Jaina Philosophy Historical Outline

Author(s): Narendra Nath Bhattacharya
Publisher: Munshiram Manoharlal Publisher's Pvt Ltd New Delhi

Page 122

The Sophisticated Stage 101
a commentary on Haribhadra's Saddarśanasamuccaya, in famous for its polemic against the doctrine of God, especially against the NyāyaVaiseșika arguments. Gunaratna himself was a very sophisticated logician of the fifteenth century who was aware of the ways and means in which the Nyāya-Vaišeşikas themselves had wanted to defend their inference of God from the typical charges brought against it. Before proceeding to refute the Nyāya-Vaišeșika inference of God, Gunaratna showed how these philosophers would have themselves answered the common criticisms with which they were confronted. Guņaratna's own philosophical style is terse and technical. My esteemed friend Prof. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya has given a nice exposition of his arguments which is also difficult to follow by the general readers who have not sufficient training in the methods of Indian logic. Hence I prefer to give below his discussion in a somewhat explanatory form.
Against the claim of the atheists that God is unreal, the NyāyaVaiśeşikas argue that the existence of God can definitely be proved by an instrument of valid knowledge, viz. inference. The inference is as follows. Earth, etc., are caused by an intellegent agent, because these are of the nature of being effects, as for instance the jar. They claim that the probans with which an intelligent cause of the world is sought is free from all the fallacies recognised in Indian logic. (i) This probans can not be an unproved one (asiddha). It is not like 'the sky-lotus is fragrant because it has lotusness in it like natural lotus. Here the middle has a locus standi. It can be proved that the earth etc. are actually of the nature of being effects because they are found to be composed in parts, not like the non-existent sky-lotus. The second inference, composed in parts, proves the validity of the main inference, earth etc., are of the nature of being effects, and there is a universal concomitance between the two, which may be exem fied by the jar. (ii) The probans for the inference of an intelligent cause of earth etc., is also free from the Viruddha or the fallacy of co dictory middle. This fallacy occurs when the middle term, ins proving the existence of the major in the minor, proves its non-existence therein; in other words, when it disproves the very proposition which it is meant to prove. If one argues, 'sound is eternal because it is produced,' we have this fallacy, because the middle term produced
ITRD, 115ff. 'IA ,pp. 167-201.