Sthūlabhadra, the eighth patriarch after Mahāvira; the next seven patriarchs down to Vajra knew only ten Purvas, and after that time the remaining Pūrvas were gradually lost, until, at the time when the final redaction of the canon took place - 980 years after the death of Mahāvīra - all the Pūrvas had disappeared, and consequently the 12th Anga too. (cf. 'Studies in Jainism', p. 11-12). About the Angas : (For details cf. 'Parisiştaparvan' edited by Jacobi p. 1xxxii-lxxxiii and 'Vira Nirvāṇa Saṁvet and Jain kāla gananä' by Muni Kalyānavijayaji).
In the second century after Mahāvira's death there was a terrible famine in the land of Magadha which lasted for 12 years. At that time the Maurya Candragupta was the king of Magadha and Thera Bhadrabāhu was the head of the Jain community. Owing to fantine Bhadrabāhu migrated to Nepal. During these unsettled times, themonks neglected their regular studies so that the sacred lore was on the point of falling into oblivion. The Sangha therefore {reassem-- bling in Pätaliputra when the famine was over, collected the fragments of the canon which the monks happened to recollect, and in this way brought together the eleven Angas. In order to recover the Ditthivāya, the Sangha sent 500 monks, with Sthülabhadra as their leader, to Bhadrabāhu in Nepal, who had then undertaken the 'mahaprāna' vow, lasting for twelve years, but all of them except Sthūlabhadra, becoming tired by the slowness of their progress, soon fell off; Șthūlabhadra alone stayed out the whole term of his master's

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Jain Sources
and unauthoritative collection of works brought together by Jincandra in Valabhi at a far later date.11
vow and learned the fourteen Pūrvas; but he was forbidden to teach more than the first ten of them to others as a penalty for misusing them. Thus the first compilation of the canon took place in Pätaliputra during the time of Candragupta Maurya who is assigned 299 B.C.i. e. the beginning of the 4th cent. B. C. or the end of the 3rd cent. B. C.
Now owing to another famine in the year 827 after the death of Mahavira (i. e. about 4th cent. A.D.) when all the sacred lore was again in danger of becoming obsolete, another council of monks was convened at Mathură under the guidance of Ācārya Skandila in order to collect the scriptures and arrange them in an orderly way. Synchronous with this, Ācārya Nāgārjuna did the same work of collecting the sacred texts by convoking a council of monks at Valabhi, but unfortunately as these two Ācārvas, Skandila and Nāgārjuna could not meet, there remained certain differences in some of the readings, allusions to which can still be found in the commentaries.
The well-known final council presided over by Devardhigaội was 'held at Valabhi, 150 years after the councils presided over by Skandila and Nāgārjuna at Mathurā and Valabhi respectively. (i.e. in the beginning of the 6th cent. A.D. or 980 years after the death of Mahāvira). Devardhi prepared his final version of the Jain canon with the aid of the written texts as well as the memory of the monks who had assembled at the council. The twelfth Anga containing the *Purvas, as said above, was already missing by this time and that is why we find only eleven Angas in the recension that has come down to us. It may be noted that Devardhi followed mainly the version of "Skandila. The latter's readings were accepted in toto and where the readings of Skandila and Nagarjuna differed, Devardhi tried to reconcile them as far as possible. Most important differences were, however, retained by giving them, in the Mula-sūtra, i.e. the text as also in the "Ţikā and Cūrņis' (For details CF “Vira Nirvāṇa Samvat and Jain kāla-gañana" by Muni Kalyāṇavijaya-p. 688 onwards). Thus the redaction by Devardhi represents the canon in the present form which forms the earliest source of information about Jain religion and philosophy. This is the Svatāmbara tradition regarding the present Jain canon. Cambridge History of India, Vol. I. *Even the Digambaras admit that the first disciples of Mahāvira knew
11.

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The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinam a
There being thus two opposite traditions regarding the Jain canon, we have to take note of the views of modern scholars who have critically examined the whole question as to the authenticity and antiquity of the Jain canon.
86
It is noteworthy that the result of recent researches of Jacobi inclines more towards the tradition of the Svetämbaras. In his opinion which is also endorsed by Dr. Charpentier,1 the Svetambara tradition regarding the Jain canon cannot be regarded as wholly without any historical foundation. Of course all the works comprising the present canon do not belong to the same period but are of different origin and age. Of the 45 texts mentioned above, the eleven Angas which are said to have been compiled by Mahavira's pupils are undoubtedly the oldest part of the canon-which is assigned to the end of the 4th cent. B. C. or the beginning of the 3rd cent. B. C., by Jacobi and others on a consideration of language and metre on the one hand and comparison with the oldest Buddhist Pali works on the other.13 It should be noted that when the Angas are said to be the oldest, that should not be taken to mean that the form in which they have come down to us is the same as it was at the time of their origin. Not only the passing of time but the traditional reliance upon memory rather than upon written documents made some additions, omissions and alterations inevitable. What is however contended is that they adequately preserve the oldest portions too.
12 33
13.
the fourteen Purvas and eleven Angas. They relate however that not only was the knowledge of the fourteen Purvas lost at an early period but that as early as 436 years after Mahavira's Nirvana, the last who knew the eleven Angas died and the teachers who succeeded him knew less and less Angas as time went on until the knowledge of these works was completely lost 683 years after Mahavira's death."
"History of Indian Literature" by M. Winternit, Vol IL p. 432-433.
The Uttaradhyayanasutra Introduction p. 31.
SBE, Vol. XXII, p. xliii (Introduction).

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Jain Sources
Of the eleven Angas, Viyahapannatti usually called the Bhagavati-sūtra, which is the fifth Anga and the biggest of all, shall be our main source of material for the discussion of Pariņāma in the Agamas, as it, besides being antique in character, presents an exhaustive and lucid description of the varied questions metaphysical and ethical, which were being discussed since the time of Mahavira and even before that during the period of Pārsva. Thus both from the point of view of its subject-matter and its antique character the Bhagavai occupies a prominent place in the Agama literature. Other relevant old works such as Thaṇānga, Pannavaṇa, Ut. Su., Anuogaddara, Jivabhigama containing references to metaphysical problems will also be consulted whenever necessary.
B
87
The Darśana Perio 1
The Period of Umasvati and Kundakundacārya : (4th and 5th cent. A. D.)
As we shall see, the account of the Jain doctrines as found in the Agamas is descriptive in its treatment. The doctrines are simple, stated without any attempt at elaborate explanation or establishing anything on the basis of reasoning. Hence many terms and phrases are left unexplained. This development is to be found in the Darśana and the Tarka period. In the earliest dārganic texts viz., the Tattvärtha-sutra of Umasvati and the works of Kundakunda (which shall be presently noticed), we find the material of the Agamas systematised in such a way as to give a comprehensive view of all the doctrines of Jain philosophy. Though these texts do not show any essential difference from the doctrines of the Agamas, yet advance over the latter is discernible in so far as a certain clearness and accuracy of idea and expression, as will be seen, characterise them. However, for the subtle dialectical exposition and discussions, we shall have to go to the still later works of the Tarka period.

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The Sāṁkhya-Yoga and the Jaina Theories of Parinama
The Tattvārtha-sūtra with the svopajña-bhāşya of Umāsvati is a work which is regarded as authentic both by the Svetāmbaras and the Digambaras, while the important works of the Digambarācārya Kundakunda viz.., Pravacanasāra, Pañcāstikāya, Samayasāra and Niyamasāra, which we are to consider are the prime authority of the Digambaras. The dates of these two Ācāryas cannot be fixed with certainty. According to Digambara tradition and scholars like Dr. Upadhyelt and Wirternitz15. Kundakunda lived in the first cent. A.D. and was anterior to Umāsvāti whose date is stated to be about the 3rd or 4th cent. A D.16 On the other hand certain scholarsli assign a later date to Kundakunda viz., beginning of the 5th cent. A.D. i.e. after Umāsvāti. It is not necessary for us to enter into this controversial issue. We shall, however, take up first the Tattvārtha in as much as it does not show such a detailed and elaborate treatment of metaphysical problems, especially of the concept of Pariņāma, as is seen in the works of Kundakunda.
The unique feature of the Tattvārtha is that it is the first of its kind in the whole of Jain philosophical literature, attempting to systematise all the tenets of the Jain system on the basis of the Āgamas. Further, as we know, the dārśanic-sūtra period of Indian Philosophy had come to a close by the time of Umasvāti and the age of commentaries on these sūtras had already set in. But there was not a single Jain Sanskrta (or Prakṛta) philosophical work so far written in the sūtra style. This need was fulfilled by the work of Umāsvāti which therefore comes to occupy the position of the first philosophical work written in Sanskrta and in the sūtra style in the whole of Jain literature. The works of Kundakunda too, are the first to be written systematically in Prāksta verses. They treat the very same philosophical problems that are dealt with in the Āgamas and the Tattvārtha, though they cannot be said to be based on the Āgamas as their authority is denied by the Digambaras.
14 Pravacanasāra Introduction p. xxii. 15 History of Indian Literature Vol. II, p.476. 16 History of Indian Literature, Winternitz. Vol. II, p.578.
Pt. Sukhalalji's Introduction to the Tattvārtha (Gujarati) p 11. 17 Muni Kalyāņavijaya's Śram aņa Bhagavān Mahavira (Hindi) p.392.

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Jain Sources
The Tarka Period
(5th Cent. A.D. to 17th cent A.D.)
The Tarka period is prolific in dialectical works. I have drawn upon the most prominent and authoritative texts which throw light on the problem of Parināma and the subject-matter related to it. I mention below, in chronological order, these works with the names of their authors.
1. Sanmati-Tarka by Siddhasena Divakara. Later part of the 4th
cent. A.D. or the beginning of the 5th cent. A.D.18 Śvetāmbara. 2. Sarvartha-Siddhi by Pūjyapāda. About 5th cent. A.D. (latter
half).19 Digambara. 3. Apta-mimāṁsā by Samantabhadra. About 6th cent. A.D.20
Digambara. 4. Višeşāvaśyaka-bhāşya by Jinabhadra. About 1st half of the
7th cent. A.D.91 Svetāmbara. 5. Tattvārtha-Rājavarttika, Aştaśati, Laghıyastraya etc. by
Akalanka. About 7th cent. A.D.22 Digambara. 6. Tattvārthasūtrabhāşyavrtti by Siddhasena Gandhahasti. Later
half of the 8th cent. A.D.23 Svetāmbara. 7. Dharma-samgrahani, Sāstravártasamuccaya, etc., by Haribhadra.
8th cent. A.D.24 (latter part). Svetāmbara.
18 Pandit Sukhalalji's Introduction to Sanmati-Prakarana (Gujarati
Translation) p.69.19 'Jainendravyākaraṇa and Ācārya Devanandi' an article in Sähitya
Samsodhaka' p. 79. 20 Pt. Sukhalalji's Prākkathana, Nyāyakumudacandra, Part II,p.17. 21 Muni Jinavijayaji, 'Bharatiya Vidya', Singhi Smāraka Grantha. 22 Pt. Sukhalalji's Prākkathana, Nyāyakunudacandra. Part II. p.16-17. 23 Pt. Sukhalalji, Iptroduetion to the Tsū. (Gujarati), p.59. 24 Muni Jinvijayaji, “Jain Sāhitya Samsodhaka', year I, Vol.I.

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The Sankhya-Yoga and the Jair Theories of Pariņāma:
8. Tattvārtha-ślokavārttika, Astasahasri, by Vidyananda. First
half of the 9th cent. Å.D.95 Digambara. 9. Commentaries on the three important works of Kundakunda
viz. Pravacanasära, Pañcāstikaya, Samayasāra by Amrtacandra.
First half of the 10th cent. A.D.?Digambara. 10. Commentary on the Sanmati of Siddhasena Divākara by
Abhayadeva. (Svetāmbara). Later half of the 10th cent. A.D.'" 11. Syadvadaratnākara by Vādideva, Early part of the 12th cent.
A.D.28 Svetāmbara, 12. Dvātrinsikā, Pramāņa-mimāṁsā by Hemcandra. 12th cent.
A.D.". Svetāmbara. 13. Syādavāda-mañjarī, by Mallişena, (13th cent. A.D.)30: Svetambara. 14. Pañcādhyāyi by Rājamalla (15th cent. A.D.)si Digambara. 15. Dravya--Guņa Paryaya Rasa, Naya--Pradipa, commentary on
the SVS. of Haribhadra, etc., by Yašovijayaji,(17th cent. A.D.): 3 Svetambara.
In all these works, as we shall have occasion to sec, two or three things stand out prominently. Firstly, in all of them we find an attempt at establishing and justifying the Jain position on the strength of dialectical reasoning. This had to be done in answer to the various objections raised by the rival schools of thought that had developed then. The objections are generally answered by controverting the objecter's position and by pointing out the fallacy and inconsistency therein, and then Jain standpoint is
25 Prof. A. B. Dhruva, Introduction to SVM, p.lxxxi. 26 Winternitz, History of Indian Literature, Vo!,JI.584. 27 Pt. Sukhalalji, Introduction to Sanmati-prakarana Guj. Translation,p.144 28 Prof. A. B. Dhruva, Introduction to SVM, ,7. Ixxxi. 29 Prof. A. B. Dhruva, Introduction to SVM, p.lxxxii. 30 Introduction, Nyāyakumudacandra, Part II, p.42. 31 Introduction to Pañcădhyāyi, by Phulacandra Siddhantaśāstri, p. 16. 32 Winternitz, History of Indian Literature, Vol. II, p.593:

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sought to be established by showing it to be free from the alleged inconsistencies and fallacies. This method of argumentation, no doubt, went a long way in the development of thought. For, all the questions so far left untouched and for whose explanation no need had so far arisen had, of necessity, to be taken up and treated at full length with a view to make the Jain system of thought strong and cogent. In this way, this later development of thought helped to fill in the gaps found in the pre-darśanic stage and to bring about a full-fledged development of all the main concepts of the Jain philosophy...

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CHAPTER VII
PARINĀMAVĀDA IN THE AGAMAS
*Introductory
The Agamas, as already said above, do not contain any systematic exposition of the Jain doctrines but a detailed descriptive account of them in a desultory manner. So, it shall be our task, here, to gather from the Agamas such references as have a bearing on Pariņāma and related matter. But, as Pariņāma being a concept of reality is closely related to other metaphysical ideas, it is necessary to study it in relation to general Jain metaphysics. We shall have to keep close to this approach throughout the discussion of Pariņāma, even in later works. Otherwise we would miss the different bearings of Pariņāma on different aspects of reality. So, first I give below a general scheme of metaphysics as is found in the Agamas.
1
Jain Metaphysics
The Davvas (Dravyas)
The universe (Loga) is said to be constituted of the five Atthikayas, viz., Dhammatthikãe (Principle of Motion), Ahammatthikae (Principle of Rest), Agasatthikae (Space), Jivatthikãe (Soul), Poggalatthikae1 (Matter). These are classed under two kinds of substances viz. Jivadavvas and Ajivadavvas. Of the four Ajîvadavvas, Poggalatthikae is rūvi (i.e. possessed of colour, taste,
' किमयं भंते लोएत्ति पवृच्चइ ?"
'गोयमा ! पंचत्थिकाया, एस णं एवतिए लोएत्ति पबुच्चइ, तं जहा - धम्मत्थिकाए अहमत्किाए जाव पोग्गलत्थिकाए ।' Bh. Su. 13.4.481
cf. also 2.10.117, 7.10-Pannavana and Tha Su. 1.251.

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93
smell and touch) while the rest are arūvi (i.e, not possessed of colour, taste etc.) ?
Āgasatthikāe is again comprised of Loyāgāse and Aloyāgāse. The space containing substances Jiva and others is called Loyāgāse while the one extending infinitely beyond it, is called Aloyāgāse. It is a void devoid of substances, 3 Thus if we want to picture to ourselves Jain cosmography we shall have to regard Āgāsa (Space), as the primary entity, a part of which is peopled with Jiva, - Poggala, Dhamma, Abamma.
It may be noted that at certain places in the Āgamas, Kāla too is admitted as a separate sixth substance (dravya).* At Ut. Sû... 28.736 the six substances viz., Dhamma, Ahamma, Āgāsa, Kāla, Poggala and Jiva are said to make up this universe (Loga). When, however, Kāla is not recognised as a separate substance it is identified with Jiva and Ajiva. These two views about Kāla persist throughout the later period.
Of the six substances, Āgasa, Dhamma and Ahamma are each one substance only while Kāla, Poggala and Jiva are an infinite number of substances. (Ut. Sū. 28.8) 2 'कतिविहा णं भंते ! दव्वा पन्नत्ता?' 'गोयमा ! दुविहा दवा प. तं जहा
जीवदव्वा य अजीवदव्वा य ।' 'अजीवदव्वा णं भंते ! कतिविहा पन्नत्ता ?' 'गोयमा ! दुविहा प. तं जहा - रूविअजीवदवा य अरूविअजीवदव्वा य ।
Bh. Su. 25.2.720 (2.10.120), Anu. Su. 14. 3 Bh. Su. 2.10. 120-121.
कतिविहा णं भंते ! सव्वदव्वा पन्नत्ता ?' 'गोयमा । छविहा सव्वदव्वा पन्नत्ता -- तं जहा -- धम्मत्थिकाए अहमत्थिकाए जाव अद्धासमए ।'
Bh. Su. 25.4 cf. Also Bh. Su. 2.10,120, 11.11.424, 13.4.482-483; Pannnvena. 1. 5 धम्मो अहम्मो आगासं कालो पुग्गलजन्तवो। एस लोगो त्ति पन्नत्तो जिणेहिं.
वरदंसिहिं ॥७॥ 6 (Jivābhigam)
'किमयं भते ! कालो त्ति पवुच्चइ ?' 'गोयमा ! जीवा चेव अजीवा चेव त्ति ।'

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With these general remarks we may proceed to consider the nature and functions of each of these substances.
94
Jiva :
The main characteristic of Java is stated to be uvaoga, the capacity to attend and to know. The other characteristics are knowledge (nāna), faith (darsana), conduct (cāritta), austerities (tava), energy (viriya) and the experience of happiness and misery. From the standpoint of substance (dravya), Jiva is described to be infinite (in number), from that of khetta ( ksetra), pervading the Logāgāsa, from that of Time, eternal, and from that of bhava, devoid of colour, taste, smell and touch. Each Jiva has innumerable (asamkhyāta) space-points, i.e. equivalent to those of Logāgāsa.10 Though Jiva is arūvi, it acquires the size and form of the body which it comes to inhabit as a result of karmas. Its space-points
17 उवओगलक्खणे णं जीवे ।
:8
जीवो उवओगलक्खणो ।
10
Bh Su. 13,4.481, 2.10.117
Ut. S. 28.10
नाणेणं दंसणेणं च सुहेण य दुहेण य ॥१०॥ नाणं च दंसणं चेव चरितं च तवो तहा ।
वीरियं उवओगो य एयं जीवस्स लक्खणं ॥११॥
Ut. Su. 28.10.11. Cf Also Bh. Su. 13.4.481
9 दव्वओ णं जीवत्थिकाए अनंताई जीवदव्वाई, खेत्तओ लोगप्पमाणमेत्ते, कालओ न कयाइ न आसि जाव निच्चे, भावओ पुण अवण्णे अगंधे अरसे अफासे, गुणओ उवओगगुणे ।”
Bh. Sū. 2.10.117.
केवतिया णं भंते ! लोयागासपएसा पन्नत्ता ? 'गोयमा ! असंखेज्जा लोयागासपएसा पन्नत्ता ॥"
' एगमेगस्स णं भंते । जीवस्स केवइया जीवपएसा पन्नता ?" 'गोयमा ! जावतिया लोगागासपएसा एगमेगस्स
णं जीवस्स एवतिया जीवपएसा पण्णत्ता ॥ '
Bh. Su. 7.8.283. The terms Sankhyata ( संख्यात) Asankhyata (असंख्यात ) and Ananta

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(paesā) are capable of expansion and contraction according to the dimension of the physical body. In this respect it resembles a lamp which though remaining the same illumines the whole of the space enclosed in a small or big room in which it happens to be placed. 1
Jiva is both an experiencer and an agent. 12 It is eternal from the standpoint of substance and non-eternal from the standpoint of modes. 13 Its different states depending upon Karmas are as
(अनन्त), it must be noted, do not possess their ordinary sense in Jain philosophy. They are technical and are explained by means of the simile of 'Palya' (a particular kind of vessel with specific m:asurements). The minimal ( जघन्य ) limit of Sankhyāta is two, while its highest limit (उत्कृष्ट ) is beyond our calculation. It is explained by means of ‘palya’, All the numbers between जघन्यसंख्यात and उत्कृष्टसंख्यात are called मध्यमसंख्यात. When one more is added to the highest (उत्कृष्ट) Samkhyāta it becomes the minimal limit of Asamkhyāta which extends over a very wide range of numbers and cannot be calculated by us. Ananta begins when one is added to the highest (उत्कृष्ट) Asamkhyāta. Ananata, too, has the highest limit. Each of these, Sarkhyāta, Asamkhyatá and Anant, has various subdivisions. For details cf. Karma-grantha, Hindi, by Pandit Sukhalalji, Part IV, pp. 208 onwards.
11. 'से णूणं भंते ! हत्थिस्स य कुंथुस्स समे चेव ?' 'हंता गोयमा । हथिस्स कुंथुस्स य, एवं जहा रायप्पसेणइज्ज जाव खुड्डियं वा महालियं वा से तेणट्ठेणं गोयमा ! जाव समे चेव जीवे ।'
Bh. Su. 7.8,293
'गोयमा ! अत्थेगइयं वेएइ,
12. 'जीवे णं भंते ! सयंकडं दुक्खं वेदेइ ?" अत्थेगइयं नो वेएइ ।’ ‘से केणटुठेणं भंते ! ।' 'गोयमा ! उदिन्नं वेrs, अणुदिन्नं नो वेएइ, से तेणट्ठेणं एवं वुच्चइ अत्येगइयं वे इ
एवं
...
... ... 1
Bh. Su. 1.2, 21
13. 'जीवा णं भंते ! कि सासया असासया ?”
...
...
95
'गोयमा ! सासया सिय असासमा '
गोयमा । दव्वट्ट्याए सासया भावट्ट्याए असासया ।'
-
Bh. Sü. 7.2.272

