________________
92
Review
* Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara. The first and second parts deal with class.
ification of categories and theory of cognition (i.e. four pramāņas) respectively. Third part treats the concept of proof such as doubt, the objective, established teret, member, the fallacy of the hetu, disputation and ascertainment. Part fourth deals with the technique of refutation - discussion, rejoinder, cavil, quibble, legitimate objection and deficiency. Doctrines of other philosophers are also discussed in the same part. In the fifth and sixth the author has disscussed the object of cognition-self, Buddhi, body etc. and source of samsāra and liberation, respectively. The seventh part is reflections on the Nyāya philosophy which is a critical estimate of Nyāya philosophy.
The main aim of this work of the learned author is a sincere attempt to remove misunderstanding of some of the western scholars who hold the view that India has no philosophy in real sense. If western philosophy is 'concerned first, last, and all time with arguments' then undoubtedly Nyāya system must be treated as philosophy. The first category viz. Pra. māņa or the valid means of knowledge, clearly brings out the predominently logical and epistemologyical character of the Nyāya system. The Nyāya system is completely based on argumentation and reasoning.
The author rightly pointed out that the problems like those of knowledge, certainty, meaning of words or inductive proof, which have figured prominently in modern western philosophy, were examined with remarkable skill and rigour, even though the Indian philosophers had none of the advantages of sophisticated techniques which a modern philosopher has at his command (Introduction). The author is very successful in his attempt to prove that Nyāya philosophy is mainly based on sound empirical foundation and it is devoid of four characteristics of mystical philosophy, hence, the allegation that indian philosophy is based on intuition rather than reason cannot be said to hold good in any strict sense (P.479). Nyā. yaphilosophy is undoubtedly an empirical school and it can be conparable to modern schools of empirical thought in western philosophy. In this direction he has compared the certain views of Naiyāikas with the western Logicians like J.S. Mill and Karl Popper (P. 487, 509). In the opinion of the author Gautama was an Indian version of Mill in a scriptural and social environment (P.478).
The author, in his critical evaluation pointed out ceretain weak points of Nyāya philosophy which are really challanging problems for research scholars in this field. Naiyāyika, though an empiricist dependents on the principle of authority (aptavākya) in explaning the incidents in the career of the atman and its destiny, which cannot be reconciled with an empiric
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
