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JAINA PSYCHOLOGY
than the knowledge of any other person in determining the nature of things. In fact, there is no such thing as his own knowledge, all knowledges being equally foreign to him. An explanation may be offered by the vaiseșika: Knowledge is absolutely distinct from the soul but it is connected with it by inherent relationship (samavāyasambandha) and hence, the knowledge of Mr. Caitra is not in the same position with respect to him as the knowledge of Mr. Maitra, for the former is connected with him by inherence, while the latter is not so. But this explanation can be easily turned aside. According to the Vaišeşika, the category of inherence is one, eternal, and allpervasive, therefore, it is impossible that the knowledge should reside in Caitra and not in Maitra; and since the souls are also allpervasive according to the view of this school, the knowledge that takes place in one soul must take place in all the souls as well, Consequently, any knowledge that Caitra has acquired would belong to Maitra also.
Granted it is possible for a particular knowledge to be connected with a particular soul by inherent relationship. But a question still remains to be answered. By what relation is the inherence connected with the knowledge and the soul? If the answer is that it is connected by another inherence, that would mean an unending series of inherent relationships and it will lead to an infinite regress. If the answer is in the form of 'itself', why should not the knowledge and the soul be connected of themselves without requiring an inherent relationship to accomplish the connection?
The opponent again argues that the soul is no doubt conscious, but that is not without a cause but is owing to consciousness to reside by inherent relationship in the soul as is shown by actual experience. The counter argument advanced by the Jaina is as under: If you are prepared to accept the evidence of experience, you must admit that the soul is essentially of the nature of consciousness (upayogātmaka). Nobody is aware of being first unconscious, and afterwards becoming conscious in consequence of the connection with consciousness. On the contrary, he is always aware of himself as the knower which implies the unity of the soul and consciousness.
It may be further held that the consciousness 'I have the knowledge' would prove a distinction between the knowledge and the
i Samavāyasyarkatvānnityatvādvyāpakatväcca.