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follows: (1) Udie (af) Operative, or that which rises from the operation or fruition of karmas. (2) Uvasamie () Subsidential, arising from the subsidence of karmas. (3) Khaie (nf), arising from the destruction of karmas. Khaovasamie (3⁄4¶¤fîã) i.e. arising from the partial destruction, subsidence and operation of karmas. (5) Pāriņāmie (ff), Natural, the soul's Own natural thought-activity, independent of karmas. (6) Sannivaie1 (fa) i.e. resulting from the association of two or more states. In the Pannavaṇā (Ch. 13) and the Bh. Su. 14.4.514, we find the different kinds of Pariņāmas of the soul given as follows: gati-pariņāma, indiya-pariņāma, kasiya-pariṇāma, lesa-pariņāma, joga-pariņāma, uvaoga-pariņāma, ṇāṇa-pariņāma, damsaṇa-pariṇāma, caritta-pariṇama and veda-pariņāma. These are explained in detail hereafter.
96
Poggala:
Poggala is distinguighed from all the other substances owing to its possessing rupitva i.e. colour, taste, and touch. 15 Its chief characteristic is said to be that of 'grahana' since it forms the basis of the bodies, senses, yoga, 16 and respiration of souls, 1 (i.e. by the vibratory activity of the soul, poggale matter - transforms itself in the form of body, senses etc.). From the standpoint 14. छव्विहे भावे पण्णत्ते, तं जहा -- उदइए उवसमिए खइए खओवसमिए पारिणामिए सन्निवाइए ।
15.
Thā. Sū. 6.537
Cf. Also Anuyoga dvāra Saṭbhāvādhikara and Bh. Su. 17.1.593. पोग्गलात्थिकाय रूविकायं अजीवकायं पन्नवेति ।
Bh. Su. 7.10.30
זן
16. This term is explained in the next chapter.
17. पोग्गलात्थिकाए णं पुच्छा' 'गोयमा ! पोग्लात्थिकाएणं जीवाणं ओरालियवेउब्वियआहारए तेयाकम्मए सोइंदियचक्खिं दियघाणिदियजिब्भिंदियफासिंदियमणजोगवयजोग कायजोगआणापाणूणं च गृहणं पवत्तति, गहण - लक्खणे णं पोग्गलत्थिकाए ।'
Bh. Su. 13.4.481

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of substance, it is infinite in number, from that of 'khetta ' ( ksetra ) it is co-terminous with the Logāgasa, from that of time it is eternal and from that of 'bhava' it is possessed of taste, smell etc. It has five colours, five tastes, four kinds of odour and eight kinds of touch. 1 A paramānupoggala, however, possesses only one colour, one taste, one smell, and two kinds of touch 19 The different kinds of transformation of poggala are stated to be - sound, darkness, lustre (of jewels), light, shade, sunshine, colour, taste, smell, and touch.20 To these may be added its other Pariņāmas such as bandhanaparināma, gatiparināna, bheda-parinama and agurulahuya-parināma 2 1 which are classed under the general heading of 'ajivaparināmas' in the Pannavanā (ch. 13 ) and the Bh. Su 14.4.22 Like the Jiva, Poggala also is eternal from the standpoint
97
18. 'पोग्गलत्थिकाए णं भंते ! कतिवण्णे कतिगंधे० रते फासे ?' 'गोयमा ! पंचवण्णे प'चरसे दुगंधे अट्ठफासे रूवी अजीवे सासए अवट्ठिए लोगदव्वे, से समासओ पंचविहे पण्णत्ते, तं जहा - दव्वओ खेत्तओ कालओ भावओ गुणओ, दव्वओ णं प्रोग्गलत्थिकाए अणंताई दव्वाई, खेत्तओ लोयप्पमाणमेत्ते, कालओ न कयाइ न आसि जाव निच्चे, भावओ वण्णमंते गंध० रस० फासमंते, गुणओ गहणगुणे ।' Bh. Su. 2.10.117
19. 'परमाणुपोग्गले णं भंते ! कतिवन्ने जाव कतिफासे पन्नत्ते ? 'गोयमा ! एगवन्ने एगगंधे एगरसे दुफासे पन्नत्ते । ' Bh. Su. 18.6.631
20. ' सद्दन्धयार उज्जोओ पहा छाया तवे इ वा ।
वण्णरसगन्धफासा पुग्गलाणं तु लक्खणम् ॥' Ut Su. 28.12
21. cf. Appendix II
22. 'अजीवपरिणामे णं भंते ! कतिविधे पन्नत्ते ?" गोयमा दसविधे पन्नत्ते, तं जहा -- बंधणपरिणामे १, गतिपरिणामे २, संठाणपरिणामे ३, भेदपरिणामे ४, वण्णपरिणामे ५, गंधपरिणामे ६, रसपरिणामे ७, फासपरिणामे ८, अगुरुल हुयपरिणामे ९, सद्दपरिणामे १० । Pannavana 13 ( परिणामपद )

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of substance and non-eternal from the standpoint of modes, 2 3
Now a little about the classification of Poggala. In Thā. Sū.82,2- it is stated that Poggala is of two kinds - Parmāņupoggala and No-paramānu-poggala (i.e. the khandhā or molecular aggregate) while a four-fold classification is also met with in the Višeșa-pada of Pannavaņā (ekt. 5) thus : (1) Khandhā, (2) Khandhadesā, (3) Khandapaesā, (4) Paramāņu poggala -- i.e. (1) molecular aggregate, (2) a part of a molecular aggregate, (3) The smallest part of a molecular aggregate and (4) an atom. Then in the Bh. Sū.8.1.309, we find a three-fold classification of Poggala based on two kinds of change or transformation - one, natural change (वीससा) and the other involving conscious effort (पओग)25.
The terms 'Tatar' and 'THAT' are not explained but subdivisions of each are given in detail in subsequent passages.
These two kinds of change, as we shall have occasion to see, are elaborately treated in later works.
It should be noted that the number of Poggala and atoms is infinite (ananta) but they occupy only the innumerable (asamkhyāta) space-points of Logāgāsa. This is possible because of the peculiar power of penetration or occupation possessed by an atom as well as a molecular aggregate. Thus one space-point can be occupied
23.
TRATTOO of ma fã HIHT TAS ?' 'गोयमा ! सिय सासए सिय असासए ।'
furegoi ?' 'गोयमा ! दव्वट्ठयाए सासए वन्नपज्जवेहिं जाव फासपज्जवेहिं असासए।' Bh. Sū. 14.4.512 faet gramat di, d. -- Trautmar da datatamar da !
sfazi o wa III GT 9778T?' 'That ! fafael atat AT, तं जहा -- पओगपरिणया मीससापरिणया वीससापरिणया।'
24. 25.

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by an infinite number of atoms and molecular aggregates.2 6
Dbammatthikāe and Ahammatthikāe Both these substances are, from the standpoint of substance, one, from that of ‘khetta', co-extensive with the Logāgāsa, from
It of time, eternal and from that of bhāva, devoid of colour. taste. smell and touch.27 The function of Dhammatthikae is to be the efficient cause in soul's all dynamic bhavas, such as gamanā. gamana (going and coming), speech, unmesa (act of opening the eyes), vibratory activity through mind, speech and body (FTTTT) and similar others signifying motion2s as also in Poggala's motion. That is why Dhammatthikāe is called 'gamana-gune'. Adhammatthikāe on the other hand is thāņa-guņe' in as much as it is the efficient cause of all the static bhavas of Jiva, like sitting, standing, sleeping, steading the mind etc. as well as of Poggala.:9 It may be noted here in passing that nowhere do we find, in the Agamas, specific mention of the Pariņāmas of these as in the case of Jiva and Poggala. Of the different Ajiva-pariņāmas mentioned in the Parinama-pada (ch. 13) of Pannavana noted above only one, viz., 'agurulahuya' is applicable to these two.
26. 'परमाणुपोग्गला णं भंते ! किं संखेज्जा असंखेज्जा अणंता ?' 'गोयमा !
नो संखेज्जा नो असंखेज्जा अणंता, एवं जाव अणंतपएसिया खंधा ।' 'एगपएसोगाढा णं भंते ! पोग्गला किं संखेज्जा असंखेज्जा अणंता ?'
‘एवं चेव ...... एवं जाव असंखेज्जपएसोगाढा ।' Bh. Si. 25.4.740 27. Ut. Si. 2.10.116 28. 'धम्मत्थिकाए णं भंते ! जीवाणं किं पवत्तति ?' 'गोयमा ! धम्मत्थिकाएणं
जीवाणं आगमणगमण भासुम्मेसमणजोगा वइजोगा कायजोगा जे यावन्ने तहप्पगारा चला भावा सव्वे ते धम्मत्थिकाएणं पवत्त ति, गइलकखणे णं
धम्मत्थिकाए।' Bh. Su. 13:4.481 29. 'अहम्मत्थिकाएणं जीवाणं किं पवत्तति ?' 'गोयमा ! अहम्मत्यिकाएणं
जीवाणं ठाणनिसीयणतुयट्टण मणस्स य एगत्तीभावकरणता जे यावन्ने थिरा भावा सव्वे ते अहम्मत्थिकाए पवत्तंति, ठाणलक्खणे णं अहम्मत्यिकाए ।' Bh. Su. 13.4.481

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Agāsattbike Āgāsatthikāe is composed of Logāgāsa and Alogāgāsa. The former contains Jiva, Poggala, Dhamma and Ahamma and Kāla whereas the latter is devoid of these, an empty space, extending infinitely beyond the Logāgāsa.80 Its function is to give place to or serve as a substratum for other substances.s1 From the standpoint of substance, it is one, from that of khetta', co-extensive with loka and aloka, from that of time eternal, from that of bhāva devoid of colour, taste, smell and touch.39 It has infinite number of space-points. Of the different Ajiva-parinamas, noted, above, only 'agurulahuya' is applicable to it like Dhamma. and Ahamma.
Kāla : It may be noted that nothing beyond a bare mention of Kala as a sixth substance is to be found in the Āgamas. At one place, however, (Ut.Su.28-10), the characteristic or function of Kala is stated to be Vattana - वत्तणालक्खणो कालो' i.e. to help substances in their continuing to exist'.We do, often, get references to vyavahāra-kala' or conventional time viz.. 'avalika' 'muhutta' etc. as in the Bh.Sü.25-5, but these do not throw any light on
30 'कतिविहे णं भंते ! आगासे पण्णत्ते ?' 'गोयमा दुविहे आगासे प० तं
जहा-लोयागासे च अलोयागासे ।' _ 'लोयागासे णं भंते ! किं जीवा जीवदेसा जीवपदेशा अजीवा अजीवदेसा अजीवपएसा ?' 'गोयमा। जीवा. वि जीवदेसावि...अजीवावि अजीवदेसावि...।'
____Bh. Su. 2.10.121 'अलोगागासे ण भंते । किं जीवा' ? पुच्छा तह चेव । 'गोयमा ! नो जीवा जाव नो अजीवप्पएसा ।'
' Bh. Su, 2.10. 121 'लोगालोगे य आगासो ।' Ut. Si. 36.7 31 'आगासत्थिकाए णं भंते । जीवाण अजीवाण य किं पवत्तति ?' 'गोयमा
आगासस्थिकाएणं जीवदव्वाण य अजीवदव्वाण य भायणभए...अवगाहणालक्खणे णं आगासत्थिकाए ।'
Bh. Sü. 13.4.481
32
Bh. Su. 2.10116

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Kāla as a metaphysical principle and its relation to the Pariņāmas of things.
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The above account of the six dravyas culled from the Agama passages, presents the Jain view of metaphysics. This view in its outline is throughout maintained by the later writers, supplying of course logical framework and consistency.
We may now turn to the theory of Pariņāma which can be formulated from the Agamas.
Elements of Pariņāma as found in the Agamas
At the outset, it may be pointed out that nowhere in the Agamas, have I succeeded in finding a passage which directly defines the concept of Pariņāma as such. We shall, therefore, endeavour to understand the Agama idea of Parinama by studying the passages relevant to the subject. Such passages by the very nature of the subject-matter get classified under three heads. viz., (A) Those bearing on the Pajjavas of Jiva and Ajiva, (B) Those bearing on the Pariņāmas of Jiva and Ajiva, (C) Those cocerning the eternal and non-eternal aspects of Jiva and Poggala.
A
The Pajjavas of Jiva and Ajiva
The Pajjavas of Jiva and Ajiva are enumerated in the fifth chapter viz., the Visesa-pada of Pannavaṇā and in the Bh.Su. 25.5.746. Therein at one place Jiva-pajjavas are stated to be infinite in number because the total number of individual Jîvas (Jiva-vyakti) is infinite. Thus it considers the pajjavas of the Jiva category viewed in a general way. At another place the innumerable Neraiyas are said to have infinite pajjavas because the shades (degrees of transformation) of a certain quality like blackness are infinite (in their variation). Thus, here a different point of view is

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indicated in the explanation of the infinity of pajjavas, viz. the possibility of infinite variety in the individual shades (degrees of transformation) of a single quality:
Ajīva-Pajjavas
Bhagavatīsūtra and Pannavaņā first divide the Ajiva-pajjavas into rūvi and arūvi and each is then classified into four and ten kinds respectively. Of these rūviajivapajjavas are stated to be infinite in number because the total number of atoms as well as molecular aggregates of different kinds is infinite. The infinite pajjavas of an atom, as also those of the different molecular aggregates, are explained by showing the possibility of an infinite degree of variation in a single quality of an atom or a molecular aggregate (as was shown in the case of Neraiya-infernal being). No such calculus is, however, used in regard to the ten kinds of arūviajīvapajjavas.
The above-noted different pajjavas of Ajiva, show the different forms which the Ajiva-substances viz., Dhamma, Ahamma, Poggala, Āgāsa and Kāla assume, as also the different limited aspects such as 'desa' and 'paesa' in which they present themselves. There is this difference, however, between Poggala on one side and Dhamma, Ahamma and Āgāsa, on the other, viz., that the former in its atomic as well as molecular form is infinite in number while the latter are each one (indivisable) in number. This difference, as seen above, characterises their pajjavas also.
It is clear that, here too, the word pajjava indicates the various formations of Poggala as well as the different aspects under which Dhamma, Ahamma and Agasa present themselves. If we put together the passages concerning both Jiva and Ajiva, we can see that the Āgama-writers used the word 'pajjava' to indicate the various aspects or phenomena in which things present themselves.

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B
163
The Pariņāmas of Jiva and Ajīva
The Parinamas of Jiva and Ajiva are enumerated in the Pariņāma-pada (ch. 13) of Pannavaṇa and the Bh.Su. 14.4.
The Pariņāmas of Jiva as stated there are:
1 गतिपरिणाम, 2 इन्द्रियपरिणाम, 3 कपायपरिणाम, 4 लेश्यापरिणाम, 5 योगपरिणाम, 6 उपयोगपरिणाम, 7 ज्ञानपरिणाम, 8 दर्शनपरिणाम 9 चारित्रपरिणाम, 10 वेदपरिणाम.
Various sub-divisions of each of these ten kinds of Parināmas are detailed in the subsequent passages of the same chapter of Pannavaṇā. For us, however, it is necessary to note only these ten fundamental ones.
The above enumeration of the parināmas of Jiva presents some difficulties as to how all the pariņāmas attributed to Jiva can belong to it. We can understand ṇāṇa, damsaṇa, caritta and uvaoga Pariņāmas, as representing the proper functioning or Pariņamana-activity of Jiva but, how are we to understand indiya, joga, kasaya, lesā, veda and gati as the Pariņāmas of Jiva? The explanation of this lies in the peculiar Jain theory of bhavakarma i.e. psychic transformation and activity. The soul's original nature is supposed to be pure consciousness possessing the full powers of cognition but in its mundane existence, this pure faculty of cognition being clouded by karmic matter, functions only partially and piece-meal. Hence it is, that the soul has restricted or limited perception of the sensations received through different senses. In reality, however, all the sensations such as those of seeing, hearing etc., that we attribute to different senses belong to the congitive faculty of the soul. So, when one speaks of Jiva's indiya-Parinama, it is the bhāva-indiyas, the limited psychic transformations, supplying in reality the cognitive aspect of the sensations received

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through material senses, that are to be taken. When, however, on the disappearance of corresponding karmas, the obstruction disappears, the soul cognises all the sensations, otherwise supplied by material senses, without the latter's aid. The Jain psychologist, thus, assumes the bhāva - psychic aspects corresponding to material aspects with which alone, ordinary people are familiar.
What applies to the cognitive aspect or Parināma of the soul, applies also to other aspects, viz, daṁsana, caritta and uvaoga. In the pure state these are all concentrated on the self but in the mundane state, they are directed in various degrees to other things. This direction of the soul to other things, or to itself is regarded as the function of the soul. It is this direction of the soul to objects other than itself, that is responsible for the material collocation or dravya-karma that attaches to itself. Thus the ‘Joga' (Yoga), which in Jain terminology means the vibratory activity of the soul through the association of body, mind and speech, is essentlally the Pariņāma of the soul.
The kaṣāyas which literally mean stains on a pure object, mean in the case of soul, so many stains on the pure consciousness. They are the different attitudes of the soul, towards the various objects of the world. They are four in number viz., anger, pride, deceitfulness and greed.
Lesas (Sans.-leśyās) are the peculiar colour-shadows of the soul due to the influence of karmic matter and are determined by the soul's bhāva-karma or psychic activity.
Veda-Pariņāma is the sex transformation in the consciousness of Jiva due to the sex of the body which it pervades.
Gati is the movement of the soul through the different worlds, such as Nāraka, Deva, Tiryañca and Manuşya on aecount of its karmas.
In short, the functioning of the soul either self-directed and therefore pure or influenced by extraneous things and therefore

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directed towards them is all the Pariņāmas of the soul. As is made clear by later writers, 'Cetana' or 'Upayoga' being the main characteristic of the soul, all its Parinamas are really the Pariņāmas of 'Cetana' and/or 'Upayoga' due to extraneous influence or independent of it (ie. in the pure state).
The Pariņāmas of Ajiva
105
The Parinamas of Ajiva are:
1 बन्धनपरिणाम, 2 गतिपरिणाम, 3 संस्थानपरिणाम, 4 भेदपरिणाम, 5 वर्णपरिणाम, 6 गन्धपरिणाम, 7 रसपरिणाम, 8 स्पर्शपरिणाम, 9 अगुरुलघुपरिणाम, 10 शब्दपरिणाम.
All these Pariṇāmas of Ajiva, excepting 'agurulahuya' are applicable, as already said, only to Poggala and not to any other Ajiva-dravya. And even amongst the Poggala-pariņāmas, a paramāņu can possess only gati, agurulahuya, vanṇa, gandha, rasa and phāsa - Pariņāmas, and not others, as the latter presuppose the existence or presence of, at least, more than one Paramāņu.
The Poggala-Pariņāmas enumerated above, do not require any explanation which was necessary in the case of the Pariņāmas of the soul. They all, in short, represent the activity of Poggala and its results in different relations.
If we take into consideration the Pariņāmas of Jīva and Ajiva, we find that they all represent the functioning or Parinamana of Jiva as well as Ajiva, particularly Poggala, which the Agama - writers could visualise.
The problem of eternality and non-eternality with reference to Jiva and Poggala
In his dialogue with Gotama & Jamali Lord Mahavira discusses this problem.

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Jiva :
I.
“Are the souls, O Lord, eternal or non-eternal ?'
'O Goyamā! The souls are eternal in some respect and noneternal in some respect. They are eternal from the standpoint of substance and non--eternal from the stand-point of 'bhāva' i.e. modes'. 33(a)
II. «The soul, O Jamāli! is eternal because at no time was it
not-existent, is non-existent, and will be non-existent. It existed, exists (now) and will continue to exist (in future). It is persistent, is fixed, eternal, imperishable, undecaying, steady and nitya'.
“The Soul, O Jamāli ! is non-eternal because after having been in an infernal state of existence, it comes to be in animal state, after that in a human state and after that in a celestial state of existence.33(b)
III. Are the Neraiyas, O Lord, eternal or non-eternal ?'
Goyamā ! They are eternal in some respect and non-eternal in some respect.'
"With what end in view, O Lord, it is so said ?? "Goyamā! They are eternal from the view-point of non-extinction (avvocchittinaya) and non-eternal from the view point of extinction (vocchittinaya).3 +
33(a) Bh. nū. 7.2.273. 33(b) Bh. Sū. 9.6.387, 14.42. 34 7.3.279,
'Avvocchittinaya' corresponds to the 'dhrauvya' and 'Vocchittinaya" to the futapäda-vyaya' aspect of the later Jain philosophers. Here one particular state, of certain duration of Jiva, viz. Neraiya is taken and its eternal and non-eternal aspects are shown. The commentator takes by 'Avvochhittinaya’ the 'dravya-aspect of the Neraiya and by 'Vocchittinaya' the changing Paryāya-aspect - viz., the Nārakatva.

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IV. 'Is it, O Lord, that an unsteady or a transient thing changes,
breaks (i. e. perishes), that a steady, persistent thing does not break (perish)? Is it that the child is eternal35 and childhood non-eternal, that the pandit is eternal and 'panditatva" non-eternal ?
"O Goyamā ! it is like that......'?36
All these passages, as can be seen, aim at showing the eternal aspect of the soul, from the standpoint of substance,by postulating its existence or persistence in all the three times and its noneternal aspect from the standpoint of bhāva' i.e. modes, such as ‘närakatva', 'manuşyatva', 'devatva', childhood, panditatva' etc., which all are subject to change. It may be noted here in passing that 'bhāva' in 'bhāvatthahāyae' has the sense of 'pajjava’ (i.e. pariņāma),
Poggala : 1. “Are the atoms, O Lord, eternal or non-eternal ?'
'Goyama ! The atoms are eternal in some respect and noneternal in some respect.'
With what end in view, is it so said ?'
'Goyamā ! they are eternal from the view-point of substance and non-eternal from the view-point of modes such as those of colour, taste, smell and touch 37
II. 'Can it be said, O Lord, that the Pudgala existed in the end
less, eternal past ?
35 Here by child, its soul - as a substance is to te considered and by
'childhood'- its quality that is liable to change. 36 Bh. Sū. 1.9.80.
37 Bh:. Sü. 14.4.512

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“Yes, Goyama ! it can be so said.
Can it be said, O Lord, that the Pudgala exists in the eternal present ? 'Yes Goyamā ! it can be so said'. 'Can it be said, O Lord !' that the Pudgala will exist in the endless, eternal future ?' Yes, Goyamā ! it can be so said'.3 8
III. 'Is it possible, O Lord, that a Pudgala, which may be arid
(at one moment) in the endless, eternal past, may become cohesive (at another moment)? - or both arid and cohesive at one and the same moment with reference to its different parts (deśas)? Again, is it possible, that it may undergo manifold varņa(colour) - pariņāmas, either naturally or by some extraneous agency (cf. commentary of Abhayabheda - on Futot), or (undergo) only one varna-pariņāma on the destruction of the previous (manifold) pariņāmas ?
“Yes, Goyama ! it is possible like that.39
As in the case of the Soul, the above passages point to the eternal and non-eternal aspects of poggala, from the standpoints of substance and modes respectively.
There is a passage in the Bh.Sū. 9.6.387 - which deals with these two aspects, eternal and non-eternal, with reference to loka or the universe as a whole. It is as follows :
'The world, O Jamāli, is eternal for at no time was it nonexistent, is non-existent, will be non-existent. It existed (in the past), exists (now), and will continue to exist (in future). It is persistent, fixed, eternal, imperishable, undecaying, steady and nitya. It is
38 Bh. Sú. 1.4.42. 39 Bh. Sū, 14.4.570.

