Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

Author(s): Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra

Page 15

20
TATTVASANGRAHA :
been explained in course of the denial of mere Non-apprehension by itself being a Means of Cognition; this has been declared in the following words -O Bhiksus, a Living Being cannot validly cognise a Living Being, or find a means of knowing it; if a Living Being validly cognises a Living Being, he becomes destroyed; I alone would cognise a Living Being, or someone else if he were like me'. Herein we have the denial of the validity of mere Non apprehension in general in regard to things beyond the kun (of ordinary men); the sentence 'I alone, etc. clearly shows the validity of particular cases of Non-apprehension.-All this points to those sections of the Text that deal with Sense-perception (Chap. 17), Inference (Chap. 18) and other Jeans of Cognition (Chap. 20).
Question . This Intervolved Wheel of Causation,-is it concomitant with any such generic character as being an entity', as declared by the Syädvudins (Jainas)? Or is it entirely unmixed (pure) in its essence 1—'What if it is the one or the other P-If it is concomitant with anything, then there would be a cross-division between the definition of the Wheel and that of Sense-perception and the rest ;-there would also be the incongruity that the cause would cease to bring about the effect, as there would be no difference between the Cause and Effect; and in that case the Wheel would not be * definitely cognisel by means of the two Means of Cognition (as stated in Text 3). Nor again, is it right to posit any such entity as the Intervolved Wheel of Causation; because even if it is entirely unmixed in its essence-inasiuch us there would be no particular diversity among the auxiliary causes, there would be no possibility of its having any efficient activity (which is the characteristic of overy ensity); exactly as there is none in things admittedly nonproductive."
In answer to this objection, we have the second line of Text 3 * Aniyasipi, etc. It is not mixed up with the nature of anything else even in the slightest degree'. What is meant is as follows-It is the latter of the two alternatives that we accept; and yet there is no room for the objections that have been urged against it; this we shall explain later on. The compound
mishribhūtā paratmakah' (in the Text) is to be analysed as- wherein the nature of anything else is not mixed up'; that is, wherein there is not the slightest trace of the character of anything else, for instance, that of the Cause in the Effect and so forth. - In the slightest degree',-avon in the most subtle form--and not only in the form of many such extensive entities as "Being *Knowable and so forth,—this is what is implied by the particle 'api', *even! What is meant is that, if the form of a single entity were present in it, the entire world would enter into its essence. This the Author will explain later on. This is what has been thus declared by the Blessed Lord-How can the Sprout be eternal 1-Since the Sprout is one thing and the Seed an en tirely different thing. Verily the Sprout is not exactly the same thing as the Seed. So also is the Sprout unlike the Seed. Hence one thing (Seed) does not pass on into the essence of another thing'. This points to the Ohapter dealing with the Examination of Syädyrāda (Chap. 20).-(3)
Question—"The Skandha (Sensorial Phase) and the rest, are pure and unmixed in nature; even so, do they always remain unchanged in their