Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

Author(s): Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra

Page 14

INTRODUCTORY.
19
[Text 3.) Question " Is this (Wheel of Cansation) A mere verbal jugglery indulged in on account of the paucity of valid reasons in support, - just as has been done by other philosophers assuming (without sufficient proof) their Categories? Or is there any valid reason for accepting it?"
The answer that there is such valid reason is given in Text 3.-Spasta, etc.', 'It is definitely cognised, etc.'-The compound Spaşlalaksana' is Karmadharaya, meaning 'whose definition, character, is clear, i.e. welldefined'; the clearness' of the 'definition is due to the fnct that it is free from the three defects of being impossible (inapplicable), or too narrow or too wide; the definition of the Means of Right Cognition provided by other philosophers, on the other hand, is not clear'; the Text thereiore has characterised its own Means of Cognition as clear'. Endowed with this character of being clearly defined' are the two Means of Cognition',-Sense perception and Inference ;-by theso is the Wheel of Causation definitely cognised'; this will be explained under all the sections (as occasion presents itself). This also is approved by the Blessed Lord, who has declared thus-O Bhiksus, my word should be accepted after due investigation, not merely throngh regard for me, just as gold is accepted as real only after henting, cutting and rubbing on the touch-stone-As regards Sense-perceptions, its definition is that it should be free from 'mistake' and conceptual content' or 'determination', this is exactly as declared by the Blessed Lord-who has said that one who has the visual cognition cognises the Blue all right, but not as blue': the phrase "cognises the Blue' implies that the cognition does not apprehend an object other than its own, which indicates the fact of its being not mistaken (or wrong); and the other phrase 'not us blue denies the presence in the Cognition of any connection with the definite name 'blue'; which indicates the fact of its being non-conceptual or not-determinale (free from all association with words). As regards Inference, tlie definition of that also has been set forth by pointing out the nature of the Linga (Inferential Indicative,
Middle Term', Probans); which has beon thus set forth-The Linga, Probans, is that which is (a) never non-concomitant with the Probandum, and (b) which is definitely known, -only then does it become the means of in. ferential cognition; this Probans, O Bhiksus, is sometimes Constructive, in all cases it is Destructive'. Here the invariable concomitance of the Probans with the Probandum is clearly asserted. This same condition has been stated in the dictum that Tho Probans is the basis of Inference, when it is charac. terised by invariable concomitance'; in this statement the Probandum has not been mentioned, because it is clearly indicated by the mention of the
invariable concomitance of the Probans' (which can only be with the Probandum).-This Probans is divided into three kinds, distinguished according to such peculiarities as those of (1) nature, (2) effect and (3) nonapprehension; the Probans called 'nature has been indicated by the term
Constructive' in the phrase 'O Bhikşus, that which is Constructive; as for the Probans styled Effect' it has been illustrated in the following statement The presence of Fire is known through Smoke, the presence of Water is known through the line of White Cranes flying above; and the Race (Gotra) of the Wise Bodhisattva is known through certain signs'.-Lastly, the Probans styled as 'a particular form of non-apprehension' has also