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non-eternal, O Jamali, in as much as after Osappiņi" there is Ussappini and after Ussappiņi, there is Osappini.'*1
109
In the above passage the words davvatthayãe and bhāvatthayāc are not used as in the case of Jiva and Poggala. The dravyarthika standpoint is obvious in the first part of the passage concerning. the eternal aspect of the universe; but the non-eternal aspect that is sought to be established through Osappini and Ussappini is not quite clear. For the effect of these two eras, according to Jain philosophy, is limited to a part of the human world (Manusyaloka) only, and not to the whole of the loka, which comprehends much more than the human world and wherein the changes do take place but they are not adversely or favourably affected by Osappini and Ussappiņi respectively. The statement, therefore, seems to have been made from a general point of view, to convey that though the universe as a whole never perishes and is thus eternal, yet as changes, due to time, constantly take place in them, it is non-eternal to that extent. Thus, the two aspects of 'permanence' and 'change' with reference to the loka, seem to be broadly aimed at.
In all the above passages, what is meant is that things are eternal from the standpoint of what persists in them and noneternal from the standpoint of what is evanescent in them. What is permanent or persistent is technically the 'dravya' of a thing while what is evanescent or passing the 'paryaya' or 'bhāva' of that thing.
Now, in order to have a clearer understanding of the doctrine of change and permanence, as it might have been held by the earlier Jain writers, it will be necessary to study comparatively Pajjavas and Pariņāmas of Jiva and Ajiva, noticed above.
40 These two terms we have already explained.
41 Bh. Su. 9.6,387

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The different Pariņāmas of Jiya and Ajiva, as we saw, represent various kinds of Parinamana-activity or functioning of Jiva and Ajiva respectively, as a result of which they assume particular formations - states, at particular moments of time. All these Pariņāmas can co-exist in a substance at a time, but none of them, taken singly, permanently abides in it (Jiva or Ajiva). Thus, for instance, take a particular gati-pariņāma viz., the human state. This Pariņāma of Jiva is not everlasting but will be replaced after a time by another gati-pariņāma say, the Nāraka-state, the Tiryañcastate or the Deva-state. Similar is the case with each Pariņāma of Jiva and Ajiva. These particular states-formations which a substance assumes in succession as a result of the process of change (pariņamana-activity), are also designated as 'pajjavas' as is evident from the use of such terms in the Agama as nāņapajjava, damsanapajjava, vannapajjava, rasapajjava, phāsapajjava etc. with reference to these parinamas.*Nevertheless the fact that the word does not exclusively signify the result of the Pariņamaņa activity, but something in addition, is borne out by a careful study of the first set of passages, bearing upon the pajjavas of Jiva and Ajiva. The title 'viseșa-pada' given to the fifth chapter of Pannavaņā (containing the pajjavas of Jiva and Ajiva), and the treatment of the pajjavas and pariņāmas in two different chapters are further indicative of a wider connotation of the term Pajjava. Let us see how this is.
When in the first instance, the Jiva-pajjavas are stated to be infinite, it can be seen that the pajjavas there represent the different kinds of bhedas – viseșa avasthās of the Jiva category viewed as one, from the standpoint of Samgraha-Naya (which takes a collective view of things). Here, we must carefully note that we cannot regard from the Jain standpoint, the different pajjavas of the Jiva-category as due to the Pariņāma of one Jiva because the Jains do not believe in one Jiva from which the various Jivas have come out, as certain schools of Vedānta like those of Ramanuja or Vallabha seem to think. Similarly another kind of
42 Bh, Sū. 14.4.512. Pannavaņā, ch. V.

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bheda or Viseșa is denoted by the term pajjava when the infinite (ananta) pajjavas of innumerable (asamkhyāta) Nārakas, and other groups of beings as well as those of atoms and different kinds of molecular aggregates are explained. One quality like blackness is supposed to have infinite degrees of variation i.e. infinite kinds (ananta-bheda or Viseṣa), on account of which the dravya possessing that quality is said to have infinite pajjavas. In the case of arūviajīvapajjavas, the word pajjava is used to signify such bhedas as deśa, and pradeśa which are only subjective, for as already noted, Dhamma, Ahamma, Āgāsa being each, one indivisible whole, cannot admit of any real division as such. It, however, is possible in the case of Poggala as its pajjavas viz., khandhas - molecular aggregates and atoms, can actually unite and become separate.
111
It becomes clear, therefore, that the word pajjava is used in a wide sense, comprehending all the possible kinds of aspects ( द्रव्यभेद, गुणभेद, कालकृतभेद, देशकृतभेद etc.) under which Jiva and Ajiva substances could be conceived. The word Parinama, on the other hand, is limited to signify only one of such manifold aspects i.e. those pajjavas which are the results of the Parinamana-activity. Thus the word Fajjava includes the pajjavas of Pariṇamana as well as of others. This is clearly seen in the passages discussing the question of eternality and non-eternality with reference to Jīva, Poggala and loka, wherein the standpoint of bhava-modes clearly refers to the results of the Parinamana-activity.
The above discussion on Pajjava, Parinama, Sasayāsāsayatta (शाश्वताशाश्वतत्व) helps us to formulate the concept of change as it must have been explicitly or implicitly understood by the ancient Jain thinkers. As said in the beginning of this chapter, even though there is no explicit definition13 of Parinama to be found in the
43 It may be noted that the Ut. Su. 28.6, attempts to define for the first time, Dravya. Guna and Paryaya thus:

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older Āgamas, yet in the passages given above we see all the different elements of the theory of Pariņāma, viz., Dravya, Paryāya
'गुणाणमासओ दव्वं एगदव्वसिया गुणा । - लक्खणं पज्जवाणं तु उभओ अस्सिया भवे ॥'
Substance is the substrate uf qualities, the qualities are those that inhere in one substance; but the characteristic of modes (pajjavas) is that they inhere in at least two substances'.
Further on in st. 13 of the same chapter, the characteristic of pajjavas are given thus : 'एगत्तौं च पुहुत्तं च, संखा संठाणमेव य ।। संजोगा य विभागा य, पज्जवाणं तु लक्खणं ।'
The characteristic of pajjava i. e. mode is sigleness, separateness, number, form, conjuction and disjunction.'
There is however a difference of opinion regarding the interpretation of “उभओ' in उभओ अस्सिया भवे । The commentator Santyacārya, takes by '34317' to imply both Dravya and Guņa – '3991: : 970acata Joy TUTUITTEXTAT: 1 But this interpretation is not possible in the light of st. 13 which describes Pajjava. Singleness separa teness etc. are not possible between Dravya and Guna but only between two or more Dravyas. What is more, the word 'g' seems to suggest contrast to 'T COTTEETAT.' Hence scholars like Pt. D. Malvania (Nyāyāvatāra-vārttikavṛtti’ Introduction p. 106-107.) whom I have followed, wouid interpret 'FH311? as meaning 'two or more Dravyas'.
Apart from the divergence of interpretation, the difinition and characteristic of pajjava given above, do not throw any greater light on the concept of Pariņāma than that thrown by the passages which we have already noted and discussed. They only point to the distinction of Pajjava from Guņa, viz., that which inheres in two substances is not to be called a Guņa, but, Pajjava. That is why we have not included and considered the above definition of Pajjava in our discussion of Pariņāma in the Agamas.
Another reason why the above passages from the Ut.Su. are not considered is that the use of the word Guņa is of a distinctly late age.

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113
and Pariņamana. Similarly the discussion of the permanent and the changing aspects of reality from the Dravyārthika and Paryayārthika standpoints respectively, clearly visualises the theory of Parinama. We might say here that the later definition of reality in terms of ‘utpāda, vyaya and dhrauvya' is derived from these earlier discussions.
We may, now, consider an interesting problem, important both historically and philosophically, arising from the above discussion, in connection with the usage of the terms Pajjava (Paryāya) and Pariņāma.
Paryāya – Pariņāma
Both the words Paryāya and Pariņāma, grammatically mean one and the same thing and, therefore, can be used as synonyms. In fact, they are actually used as synonyms in the earlier and later Jain philosophical literature.
The problem, now, arises, whether we are to regard both terms of equal status historically in Jain literature or, whether there are any considerations, which would make us think, that the term Pariņāma might have been taken from common usage to elucidate the doctrine of Change and Permanence.
One consideration, which immediately changes to our view is, the word Pariņāma is of common usage in the Jain and other darśanas while, the term Paryaya in this particular sense, is a Jain
For Dravya and Paryāya, as we know, were already too familiar to the older Agamas, but the word Guņa in the sense of a 'quality' seems to be unknown to them. Guņa, in the Agamas (as we have already seen) is generally used in the sense of so many 'fold' or 'times'. The above passage of the Ut. Sū., however, introduces the category of Guņa for the first time in the Āgamas in the specific sense of quality', pro bably due to the Vaiseșika influence.....

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technical word. Another consideration which weighs with us is, that the word Paryaya, as seen above, has a wider connotation, including all the possible aspects due to Pariņāma and others, independent of it. I am, therefore, inclined to suggest that the earlier Jain thinkers viewed the problem of reality from the Paryaya point of view. They saw that the different phenomena of the world (paryayas) show certain persistent elements. They classified these persistent elements into five or six categories which are their five or six Dravyas. They, thus, viewed reality as consisting of Dravya and Paryaya and when they developed their dialectic for discussing metaphysical problems, they did it, accordingly in the form of Dravyarthika-Naya and Paryāyārthika-Naya. It may be noted that we do not meet with such a usage as Pariņāmārthika-Naya, which clearly proves that Paryaya was traditional with them.
However, in the general philosophical discussions of their contemporaries, there was another word almost a synonym of Paryaya, viz., Pariņāma. This word, however, had an important connotation. It referred to an activity which brings forth various states. Philosophically it was necessary for the Jain to have a concept which would explain why the Dravyas tcok on different Paryāyas. Pariņāma could explain it, and so the term which could be a synonym of Paryaya and which at the same time, had the further advantage of explaining how the Paryāyas form themselves, was brought into service and made a current coin by the Jain thinkers. Nevertheless, the stuck to their original word Paryaya, and allowed it to have a wider connotation of aspects, which could not be brought under the Pariņāma-activity. That shows the strength of the traditional usage.
That the word Pariņāma was more or less used to suggest activity or functioning, in addition to being a synonym of Paryaya, is not only brought out f.om the passages referred to above but also by the use of such verbal forms of pari + nam (qft + 7)+ wherever
4
44 Bh.Su. 14. 4. 510-511. 12. 5. 452.

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activity is to be indicated. It is only rarely that the verbal forms of pari + i (9f7 + ) are used for that purpose.
These considerations lead me to think that the earlier Jain thinkers, even before the nucleus of the Jain Agamas was formed, in which both the terms Paryāya and Pariņāma are found, might have brought into service the term Pariņāma, of common usage, to elucidate their doctrine of Dravya and Paryāya. I, however, do not suggest that there was any conscious borrowing from one school by another. It only suggests the historical process of phidosophical development of the Paryāya doctrine, with the help or impact of the current ideas of Pariņāma-activity.

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CHAPTER 1X
PARINĀMA IN THE WORKS OF UMĀSVĀTI
AND, KUNDAKUNDA
The Tattvārtha-Sūtra with its svopajña Bhāşya
(About the 3rd or 4th cent A. D.)
Coming to the post-Agama period, we take up, first, the TSū. of Umāsvāti. As already said, this work occupies a unique position in Jain literary history, because it is a work which is accepted as authentic both by the Svetāmbaras and the Digambaras, which is not the case with the Agamas.
Let us, first, study the relevant passages from this work, bearing on our problem, and then consider what development we can detect in them.
We saw, in our discussion on the Āgama-material, that the Paryāya-Pariņāma theory is intimately connected with the concept of Dravya. So here also, we must, first, try to understand what Dravya means. We saw that older Āgamas, nowhere, clearly define Dravya. It is only, later, in the Ut. Sū., that we get the definition of Dravya, Guņa, and Paryāya. In the Tattvārtha, Dravya is. defined, as an entity possessing Guņa and Paryāya. This definition, by bringing in the aspect of Paryāya, makes the concept of Dravya, more consistent with the Jain tradition than that of Dravya given in the Ut. Sū. The latter defines substance as the substratum of qualities. The analysis of reality into Dravya and Paryāya is a Jain concept, while the analysis of reality into
i quet4qç FUH I V. 37 2 Torpareat conti

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Dravya and Guna is a Vaiseşika concept. Philosophically consiered, these two approaches are distinct. One takes reality as it ssumes different forms, or views reality, through its transformtions; while the other statically analyses it into substance and ualities. When, however for whatever reason, the analysis of Dravya and Guna was accepted by the Jains, (following the Taiśeşikas), they had to find a place for it, along with their Dravya-Paryaya analysis. And Umāsvāti defines gunas as residing n the substance and having no quality (guna) in themselves."
Here, however, we are primarily concerned with the explanaion of Paryaya that is given in the bhasya on. V. 37. Paryāya s another bhāva(state) and another name, i.e. the Paryaya of a Dravya is a distinct transformation, bearing a distinct name. In this definition, the idea of another name seems to be due to a desire to incorporate the common meaning of Paryaya viz, a synonym. Philosophically, one might say, that a Dravya may have a distinct Paryaya yet it may not always have been possible to name it differently, though one may concede that for the purpose of discourse, one has to have a distinct name, to indicate a distinct state. This is because, we can speak of a Paryaya when it is recognised as such by our thought and to pin it down our thought would require a word. However that may be, the concept of Paryaya is made clearer by Umāsvāti, by defining it as a distinct state (formation) to be recognised by a distinct name.
Now, let us take the definition of Parinama. The Bhasya states that Pariņāma is the nature, the 'thatness' of each substance (dravya) and its qualities (gunas), in other words, if we regard reality as the sum-total of the five or six substances
5
3 द्रव्याश्रया निर्गुणा गुणाः । V. 40
4 भावान्तरं संज्ञान्तरं च पर्यायः ।
5 तदुभावः परिणामः । (V. 41 ) भाष्यम् - धर्मादीनां द्रव्याणां यथोक्तानां च गुणानां स्वभावः स्वतत्त्वं परिणामः ।

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(dravyas) and their qualities (guņas), Pariņāma is the nature of all these. In short, it is the nature of dravyas-cum-guņas to transform.
Umasväti has taken a further step in the development of Jain philosophy by defining reality as such under the term Sat (which was not so far used in the earlier Jain literature).
He defines sat (reality) as characterised by origination, decay and permanence. This definition and its explanation give us two important ideas - one, viewing all the Dravyas under the term Sat, and the other - the nature of this Sat, which is stated to be Pariņāma in the sūtra V.41, is analysed into the three aspects of utapāda-origination, vyaya-decay, and dhrauvya-permanence. In short, it gives us an analysis of Pariņāma, and its identification with reality as such. This analysis of Pariņāma, it may be noted, comes to be the same in substance as the definition of Vipariņāma, given by Yāska in his Nirukta.
Not to be deprived of this triple nature of origination, decay and persistence is the definition of eternity (nityata). This definition points out that, that is to be called eternal which does not become apart from the state of being Sat or real. Now, the nature of Sat, as already noted, is to originate, to decay and to persist. Thus to be eternal is to originate, decay and persist. This is the source of the doctrine of 'parinaminityatva.'
There are three sūtras (V. 42-44) in the Tattvärtha, at the end of the fifth Adhyāya which present a new kind of classification of Pariņāmas into 'adimān' i. e. having a beginning and 'anadi' i. e. beginningless. They further state that the anádi
6 JAGoTaloyati I V.29 7 Tograronai facut 1 V.30 74# - 2425 HT Hann safa 7 stofa
3
afecafeHİN I V.42

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parināmas take place only in the arupi dravyas, such as Dharma, Adharma, Ākāśa and Jiva, while, the rūpi dravyas undergo ādiman-pariņāmas, like those of colour, taste, smell and touch.10 One exception to this is however pointed out, viz. that though Jiva is arūpi, and therefore, liable to anādi-pariņāmas only, as stated before, yet there are certain adiman-pariņāmas like those of Yoga and Upayoga taking place in it, along with anadipariņāmas.11
With reference to the above three sutras, it should be noted that they are omitted by the Digambara commentators of the Tattvärtha, viz. Pujyapāda and Akalamka. They, however, do refer to this classification in the commentary on the Sūtra, ‘: afm: ', but, do not follow Umasvati in the explanation of the same. According to them, all the Dravyas rūpi and arūpi - have anãdi-pariņāmas from the Samanya or Dravyarthika standpoint, and adiman-pariņāmas from The Visesa-Paryayarthika standpoint.12 It is important to note that even the Svetambara commentator Siddhasena too, does not seem to follow rigidly Umasvati's explanation. He maintains that everywhere - i. e. in all the dravyas there are certain anadi-pariņāmas and certain
9
भाष्यम् - तत्रानादिररूपिषु धर्माधर्माकाशजीवेष्विति । V.42
10 रूपिष्वादिमान् । V.43
भाष्यम् - रूपिषु तु द्रव्येषु आदिमान् परिणामोऽनेकविधः स्पर्शपरिणामादिरिति ।
योगोपयोगी जीवेषु 1 V.44
11
119
-
12
The two terms yoga and upayoga are explained later on.
सद्विविधोऽनादिरादिमांश्च । तत्रानादिर्धर्मादीनां गत्युपग्रहादि: सामान्यापेक्षया । स एवादिमांश्च भवति विशेषापेक्षया । Sarvarthasiddhi V.41. द्रव्यार्थिकपर्यायार्थिकनयद्वयविवक्षावशात् सर्वेषु धर्मादिद्रव्येषु स उभयः परि
¶¶¶: | Rāj-vārttika V. 41.

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ādimān-pariņamas.13
Thus these sūtras make an attempt to understand Pariņāna in some detail.
The foregoing discussion based on the sūtras of the Tattvartha along wilh the bhāșya shows a distinct philosophical advance cver the Āgamas, both in a wider generalisation, clarification and method. The concept of Sat as comprehending the whole reality, has been reached under the term Sat, and clearly defined. Similarly Dravya, Guņa, Paryāya and Pariņāma receive precise difinitions.
Kundakundācārya (About the 5th cent. A. D)
Kunda kundācārya occupies a prominent place in the Digambara hierarchy of scholar-saints. From our point of view, bis importance lies in the fact that he is a philosopher of Parinama, par excellence. We can study and understand Pariņāma theory nowhere better than in the works of this great acārya. He tries to explain and elucidate the theory of Pariņāma in its various aspects, by means of its analysis and application to the different Dravyas.
In the TSū., as we saw, Umāsvāti took a step in the development of Jain philosophy, by postulating Sat, and identifying it with utpäda, vyaya and dhrauvya. Kundakunda carries forward that step and describes Sat or Satia in greater detail,14 identify
13 ये तु मन्यन्ते रूपिष्वेवादिमान् परिणामो भवति, नामूर्तेषु, तेषामरूपिद्रव्य
पर्यायाश्रयव्यवहारलोपादुत्पादादिलक्षणायोगात् . परिणामाभाव:...... तस्मात्
797 #fagarar: #fazifahre: qfaunar fa 5914: 1 V. 43. P. 440 14 JTI HOT7an Afanear Bylawsuit i n
sicgraaf cafcatar gafa gert II PK. 8

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Parinama in the works of Umasvāti and Kundakunda
ing it with Dravya, 15 and pointing to it as 'living' in everything.16
Thus Kundakunda imagines Satta almost in the terms of ekam sad viprā bahudhā vadanti. He qualifies it a sappaḍivakkha. This clearly indicates the Jain Anekanta or relative position. Nevertheless, if the aim of philosophy is to reach wider and wider generalisations, then this is the statement of the widest imaginable generalisation.
Another point, that may be noted, is the derivation of the word Dravya, as one that flows and reaches out to all its Paryayas, which beautifully explains the operation of Pariņāma (Pk.9).17
Next, in the TSu., we noticed that Pariņāma was, by implication, analysed into utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya. Kundakunda explicitly states this position, in PS II. 7. He says that the Pari nama characterised by permanence, origination and decay of Dravya with reference to qualities and modes, is its (Dravya's) nature. Kundakunda, further, elucidates this point, by explaining the relation of invariable concomitance between the three aspects of Pariņāma, viz. utpāda, vyaya and dhrauvya, in PS II. 8. where he states that there is no origination without decay, nor is there decay without origination; origination and decay are not possible without the aspect of permanence.
Kundakunda further describes a thing (18 i, e. anything about which we can predicate is), as lying in substance (), 15 दवियं तं भंते अण्णष्णभूदं तु सत्तादो || PK. 9
!
16
इह विविहलक्खणाणं लक्खणमेगं सदिति सव्वगयं । PS II. 5. 17 दवियदि गच्छदि ताई ताई सम्भावपज्जयाई जं । दवियं तं भण्णं ........
PK 9
18 Artha' employed in the gatha-signifies substance, quality, and mode but here it is taken to mean quality and mode with reference to substance. Ps II 14

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quality (Tot), and mode (9719), and shows the inseparable connection between Artha and Pariņāma.19
This means that there is in this world not a single object which does not undergo modification, and no modification without an object as its substratum, implying thereby that the two, 'the Real' and the ‘Pariņāma' are so inseparably connected with each other, that the very concept of one is impossible without that of the other. This stanza, it can be seen, identifies, on one side, Artha with Dravya, Guņa 2nd Paryāya and on the other with Pariņāma. The TSū., as already seen, mentions Dravya, Guņa and Paryāya but does not identify them with Artha. Similarly, Pariņāma was said to be the nature of the reals (Dravyas), but the metaphysical identity of Pariņāma with reality was. not so explicitly stated as here.
The definition of Dravya in the TSū. makes clear that there cannot be any Dravya apart from Guņa and Paryāya. It is also stated in the bhāşya on I. 520 that such a Dravya, severed from Guna and Paryāya, can only be imagined, through abstraction in thought; but this does not clarify, whether Guņa and Paryāya can exist apart from Dravya. Kundakunda clarifies this point, and explains the mutual relationship betwen Dravya, Guņa and. Paryāya in the following manner :
I
“There is nothing as quality nor as modification in the absence of a substance.'
II.
There is neither substance without mode nor mode without substance. The one cannot be without the other, so say
the 'śramaņas. 19 पत्थि विणा परिणामं अत्थो अत्थं विणेह परिणामो । दव्वगुणपज्जयत्यो
अत्थो अत्थित्तणिव्वत्तो । 20 द्रव्यजीव इति गुणपर्यायवियुक्तः प्रज्ञास्थापितोऽनादिपारिणामिकभावयुक्तो जीव
JETTI

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JII.
There is neither quality without substance, nor substance." without quality, hence these two are not incompatible in their nature'.
'The substance which is not different from Sat, modifics: itself through change of quality; therefore, modificationsin qualities are further called the substance only'.
A substance is said to be identical with that (bhāva or state) in which it is transformed for that much time (i. e.. as long as that state remains).'
Vi.
'If the substance is entirely separate and distinct from its , qualities, then it may change into infinite other substances. or again if the qualities can exist apart from their substance, there will be no necessity for a substance at all’. 21
In the above passages, we see that Kundakunda is at pains to establish the material (or objective) identity between Dravya,Guņa and Paryāya as well as Pariņāma. However, in philosophical analysis, all these concepts of Dravya, Guņa, Paryāya and Parināma are to be grasped as distinct and separate from one another. This raises the problem of identity and difference. Kundakunda renders a definite service to Indian philosophy by clearly enunciating the two types of differences - one which is made by thought and the other which is objective. For the for.. mer he uses the term 'anyatva' and for the latter, 'prthaktva'.. He defines and explains them as follows :
1.
'It is the dictum of Mahāvīra, tha separateness (prthaktya). consists in having separated space-points; non-identity (anyatva) is the absence of identity.'
II.
'Really speaking, what is substacee is not quality, nor what:
21 PS I1. 8; PK 12, 13; PS 11. 12; PS 1. 8; PK 50

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III.
The Samkhya-Yoga and the Jain Theories of Parinama
is quality is substance; this is a case of non-identity and not of absolute negation; so it is pointed out.'
'The difference between Dravya and Guna may be determined by appellation, form, number, or locality. These determinants are various, They hold good among things and their qualities, whether these are considered different or identical'.
IV-V. 'Colour, taste, smell and touch are the qualities of the primary atom. They are not said to be really distinct from their material substratum, though they are undoubtedly distinguishable from it as regards name, form, etc. In the same way, perception and knowledge are really inseparable from the self and are not distinct from it, though from the viewpoint of name, form, etc. they may be spoken of as distinct from the substratum. In short, though distinguishable in thought, thay are not really distinct.'2"
Thus with the help of the distinction between 'anyatva' and 'prthaktva' Kundakunda avoids the confusion, which is likely to occur in the discussion of 'bhedabheda".
After having made this distinction, Kundakunda further analyses the concept of Pariņāma into its two components, viz., 'change' involving utpada and vyaya, and 'permanence' involving dhrauvya, by relegating utpada and vyaya to Paryaya and dhrauvya to Dravya.23
The above discussion makes clear the contribution of Kundakunda to the clarification of the concepts of reality and Pariņāma.
22 PS II. 14 & 16; PK 52; PK 57-58
.23 PK. 15, PK 11, PS II. 11

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Application of Pariņāma to Kāla, Pudgala and Jiva
as found in the works of Kundakunda. At the outset, it must be pointed out that, of the six Dravyas, Kundakunda, like his predecessors, omits Dharma, Adharma and Akāśa and applies the doctrine of Pariņāma to Kāla, Pudgala and Jiva only.2+ Kala :
In the Āgamas, we saw, that Kāla was mentioned as a sixth: Dravya, but its paryāyas were not given.? 5 Similarly, the Tsū. devotes only two sūtras to Kāla, stating that it is accepted by some as a separate Dravya and that it has infinite samayas.96. Kundakunda, however, clearly explains the nature and functions. of Kāla and shows the application of the doctrine of pariņāma to it as follows. That on account of which the five Substances undrero changes is called Real Time or Kāla-dravya. It is devoid of physical qualities like colour ete. Samaya, Nimişa, Kāștha, Kalā, Nālī, day and night, month, season, Ayana (half-year) and Samvatsara (year) are all Vyavahāra or conventional time. These are determined by other objects. Duration of time, either long or short, is impossible apart from a standard of measurement. The standard of measurement also has no meaning apart from material objects. Hence, conventional or relative time is brought about by extraneous conditions. Relative time is determined by changes or motion in things. These changes themselves are the effect of time 24 There is only one stanza in the PK. (91) which seems to refer to the
Pariņāma of the Dharma Dravya. It is as followsअगुरुलघुगेहिं सया तेहिं अणंतेहिं परिणयं निच्चम् । गदिकिरियाजुत्ताणं करणभूयं सयमकज्जम् ॥
The Dharma Dravya which is eternal constantly undergoes infinite modification of the quality 'agurulaghu'. It is unaffacted by movement,
but it conditions the motion of those that can move. 25 In the Bh. Sū. 25.5.747, the notion of conventional time, viz., avalikä,
muhúrta etc. is there but it is not clear whether these pusat HUT
are to be understood as referring to the paryāyas of Dravya-Kāla. 26 FTCTROCTE' v.38. Sarat4:' V.39.

