Jaina Psychology

Author(s): Mohanlal Mehta
Publisher: Sohanlal Jain Dharm Pracharak Samiti Amrutsar

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occurrence persists in maintaining that apprehension arises first and comprehension afterwards, then with the same force of argument, the opponent may hold that comprehension appears first and apprehension afterwards. Besides, why should we admit succession at all when the removal of the obstruction is simultaneous? To refute the position of the advocates of simultaneity, Siddhasena remarks that even the view of the simultaneous occurrence is not logical, since two conscious activities cannot occur simultaneously. He further observes: 'If the omniscient knows all in one instant, he must continue to know all for ever, or otherwise, he does not know all'.1 If it is admitted that the omniscient cognises all the modes of all the objects at one and the same time, it must be admitted that it is so at all times, otherwise he is not omniscient. Therefore, Siddhasena concludes that the apprehension and comprehension of the omniscient arise simultaneously, last for ever, and remain identical. This interpretation of the controversial problem of the occurrence of apprehension and comprehension in the omniscient does not go against the Scriptures. A doctrine that holds that there is an interval of one moment between the occurrence of apprehension and comprehension should not be accepted as a real Jaina doctrine, and is to be understood as the position of the non-Jainas. A perfect person apprehends and comprehends directly the whole of the universe in its generic and specific forms. His conscious activity as the cognition of generic features is apprehension and the same conscious activity as the cognition of specific features is comprehension." Hence, it is not illogical to believe in the identity of apprehension (darśana) and comprehension (jñāna) of the omniscient. This finishes our discussion of the position of Siddhasena as regards the occurrence of apprehension and comprehension in perfect personalities. We have already stated that all the Jaina thinkers are unanimous with respect to the problem of the temporal relation between apprehension and comprehension in the case of imperfect beings. All of them believe in the successive occurrence of the two. In other words, two
CONSCIOUSNESS AND COGNITION
1 Jai savvam sāyāram jāņai ekkasamaena savvaṇu.
Jujjai saya vi evam ahava savvam na yāņai.
Ibid., II, 10.
2 Ibid., II. 31.
3 Ibid., II, 30.