Jaina Philosophy Historical Outline

Author(s): Narendra Nath Bhattacharya
Publisher: Munshiram Manoharlal Publisher's Pvt Ltd New Delhi

Page 134

The Sophisticated Stage 113 logicians did. In Māņikya Nandi's Parikṣāmukha-sūtra, objects of valid knowledge have been classified into general (sāmānya) and particular (viseṣa). The general is of two kinds, homogeneous (tiryak) and heterogeneous (ūrdhvatā). Likewise the particular is of two kinds, relating to things and relating to action. Siddhasena divides direct knowledge (Pratyakṣa) into two categories: practical (vyavahārika) which is the knowledge acquired by the soul through five senses and the mind and transcendental (paramārthika) which is the infinite knowledge that comes from the perfect enlightenment of soul. According to Deva Sūri, this knowledge should come exclusively from the illumination of soul and should be opposed to the three kinds of superimposition (samāropa)-inversion (viparyaya), doubt (samsaya) and uncertainty (anadhyavasaya). So long as this knowledge remains in the stage of avadhi and manaḥparyaya it is defective (vikala), but when it is free from all faults and obstructions it becomes perfect (sakala). In Jain logic the terms Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa are also applied to the understanding of Pramana or the means of valid knowledge, as we shall see below.
The term Pramāņa is generally understood as the means of valid knowledge which is also classified under the two traditional categories Pratyakṣa (direct) and Parokşa (indirect). The latter includes, according to Umasvati, inference (anumana), comparison (upamāna), verbal testimony (agama), presumption (arthapatti), probability (sambhava) and non-existence (abhāva). It is interesting to note that in the earlier stages of the development of Jain logic, the terms Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa were used in senses quite opposite to those in which they were used in Brahmanical, Buddhist and later Jain logic. Siddhasena Divakara divides the sources of indirect valid knowledge (parokṣa) into inference (anumāna) and verbal testimony (śabda). We have seen that the earlier Jain conception of Pratyakṣa had practically no bearing on its traditional sense which is suggestive of direct perception. An incipient conception of Pratyakṣa as direct perception is found in Manikya Nandi's work in which Pramāņa or means of valid knowledge is classified into direct which rises through senses, etc. and indirect consisting of recollection (smrti), recognition (pratyabhijñā), argumentation (tarka or uha) inference (anumāna) and scripture (agama). Deva Suri also maintains this calssification so far as
Jcf. Gunaratna's commentary on SDSC, 55. 2TTDS, I, 12.