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absolute. The former is momentary, i.e. having beginning and ende. The latter is eternal. The duration that an atom reguires to mov from one spatial point to the next one is called samaya (moment). This samaya is liable to origination and destruction. No two samayas are co-existent. 37 Appliction of Pariņāma to Pudgala
Matter exists in four main modes; skandhas, skandhadesas, skandhapradešas and primary atoms. The complete molecule of matter is skandha; a half of it is skandhadesa; a half of that half is skandhapradeśa; and what cannot be divided is the primary atom. Skandhas are of two kinds - those that can be perceived by the senses and the minute ones beyond sense - perception. These also are called matter conventionally. These manifest them-selves in six different modes by which the three worlds are completely filled. An atom has physical qualities and it itself is unable to produce any sound whatsoever. All the atoms are homogeneous and capable of being the cause of any of the four physical elements - earth, water, fire and air. Skandhas, when strike one another, produce sound. An atom has a single taste, colour and smell and two contacts. Whatever is perceived by the senses, the sense-organs, the various kinds of bodies, the physical manas, the karmas (subtle material forces affecting soul) etc. are material (i.e. the modes of matter). Colour, taste, touch, smell and sound are the qualities of matter while structure, conglomeration (composites) and sound are the modes of matter. The primary atom has no space-points; it is an unit of space-point. 'When conjoined with other atoms due to its being arid or cohesive, it comes to have two or more space-points. The degrees of aridness or cohesiveness of an atom increase from one to infinity gradually one by one. Two atoms form an aggregate only when there is the difference of two degrees (points) in the cohesiveness or aridness that they possess, the minimum degree being excepted. The aggregates having two or more space-points and the subtle and gross elements of carth, water, fire and air come into existence 72 PK 23-26, 107-108; PS II. 47, 49-51

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when different numbers of atoms combine themselves with one another on account of the different degrees of their cohesiveness and aridness. The molecules, capable of becoming karmas, coming into contact with the (passional) conditions of the Soul, are transformed into Karmas. The soul (as a direct agent) does not transform the molecules into the Karmas in the same manner as a potter moulds clay into a pot.?!
Jiva :
Compared to the somewhat sketchy treatment of Parināma with reference to Kala and Pudgala, the treatment with reference to Jiva is elaborate and comprehensive. This is but natural. The Jain darśana, being a Mokșa-darśana, should be more concerned with those topics which have a direct bearing on the problem of liberaticn of the scul. Pariņāma, being a guiding principle, it is quite in the fitness of things that Kundakunda should give a detailed application of it, with reference to Jiva. The Agamas and the Tsū. give a good account of bondage (bandha), its cause (asrava), the means to liberation (samvara and nirjara) and liberation (Mokşa), which constitute important problems of Jain spiritual philosophy. Kundakunda also, discusses these topics, but does it, in the light of the theory of Pariņāma, i. e, by viewing them as results of the operation of Pariņāma.
Before we come to the application of Pariņāma to Jiva, we should note the consistency of the Pariņāma theory, with the principle of Dravya. The five or six Dravyas are by their very definition, absolutely distinct from one another. This distinctness, as we shall see, is consistently maintained in their Parināmas. Kundakunda, however, refers only to Jiva and Pudgala, because it is the Pariņāmas of these, that are primarily his concern. Here, naturally, the question arises, as to how Jiva and Pudgala ever «come together and form this phenomenal world, if they are abso
28 PK 80-82, 85-86, 88–89, 133; PS. 11. 71-73, 75, 77

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lutely distinct from each other. The answer to this will be found in the Jain theory of karma, which is discussed by Kundakunda in his application of Pariņāma to Jiva.
128
The nature of Jiva is said to be constituted of sentiency (cetana) and manifestation of consciousness (upayoga).29 The Pariņamana-activity of this Cetana is said to present itself in three aspects, with reference to knowledge, karma and the fruit of Karma.30 Knowledge is the comprehension of objects, whatever is initiated by the soul is Karma, the fruit of Karma is either happiness or misery.31 Kundakunda, further, indentifies in the next stanza, pariņāmi with Pariņāma and speaks of Atman itself as Parinama and of knowledge, Karma and the fruit, as Atman, of course in the sense of having apṛthaktva. 32
What is meant is that it is the evolving Cetana which has always these three aspects and that we name it as knowledge (jñāna), Karma (karma) and fruit (phala), only on account of the predominance of one over the others. It also follows from the above that these three aspects of Cetana are to be found in any state of the soul, either mundane or liberated. Of course, the nature of these three differs in the two states. In order to understand this difference, it is necessary to know first the nature of bondage, its cause, the means to freedom, and the nature of freedom, according to Jain philosophy.
29 जीवः पुनश्चेतनोपयोगमय : Ps. II 35.
30 परिणमदि चेदणाए आदा पुण चेदणा तिधाभिमदा । सा पुण णाणे कम्मे फलम्मि वा कम्मणो भणिदा ॥ PS II. 31
...
31 णाणं अट्ठवियप्पो कम्मं जीवेण जं समारद्धं ।
तमगविधं भणिदं फलं ति सोक्खं व दुक्खं वा ॥ PS. II. 32
32 अप्पा परिणामप्पा परिणामो णाणकम्मफलभावो ।
तम्हा णाणं कम्मं फलं च आदा मुणेदव्वो । PS. II. 33

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Kundakunda explains the nature of bondage and its cause thus. He says that when the soul functions in an 'otherward' attitude as 'I am this', 'this is mine', identifying itself with things other than itself, through its Pariņāmas of rāga (attachment), dveśa (aversion), moha (delusion), it comes to have the state of bondage.33 This is the same thing as to say that it is through rāga-dvesa-moha Parinamas, that the soul becomes 'otherward' in its attitude, which is responsible for the influx of karmic matter which clings to it.
Another important thing, that is pointed out is that the soul is the direct agent of its own modifications only, and not of those of matter, but maiter being transformed into karmas by reason of the soul's thought-activity, the soul is called an auxiliary cause of the modifications of matter into karma. Similarly, matter is the direct cause of its own modifications only, but being responsible in producing thought-activity (rāgādi) in Jiva, it is regarded as the auxiliary cause of the latter's modifications, 4 Thus, the Jain provides a causal nexus or rather a nexus of action and reaction between Jiva and Pudgala.
The means to liberation and the nature of the state of liberation, are described by Kundakunda.35 There he aims at showing that when the soul, by its properly directed process of Pariņāma, through Samvara-blocking and nirjarā-shedding of Karmas, totally destroys its passions, viz. rāga-dveśa-moha, and the consequent infiux of karmic matter, its attitude becomes 'self-ward' i. e. it realises its own true self which is the state of liberation. In this state, the soul does not cease to function altogether, but continues to modify itself into pure infinite jñāna, darsana,
33 PS I. 84, see also PS II. 85, PS 11. 96, PK 135–137 34 PS II. 92, SS-87 35 PK 149; PS I. 80; PK 152, 157, 159; PS I. 19 & 60.
.

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căritra, 3 0 virya (energy) and sukha (bliss).
We can now understand the difference in the nature of the three aspects of Cetanā, viz.jñāna, karma and phala in the state of bondage and liberation. Kundakunda explains this from an ethical point of view. He refers to three kinds of upayoga, viz., auspicious (śubha), inasupicious (aśubha), and pure (śuddha).37 This term, upayoga, is peculiar to Jain philosophy. Along with Cetanā, it is regarded as the differentia of a soul. It is not easy to distinguish between Cetanā and Upayoga unless we regard former as a static abstraction and the latter, the concrete Cetana, or Cetana as it functions, Kundakunda defines Upayoga which is indentified with Jiva, as Jhāna-cumdarśana.38 It is the different Pariņāmas or transformations of
36 'Cáritra' ia the worldly state is translated as 'conduct' which may be
right (samyak) or wrong (mithyā). In the state of liberation, however, there being no body, 'caritra' signifies 'sama' i. e, manifestion of pure consciousness or self-realisation.
स्वरूपे चरणं चारित्रं स्वसमयप्रवृत्तिरित्यर्थः । तदेव वस्तुस्वभावत्वाद् धर्मः । Taarupaigafacatt: Amętacandra on PS. 1. 7.
The terms 'jñāna' and 'darśana' are explained hereafter
37 PS. II. 63–66, PS. I. 70, 11, 12, 14, 15
38 39317 UTT HUT #foret... PS II. 63 Jrāna and darśapa are also called
sākāra Upapoga and anākāra Upayoga respectively. (cf. Tsū. II. 9 and the bhāsya). Of these the first is the specific or differentiated knowledge while the second (darśana) represents the primary grasping of a thing, i. e. the undifferentiated knowledge.
It may be noted that the term darśana has, in Jain philosophy, another sense also, viz., faith in truth or right belief (cf. Tsü. I. 2. faraleist17 #GY171').
For want of precise English equivalents, the Sanskrt terms, 'jñüna' and 'darsana' have been retained.

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this Upayoga which are responsible for the varied states of bondage and the final state of liberation.
It must be noted that Upayoga' primarily denotes jñāna and darśana i.e. refers to the aspect of knowledge only, but, when viewed from the ethical standpoint, it comes to be classified as subha, aśubha and suddha. Of these first, as seen above, refers to the subha-pariņāma of the soul, which causes the meritorious influx of karmas and happiness, as its fruit. Asubha pertains to aśubha-parņāma (thought-activtity), leading to the sipful influx of karmas in the soul, and the fruit of which is the experience of misery. Both these Pariņāmas occur in the worldly state of bondage. On the other hand, that Upayoga which is free from the worldy dualism of good and evil, happiness and misery, in other words, from raga, dveśa and moha is called suddha or pure. This ultimately leads the soul to mokṣa or self-realisation. In this state, jñāna, karma and phala cannot evidently be understood, as in the state of bondage, The soul in this state is steady in its own self, and non-attached to anything alien to itself. So, we have to understand that its jñana, karma and phala are all 'self-ward' (directed to the self). It is only from this point of view, that the Jain can consistently hold the view that the soul in suddhopayoga realises its nature of infinite jñāna, dargana, caritra, sukha etc.
Thus, Kundakunda, through the principle of Pariņāma, explains the different transformations of the soul from the various mundane states to the pure state of liberation, the cause of the mundane states and the means of achieving liberation. Through his theory of karma-pariņāma, he makes an attempt to explain how the two absolutely distinct entities come to influence each other, and make this world as it is. In short, the principle of Pariņāma has been useful in explaining metaphysics and ethics, as well as the mundane phenomena of the world, in which, a man, or for the matter of that, every living being, finds himself

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The foregoing discussion on the different aspects of Pariņāma and its application to the Dravyas, particularly the Jiva Dravya, enables us to gauge Kundakunda's philosophical acumen which has gone a long way in contributing to the deve. lopment of Jain philosophit thought.

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CHAPTER X
PARIŅĀMA IN TARKA-PERIOD
Exposition of Pariņāma as found in the commentaries on the
relevant sūtras of the Tattvārtha
In the history of Indian philosophy, we find that the development of ideas in later periods, has taken place not so much through original works as through commentaries on the sūtras, bhāşyas etc. of the different darśanas. This holds good for the Jain darśana also. So, to study the further exposition of the doctrine of Pariņāma,, we shall have to take recourse to the important commentaries on the relevant sūtras of the Tattvārtha, which we discussed before.
The Digambara Ācāryas seem to have particularly applied themselves to the exposition of the Tsū. in a number of commentaries. The Svetāmbaras seem to bave satisfied themselves with the bhāşya and it is only at a comparatively late period that an able commentary viz. that of Siddhasena, both on the Tsū. and its bhāşya, was written. We shall first take the Digambara commentators, Pūjyapāda, Akalamka and Vidyānanda and then the Svetambara commentator Siddhasena even though Vidyapands is later than Siddhasena. Pajyapada's comment on the sūtra, TFTवाव्ययं नित्यम् deserves study.
The Tattvārtha blaşya explained, 'Tadbhāva' as simply 'Satobhāva’ wherein Sat referred to utpāda, vyaya and dhrauvya; Pūjyapada explains it as 'pratyabhijñānahetuta,' i.e. the cause of the recognition this is that.' We see here a distinct progess in philosophical thought. In the bhāşya, the principle of identity
1
5th cent. A. D. to 17th cent. -A. D. **

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is merely grammatically and objectively explained as the “state of being that', while Pūjyapāda explains it subjectively or rather epistemologically on the basis of knowledge of recognition, thus : 'Identity is that in a thing, which is responsible for the recogni. tion of a thing, as identical with something that we had formerly known. This would be impossible, if there were a total destruction of the thing formerly experienced or if it were merely a new phenomenon. Thus, that which retains this trait, i.e. literally, does not become apart from this trait, is nitya or eternal.'?
Akalamka, in his Raj. V. (p. 239-240), and Vidyānanda, in his Šl. V. (p. 434), essentially, follow Pūjyapāda in the explanation of 'Tadbhāva', but make more explicit and clear what was suggested in Tet tefte afastoupi (Pūjyapāda). Thus, Akalamka attempts to explain away the contradiction that may be alleged against the three aspects of reality viz., utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya, by bringing into service the doctrine of relative standpoints, i.e. of Dravyārthikan aya and Paryāyarthikanaya, which will be noted fully later on when we consider the defence of Pariņāma by later writers. Vidyānanda, by raising the question as to what is that nitya-aspect of reality, which is possessed of
dhrauvya' and what, the anitya-aspect, which is possessed of 'utpāda and vyaya' – seeks to, respectively, explain them in the two sātras, viz. तद्भावाव्ययं नित्यम् and अतद्भावेन सव्ययमनित्यम् the latter sūtra being derived from the former. He explains “Tadbhāva' in the same way as Pūjyapada does, while ‘Atadbhava’ is explained
2
pagta: ? TETHETIÈgar i agafafa FATUT TAPATHI तदकस्मान्न भवतीति योऽस्य हेतुः स तद्भावः । तस्य भावस्तद्भावः । येनात्मना प्रादृष्टं वस्तु तेनैवात्मना पुनरपि भावात्तदेवेदमिति प्रत्यभिज्ञायते । यद्यत्यन्तनिरोधोऽभिनवप्रादुर्भावमात्रमेव वा स्यात्ततः स्मरणानुपपत्तिः। तदधीनो लोकसंव्यवहारो विरुध्यते । ततस्तद्भावेनाव्ययं नित्यमिति निश्चीयते । तत. कथंचिद्वेदितव्यम् । सर्वथा नित्यत्वेऽन्यथाभावाभावात्संसारतन्निवृत्तिकारणप्रक्रियाविरोधः स्यात् ।
– Sarvärtha Siddhi

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as that which is the cause of knowledge of otherness' or 'this is not that's
Siddhascna's commentary is, somewhat, more elaborate and. contains other discussions also, in addtion to the clucidation of the sense of the sūtra,
We explain the comment as follows: The sattva which is the common characteristic of all the five astikāyās indicates those qualities of each, which persist; for example, consciousness, incorppreality etc. of the soul. He explains 'nityatva' as signifying the 'dhrauvya aspect' of reality. But having done that he finds it difficult to find room for utpada and vyaya, which as a process are also essential to reality. He solves this difficulty by stating that utpada and vyaya have one substratum viz. dravva or dhrauvya and that the word 'bhāva in the sūtra indicates the utpāda--vyaya aspect implying at the same time the rejection of kūțasthanityatā or absolute non-change, which can never be the nature of a real. Had it not been so, the sūtra would have been "Tadavyayam pityam'.' It can be seen from the above that in substance there is not much difference between Siddhasena and his predecessors.
3 अतद्भावोऽन्यत्वं पूर्वस्मादन्यदिदमिति अन्वयाप्रत्ययादवसेयम् । 4 ...तस्य सतो भवनं भावस्तद्भावः, तदेव हि सत् तथा तथा भवति जीवादि
देवादिरूपेण, न जातुचित् सत्त्वत्यागेनान्यथा भवति, तद्भावादव्ययं अविनाशि नित्यं ; नित्यग्रहणाद् ध्रौव्यांशपरिग्रहः, सह्यन्वयी द्रव्यास्तिकांशः सर्वदासर्व त्र न विच्छिद्यते, सदाकारेणानुत्पत्तेरवि नाशाच्च, भावशब्दोपादानात् परिणामनित्यता गृह्यते, कूटस्थनित्यता त्यज्यते, अन्यथा 'तदव्ययं नित्यमिति सूत्रं स्यात् । यत् तु न केनचिदाकारेण विक्रिय ते, तदनुपाख्यमेव भवेत् । सत्त्वं च सर्वेषामन्वयिनां धर्माणां सूचकम्, पञ्चास्तिकायव्यापित्वात् तु सत्त्वपरिग्रहः, साक्षाज्जीवस्तावत् सत्त्वं चैतन्यममूर्तत्वमसंख्येयप्रदेशत्वं चाजहत् तथा तथा परिणामान्न व्यगात् न व्येति न व्येष्यत्यविनाश्यव्ययो नित्य उच्यते, न पुनर्देवादिपर्यायेणाप्यनन्वयिना नित्यता ध्रौव्यमस्य विद्यते, तथा पुदगल: ... ... ।'

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While explaining the sutra tadbhavaḥ pariņāmaḥ' Pujyapāda states that the nature by which substances transform themselves is Parināma."
Akalamka does not add anything to the above explanation.
Vidyananda elaborates the statement of Pujyapada by saying that 'Tadbhāva' is the way in which substances like the soul etc. exist in their particular states. This is Pariņāma, their nature, which is experienced by us as existing in the present."
Siddhasena attempts a further explanation of the same by pointing out that Parināma is to be understood as 'सामान्यरूप ' because it involves the persistent aspect also ( ध्रुवांश) and not mere change exclusively, and by illustrating Pariņāmanityata through its application to the different Dravyas. This question of application will be treated in the next section.
Pūjyapāda in his comment on the sūtra 'उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययुक्तं सत्' explains the three terms utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya, according to Jain philosophy, in the following way.
'एवमन्वय्यंशो नित्यत्वेन लक्षितो द्रव्यनयस्वभावः । पर्यायनयस्वभावी स्थित्यंशप्रतिबद्ध | स्थितिरपि पर्यायप्रतिबद्धा, सर्वदा संसर्गरूपत्वाद् वस्तुनः, एकमेकाधिकरणावुत्पादविनाशौ जैन एवं शासने साङ्गत्यमनुभवतोऽन्यत्र तु व्यधिकरणावेवोत्पादविनाशौ नियतो वेति ।' p. 391, 392 (V, 30) 5 धर्मादीनि द्रव्याणि येनात्मना भवन्ति तद्भावः तत्त्वं परिणाम इति व्याख्यायते । 6 जीवादीनां द्रव्याणां तेन प्रतिनियतेन रूपेण भवनं तद्भावः तेषां द्रव्याणां स्वभावो वर्तमानकालतयानुभूयमानस्तद्भावः परिणामः प्रतिपत्तव्यः ।
7 ... तस्येति द्रव्यषट्कस्याभिसम्बन्धः, तदेव हि धर्मादिद्रव्यं तेन तेनाकारेण भवति, गतिस्थित्यवगाहरूपत्वात्, अनुवर्तते हि सर्वत्र गत्यादिषु धर्मादिद्रव्यं स्वरूपमजहत् धर्मो हि गन्तुर्गत्युपग्रहाकारेण परिणमते स्वरूपापरित्यागेन, स्थित्युपग्रहाकारेण स्थातुरधर्मः, व्योमाऽप्यवगाढुरवगाहदा यित्वेनोपजायते, पुद्गला: शरीरशब्दादिरूपेण, आत्मा ज्ञानदर्शनोपयोगवृत्त्या नारकादिभावेन च, कालोऽपि वर्तनादिप्रपञ्चेन परिणमते ।
......
******

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Utpada or origination is the attainment of another state, due to internal and external causes by a sentient or a non-sentient substance, whithout abandoning its essential nature. As for example, the attainment of another state, viz. that of a jar, by clay, is the latter's Utpada.8
Vyava or decay is the abandonment of the previous state, as, for example, the abandonment of the form of pinda, on the origination of another form, viz. that of a jar.'
On account of the beginningless Pariņāma-nature of reality, there is an clement in it which persists because it is neither produced, nor does it become extinct. This is the persistent or dhrauvya aspect of reality as, for instance, the persistence of clay, in its different states such as those of pinda, jar etc.
Akalamka and Vidyānanda have nothing more to add, by way of explanation of these terms. They discuss another question, namely, that of the identity or difference between Dravya on one hand, and utpada-vyaya-dhrauvya on the other, which will be considered at its proper place.
Siddhasena, in the proper anekānta style, says that from the standpoint of substance (Dravyārthikanaya), utpada and vyaya are merely appearance and disappearance. In reality, nothing is produced or destroyed. This is in short the Kūțasthanityata. But, he takes care to add that from the standpoint of modes (Paryāyārthikanaya) utpada and vyaya are real. The question of the conflict between these two points of view is sought to be
8 चेतनस्याचेतनस्य वा द्रव्यस्य स्वां जातिमजहत उभयनिमित्तवशाभावान्तरावा
प्तिरुत्पादनमुत्पादः । मृत्पिण्डस्य घटपर्यायवत् । 9 पूर्वभावविगमनं व्ययः । यथा घटोत्पत्तौ पिण्डाकृतेः । 10 अनादिपारिणामिकस्वभावेन व्ययोदयाभावात् ध्र वप्ति स्थिरीभवतीति ध्र वः ।
यथा मुत्पिण्डघटाद्यवस्थासु मृदाद्यन्वयः । . .

