Jaina Psychology

Author(s): Mohanlal Mehta
Publisher: Sohanlal Jain Dharm Pracharak Samiti Amrutsar

Page 52

CONSCIOUSNESS AND COGNITION
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childhood self; as (2) complex-I am a perceiving, remembering, feeling, willing self; as (3) a unique, an irreplacable self-I am closely like father, brother or friend, but I am, after all, only myself; there is only one of me. I experience myself (4) as related to (or conscious of) objects either personal or impersonal." According to Calkins, the self is consciously related to the objects it experiences, in various ways. It takes a receptive attitude towards an object in observing it, but a dominating attitude in managing it; it has the attitude of liking certain objects but of disliking others. To speak of pleasantness and unpleasantness as impersonal scattered conscious states is as absurd as to speak of them as unrelated to objects, for the real datum is the self being pleased or displeased by an object. Among the objects of the self other selves are not less important. The self is essentially a social being. That is why only a self-psychology can provide the basis for a genuine social psychology. William Stern offered more or less the same truth in the form of personalistic psychology, just a few years after the self-psychology of Calkin's made its appearance. This account is an evident indication of the importance of the problem of self or soul in the field of psychology.
The Jaina philosophers have advanced various arguments to prove the existence of soul. In their opinion, consciousness is the essence of the soul. Every living being from the lowest to the highest possesses consciousness. The principle of consciousness is not a material substance but an immaterial entity separate from and independent of the body as well as the brain.
In the Viseṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, there is a long discussion between Lord Mahāvīra and Indrabhuti on the problem of the existence of soul as an independent principle of consciousness. Lord Mahāvira in the opening presents the views of those opponents who do not believe in an independent existence of soul. "O Indrabhūti! You have a doubt about the existence of soul, since it is not directly perceived by the senses as is the case with a jar. And so you argue that whatever is imperceptible does not exist in the world, e.g., a flower in the sky"."
1 Contemporary Schools of Psychology, p. 243.
2 Jive tuha saṁdeho paccakkham jam na ghippai ghado vva. Accamta paccakkham ca natthi loe khapuppham va. Viseṣāvasyaka-bhāṣya, 1549.