Samipya 1991 Vol 08 Ank 01 02

Author(s): Pravinchandra C Parikh, Bhartiben Shelat
Publisher: Bholabhai Jeshingbhai Adhyayan Sanshodhan Vidyabhavan

Page 49

iv. If it be said that the absence of pain though not cognised can be mokşa like the
absence of pain at the time of dreamless sleep. It is not logical since there is no valid means of knowledge (pramāna) to prove the absence of cognition at the time of dreamless sleep. As everything is known by cognition by which absence of cognition will be cognised ? If it is through cognition itself, then, the absence of all cognitions cannot be said. The person in dreamless sleep also cannot cognise the absence of all cognitions by inference. Moreover, since one has the rememberance of pleasure which is evidently clear from his statement i.e. "I slept soundly", we, therefore, prove that the person of dreamless sleep has cognition of pleasure. Hence it is the experience of pleasure one has in the state of
dreamless sleep and not mere absence of pain. Hence it is not reasonable.16 V. If it be said that the statement-I slept soundly-has the implication-I slept free
from pain-after inferring the absence of the experience of pain, as evidenced by the absence of the rememberance of pain, it is not sound. Because it is inconstant with respect to the establishment of remembrance and there is no refutation of the remembrance of the experience of pleasure. But at the time of dreamless sleep, the supreme bliss is mainfested, but not the absence of pain. Thus the final release being devoid of the cognition of pleasure cannot intelligibly be the human goal. If it be so, there cannot be any activity of intelligent persons. Because it is like the unconscious state. It is like the annihilation of one's own
self also.17 Vi. Further, the complete absence of the cognition of a thing even though existing
by itself is not practically different from non-existence (abhäva). Persons applicated with very serious diseases endeavour to put an end to their lives. It cannot be said that their endeavour is to put an ont to the body, for persons who are oblivious of the fact that there is a self other than the body endeavour with this consciousness that they are putting an end to their selves. Those person bearing their bodies full of pain endeavour so since their pleasures have been annihilated entirely an account of the increasing diseases. As the worldly people, will make actions to enjoy various kinds of pleasures both mundane and supermundane, they will not work for that kind of mokşa which is in the form
of the extermination of all pleasures.18 VII. According to Nitisastra, it is not proper to endeavour merely to remove pains.
It is better to accept that pleasure which is full of pains. No one who knows all the categories varily endeavours to achieve delusion. It is established, therefore, that the doctrine of liberation (mokşa) which is in the form of the annihilation of all the special qualities like cognition etc., does not stand to reason. 19
IV From Anandabodha's refutation of the Nyaya doctrine of mokşa.it is easily intelligible that the Naiyāyikas consider mokşa as a state where self exists in its pure Anandabodha's Criticism of Nyāya View of Mokşa]
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