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solved by saying that the two standpoints are not independent but are controlled by each other.11
The above three sūtras of the Tattvärtha and their exposition given by the Svopajña-bhāşya_and the different commentaries, attempt to analyse and bring out the nature of Pariņāma. The eternal nature of reality is to persist in such a way, that it continuously assumes new forms, giving up the old ones. In other words, the five or six Dravyas which constitute reality change in such a way that in every change, one can recognise the element of selfidentity.12
One question, however, arises from the above, as to whether 'nitya' is to be taken as suggesting that the Pariņāma nature of things consisting of utpada-vyaya-dhrauvya is nitya (eternal) or merely as referring to their permanent aspect (dhrauvya). The Svopajña--bliașya of the Tattvartha seems to take the former view, whereas the later commentators seem to incline towards the latter
11 '.....तत्र द्रव्यनयाभिप्रायेणाकारान्तराविर्भावमात्रमुत्पाद औपचारिकः, परमार्थतो
न किञ्चिदुत्पद्यते सततमवस्थितद्रव्यांशमात्रत्वात्, तथा व्ययः तिरोभावलक्षणः, पूर्वावस्थायास्तिरोधानं विनाशः, यतो द्रव्यमेव तथा तथा विवर्तमानमुत्पादविनाशव्यवस्थया व्यपदिश्यते ...... ।' '.....ननु च द्रव्यपर्यायनयौ स्वतन्त्रत्वात् द्वावपि विजिगीषु (पू)स्वविजयोपमर्द परस्परं न सहेते, ...... । उच्यते-पर्यायनयस्य तावदुत्पादव्ययलक्षणस्य स्वातन्त्र्यं नास्ति द्रव्यास्तिकेनाङ्कुशितत्वात् । न ह्य त्पादो नाम कश्चिद् धर्मोऽस्त्यभूतभवनात्मकः......।'
p. 383 (on Tsu. V. 29) 12 'The three clements, of origination, cessation and persistence, as con
stituting a reality, are a natural deduction from the reality of change.. The Jain believes in the dynamic nature of reals and, in deference to the demands of reason and experience alike, he sums up the three clements as the component factors of the constitution of reality. One can avoid this triple charactristic only by the declaration of change as appearance which is the position of Vedānta'. Dr. Mookerji, Taim Philosophy of Non-absolutism'.

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view. Nevertheless by adding ' faal' to 'nitya', they seem to make their explanation practically identical with that of the bhāşya.
Application of the doctrine of Pariņāma to Dharma,
Adharma and Akāśa.
We have noticed, in the treatment of Kundakunda, the appli-- cation of Pariņāma to Jiva, Pudgala and Kāla. The later writers attempt to apply the doctrine of Pariņāma, to Dharma, Adharma and Ākāśa that were so far left out. Let us see how this is done.
It is objected that if the Dharmādi substances are devoid of kriya (kriya here signifies movement), then their utpāda-origination will not be possible. For utpada of pot, etc. is always seen to be preceded by kriyā or activity. In the absence of utpāda, there will be no vyaya or decay. Consequently, the doctrine of the utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya holding good about all the substances - (Dravyas), will be contradicted. This is met by saying that it is possible in a different way. Despite the absence of utpada, due to kriyā, in these Dharmādi substances, it is imagined or thought of in a different manner. Utpāda is of two kinds, one due to one's own agency (of the thing itself) and the other due to extraneous agency. The varying degrees of increase and decrease in the 'agurulaghu' qualities (of these dravyas), which are infinite and which are accepted on the authority of the Agamas, represent their utpada and vyaya which are due to their own agency (svanimitta). The utpada and vināśa due to their being passive instruments in the motion, staticity and occupation respectively of horse, etc. are generally regarded (54afgua) as their ‘parapratyaya' utpada and vinaśa (i.e. due to extraneous agency). Owing to the distinctness, at every moment, of motion, staticity and occupation of horse, etc. there follows the distinctness of their cause also: (i. e. Dharmádi). 12
12 HORAS Tsu V. 6
.

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Akalamka in his Rāj. V., gives the above enplanation verbatim. Vidyananda in his S. VI. points out that though Dharma and Adharma, are devoid of Parispanda Kriya (of the nature of movement) owing to their pervasive character, yet they are possessed of Pariṇama kriya, (i.e. internal transformation of qualities). Otherwise, i.e. if this is not accepted, the concept of reality will be stultified.18
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Siddhasena, in his comment on the Tsu. and its bhāṣya (V. 30) more elaborately explains the application of Pariņāma to Dharma, Adharma, and Akāśa thus: The substance Dharma abides(i.e. is eternal) from the standpoint of its essential characteristics, viz., sattva (existence), amurtatva (incorporeality), asamkhyeyapradesavattva (possessing innumerable space-points), lokavyāpitva (pervading the universe) etc., but is not eternal from the standpoint of its helping the motion of the movers like atoms, Devadatta etc. The function of helping the movement becomes distinct, because of the distinctness of the gantr (goer). Thus the subsequent Pariņāma becomes different from the previous one. The 'gatyupakäritvapariņāma' that is first produced, does not last for ever, because it is produced by the association of things different from itself like pot etc. Similarly, Pariņāmitva' should be understood in the Adharma substance. The notion of 'anityatva' (non-eternality) therein, is to be understood, from the standpoint of its helping the staticity of things. Akāśa, however, is eternal from the point of view of its essential characteristics, viz., sattva (existence), incorporeality (amūrtatva), anantapradeśavattva (possessing infinite space-points) etc., and non-eternal, from the standpoint of its giving room to things. Even where, there are no substances viz. Jiva and Pudgala, i.e. in the Alokākasa, 'anityata' should be necessarily understood through the modes (paryayas) of the qualities like 'agurulaghu' etc. These modes become different (every moment). Otherwise, (i.e. if this kind of 'anityatva' is not acce
13 धर्माधर्मो परिस्पन्दलक्षणया क्रियया निष्क्रियो सकलजगद्वयापित्वादाकाशवत् । परिणामलक्षणया तु क्रियया सक्रियावेव, अन्यथा वस्तुत्वविरोधात् । P. 398

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pted) there will not be (in the Alokākasa) either independent utpada-vyaya (i.e. due to its inherent agency), or even dependent (or relative) utpāda-vyaya (i.e. due to the agency of extraneous things). Consequently, the definition of Sat will become narrow (in so far as it will exclude Alokakāśa from its pale).
Thus, Siddhasena completes the application of Pariņāma, by extending it to Alokākāśa too.
It may be noted that in the SVM of Mallişeņa, the application of Pariņāma i.e. utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya, to Ākaša is explained, in two ways, as follows :
When souls and material objects, which occupy space, travel from one point of space, to another, they become separated from one portion of Akasa, and get united with another portion of Ākāśa. These separation and union, being contradictory dharmas, must belong to two different dharmins, according to the rule, (6377 f t Wegaf afgTAFETTA: Tutaxafa l i.e. those things must be regarded as distinct, which possess contradictory predicates, or spring from different causes. Akasa comes under the first part of the rule, and is thus shown to be two - one that is destroyed, and the other that is produced, the former being the one from which the previous samyoga is destroyed, and the latter being the one with which a new samyoga is produced; and yet, in another way, both the Ākāśas are one. Thus Akaga may be. shown to be both nitya and anitya.
When ‘ghața' is gone and 'pata' takes its place, 'ghatākāśa' is replaced by 'pațākāśa'; thus one Ākāśa is destroyed and another is produced. It may be objected, that this is mere `upacara' j.e. Ākāśa is not really produced or destroyed, but by a transference of predicates, it is said to be produced or destroyed according to the production or destruction of ghața, pața, etc., which condition it. To this objection, it is replied : the transference of predicates takes place in an ‘upacāra' owing to something being

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common to the primary and the secondary subject. Thus, 'upacāra' does not take place without some connection of the predicate, with the primary object. For example, Ākāśa is primarily all-pervading, but, in accordance with the ghata, pata, etc, which reside in it, it has different supposed parts' with reference to which it may be said to possess a 'parimana which covers a particular space or spot, and the Akasa is thereby known as 'ghaṭākāśa', change of that to 'paṭākāśa' etc. This change of states means which the states belong. Thus, the production and destruction of ghata', 'pata' etc., and through them, of 'ghaṭākāśa', 'paṭākāśa' etc., amount to the production and destruction of Akāśa itself. Thus Akasa is shown to be 'pariņāmi-nitya' in another way. 14
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From the above elucidation, it is clear that when the later Jain writers were confronted with objections regarding the application of pariņāma to Dharma, Adharma and Akāja, they had to answer them and explain the application, in order to maintain consistency with their fundamental dogma that pariņāma characterises every existent real. But these entities, being abstract in character, their pariņāmas cannot be explained in so smooth a manner, as those of Jiva and pudgala and hence have to be explained through those of Jiva and pudgala which exist in Space and move or remain steady by Dharma and Adharma respectively. The use of such expressions as 'कल्प्यते' and 'व्यवह्रियते ' in Pujyapāda is evidence of the difficulty of smoothly explaining the parinamas of these three substances and of the far-fetched character of the explanation. 15
Further Application and Analysis of Paryaya-Pariņāma
(1) Dravya-Paryaya and Guna-Paryāya
The distinction between Dravya and Guna is important for us as giving a further elaboration of Pariņāma and Paryaya in
14 Prof. A. B. Dhruva, SVM. p. 15, 16 and Notes, p. 42, 43, 45 45 With reference to Dharma, Adharma and Akāśa Dr. Jacobi remarks

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to Dravya paryāya and Guņa-Paryāya. We saw that the older Āgamas did not make this distinction but a late passage in the Uttarādhyayana-sūtra, Umāsvāti and Kundakunda, have recognised Dravya and Guņa as two distinct categories. The recognition of Guņa as a distinct category over and above Dravya category led to the discussion as to whether this Guņa should be considered as different from paryāya or identical with it. The distinction between Guņa and Paryāya has not been unanimously accepted by later writers. I give below the views of those writers who accept it as well as of those who do not, in order to study their arguments and see if they reflect any development of philosophic thought.
Siddhasena Divākara? 6 regards them to be non-different on the following grounds. In the Āgamas only two view-points are mentioned, viz., Dravyāstika and Paryāyāstika. They should have mentioned the third view-point viz., Guņāstika if they really wanted to give guņa, the status of an independent category. Secondly, Guņa is identical with Paryāya and not something independent of Paryāya as the former is synonymous with the latter. Guņa differentiates one (universal) into many individuals); Paryāya differentiates one (individual) into many (states). Of course, the shades of meaning of these two words are different. Yet, in the
that 'the function of space, as we conceive it, is by the Jains, distributed among three different substances; this seems highly speculative, and rather hyperlogical' (Studies in Jainism. p. 18).
Dr. Jacobi, further, compares Dharma and Adharma with Rajas and Tamas of the Sāṁkhya. He says, 'Rajas is necessary for motion and immobility is caused by Tamas. Immobility or rest is, however, but one aspect of Tamas; another is 'iniquity' adharma. This character of Tamas, consisting in Adharma, proves the near relation between Sämkhya Tamas and Jain Adharma and, explains at the same time, why the substratum of immobility has been named by the Jains, by the
strange name Adharma'. (Studies in Jainism, p. 85). 16 This Siddhasena is different from Siddhasena, the commentator of the
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Agamas at all places the employment of the term Guņa is avoided. Thirdly, the meaning of the word Guņa used in the Āgamas is not quality but number. For example, the term Guņa in the phrase- 'eka-guņa, "dasa-guņa”- means number (of states or degree) and not quality. All this conclusively proves that Āgamas do not accept Guņa as an independent category over and above Paryāya."?
Thus siddhasena, on the basis of the authority of the Āgamas, establishes the position that Guņa is not a distinct category apart from Paryāya but is identical with the latter.
Pūjyapāda recognises Guņa as different from Paryāya. The Guņas, according to him, are those that always accompany the Dravya while the Paryayas are those that do not accompany the Dravya (throughout its career of pariņāma). Thus, for example, knowledge etc., are the Guņas of Jiva which always accompany the latter. Similarly colour, etc., are of Pudgala. The specific transformations of these Guņas, such as the knowledge of ghața, pața etc., anger, pride etc., in the case of Jiva, strong and mild odour, dark and faint colour etc., in the case of Pudgala are the Paryayas of Jiva and Pudgala respectively.18
Akalamka in his Rāj. V. maintains both the views viz., the non-distinction between Guņa and Paryāya as well as the distinction between the two.19 The first view is similar to that of Siddhasena Divākara while the second to that of Pūjyapāda.
Vidyānanda, following Pūjyapāda, explains Guņa and Paryaya thus. The Guņas co-exist in Dravya, while the Paryāyas are different from them in so far as they take place in succession.30
.
17 Sanmati-Tarka II. 9–14. 18 Sarvārthasiddhi on Tsu V. 38. 19 p. 243—244 20 Slokavārtika on V. 42 (p. 440)

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Siddhasena, the commentator of the Tsū. and its bhāşya, clearly endorses the view of Akalamka. According to Siddhasena, from the empirical standpoint, Guņas are distinguished from Paryāyas. The Guņas have simultaneous existence in a Dravya, whereas the Paryāyas have not. In reality, however, the Paryāyas themselves are the Gunas i. e. are identical with the Gunas?!
Vādideva, in his Syādvāda-ratnakara, accepts the distinction between Guna and Paryāya but defends it more cleverly by regarding Guna and Paryaya as two types of Višeşas. Višeşa or particular, he says, is of two kinds, Guņa and Paryāya. Guna is a coexistent characteristic, as for instance, the potentiality of the manifestation of consciousness etc. in the Ātman; and the Paryāya, on the other hand, occurs in succession one after another-as for
example, happiness, unhappiness etc. in the Ātman.22 : Haribhadra, in his SVS, seems to follow Siddhasena Divākara. by accepting only two categories, viz. Dravya and Paryāya. He assimilates the Guņas in the category of Dravya ? 8
Yaśovijayji, in his commentary on the SVS, not only follows Siddhasena Divakara's view but also discusses it, in detail, giving the same arguments as were given by Divakara.54
The same view is put forward by Yasovijayaji in his Gujarati work, 'Dravya-Guņa-Paryāya Rāsa', wherein he siates that the view of some who uphold that Guņa, as potentiality, is a distinct category and that it is the cause of Guņa-paryāya just as Dravya is the cause of Dravya-paryaya is not correct 25
The above discussion gives us some idea as to how the Jain Ācāryas extended the principle of Paryāya to Guņa. Once when 21 Siddhasena's Commentary on V. 37 (p. 428) 22 Syādvādaratnākara, Ch. V., p. 735 23 SVS VII. 31 24 Commentary of Yaśovijaya on SVS p. 261 25 'Dravya-Guņa-Paryāya Rāsa’ II. p. 10.
10

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they accepted the analysis of reality into Dravya and Guna, they must have felt the difficulty of showing the relation between Guna and Paryaya. This they solved by having two types of Paryayas viz., Dravya-paryaya and Guṇa-paryaya. But, while doing this, they defined Gunas as 'anvayinah' i, e. the persistent elements of a thing. After such a definition of Guna, it is difficult to see what would be left of Dravya, for a Pariņāmavadin. However, with the ever helpful Anekanta dialectic, the Jain Acaryas will justify it, by having recourse to 'bhedabheda'. It appears, however, that Siddhasena Diväkara, Haribhadra and Yasovijaya are not only more consistent with the teaching of the Agamas, but philosophically more sensible also. 26
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(2) Parinama and Parispanda
The later works analyse Parināma into Parispandātmaka pariņāma and Aparispandatmaka pariņāma. The first being change due to movement in space and the second internal change of qualities in a thing. Sometimes these two are also viewed under the concept of kriya. This distinction, it must be noted, is not to be found in Jain philosophical literature before Pujyapada. Let us see how Pujyapāda and the later Jain philosophers distinguish them.
According to Pujyapāda, the change in a thing, of the nature of origination of a new characteristic and disappearance of the old one, is to be called Aparispandātmaka-pariņāma. For example, anger etc. in Jiva, changes of colour etc. in Pudgala, the change
26 Jacobi, correctly, observes that 'the mention of Guņas seems to be a later innovation, due to the influence which the philosophy and terminology of Nyaya-Vaiseṣika, gradually, gained over the scientific thoughts of the Hindus. For, at the side of Paryaya, there seems to be no room for an independent category 'quality', since Paryaya is the state in which a thing, Dravya, is at any moment of its existence and this must therefore include qualities, as seems to be actually the view, embodied in the oldest text'. (SBE. Vol. XLV. pp xxxiv)

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in the ‘agurulaghu' quality of Dharma, Adharma and Akāśa-all these represent Aparispandātmaka-pariņāma. Kriya, however, is distinguished from this kind of Pariņāma and is called Parispandātmikā though Parispanda is not defined. 87
Akalamka refutes the view that like 'sthiti' (staticity), kriyā too gets included under Parinama. He points out that a substance (dravya) possesses two bhavas (states)-Parispandātmaka and Aparispandātmaka; to indicate the former, the term kriyā is employed and to indicate the latter the term pariņāma is employed as
Vidyānanda points out that only that paryāya or pariņama of a Dravya which is the cause of the attainment of another place is to be called Kriya and not all.To At another place he includes both Parispanda and Pariņāma under kriyā.30
Siddhasena, the commentator of the Tsū. and its bhāsya, at one place, states that the change in a substance (dravya) without abandoning its essential nature is pariņāma; and hence pariņāma does not include in its fold parispanda, i. e., kriya,31 while at another place he states that kriyā is a particular kind of pariņāma.32 This suggests that he is not opposed to the view that includes kriyā under the head of pariņāma.
Thus, Pūjyapāda and Akalamka distinguish between Kriyā and Pariņāma by defining the former as Parispandātmikā (i. e. movement in space) and the latter as internal change of qualities
27 Sarvärtha-siddhi on V. 22 28 RājV p. 227 29 OPEL FE agradariaeg: quft: fet, 7 fra
ŚI. V. p. 357–398 30 qfE9rG274091 FFTTT...... qfUTASTATUTAT $201...1
Sl. V. p. 398, See also ASS p. 178 31 Fahrrafata ofertraCETATTURUFTÈCHTA: affitta.....
commentary, p. 350 32 fafaragiar ga aiaf ar afa i Ibid, p. 353

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in a thing. Akalamka uses the word 'bhāva' to include both kriyā and Pariņāma. Vidyānanda uses the word kriyā in the same sense (i. e. Parispanda), but, while applying Pariņāma to Dharma and Adharma, he uses the word kriyā, in a wider sense, to include both Parispanda and Pariņāma, 1. e. in the sense in which Akalamka uses the word 'bhāva'. Siddhasena also follows the distinction made by Pūjyapāda and others in the passage quoted in fn. 31. However, what is to be noted is that Vidyānanda calls kriya a Paryayaviseşa of Dravya, and Siddhasena too calls it a Pariņativiseșa. This is likely to cause some confusion. For, if we follow the distinction between Pariņāma and kriyā (gatikarma or Parispanda), it would not be quite proper to include either, Pariņāma and kriyā or Parispanda, as two varieties of Kriya as Vidyānanda and Siddhasena do or to calí kriyā a paryaya. viseșa as Vidyānanda and Siddhasena do. If we confine the word Paryaya to denote a state due to Pariņāma, then it cannot be used to denote Kriyā, which is distinct from pariņāma. But the Jain Ācāryas seem to have allowed this looseness to remain on purpose because Pariņāma-Paryāya express the nature of realty as such. Hence every kind of change, either internal (of qualities of a thing) or due to movement in space, has to be regarded as a case of Pariņāma-Paryāya. Akalamka tries to avoid the difficulty, by using the word bhāva to include both Pariņāma and Kriya but if he be asked to define 'bhāva', he would have to include Parinama as a part of his definition. The narrower meaning that is sometimes given by the commentators is scientifically more useful in as much as it clearly distinguishes between the change which we call transformation or evolution, and the change due to movement in space, which may not affect the internal qualities of a thing. But philosophically, it delimits the principle of Pari. nama, which was supposed to characterise the whole of reality, and therefore, kriyā also. So, the Jain Acaryas could not help being loose and indefinite in the usage of these terms.

