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CONCLUSION AND RECAPITULATION
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is devoid of form. The substance possessing material shape cannot be the cause of immaterial qualities. Hence, the body cannot be the source of cognition. It is the self which is the cause of all conscious activities. Consciousness is the very essence of self and not an adventitious quality, since the very existence of self is dependent upon consciousness. APPREHENSION AND COMPREHENSION
As regards indeterminate cognition, i.e., apprehension, the Indian schools of psychology hold slightly different opinions. The Buddhists hold that indeterminate cognition apprehends only the unique momentary thing-in-itself shorn of all relations. The Sankhya holds that indeterminate cognition is purely presentative in character. It is free from all associations of name, class, etc. The Vaišeşika maintains that indeterminate cognition is nothing but an immediate apprehension of the mere form of an object that arises just after the contact of the object with a sense-organ. The Naiyāyika also upholds the same view. The Bhāțța maintains that just after peripheral stimulation there arises an undefined and indeterminate knowledge. It is pure and simple, just like the simple apprehension of a baby. The Prābhākara says that indeterminate cognition is not the apprehension of mere individual object which is the substratum of its generic and specific qualities, but it also cognises the general and particular qualities of the object without comprehending their distinction. The Sankarite holds that indeterminate cognition does not cognise any qualification. It apprehends merely the unqualified 'Being'. The Rāmānujite maintains that indeterminate cognition apprehends an object attributed by some qualities and not devoid of all qualifications. Regarding the nature of indeterminate cognition (darśana), the Jaina thinkers can be classified into three blocs. Some hold that the introspection of the self is of the nature of apprehension, i.e., indeterminate cognition (darśana), whereas the observation of an external object falls under the category of comprehension, i.e., determinate cognition (jñāna). Both of them cognise their objects with both generic and specific qualities. The distinction of the two is that apprehension is purely introspective in character, while comprehension is observational in nature. Vīrasena, Brahmadeva, etc., are the advocates of this view. Some others believe that apprehension is the knowledge of the generic characters of an
