Jaina Philosophy Historical Outline

Author(s): Narendra Nath Bhattacharya
Publisher: Munshiram Manoharlal Publisher's Pvt Ltd New Delhi

Page 135

114 Jain Philosophy in Historical Outline the sources of indirect knowledge are concerned. Regarding the Pratyakşa he goes another step further to invite perception. The division of direct knowledge into Paramärthika and Vyavahārika was probably the first attempt to shift the area of perception from the category of Parokșa to that of Pratyakşa. Regarding perception in the field of practical (vyavahärika) direct knowledge, Deva Sūri makes a two fold classification: Knowledge that arises through sense-organs (indriya-nibandhana) and that arises through the mind (anindriyanibandhana). Each of these passes through four stages--avagraha or distinction, ihā or enquiry, avāya or identification and dhāraņā or conception.
Anumăna or knowledge derived from inference is the most important aspect of logic. In the earlier Jain texts like the Sthānanga, the word hetu is used in the sense of anumāna, but in later works both of the terms have received their distinctive significance. Umāsvāti was the first important writer to use the term anumăna to denote logical inference. According to Siddhasena Divākara, inference or anumāna is the correct knowledge of the major term (sādhya) derived through the middle term (hetu or linga) which is inseparably connected with it. Inference is of two kinds, Svärtha and Parārtha. The first is deduced in one's own mind after having made repeated observations (cf. the concomitance of fire and smoke observed in kitchen extended to that of fire-in-general and smoke-in-general) while the second is its communication to others through words. Without inseparable connection or invariable concomitance (vyāpti), the constant accompaniment of the middle term by the major term, inference is impossible. This has been maintained by Māņikya Nandi, Deva Sūri and all other Jain logicians.
Hetu or reason, which serves the most important purpose as the middle term in the formation of syllogism, as we have remarked above, did not acquire a definite significance in the earlier stages of the development of Jain thought. In the Dasavaikālika-Niryukti, attributed to Bhadrabāhu, has been elaborated a syllogism, consisting of ten parts (daśāvayava-vākya), in which the term hetu has been used exclusively in the sense of reason. The ten parts are as follows: pratijñā (proposition), pratijñā-vibhakti (limitation of the proposition), hetu (reason), hetu-vibhakti (limitation of the reason), vipakşa (counterproposition), vipakşa-pratiședha (opposition to the counter proposi
1TTDS, I, 12.