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(3) Prayoga-Pariņāma and Visrasa-Parinama
The analysis of Pariņāma into Prayoga, Visrasa and Migra is, as we have seen, mentioned in the Bh. Sū., with reference to Pudgala. The Tattvārtha-bhāşya refers to the same, as subdivisions of gati or kriyā. But these are not explained either in the Bh , Sū. or in the Tbh.
There is, however, no uniformity in the treatment of this topic in later works. Sometimes these are mentioned in relation to Pariņāma, sometimes in relation to utpada-vināša, and some
times in relation to kriyā or gati. What is more, while certain works mention further subdivisions of Prayoga and Visrasā, such as 'Samudayaksta', 'Aikatvika' etc. (which we shall presently see), others simply explain these, in a general way, without referring to the subdivisions. Lastly, it may be noted that Miśra-Pariņāma is more often than not, omitted. All this will be clear from what follows.
Siddhasena Divakara, in his Sanmati-tarka, mentions prayoga and visrasā in relation to utpāda and vinaśa and gives the subdivisions thereof. According to him, utpăda (origination) and vināśa (destruction) are of two kinds-one brought about by sentient agency (prayoga) and the other natural (visrasā). Origination or destruction brought about by sentient agency is also called samudāyavāda or aparisuddha. And natural origination or destruction is also of two kinds-samudāyakst and aikatvika. Aikatvika origination (one-sided) is seen in Akāśa, Dharma and Adharma. It is due to external causes and is not seen invariably. Regarding samudāyakrt destruction, it is said that it could be brought about in two ways, viz. by the separation of aggregates and by the transformation into another mode. 33
33 Sanmati-tarka, III, 32-34

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The only extant commentary on Sanmati is by Abhayadeva (11th cent. A. D). It explains the meaning of the concerned Sanmati gathas in detail, the gist of which may be stated as follows:
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"Both origination and destruction are of two kinds, viz.,. 'prayogajanita' i. e. brought about by human efforts and 'vaisrasika', i. e. natural. Now, both the artificial origination and destruction and natural origination and destruction are Samudayakrta i. e. aggregational. When the disjoined members unite to make up a thing, it is an instance of aggregational origination. It is also termed 'impure origination' (apariśuddha), as it does not depend on one particular substance (but more than one). Aggregational destruction (both artificial and natural) is of two kinds, one, arising from a disjunction or division of the compo nent parts of an aggregate and the other resulting from the transformation of a thing from one state to another. The example of the former is the destruction of cloth, on the disjunction of its component parts viz., the threads, while the transformation of clay into a pot is the second kind of destruction.
Natural origination and destruction, has besides the above, one additional division, viz., Aikatvika, which is not found in the artificial utpada and vināśa. This Aikatvika Utpada and Vinaga are confined only to those single entities viz., Ākāśa, Dharma and Adharma which are indivisible wholes. Again, they are simply natural. For Ākāśa, Dharma and Adharma cannot give scope to effort as they are, unlike atom, devoid of the motion, though they undergo a modificatory change. The utpāda and vināśa of these three, is or can be simply this that they disinterestedly become a receptacle and passive instruments in effecting motion or stability from the viewpoints of Time and Space for the atom or the Soul which has the dynamic power. But such utpada and vināśa, being dependent on others are 'aniyata' or 'irregular.' (or not invariable).34
34 द्विभेद उत्पाद:- पुरुषेतरका रकव्यापारजन्यतया अध्यक्षानुमानाभ्यां तथा तस्य

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Siddhasena, the commentator of the Tsu. and its bhasya,36 and Yaśovijayaji3G also discuss in detail the above subdivisions of Prayoga and Visrasā. The gist of their discussion is essentially the same, and so we do not repeat it here.
Pūjyapāda, Akalamka and Vidyānanda do not allude to the above mentioned divisions of Prayoga and Visrasā, but explain them in general. Pūjyapāda mentions Prayoga and Visrasā, as two kinds of Parispandātmikā kriyā. The movement of cart, etc. and that of clouds etc. are given as illustrations of the two kinds of kriyā37 respectively. He does not explain Prayoga and Visrasā
प्रतीतेः । ...... तत्र प्रयोगेण यो जनित उत्पादः मूर्तिमद्रव्यारब्धावयवकृतत्वात् स समूदायवादः, तथाभूताऽऽरब्धस्य समुदायात्मकत्वात् । तत एवासावपरिशुद्धः, सावयवात्मकस्य तच्छब्दवाच्यत्वेन अभिप्रेतत्वात् ॥ English translation by A. S. Gopani, f. 143-146 स्वाभाविकश्व द्विविध उत्पादः - एकः समुदायकृतः प्राक्प्रतिपादितावयवारब्धो घटादिवत् । अपरश्चै कत्विकोऽनुत्पादिताऽमूर्तिमद्रव्यावयवारब्ध आकाशादिवत् । आकाशादीनां च त्रयाणां द्रव्याणामवगाहकादिघटादिपरद्रव्यनिमित्तोऽवगाहनादिक्रियोत्पादोऽनियमाद् अनेकान्ताद् भवेत् अवगाहक-गन्त-स्थातृ द्रव्यसन्निधानतोऽम्बर-धर्मा-धर्मेष्ववगाहन-गति-स्थितिक्रियोत्पत्तिनिमित्तभावोत्पत्तिरित्यमिप्रायः ।
विगमस्यापि एप द्विरूपो भेदः - स्वाभाविक: प्रयोगजनितश्चेति...... । तत्र समुदायजनिते यो विनाशः स उभयगामि द्विविधा - एकसमुदयविभागमात्रप्रकारो विनाशः यथा पटादेः कार्यस्य तत्कारणपृथक्करणे तन्तुविभागमात्रम्, द्वितियप्रकारस्त्वर्थान्तरभाषगमनं विनाश: यथा मत्पिण्डस्य घटान्तरभावनोत्पादो विनाशः । ..
Sanmati, Vol. V. p. 641, 643 35_p. 383, 384; 385 36 Syadavadakalpalata a Commentary on SVS. VII 7 by Yasovijaya,
p. 219, 220, 221. cf. also 'Dravya-Guna-Paryaya Rasa', p. 97, 98, 99 37. 'क्रिया परिस्पद्वात्मिका। साद्विविधा प्रायोगिकवैससिकभेदात् । तत्र प्रायोगिकी शकटादीनां वैनसिकी मेघादीनाम् ।
Ssi on Tsu V 22

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as such. But Akalamka explains them as such in the following manner.
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The modification, of the nature of Prayoga and Visrasā, of a Dravya without giving up its essential nature, is Pariņāma. The "aupaśamikādi states' (i. e. those states in which passions are being subdued) of the soul, being dependent upon the suppression of Karmas and not upon the efforts of a sentient agent, represent the natural Pariņāma of the soul, while the states (bhava) of knowledge (jñāna), conduct (śila), and thought-activity (bhāvanā), being dependent upon the efforts of Acāryas etc, constitute the Prayogaja or artificial Pariņāmas of the soul. In the case of nonsentient substances, like clay etc., the Pariņāma of the form of 'ghata' etc. being the result of the efforts of sentient agents like potter, etc. is the artificial one, while that of rainbow etc., is the natural Pariņāma. Similarly, the Pariņāma of Dharma etc. should be understood, a s
Thus, Akalamka understands Prayoga and Visrasa as two types of Pariņāma and applies them particularly to Jiva and Pudgala.
Vidyananda applies Prayoga-Visrasa to Dharma, Adharma and Akāśa, besides Jiva and Pudgala.
The natural Pariņāma of Dharma and others, he states, is the state of their possessing innumerable space-points, of their being the cause etc. of particular movements of things, while their being the cause etc. of movement of machines, etc. is their
38 द्रव्यस्य स्वजात्यपरित्यागेन प्रयोग विस्रसा लक्षणो विकारः परिणामः ।
तत्र चेतनस्य द्रव्यस्य औपशमिक । दिर्भावः कर्मोपशमाद्यपेक्षोऽपौरुषेयत्वात् वैत्रसिक इत्युच्यते । ज्ञानशीलभावनादिलक्षणः आचार्यादिपुरुषप्रयोग निमित्तत्वात् प्रयोगजः । अचेतनस्य च मृदादेः घटसंस्थानादिपरिणामः कुलालादिपुरुषप्रयोग निमित्तत्वात् प्रयोगजः । इंद्रधनुरादिनानापरिणामो वैससिकः । धर्मांदेरपि परिणामो योज्यः । Raj, V. p. 22
तथा

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artificial Pariņāma because it depends upon human effort. 50
Siddhasena, the commentator of the Tsū and its bhāşya, while commenting on the Tsū. V. 22 gives Prayoga, Visrasā and Miśra as the varieties of 'gati' or 'kriyā. 4 0 It must be noted that he does not refer to those varietes viz., Samudāyakşta, Aikatvika etc., which he discusses in his tīkä on the Tsū. V. 29.
From the above, it can be seen that while Siddhasena Divā. kara, Abhayadeva, and Siddhasena the commentator of the Tsū. and its bhāşya, apply the two types of Pariņāma, Prayoga and Visrasă, chiefly to changes of Pudgala, Dharma, Adharma, and Akāśa i. e. to Ajiva substances only, Akalamka and Vidyānanda .extend them to Jįva also.
The above analysis of Pariņāma into Prayoga and Visrasa is an attempt to explain two types of causation, one natural and the other invloving human agency. This obviates, for the Jain, the necessity of postulating a Creator, because he is able to explain all the happenings in the universe by these two types of Pariņāmas.
(4) Artha-Paryāya and Vyañjana-Paryāya
The distinction or analysis of Paryāya into Artha--Paryāya and Vyañjana-Paryaya is to be found for the first time in the Sanmati-Tarka of Siddhasena Divakara.
39 धर्मास्तिकायादिद्रव्यस्य तु वैससिकोऽसंख्येयप्रदेशित्वादिरनादिः परिणामः
प्रतिनियतगत्युपग्रहहेतुत्वादिः । आदिमान् प्रयोगजो यंत्रादिगत्युपग्रहहेतुत्वादिः
gauitara I SI. V. on V. 22 .40 तत्र प्रयोगगति: जीवपरिणामसंप्रयुक्त्ता शरीराहारवर्णगन्धरसस्पर्शसंस्था
नविषया, विस्रसागतिः प्रयोगमन्तरेण केवलाजीवद्रव्यस्वपरिणामरूपा, परHỊU VÌgaFT: fagifi fafiqade I ...... | P. 353

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Siddhasena Divākara uses the term vyañjana-Paryāya to signify a series of changes which has such similarlity as to allow it to be called by one name, and the term Artha-Paryāya, to indicate those minute or subtle divisions in the change-series, which are or appear to be further indivisible and which, therefore, cannot be given any name. 41
. This distinction is referred to at various places in the works of the Tarka-period like those of Akalamka, Vidyānanda, Yaso. vijaya etc, and is explained in a similar manner.s? Yaśovijayaji, it may be noted, gives in detall various subdivisions of Artha-- Paryāya and Vyañjana-Paryāya such as 'Dravya-vyañjana-paryāya' "Guna-vyañjana-paryāya’, Dravya-arthah-paryāya', 'Guņa-arthaparyāya’, Vibhāva-dravya-vyañjana-paryāya', 'Svabhava-dravyavyañjana-paryāya’, 43 etc. which are generally not to be seen in other works.
It is noteworthy that a late work (15th cent. A. D.) ,Pancā. dhyāyi, by Rājamalla alludes to Artha-Paryāya and VyañjanaParyāya in an altogether different sense. According to him, GuņaParyāya is Artha-paryāya and Dravya-Paryāya is Vyañjana-Pary. āya; what is more, Dravya-Paryāya is, specifically, taken to mean minute spatial parts of indivisible wholes, like Dharma, Adh
41 Sanmati-tarka, I. 31, 32, 34 42 दृश्याः स्थूला व्यञ्जनपर्याया: अदृश्याः सूक्ष्माः केवलागमगम्या अर्थपर्यायाः ।
स्थलो व्यञ्जन पर्यायो वाग्गगम्यो नश्वरः स्थिर: । सूक्ष्मः प्रतिक्षणध्वंसी पर्यायsaria : 1 ASS on kā. 11 Țippana p. 112 Cf also SI. V. pp. 129-130 धर्माधर्मनभःकाला अर्थपर्यायगोचराः । व्यञ्जनेन तु संबद्धौ द्वावन्यौ जीवgaurant i Bataafa of Devasena st. 2. स्थूलाः कालान्तरस्थायिनः शब्दानां संकेतविषयाः व्यञ्जनपर्याया इति ।।
fra aftasta: 1 munata p. 64 43 'Dravya-Guna-Paryāya Rāsa', p. 149, 151
Naya-pradipa, p. 47

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arma,as etc. which can only be imagined, and which are, therefore, not real but subjective. 4 5 This sense of Dravya-Paryāya reminds us, of such Paryayas of Dharma, Adharma and Akasa, as desa, pradesa, which we noticed in the Agama section. Anyway, it is clear that Pancādhyāyi does not follow Siddhasena Divākara and others, in the interpretation of the terms Artha-Paryāya and Vyañjana-Paryāya. It is also not clear as to whom the words, 'Kecit Budhāh.' (I 63) refer. For, in no other work, do we find this kind of meaning given to Artha-Paryaya and VyañjanaParyaya.
Defence of Pariņāma
So far we have considered the elucidation of Parināma and its progressive application to the Dravyas from various points of view. Now we have to consider the various arguments advanced by the later dialectical writers, in defence of Parināmavāda. This is done by showing the logical impossibility in the realm of metophysics as well as ethics of holding absolute changelessness of reality, (Kutastha-nityata), or absolute change-fulness without any persistent element (Ksanikavada).
In this section, as the arguments of the different Svetāmbara: and Digambara writers on this topic show a substantial unifor.
44 गुणपर्यायाणामिह केचिन्नामान्तरं वदन्ति बुधाः ।
अर्थो गुण इति वा स्यादेकार्थादर्थपर्यया इति च ।। अपि चोद्दिष्टानामिह देशांशैर्द्रव्यपर्ययाणां हि । व्यञ्जनपर्याया इति केचिन्नामान्तरं वदन्ति बुधाः ॥
I, 62763. 45 अंशविभागः स्यादित्यखण्डदेशे महत्यपि द्रव्ये । .. विष्कम्भस्य क्रमतो व्योम्नीवायलिक्तिस्तिहस्तादिः ॥ प्रथमो द्वितीय इत्याद्यसंख्यदेशास्ततोऽप्यनन्ताश्च । अंशा निरंशरूपास्तावन्तो द्रव्यपर्ययाख्यास्ते ॥ 1. 24-25

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mity, I have drawn upon those authors whose exposition is detailed and clear. Other references are quoted in foot-notes.
(1) Defence of Parināma on Metaphysical grounds
The metaphysical problems concern the operation of causality (kāryakāraṇabhava), arthakriyākāritva, recognition (pratyabhijñā), and memory. The Jain writers mainly show that all these three would not be possible if their Pariņāmavāda is not accepted.
(a) Kāryakāraṇabhāva :
If a thing is regarded as unchanging in an absolute sense, there would be no causation, as causation is possible in time and is therefore possible in that which is temporal. An unchanging eternal has no temporal character and so cannot be a cause. On the other hand, if a thing is supposed to be momentary, in an absolute sense, the question arises, as to whether the two momentary reals that are supposed to cause one the other are simultaneous or successive. If the former, one of them cannot produce the other, any more than the left horn can produce the right horn. If the latter, there can be no causal relation between them, in as much as one (i. e. the cause) has already passed away when the other (i. e. effect) springs into existence. And if the latter can come into existence even in the absence of the cause at the moment of its origin, there is no reason why it should not come into being at the other moments (even before the production of the effeet) when the cause is absent likewise, 6
The Jain, however, maintains that causation can easily fit in with his view of reality, as it fulfils the necessary condition of 46 AMi 37, 43; DhS 237-244; AYD 16, SVM on AYD 16
It must be noted that many more arguments on the basis of dialectical reasoning are set forth in the works noted above, to show the impossibility of causation on the assumption of absolute non-change or absolute changefulness, but we have noticed only the important ones. I have followed the same method in the following discussion also.

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causation viz. change through persistence (the cause being both permanent and fluxional).
(b) Arthakriyākäritva
The most important criterion of Sat or reality is given as ‘arthakriyākāritva', i. e. the the quality of serving a purpose. The theories of kūtastha-nityatā and kşaņikatva are criticised from this point of view.
The impossibility of arthakriyakāritva,' in an unchanging eternal is shown by the following dilemma : Does the thing that is supposed to be unchangingly eternal exercise arthakriya step by step or all at once ? It cannot do so step by step for that invo. Ives the loss of nityatva - the thing having already changed i. e. ceased to be nitya, the moment the first step has been taken. If the thing continues to be the same even after the first step is taken, there will be no cessation of the activity suited to the first step, and thus there will be no possibility of a second step ever being taken. If, on the other hand, the thing is supposed to change by the first step, it loses its nityatva by so doing. For, to be no longer in the former state, means to be anitya. If it be said by way of defence that the thing remains the same all along the steps but awaits the arrival of an auxiliary - sahakārin - cause in going from step to step and thus the changes are rung out, not on the original thing which retains its sameness and therefore nityatva, but only on the series of sahakārins, that does not really obviate the difficulty but only pushes it a little further on. Thus if the thing remains the same in spite of the arrival of the sahakārin, it means the latter has exercised no influence upon the original cause, and if for influencing, another sabakārin is needed, then the fallacy of regressus infinitum (anavasthā dosa) will occur.
The other alternative of ‘yaugapadya' too is impossible. No. thing can put forth activity in all directions, and accomblish its effects all at once, in a single moment of time. Supposing it can, -

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all its work will be finished in the first instant of time, leaving the thing without kriya and, therefore, different from what it was before, which amounts to a confession that the thing is anitya.
#58
In the same way, if all things be momentary, the cause and effect will fall on two different moments of time, and so, at the moment when one is, the other is not. Now how can that which is, act upon that which is not? And if a thing cannot act, it cannot be, for to be is to act or accomplish. Thus the things, can never be momentary in the absolute sense. This is, further, shown by the following dilemma: Is the momentary thing sat, while it acts, or is it asat? Not the former. For, in that case, it would be operating upon its contemporaneous effect which is impossible; for if that were possible, all things being contemporaneous with one another, would be causes of one another, which is absurd. The latter alternative also will not do, for how can a thing, that is asat, possess causal power any more than the hare's horn? And no third alternative is possible. Therefore the original hypothesis of momentariness breaks down17
For the Jain, however, there is no difficulty as the things, under syādvāda hypothesis, can act, while they possess the threefold charactieristic of abandonment of previous form, acceptance of a new form, and retention of its own identity.
(c) Pratyabhijñā Smaraṇa
In an absolutely unchanging thing, there being no antecedence and sequence, recognition of the sameness in change, is not possible; similarly recollection is impossible, on the assumption of momentariness of things. For, knowledge, that is, experience has passed away and there is nothing to connect it with the knowledge that is memory. If the author of experience and that of memory were not required to be identical, A would experience a
47 SVM on 26

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thing and B would remember it. In other words, any man would remember any thing, irrespective of the need of previous experience. And if recollection is impossible, recognition becomes impossible too, as it involves recollection in addition to experi
ence. 4 $
(2) Defence of Parinama on ethical grounds
All the darasanas, excepting Cārvāka, believe in liberation as the final goal of life and consequently the possibility of achieving it through human behaviour. Now, the Jains try to prove that on the assuption of either absolute non-change or absolute change, all human behaviour becomes meaningless.
If Atman be regarded as absolutely nitya, the experience of happiness and unhappiness, which is a felt fact, will be rendered impossible. For, to be nitya means to be unchangeable and there cannot be experience of happiness and unhappiness one after another unless Atman could pass from one state to another. It will be possessed of either happiness or unhappiness for all time, if it be absolutely nitya. If it be urged that the Atman does not change, only its states change, it is asked, 'do the states remain separate from the Atman or are they one with the Atman?' In the former case, how could they be associated with Atman ? In the latter case, they are as good as not, and the difficulty of accounting for change, consistently with the absolute nityatva of Atman, remains the same.
Furthermore, punya and papa too are impossible on the hypothesis of absolute nityatva. For, the experience of happiness and unhappiness are brought about by punya and papa, which means that they should exercise a certain activity and this is impossible, if Atman is unchangingly eternal.
Next, bondage and liberation will be similarly inexplicable on the hypothesis of exclusive nityatva. Bondage is a kind of sam
48 SVM on 18 (P. 125)

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yoga between Ātman and karma, and samyoga is 4379197771 afat: i.e. obtaining what has not been obtained already. Thus, there are two distinct states involved in the notion of samyoga, the previous absence and the later presence-which are inconsistent with the hypothesis of absolute nityatva. Moreover, it will be asked, “How does a changeless and uniformly enduring Ātman suddenly happen to incur bondage ? Again, was it not free before the chains of bondage came to be put on it ? Then, does the bondage make any change in the Ātman or not? If it does, it is anitya, like any other mortal thing such as a piece of hide. If it does not, so as to keep it nirvikāra, the presence or absence of the bondage matter nothing to it who remains as unaffected as Ākāsa by change.*9
The opposite absolute view of anityatva of Ātman is shown to be untenable thus. If the Ātman is so absolutely anitya, as to undergo change every moment, the law of Retribution which requires personal identity of the doer and the enjoyer, would not hold good, i.e. the doer of the act will be one while the enjoyer of the fruits thereof will be quite a different person.
Similarly such Ātman cannot be the author of punya and papa. For, the single instant is the length of time just sufficient for it to come into exisience and there is nothing to spare for doing of punya and pāpa. If it be urged by way of defence that the Ātman of the first moment produced the Ātman of the next moment, and so on, so that there is a continuity, not the identity, of being, this defence will be of no avail. The law of homogeneity of cause and effect would require that a happy Ātman should beget only a happy Ātman, and so the vicissitudes of happiness and unhappiness in the Ātman would become impossible 50
49 SVM pp. 155-156 50 SVM. by Prof A. B. Dhruva, Notes, pp. 272, 273, 274
Cf. Similar arguments in DhS 194, 195 etc.. 218, 220-222, 228-231 etc. Sanmati-tarka I. 17-20 Ami 40-41 and AS and ASS on them. SVS. III. 32, 33, 35, 36. IV. 7-10

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The bondoge and liberation will have no meaning also, as they cannot be predicated of one and the same Atman.
If the Buddhist were to explain all the aforementioned problems by substituting samtāna for Atman, i.e. continuity for identity and thus making not the identical Atman, but the continuous stream of consciousness, which we call Atman, both the doer and the enjoyer, - karma being transmitted from one life to another in the shape of karma-vāsanās i.e. as impressions left on the Atman by karmas on the analogy of a colour which transmits itself from one piece of cloth to another - the Jain declares this explanation to be without substance and cogency; according to him, samtāna and vāsanā have no reality. This is shown by this dilemma :
Is the samtana the same as the samtanin or different? In the former case, the position remains the same (as in the view of momentariness). In the latter case, a question may be put whether the distinction of the samtāna and the samtanin is real or unreal. If it is unreal, the position remains status in quo ante. If it is real, it may be asked whether the samtana which is supposed to be really distinct from the samtanin, is itself momentary or otherwise (i.e. nitya). If the former, all the fallacies, shown in the doctrine of momentariness, stand as they are. If the latter, the samtāna will be only another word for a permanent Atman, and this would be contradicting the assumption of momentariness.
The unreality of vasana is thus shown. The two, viz., vāsanā and the stream of different moments (Ksanasamtati) cannot fit in with each other as identical interese. For if they be identical, they are either vasanā or kṣaṇasamtati; one must be merged in the other. If there is vasaṇā alone and no vasya on which vasana is to operate, the vasana would be no vāsanā. If, on the other hand, kṣaṇasamtati be regarded as the sole reality, the old difficulties stand as before. If the two, vasana and samtati, are different,
11

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then the question is, whether the vāsanā is momentary or otherwise. If the former, there is no reason for its recognition. The only reason for its recognition is to supply the principle if permanence, which is lacking in the kṣaṇasamtati. If, it is nitya, it violates the doctrine of universal momentariness.
The third alternative of anubhayapaksa too is impossible. There must be either bheda or abheda between vāsanā and kşaņasamtati; because bheda and abheda are mutually exclusive, and if one is not, the other must be there. Besides if the relation is neither bheda nor abheda, it means it is unreal. According to all those who do not endorse the anekāntavāda of the Jains, a thing must be either bhinna or abhinna, a third alternative is not possible. It is, therefore, concluded by the Jain that the opponent must endorse the Jain doctrine of both bheda and abheda."
Thus the aforementioned metaphysical and ethical problems, as also uncontradicted verdict of experience necessitate, maintains the Jain, the recognition of the doctrine of Pariņāma, which represents the synthesis of the two extremes of absolute nityatva and absolute anityatva. It is the doctrine of identity-in-change, of unity-in-difference.
After having justified the doctrine of Pariņāma on metaphysical and ethical grounds, the Jain sets himself to the task of answering the arguments advanced against the doctrine of Pariņāma.
13) Jainas answer the objections raised by others
It has been contended, by the opponent, that there is inconsistency in the doctrine of Pariņāma, as it involves the attribution of opposite properties of 'permanence' and 'change to one and the same entity For, utpāda is the birth or origination of some
SI SVM P. 126-128

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thing, that did not exist before, and vināśa is the opposite of it i.e. the abhāva or destruction of that which existed. 'Dhrauvya', on the other hand, is devoid of both these traits viz. utapada and vinaśa. How can these be in an entity at a time."2
The objection is answered by the Jain by an appeal to experience, as also by having recourse to the anekanta dialectic thus:
The experience favours the view that things are multiform in character, and so, the only doctrine which tallies with experience and, therefore, with truth is that things are neither exclusively nitya, nor anitya, but are, in reality, both.
It is also averred that the statement of utpada, vyaya, and dhrauvya is made from two different standpoints viz., the Paryāya standpoint and the Dravya standpoint respectively. It, thus, refers to the two aspects of reality, the Dravya referring to the dhrauvya aspect, and Paryaya to the utpada-vyaya aspect; so, there remains no scope for the alleged inconsistency which would be justifiable, if the two opposite properties were predicated, in one and the same breath, of one and the same aspect. 53
Another objection concerns the relation of the triad of utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya, to the thing (reality) of which they are predicated. This objection is stated and answered by Vidyānanda in this ASS.55 As this portion of ASS has been very lucidly explained by Dr. S.Mookerjee in his Jain philosophy of non-Absolutism" (p. 74-76) we quote his words below.
52 अत्राप्यभिदधत्यन्ये विरुद्धं हि मिथस्त्रयम् । gaâânal Ħaeci meafa angfag 11 उत्पादोऽभूतभवनं विनाशस्तद्विपर्ययः ।
ध्रौव्यं चोभयशून्यं यदेकदैकत्र तत्कथम् ? ॥
53 SVS VII 10-14; RajV on V. 30 (p. 239)
54 cf. Raj V. on TSû V. 29. P. 239. Śl. V. p. 434. SVM, p. 133-136. 55 ASS p. 112-113 (on Ami 11.)

