Jaina Psychology

Author(s): Mohanlal Mehta
Publisher: Sohanlal Jain Dharm Pracharak Samiti Amrutsar

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JAINA PSYCHOLOGY
point. The substance cannot exist absolutely independent of its qualities and the qualities have no existence entirely independent of their substance. If the qualities are experienced, the experience of the substance is natural. The experience of the qualities of the self is evident. Because these qualities cannot have an absolutely independent existence, hence, the existence of the soul to which all these qualities belong, is obvious.
It may be that the opponent admits that there is a substance which is the substratum of the qualities like cognition, affection, etc., but he may refuse to believe that this substance is something else than the body. That is to say, he looks upon the body itself as the substance in question, because the qualities are experienced in the body only. The argument runs like this: Cognition etc., are the qualities of the body, because they are observed there and there only like other attributes of the body, such as its whiteness, thinness, etc.
The counter argument is: The qualities like knowledge etc., cannot belong to the material body, for the body has a form as is the case with a pitcher. The qualities of a substance having form must be with form. Knowledge etc., are bereft of form, therefore, the substance that possesses these qualities, too, must be formless, and hence, it cannot be the body which is with form. Thus, the substance which is formless is nothing but the self.
Secondly, as some other writers argue, sometimes it is seen that the qualities such as sensation, perception, memory, etc., are absent even when the body is present as in sound sleep, death, etc. It indicates that cognition etc., cannot be attributed to the body but to a distinct substance, i.e., the soul.
Thirdly, the body cannot be the cause of knowledge, because it is composed of material elements that are bereft of consciousness. The effect must exist in the cause implicitly. Unless it is so, a particular effect cannot be ascribed to a particular cause. If the material elements do not possess consciousness as one of their qualities, how is it that the body becomes conscious? If consciousness is absent in each of the material elements, it would necessarily be
1 ñanan na sariyagunam sati śarire nivartamănatvāt.
Prameya-kamala-mārttaņda, p. 114.