Samipya 1991 Vol 08 Ank 01 02

Author(s): Pravinchandra C Parikh, Bhartiben Shelat
Publisher: Bholabhai Jeshingbhai Adhyayan Sanshodhan Vidyabhavan

Page 50

essential nature being devoid of consciousness or buddhi and happiness which are, according to Nyāya philosophy, accidental qualities of the self. Anandabodha during his refutation has given emphasis on two points, viz., the state of mokşa is devoid of consciousness and hence equal to mūrchă avasthā or unconscious state; and it is devoid pleasure. As a staunch Advaitin he, keeping in view Sankara's soteriological theory points out emphatically that mokşa should be a state wherein one will experience the eternal imperishable happiness identified with the Brahman. One major point, though Anandabodha has not made it very clear during his repudiation is that he does not identify duhkhabhäva with snkhanubhava. For him both are different. In another context wherein he discusses Advaitic ontology, he has made it very clear. Hence he says that since Nyāya mokşa is bereft of eternal bliss. no one will attempt for its attainment.
But Nyaya system gives us another logic in defence of his theoy of mokşa. Since in this world pure pleasure cannot be experienced and all the times pleasure is mixed with misery, hence duhkhabhāva should be paramapuruşartha. The Nyāya system also includes body (Sarira ) among twenty four miseries. Complete duhkhābhāva is possible only when the self will remain in its own nature being devoid of the present body and will never be associated with another body which is the source of misery. But so far the Nyāya concept is very reasonable. But when it advocates that consciousness also gets ceased in the state of mokşa, the Nyāya system commits a great blunder which spoils the validity of the theory. Anandabodha, therefore, has caught this point and refuted it. His refutation, to my knowledge, stands to reason.
In the light of what has been said above, it should be pointed out bere that the Nyāya conception of release relduces itself to an absurdity. If mokşa is the state of the self when it remains in its condition, freed from all special qualities like knowledge, etc; there is nothing to distinguish such a state from the abhāva or nonbeing of the self. The Naiyāyika proves the adventitious nature of knowledge by citing dreamless sleep where the self is supposed to endure by becoming a pure substance (suddha-dravya ) devoid of any consciousness of the world and its joys and miseries. This contention, however, is not satisfactory. The peace of extinguished consciousness may be the peace of death. The state of painless, passionless existence, which the Nyāya idealises, seems to be a more parody of what man dreams to be. The Nyāya conception of mokşa is a word without meaning. No one would be desirous of the abhäva or non-being of the self which is the seat of supreme felicity and the source of unsurpassed bliss. If mokşa is the abhāva of self, it ceases to be the goal of human endeavour. This is the reductio ad. absurdum of the Nyaya view of the self.
It is perhaps the reason why the Nyaya philosophers like Bhasarvajña and Udayanācārya do not accept the above-said Nyāya theory of mokşa. On the basis of the above discussion, we can have following conclusions :
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[ Samipya : April, '91-March, 1992