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'If persistence, cessation and birth were, each of them, identical with substance of which they are predicated, then being identical with the same substance, all of them would be identical with one another. Thus, persistence would be the same thing as cessation and birth, cessation would be identical with persistence and birth, and birth would be identical with cessation and persistence. So the triple character is reduced to an identical single mode. And if, each of these modes were regarded as numerically different from the substance and also from one another, and if each of them were believed to be real, then again each of these modes would have triple character. An infinite vicious series would be inevitable, as each of the triple modes, would have another triple character and so on to infinity, unless the triple mode were severálly and jointly asserted to be unreal characterization. Either a single mode, in the place of the triple character, or an infinite series, or its unreaiity, is to be asserted. But, the Jain answers the critic, by asserting the non-absolutistic position. So far as persistence etc are regarded as identical with the substance, it is. legitimate that persistence and cessation and birth should be regarded as identical. And if attention is concentrated on the aspect of difference of those modes, from the substance, and from one another, then each of them would have a triple character. There is no reason for the infinite series, as difference is not absolute. The modes are identical with the substance only so far as the substance is focussed in the modes. The modes are not absolutely different from substance, as, in that case, the modes would not belong to the substance. The mode is a mode of the substance, because the identity of substance is focussed in it and, is not annulled. So a mode is identical with substance in that respect. To take an example, clay is transformed into a jar, and so the former is regarded as the cause of the latter. The jar is different from clay, no doubt, but the jar could not be a jar unless it were the same substance as clay. So difference and identity, both being inseparable moments in the relation, a mode as identical with the substance may have the same predicates with the substance, and as different from the substance may each of them

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behave as an independent reality and such may have the triple characteristic. The reduction of the triple character to a unitary character is also a matter of point of view. The mode and the substance may be viewed as identical and also as different, as they are both in one. Thus the consequences, alleged to be inevitable by the opponent, are not inevitable, as they are based upon exclusive identity and exclusive difference. But the identity is not exclusive of difference and vice versa as both are the attested traits of reality. A mode and a substance are different because they are two, and they are identical because one is not independent of the other. If identity is to be asserted on the evidence of experience, difference also should equally be asserted on the strength of the same evidence. The compartmental way of looking at things leads to the affirmation of one and to the nega. tion of the other, since it concentrates on one and ignores the other. The besetting sin of philosophers has been the habit to put the telescope upon the blind eye and then to deduce that the other aspect is not real. The Jain philosopher voices the necessity of using both the eyes and of seeing the obverse of the coin of reality
Recapitulation
Āgamas frequently refer to Paryāya and Pariņāma. As in the Samkhya-kārikā, here also the terms are not clearly defined and probably for the same reason viz. that the terms were too wellknown to require explanation. The elements of Parināma are, however, clearly mentioned, viz. Dravya - the permanent or abiding element, Pariņāma - the process of transformation, and Paryāya, the state of Dravya. Only these are not put together to form a definition,
The term Paryāya, however, has a wider connotation signi'fying both a state due to Pariņāma or any other aspect due to division in space such as desa and pradera of Dharma, Adharma and Akasa.

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This consideration as well as the greater frequency of the term Paryāya leads one to believe that Paryayavāda must have been. the original doctrine of the Jains, particularly so when we bear: in mind that the term Paryāya does not occur in the sense in other darganas. On the other hand, the concept of Pariņāma was. a common property and so must have been used by the Jain thinkers to explain their doctrine of Paryāya.
The Tattvartha-Sūtra shows a more philosophical develop- ! ment, reflecting the influence of other darśanas. In the fashion of the Vaiseşikas, Dravya is defined as consisting of Guna (quality). in addition to the orthodox Paryāya (mode). The word sat is used to denote reality and is defined as consisting of origination, decay and permanence. This pature of reality is called Pariņāma in: 'agyta: qfCOTA: 1? This approach leads to the application of Utpada, Vyaya and Dhrauvya to anything about which existence can be predicated.
Amongst the Jains, Kundakunda may be called the philosopher of Pariņāma, par excellence. He describes reality - Sattā as. HTTGFIT, 571, 3.ragafar, startufat etc.' and in that way puts together all the elements of reality which were teft loose by Umāsvāti. The nature of reality is clearly stated to be Pariņāma which becomes analytically defined as utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya. Again, by showing invariable concomitance between utapāda, vyaya and dhrauvya, he clarifies the concept of Pariņāma as a unitarily related process. This unitary character is also brought out by pointing to two types of bhedas Has - viz. Pșthaktva i.e. distinction due to separate space-points and Anyatva. i.e. distinction based upon subjective analysis - and stating that Dravya, Guņa and Paryāya are not 'prthak' but only ‘anya'. He compares and shows the relation between the two triplets of utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya on one side, and Dravya-Guņa-Paryāya on the other, by declaring , that utpāda and vyaya belong to Paryaya while Dravya is what, is dhruva or permanent in a thing.

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Kundakunda has applied the theory of Pariņāma to his metaphysics of Jįva, Pudgala, and Kala. His remarkable contribution, however, lies in his philosophy of the Pariņāma of Jiva.
The introduction of category of Guna, in addition to Dravya and Paryāya, as constituting reality made the later Jain writers assume two types of Paryāyas viz. Dravya-Paryayas and GuņaParyāyas.
The later works of the Tarka-period attempt to apply the doctrine of Pariņāma further to Dharma, Adharma and Akāśa, and in that way make it a universal principle. In this attempt, however, they have not shown the Pariņāmas of these Dravyas as such but through the Parināmas of Jiva and Pudgala. This difficulty is due to the peculiar view of the nature of Dharma, Adharma and Ākaśa which are all-prevading and indivisible wholes.'
The application of Pariņāma to Dharma, Adharma and Akasa compelled the Jain thinkers to relate properly the concepts of Kriya and Pariņāma. Sometimes they would take kriyā as a wider concept and understand, movement of a thing in space (Parispanda) and material change in time as two types of kriyā. Sometimes they would bring these two, viz. Parispanda and Pariņāma under Pariņama, calling the former a Paryāya-viseșa (qufafago) and thus understand Pariņāma as a wider concept.
From a different point of view, they would analyse Pariņāma into two types, viz. Prayoga and Visrasā, the first brought about by sentient agency and the second by natural transformation (i.e. without the aid of any sentient agency).
The experience of the fact of human personality which is a Paryāya and yet abides from birth to death, made the Jain thinkers classify Paryāyas into Vyañjana-Paryāya and Artha- .. Paryāya. As long as we can roughly indicate a Paryaya by one:

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word, so long it appears as having a sort of abiding quality. This type of Paryaya is Vyañjana-Paryāya. The actual transformation which goes on continuously every moment is the Artha-Paryāya which is not cognisable to ordinary intelligence and therefore not capable of being named.
The theory of Pariņāma is explained in greater detail, in the commentaries on the relevant sūtras of the Tattvārtha. What we have to note is that the word 'agira' in the definition of nitya (amatoud facea' 1) which was explained objectively in the Tattvārtha-bhāşya as 'Tra' comes to be explained by Pūjyapāda, Akalamka and Vidyānanda as formaat on the basis of our experience which vouches for the knowledge of recognition of the identity in a thing. In the same way, Vidyānanda adds that utpäda and vyaya refer to that which is the cause of the knowledge of difference, - 'This is different from that, i.e. the previous one'.
Siddhasena, the commentator of the Tbh., explains utpada and vyaya in terms of manifestation (stfaufa) and non-manifestation (faratha) like the author of Yuktidipika and Vacaspati.
Lastly, the Jain thinkers of this period, defend the doctrine of Pariņāma on various grounds and try to answer the objections of the rival schools of thought. This is done by showing how the principle of causality, the facts of memory and recognition and dogmas of kartștva, bhoktặtva, sukhaduḥkhānubhava, bandha, mokşa etc. - which are the accepted postulates of almost all the darśanas - will not hold good on the assumption of absolute permanence or absolute change without anything abiding. All these postulates, avers the Jain, can be properly explained only on the acceptance of the doctrine of Pariņāma, i.e. utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya.
To conclude, the Jain analysed reality, first into Dravya and Paryaya and then into Dravya, Guņa and Paryāya. The relation between Diavya and Paryāya (i.e. the state of Dravya) is explained

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by the process of Pariņāma. Here too, Pariņāma has the same meaning as given by Yaska.
The Jain assumes five or six ultimate entities - Dravyas. All these have their Paryāyas through Pariņāma. Thus, in Jain philosophy, Pariņāma is a universal principle, applying to the whole of reality.

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CHAPTER X
SAMKHYA-YOGA AND JAIN-A COMPARISON
Philosophical
Both the Samkhya-Yoga and Jain seem to have followed Yaska's definition of Vipariņāma in their doctrine of Pariņāma,. i.e. they have viewed the world-process as change in an abiding. entity or entities (विपरिणमते इत्यप्रच्यवमानस्य तत्त्वाद्विकारम् 1 )
Umasvati analyses the Pariņāma nature of reality into utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya. Vyāsa defines Pariņāma as f पूर्वधर्मनिवृत्तौ धर्मान्तरोत्पत्तिः । These two views are, in substance,
identical.1
Vyasa has analysed Parinama into Dharma-Pariņāma, LakṣaṇaPariņāma and Avastha-Pariņāma. The Jaina has not analysed Puriņāma in this way. Nevertheless, these become expressed in his Dravya-Paryaya and Guṇa-Paryaya. Every Dravya-Parinama (such as a pot in the case of Pudgala and manhood in मनुष्यत्व the case of Jiva) and Guna-Paryaya (such as darkness or yellow-ness in Pudgala and Jñana-paryaya in Jiva) of the Jain represent Dharma-Pariņāma or change of aspect. When the same is viewed from the standpoint of its time-variations of past, present and future, it is Lakṣaṇa-Pariņāma. The oldness and newness or *tivrata-mandata' (я- in the case of Jiva) which a Dravya
1
Cf Yuktidipika:
जहद्धर्मान्तरं पूर्वमुपादत्ते यदाऽपरत् । तत्त्वादप्रच्युतो धर्मी परिणामः सः
3 on Ska. 16
and Sloka Vārttika : पूर्वस्वभावपरित्यागाजहद्वृत्तोत्पादो द्रव्यस्योत्तराकारःपरिणामः स एव पर्यायः ।

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Pāryāya or a Guņa-Paryāya suffers as a result of time-process is its Avasthā--Pariņāma. This Avasthā-Pariņāma, it must be noted, is possible only in the Vyañjana-Paryāya of the Jain which abides. for a certain length of time. There cannot be such AvasthaPariņāma in the Artha-Paryāya as the latter is momentary.
Both the Samkhya and the Jain understand: Parināma as a: wide concept including the material change in time (Aparispanda-- tamaka-pariņāma)as well as physical movement in space technically called Parispanda. Both of them, sometimes, bring these two kinds of changes under two types of Kriya, viz. afrontarfar ffar and qfefqetfHAT ft. In the Jain view, the Parispanda is possible only in Jiva and Pudgala, as each Java and Pudgala i.e. atom is limited and therefore capable of movement. In Dharma, Adharma and Akāśa which are indivisible wholes and pervade this loka ( i.e. the universe), there is evidently no scope for Parispanda. In the Sāmkhya, Parispanda has to be negated in Prakrti which is one: homogeneous whole and all - pervading. It becomes possible in. the different products of Praksti, from Buddhi onwards, which are limited compared to their cause, the Prakşti.
There is, however, one difficulty in understanding Parispanda. in the Sāmkhya, viz. that it has to be visualised without Ākāśa.. :
Vijñānabhikṣu felt this difficulty and hence he clarified that Prakrti subsumes Ākāśa. But this interpretation, as already seen, is not vouchsafed by the older Samkhya texts which derive Ākāśa from the Sabda-Tan-mātrá, So we must understand Parispanda in Samkhya before the production of Akága as something which is possible without Space. For the Jain, however, there is not such difficulty as Ākaša is accepted as an underived entity,
The Samkhya and Jain show certain affinity in regard to the concept of Kala. The Samkhya does not recognise Kāla as an independent entity. It is only an aspect of Prakrti, i.e. identical with the pariņāmas of Praksti. A moment is identified with the

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unit of change of the Gunas. In the Jain system, there are two divergent views on Kala since the Agama period. One regards it as an independent entity, a sixth Dravya while the other identifies it with the changes of Jiva and Ajiva. The second view is similar to that of the Samkhya.
Next, the Samkhya-Yoga view of the regulation of Parinama 'from the point of view of देश (place), काल (time), आकार (form) and fafa (extraneous cause) finds a certain parallel in the Jain view according to which the Pariņāma of every object is conditioned by द्रव्य (substance), क्षेत्र (place), काल (time) and भाव ( the essential characterstics which constitute a thing). This is illustrated by means of an illustration of a pot, in the Raj. V., thus घटो द्रव्यतः पार्थिवत्वेन उत्पद्यते न जलत्वेन । देशत इहत्यत्वेन न पाटलिपुत्रकत्वेन । कालतो वर्तमानकालतया नातीतानागताभ्याम् । भावतो महत्त्वेन नाल्पत्वेन (or भावतो रक्तत्वादिना ) । pp. 180-182 'From the standpoint of substance, a pot is produced from the earth and not from the water. From the standpoint of place, it is produced here (i.e. at the particular place where it is produced) and not elsewhere, in Pataliputra etc. From the standpoint of time, it is produced in the present (and not in the past or future). From the standpoint of bhāva, it comes to have the qualities of mahat-parimāṇa and not the alpa-parimana (or it comes to have the qualities of redness etc.)' We have already explained the Samkhya-Yoga view in this respect and so, here, we do not give it again.
The causal theory of the Samkhya is the Satkaryavāda which is deducible from the doctrine of Pariņāma. It means that the effect pre-exists in the cause and is only manifested by causal operation. There is no new creation or production of the effect as such. The Jain, even though,accepting the doctrine of Pariņāma, calls his causal theory Sadasatkāryavāda, i.e. the effect is both pre-existent and pre-non-existent. It is existent in so far as it

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potentially pre-exists in the cause and non-existent in so far as its actual manifestation is a novel emergence. Thus the Jain too in the way of the Samkhya regards effect as manifestation of the abiding entity but the phrase Satkaryavāda being suggestive of ‘Ekāntism', the Jain as an 'Anekāntist' brings in Asat along with Sat. He also seems to be influenced by the Vaiseṣika logic which emphasises the newness of the effect, though he would not regard manifestation as new creation in the Vaiseşika sense. For the Sāmkhya too, it must be noted, the manifestation is (अभिव्यक्ति) non-existent (3) and is brought about by the operation of the Karakas but he does not use the term Asat, Vidyananda in his Aṣṭasahasri draws attention to this by stating that the Jain view is really meant by the Samkhya even though he does not profess it and that the Samkhya cannot maintain his Satkāryāvāda in an absolute sense without stultifying his whole scheme of metaphysics. 2
The differences in the application of the theory of Pariņāmas between the Samkhya and the Jain are due to their differences of view regarding the nature, number and derivation of the original entities. The Samkhya analyses reality in two ways. One, on the
...
2 तदाविर्भावस्य कादाचित्कत्वादपेक्षितपर व्यापारत्वं, न तु घटादेरिति चेत् कोयमाविर्भावो नाम ? प्रागनुपलब्धस्य व्यञ्जकव्यापारादुपलम्भ इति चेत् तर्हि प्रागसन् कारण : क्रियते न पुनर्घटादिरिति स्वरुचिवचनमात्रम् । अथ तस्यापि प्राक्तिरोहितस्य सत एव कारणैराविर्भावान्तरमिष्यते तर्हि तस्याप्यन्यत्तस्याप्यन्यदाविर्भावान्तरमित्यनवस्थानान्न कदाचिद् घटादेराविर्भावः स्यात् । अथाविर्भाव -- स्योपलम्भरूपस्य तद्रूपाविर्भावान्तरानपेक्षत्वात् प्रकाशस्य प्रकाशान्तरानपेक्षत्ववन्नानवस्थेति चेत् तर्हि तस्य कारणादात्मलाभोभ्युपगन्तव्यः, ततः कार्यमाविर्भाव इति । तद्वद्धादिकमपि, अपेक्षितपरव्यापारत्वाविशेषादात्मलाभे । न ह्यलब्धात्मलाभस्योपलम्भः शक्यः कतु, सर्वथातिप्रसङ्गात् । तदेवं प्रधानपरिणामतयापीष्टं घटादिकं कार्य द्रव्यमापाद्यते । तस्य च प्रागभावापह्नवेऽनादित्वप्रसङ्गात्कारव्यापारानर्थक्यं स्यादिति सूक्तं दूषणम् । प्राक्तिरोभावस्योपगमे वा स एव प्रागभाव: सिद्ध:, तस्य तिरोभाव इति नामान्तरकरणे दोषाभावादुत्पादस्याविर्भाव इति नामान्तरकरणवत् । ASS. p. 104

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principle of 'Sentience' (ar) and Non-sentience (73) and the second way is to view. reality as Pariņāmi and Apariņāmi or Kūtastha. He identifies the sentient with the Kūțastha and all change physical and mental is relegated to the Non-sentient i.e. the Prakřti. The Jain dualism accepts the first principle of division only, viz. Sentience (Jiva) and Non--sentience (Ajiva) and rejects the second. This is the fundamental difference between the Sāmkhya and the Jain. The latter regards the soul also as undergoing Pariņāma. For him, all reality - Sat has the characteristic of utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya and so both the Jiva and Ajiva must possess this characteristic.
Next, the Sāṁkhya regards the transforming Prakrti as responsible for all changing phenomena. To make his cosmology systematic, he first derives in a fixed order the twenty-three tattvas from Prakṣti and then regards all phenomena as the result of the qualitative and the quantitative combination and separation of the twenty-three tattvas. The primary derivation is, in Samkhya phraseology, called Tattvāntara-Pariņāma; while the subsequent parināma is called Dharma-Lakşaņa-Avasthā Pariņāma. For the Jain it was not necessary to have Tattvāntara-Pariņāma because he starts with the five or six Tattväntaras as fundamental and underived entities. The Jain is really a pluralist because in addition to the category of Jivas, he assumes four underived Ajiva catego. ries viz. Pudgala, Dharma, Adharma and Akāśa. He explains all psychic phenomena as resulting from the pariņāmas of Jivas, all material phenomena, from the pāriņāmas of Pudgala, consisting of infinite atoms, while Dharma, Adharma and Akāśa make possible the movement ( गति ), static ty (स्थिति) and occupation (अवगाह) respectively of Jiva and Pudgala.
As just said, the essential difference between the Sānkhya and the Jain lies in the fact that the principle of Parinama is not applied to Puruşus by the Sāmkhya while the Jain would apply it to both Jivas and Ajivas. From this difference ensue various differences of view between the Sāņkhya and the Jaia.

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The denial of Pariņāma in the Purusas has made it highly difficult for the Samkhya to relate them to the changing Prakṛti and has prevented them to play any substantial role in the world -phenomena. In fact, Prakṛti, having the inherent power to change, could very well function in the absence of such Purusas whose existence, however, makes the natural movement of Prakṛti teleological. This is difficult to grasp because we are accustomed to associate purposive activity, with sentient beings.
175
.
Another consequence of this assumption is that jñāna, bhoga, bandha, mokṣa etc. which appear as of Puruşa become really so many transformations of Prakṛti. Puruşa is never bound and therefore has never to be free. He merely witnesses all the transformations of Prakṛti. Thus, in Samkhya, truly speaking, bandha and mokṣa are the transformations of Prakyti.
The above difficulties do not confront the Jain. The application of Pariņāma to Jivas enables him to smoothly relate the two, viz., Jiva and Pudgala, and explain their mutual influence and inter-action. The Jain theory of Pariṇāma which in the case of Jiva takes the form of bhāva-karma and in the case of Pudgala, dravya-karma, makes it possible to attribute jñāna, bhoga, bandha, mokṣa etc. to Jivas directly. Thus the infinite variety of phenomena and their significance to Jives as objects of knowledge, enjoyment and as objects from which Jivas have to be free are consistently explained by the Jain theory of Pariṇāma.
The only difficulty that the Jain will have to face is that, if by definition, Jiva and Pudgala are fundamentally different from each other, how the transformations (pariņāmas) of the one can ever be related to those of the other. In the case of the Samkhya there is no such difficulty because the Purusas and Prakṛti are always distinct from each other and never come in real contact. The bhoga and mokşa in the Puruşa are always aupacārika (i. e. only a way of speaking).
The Samkhya is thus metaphysically in a stronger position while the Jain's position is empirically more comprehensible.

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Historical ... Many divergent views are held by scholars on the question of the nature of pre-Isvarakršna Samkhya.
According to Garbe, the Sāmkhya was thought out by one seer as a complete and well-knit system, such as we have in Isvarakrsna's Kārikā, in non-Brāhmanic circles, in pre-Buddhist period. This original Samkhya came to be perverted in the Upanişads and the epic, the Gitā, and later still in the theistic Yoga and the several sectarian Puranas; but, in spite of such deliberate attempts outside, the doctrine in its own school was maintained singularly unalloyed, all through its long career extending over more than a dozen centuries.
Jacobi* assigns the origin of the Samkhya to 800 B. C. approximately and before 500 B. C. it became fixed up in a systematised form which agreed with the classical form in being dualistic and atheistic but differed from the classical in other details such as the following :- (1) The 'pre-classical Sāmkhya, as differing from the later system which has only a metaphyical interest, had a didactic and practical purpose, being addressed to the masses rather than to trained dialecticians. (2) Its original dogma of Satkāryavāda or the continual reality of the products sub specie aetenitatis was more allied to the contemporary Jain doctrine of the indesructibility but qualitative indefiniteness of matter, rather than to the Vedāntic 'satkaraņavāda', with which it later came to be identified. (3) It did not fully develope the doctrine of the three-fold pramāņas right from the very start. (4) The similarity between the Sāmkhya and the Jain view as regards the nature of matter the size of the individual souls. belief in Karm an and
3
4.
Die Sámkhya Philosophie' first edition, 1894, second edition 1917. (As Prof. Belvalkar has noted in History of Indian Philo sophy, Vol. II. p. 414). cf. His two reviews of the two editions of Garbe's book in 'Gottingensche Gelehrte Anzeigen', 1895, pp. 202-211 and 1919, pp. 1-30. cf, also ZDMG, Vol. I ii, pp. 1-15, other smaller papers contributed to 'Kuhn Festschrift, Lichtdes Ostens,' etc. (Prof. Belvalkar, p. 416).

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transmigration, the doctrine of Ahimsa etc. suggests an origin of both these systems, by degrees, from out of a common cultural and philosophical heritage. (5) The pre-classical Samkhya, so far from making a tirade against the Śrutis, endeavoured to interpret them to support its own views, as seems clear from the data in the Brahma-sūtras.
177
Oldenberg's view differs from those of Garbe ond Jacobi.". He sees the beginnings of the Samkhya in the Katha and especially the Svetasvatara Upanisads. His pre-classical Samkhya is a triune-unity as set forth in the first chapter of the Svetāśvatara. Lastly, seeing that the Samkhya of the Katha and the Sve. Upanisads affords a close similarity to the Samkhya of the Gitā and the Epic generally, Oldenberg is not ready to regard the 'Epic Samkhya' as belonging yet to the formative, pre-classical stage, because the Epic invariably speaks of the Samkhya as well as the Yoga as two systems of long standing (). He would go so far as to regard the Epic form of the system as one self-consistent line of development taken by the 'original' Samkhya, just as its classical form with its pronounced dualism and its negation of the Absolute may very well have been another independent line of development.
Dr. Belvalker, after criticising these endorses in the end the view of Oldenberg.
different views,
Dr. Keith' also seems to incline more to the views of Oldenberg. According to him the classical Samkhya is a natural
6
7
5
cf. his 'Die Lehre der Upanishaden and die Anfange des Buddhismus.* 1915.
Also 'Zur Geschichte der Samkhya-philosophic' in NGGW, 1917, pp. 218-253. (Belvalkar, p. 418)..
History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 426,
Samkhya System, p. 52-53.
12

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growth from the philosophy of the Upanisads which show traces of the Samkhya doctrine.
178
At the outset I may say that owing to lack of sufficent evidence, one cannot come to a definite conclusion on any one of the above views.
I shall, however, try to put forth my hypothesis which, though not agreeing entirely with any of the views stated above, finds support piece-meal in them.
The Samkhya that is known to the darśanic tradition of India is the Samkhya of Isvarakṛṣṇa. It is dualistic, 'pariņāmistic' and atheistic in its philosophical outlook. The Indian därganic tradition takes no notice of those Samkhya ideas of the Upanisads and the Mahabharata which differ from the Samkhya of Isvarakṛṣṇa.
8
Let us consider first the evidence supplied by the Karikas of Isvarakṛṣṇa, According to Kā. 69, 70, 71, 72, the tradition which Isvarakṛṣṇa has followed and the works which he has summarised are as follows. This abstruse knowledge for the fulfilment of the purpose of the Spirit, wherein the origin, duration and dissolution of beings are considered, has been expounded by the Great Sage (Paramarși). The Sage imparted this supreme purifying doctrine to Asuri, who taught it to Pañcasikha who elaborated the doctrine. Handed down through a long tradition of pupils, it has been briefly written up in Arya metre by Isvarakṛṣṇa. The subjects that are treated of in the 'Saptati' are those of the complete 'Satitantra' excluding illustrative tales and omitting the doctrines of other schools..
8
Sarvadarsanasamgraha of Madhavacārya and Saddarianasamucaya of
Haribhadra.
9 पूरुषार्थज्ञानमिदं गुह्यं परमर्षिणा समाख्यातम् । feregenfersmenfazzard 44 garang 11

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179
From this one may reasonably conclude that the tradition and the works referred to by Isvaraksina must have held the views which are reflected in the Karikas. We have no reason to doubt this tradition which would carry the Samkhya of Iivarakršna to carlier centuries. Whatever else we may say, we cannot deny that there was an earlier Samkhya school which held the views embodied in the Karikās.
Isvarakrsna docs not mention the name of the Scer of his system, whom llc refers to merely by the word 'Paramarşi'. This •Paramarşi' is identified with Kapila by the commentators. 1° This Kapila, as already said, may be regarded as historical and placed in the century preceding Buddha."
Sa
एतत्पवित्रमण्यं मुनिरासुरयेऽनुकम्पया प्रददौ । आसुरिरपि पञ्चशिखाय तेन च बहुधा कृतं तन्त्रम् ।। शिष्यारंपरयाऽऽगतमीश्वरकृष्णेन चैतदार्याभिः । संक्षिप्तमायंमतिना सम्यग्विज्ञाय सिद्धान्तम् ॥ सप्तत्यां किल येऽर्थास्तेऽर्थाः कृत्स्नस्य षष्टितन्त्रस्य ।
आख्यायिकाविरहिताः परवादविवजिताश्चापि ॥ 10 It may be noted that Sarkarācārya distinguishes the Kapila of
Sānikhya from the Kapila mentioned in the Sve. Up. 11 'There seems to be no reason to doubt that Kapila was a real (human)
philosopher, and not a more shadow of a divinity'. Hopkins, The Great Epic of India, p. 98. As regards the antiquity and authority of the Samkhya thought, cf. p. 50-51 "Besides the tradition recorded in the Buddhacarita that the Buddha had his schooling under Alära Kāläma lends additional support to the theory of its pre-Buddhist origin. The anitquity of Sankhya philosophy is further attested by the fact that the fundamental doctrines of Sainkhya School have been elaborately criticised in the NyayaSūtra and the Brahma-Sūtra,... lu Aśvaghoşa's Buddhacarita also, similar Sankhya doctrines have been expounded. In the AhirbudhnyaSamhitä also we find a representation of Samkhya doctrines with necessary adaptations and variatinos.' The Sāro khya-Yoga' by Dr.

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Another important point to be noted is that Isvaraksşņa puts on a par the Šrauta (anusravika) remedy with that of the empirical (drotavat) so far as the achievement of the final goal is concerned. This attitude towards the Śruti could not have been an innovation on the part of Távarakļşņa. We must regard it as the attitude of the original Samkhya thinkers. This would go to show that the early Sámkhya tradition was not completely bound down to srauta tradition and was independent enough to differ from the Srauta tradition, at least from its karma-mimāmsa."
If this were the only evidence, the question would have been easy to settle, but we find the Sāmkhya ideas referred to in the Upanigads and the Mahabharata. The Mbh. mentions three types of Sāmkhya, two of which derive Prakrti from Brahman, Vişnu or Narayaņa. These are decidedly theistic in their outlook. One of the schools of twenty five categories, agrees with KapilSakhya.
This complication has given rise to the controversies noted
Mookerji, a chapter in History of philosophy, Eastern and Western,
p. 243. 12 Again in Mbh. XII. 268. 6-10 "Kapila appears as a teacher of unor
thodox non-injury and maintains to the end (so that his view is presented as really correct) that not the Sacrifice of animals but the "Sacrifice (worship) of knowledge” is the best. Great Epic of India, Hopkins, p. 99, Also cf. Gitā II. 42, 43, 44 wherein the Jãāna-less ritualists are condemned by the Samkhya-Yoga. यामिमां पुष्पितां वाचं प्रवदन्त्यविपश्चितः । वेदवादरता: पार्थ नान्यदस्तीति वादिनः ॥४२॥ कामात्मानः स्वर्गपरा जन्मकर्मफलप्रदाम् । क्रियाविशेषबहुलां भोगैश्वर्यगति प्रति ॥ ४३ ॥ With reference to the Sāmkhya and Yoga in the Mbh S. K. De says that 'the Yoga was perhaps more orthodox, but the Sāṁkhya is the philosophy of knowledge par excellence which did not adhere strictly to traditional views'.'
History of philosophy, Eastern and Western, (p. 87).

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above, about the original Sakhya being theistic or atheistic, monistic or dualistic,
181
Under the circumstances, the only proper way seems to be to rely upon the tradition of Isvarakrṣṇa for the history of his darsana and explain the occurrence of Samkhya ideas in the Upanisads and the Mbh. on that basis. It is possible to do so in the following way.
Even though all the darśanas claim to be complete systems, yet each one of them is known to the Indian tradition for its particular contribution. Thus, Pūrvamīmāmsā's contribution lies in its rules of interpretation and the doctrine of Karma, while Vedanta is known for its Adhyatma-vidya. One goes to the Vaigesika darśana for the theory of atomism and the theory of causation involving agency of God. Nyaya darśana's main object is to teach the means of valid knowledge. The Yoga-school teaches ethical psychology.
Viewed thus, the Samkhya darśana is more or less synonymous with its doctrine of the Gunas, and its doctrine of Utpatti, Sthiti and Laya of the world i.e. its cosmology. These ideas of the Samkhya school appealed most to the thinkers of India and so whenever cosmological ideas are alluded to in the Upanisads, the Mbh., the Smṛtis and the Purāņas, they bear the impress of this Samkhya thought. They are sometimes specifically called Samkhya and sometimes merely incorporated as common property.
As noted above the Upanisadic monism explained the world-phenomena in two ways; the one adopted by Yajñavalkya which regarded the world-phenomena as chimerical and the other which regarded them as real and explained it in such Upanisads as the Sve. by having recourse to Samkhya ideas expressed in such words as Aja, Mäyä, Prakṛti, Pradhana etc. However, the Upanisadic thought being monistic, this Pradhana, Prakṛti, etc,, would be looked upon as the creative aspect of the first principle. Thus, the Upanisadic thought which is developed

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in the Mahabharata, remained true to its original inspiration of monism and to support its (i.e. Upanisadic) cosmology adapted the cosmological ideas of Samkhya, with which the latter must have been identified amongst thinkers. We would not, therefore, agree with the opinion of those who regard the Samkhya in the Upanisads, the Mbh., the Smrtis and Purānas as mere perversion of the classical Samkhya or with the opinion of those who regard the Kapila Samkhya as derived from the Upanisad-Mbh. view. We would rather regard these Samkhya ideas as adaptations of the classical Samkhya. The Samkhya proper remained true to its position of dualism, 'Pariņāmism' and atheism15 just as the Vedanta remained true to its Upanisadic monism.
Whether Kapila-Samkhya had some affiliation with any of the numerous early Vedic schools or whether it was like the Śramana sects, a school of non-vedic Parivrajakas, we cannot definitely say, though Isvarakrṣṇa's contemptuous reference to 'ānusravika' in the Ska. and other such references in the Mbh. and the Gita (noted above) leave room for the possibility that in the beginning, it might have been non-Vedic.
As we have seen, these two schools (viz. Sāṁkhya and Jaina) have many points of agreement between them such as (i) the dualism of sentience (cetana) and non-sentience (jaḍa); (ii) the infinite number of purusas; (iii) the explanation of world-phenomena through Parinama and achievement of salvation through
13 Garbe and Jacobi.
14 Keith.
15 The fact that the Mbh. mentions a school of Samkhya agreeing with that of Isvarakṛspa and the express statement of the Mbh. that the Samkhya unlike the Yoga, does not believe in a supreme personal God, point out that the dualistic and atheistic Samkhya had its existence then. The statement in the Mbh. of the Cenial of Isvara by the Samkhya (Mbh. XII. 300) seems to indicate that it might have been atheistic from the beginning.

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183
discriminative knowledge (viveka-jñana, bheda-jñana). Their outlook of life that it is nothing but suffering in the last analysis, is also common.
The fundamental difference, however, lies in the concept of the nature of Puruşa and Jiva. The Samkhya purusas are, as seen above, kūtastha-nitya i e, not undergoing any change, whercas the Jivas, in Jain philosophy, undergo Pariņāma.
From these similarities and differences, we cannot say whether one was derived from the other. Historically, if we place the rise of Samkhya in 800 B.C, as some scholars To do, we have also to take into consideration the historicity of Pārsva (800 B,C.) which is now generally accepted. Thus the question of derivation of one from the other must remain unsolved till some pew evidence comes forth.
However, one consideration may be put forward. Jainism might represent the more primitive outlook, which regarded the Jivas also as changing like other material things. The Samkhya view of relegating all change to one entity, viz. Prakrti and regarding the Purvşas as absolutely unchanging is philosophically more advanced and, therefore, might have been a later view.
However that may be, it appears that earlicr than Yaska, there must have been a school of Parināmists, whose concept has been explained in the Nirukia. This school of Pariņāma-thinkers might have been the original inspirers both of the Proto-Samkhya and Proto-Jain thinkers-Jaina thinkers who were in the habit of looking at things as the Paryāyas of some original entities, especially of one and the same Jiva becoming manuşya, tiryanca. Dāraka etc.
The attempt to find out whether these Proto-Sāmkhya and Proto-Jain Pariņāma-thinkers were śramaņas or Vedic Brahmaņas is again bound to be futile for the simple reason that there is no evidence whatsoever to decide this issue. 15 Jacobi, Studies in Jainism, p. 80.

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APPENDIX
AGURULAGHU
The term 'agurulaghu' is technical in Jain philosophy. It seems to have been used in more senses than one.1
Firstly, it is used in the karma-sastra in two ways--one, one of the varieties of Nama-karma (a) which itself is one of the kinds of eight basic Karmas viz. Jñanavaraṇiya etc. and the other, as an attribute of the soul, obscured by the Gotrakarma. On account of the 'agurulaghu-karma' the soul comes to possess a body which is neither too heavy nor to light to do anything, i.e. a normal body, capable of carrying on the requisite functions in life.
Next, the attribute agurulaghu' is regarded as one of the eight attributes of the soul viz., jñāna, darśana, caritra, etc. which are supposed to be obscured or veiled by the respective karmas viz., Jñānāvaraṇīya etc. This particular attribute is said to be obscured by the gotra-karma as a result of which the soul comes to be looked upon as high (T) or low () as regards its birth, family etc. In reality, however, all the souls are alike, neither high nor low. When the gotra-karma is annihilated, this attribute "agurulaghu' of the soul manifests itself." Thus, the 'agurulaghu' here indicates the inherent similarity of all the souls."
1
cf. Tsu. VIII. 12. Gujarati edition by Pt. Sukhalalji. p. 335. 2 The eight attributes, on the annihilation of the eight kinds of karmas, fully manifest themselves in a soul. These are then called the eight attributes of a siddha.
3
Cf. Tattvärtha Sutra - Gujarati Edition, p. 400. It may be noted that the term 'agurulaghu' is also used in a purely spiritual sense with reference to Jiva. That soul who is engrossed in sinful activities, viz. violence, falsehood, stealing etc., is called 'guru-karma', while

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Agurulaghu
185
The third usage pertains to our ordinary notion of heavy weight and light weight. That which is heavy and has a tendency to go down is 'guru', e.g. stone etc. Laghu is light, like smoke etc. whose nature is to go up. Vāyu is called 'gurulaghu', as it tends to move across. That which is neither light nor heavy is 'agurulaghu' as for instance, Akāša. Thus, "agurulaghu', here, signifies the negation of the different degree of lightness and heaviness of weight. From this point of view, all the arūpi incorporeal Dravyas viz., Java, Dharma, Adharma and Akāśa are called 'agurulaghu'. In the rūpi Pudgala, atoms and those subtle molecular aggregates (skandhas) which possess four kinds of touch are called agurulaghu, and the rest of the rūpi substances, viz., the gross molecular aggregates, possessed of the eight kinds of touch, etc. are 'gurulaghu'. Thus, the molecular aggregates which constitute the Aūdārika, Vaikriya, Āhāraka and Taijasa bodies are called 'gurulaghu', while those which form the Karmaņa body, mind and speech are "agurulaghu'.
Now, of the three usages given above, the first twe, as can be seen, refer specially to Jiva and karma. Though the term itself is negative (3T+TETET) its import is positive in these two cases. The third meaning of the term, as applied to all the fundamental Dravyas, seems to indicate the negative character of the attribute.
The question, now, is, whether the ‘agurulaghu-paryāyas or pariņāmas', which are frequently referred to in the Jaina philosophical literature, are to be understood as the Paryāyas of this attribute (as applied to all the ultimate Dravyas). The negative character of the attribute, however, makes it difficult to understand them (the paryayas) that way. So, what could be the meaning of 'agurulaghu', as an attribute - undergoing Pariņāma - of all the
the one who refrains from them and leads a pious life is called ‘laghu-karma'. The liberated soul is beyond these two. Thus, 'gurulaghu' and 'agurulagbu', here signify the different degrees of spirituality. cf.
Bh. Sú. 1. 9. 73. 4 cf. Bh. Sú. 1. 9. 74. and its commentary by Abhayadeva.

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fundamental Dravyas? We are here primarily concerned with this 'agurulaghu'.
Pandit Sukhalalji and Baraiya have attempted to explain it as follows: Each Dravya is Parinami in Jaina philosophy. In fact, Parinama is regarded as the very nature of reality. It is quite likely, therefore, that each Dravya, being possessed of the inherent power to change, may in the absence of a controlling factor, transgress its limit of Pariņāma and change in such a way as to give up its essential nature स्वभाव, जाति altogether and become a totally different Dravya. Hence, in order to avoid this contingency, this attribute agurulaghu seems to have been recognised, as controlling and regulating the Pariņāma of each Dravya and thereby keeping it within its specific limits."
The above explanation was formulated, as Sukhalalji says, without any textual authority in support of it. However, I have been able to discover its corroboration, in Amṛtacandra's commentary on the Paficästikäya (st. 84-Nirnaya Sagar edition and 91 in the Eng, edition) of Kundakunda. It is as follows: af अगुरुलघुभिर्गुणैरगुरुलघुत्वाभिधानस्य स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठत्व निबंधनस्य स्वभावस्याविभागपरिच्छेदैः प्रतिसमयसंभवत् षट्स्थानपतितवृद्धिहानिभिरनंतेः सदा परिणतत्वात्......।'
Thus, 'agurulaghu' is that element in the five or six ultimate Dravyas, which keeps them in their own nature in spite of continuous transformation. To put it in modern terms, it is what constitutes the 'thatness' of an ultimate entity.
cf. Tsu. Gujarati Edition, p. 401, 402.
5

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About the Author
Late Dr. Indukala H. Jhaveri (19281983), a scholar, had conceived this work as her research project, which later earned her Ph.D. from Gujarat University. Apart from this thesis entitled, 'Sankhya-Yoga and Jain Parinamavada' her other publications include the edited Prakrit work 'Yogaśataka' of Haribhadra enriched by Gujarati translation, exposition and comprehensive introduction; the English translation of Pt. Sukhlalji's introduction (Hindi) to Pramanamimamsa and Gujarati translation of the second part of Outlines of Indian Philosophy by Prof. M. Hiriyanna. Dr. Ms. Jhaveri's sundry research papers were published in journals like Aryanpath, The Journal of Oriental Research Institute and Vidya.
Dr. Jhaveri began her teaching career at B. J. Institute of Learning and Research and later taught at Shri H. K. Arts College, Ahmedabad.

Page #208
10-00 ગુજરાત યુનિવર્સિટી દ્વારા પ્રકાશિત થયેલ પુસ્તક અ. નં. પુસ્તકનું નામ લેખકનું નામ | કિંમત 1. ઋવેદ તૃતીય મ ડળ ડ, જયદેવ શુકલ 2 પુરુષોત્તમદેવની લઘુપરિભાષા વૃત્તિનું હૈ. વી. એમ, ભટ્ટ 32-00 વિવેચનાત્મક અધ્યયન 3. સાંખ્ય સતિવૃત્તિ વિ. 1 ઈ. એ. સોલોમન 6-00 4 સાંખ્ય સપ્તતિવૃત્તિ વિ 2 ઈ. એ. સોલોમન પ--00 5, ધ્વન્યાલોક લોચન ડો. તપસ્વી નાન્દી 18-00 6. દેવન્યાલક ડોલરરાય માંકડ 10-00 7. અય દિક્ષીત-કવિ અને ડો.ભગવતી પ્રસાદ ડી 30-00 અલિંકારિક પંડયા 8. અલંકાર વિચાર પી. જી. શાસ્ત્રી 5-00 9. ભરતનું નાટયશાસ્ત્ર ડો. ટી. એસ. નાન્દી 16-00 10. A Critical Study of the ડો.એલ. વી જોષી 30-00 Partyaksha Particcheda of Bhasarvajna's Nyayabhusana 11. The Origin & Devp. of the ડો. ટી. એસ. નાન્દી 20-00 Theory of Rasa and Dhvani in Sanskrit Poetics 12. કાદમ્બરી પૂર્વાર્ધ જે. એચ. દેસાઈ 17-00 13. શ્રી હર્ષકત ખંડન ખંડખાદ્ય પ્રો. એસ્તર સોલોમન 60-00 પરની શૈલ્ય હિતિષણી ટીકા યુનિવર્સિટીનાં પ્રકાશને કેવી રીતે મેળવશો ? યુનિવર્સિટીનાં પુસ્તક-પુસ્તકની કિ'મત તથા જરૂરી ટપાલ ખર્ચ અગાઉથી યુનિવર્સિટી કાર્યાલયના " નાણાં સ્વીકાર કેન્દ્ર” ઉપર કાર્યાલયના કામકાજના દિવસેએ 11-15 થી ૨-૦૦ના સમય દરમિયાન ભરી અથવા રજિસ્ટ્રારશ્રી, ગુજરાત યુનિ. ( હિસાબ વિભાગ), અમદાવાદ-૩૮૦૦૦૯ને ડિમાન્ડ ડ્રાફુટથી નાણાં મોકલી પ્રકાશને મેળવી લેવાનાં રહેશે. ડિમાન્ડ ડ્રાફ્ટ સાથે પૂરેપૂરું નામ, સરનામું, પ્રકાશન વગેરેની પૂરી વિગતો જણાવવા વિનંતી છે. યુનિવર્સિટી દ્વારા પ્રકાશને વી. પી. થી મોકલવામાં આવતાં નથી.