Jaina Philosophy Historical Outline

Author(s): Narendra Nath Bhattacharya
Publisher: Munshiram Manoharlal Publisher's Pvt Ltd New Delhi

Page 208

A Comparative Study 187 pudgala, i.e. a particular kind of physical substance (iada-dravyavišeşa). Over and above the five usual sense organs, a sixth one of the form of an internal sense-organ has been accepted by all the systems under the name manas. According to the Samkhya, manas is not atomic, but it is quite small in size, born out of the evolution of material Praksti. The Jains also hold that mind is a material entity (pudgalika) originating from an extremely subtle physical substance called manovargaņā. Like body it undergoes change every moment. They also have a conception of bhāva-manas which is of the nature of cognitive potency and cognition, and this comes out of a conscious substance (cetana-dravya-janya). The Jains, however, criticise the Sāņkhya view that just as a mirror reflects the light of a lamp and thereby manifests other things, so the material principle of intellect, being transparent and bright, reflects the consciousness of the self and illuminates or cognises the objects of knowledge. In refuting some of the points of the Sāņkhya theory of perception, to which the Jains do not like to subscribe, they have followed similar arguments laid down by the Nyāya school. With regard to the classification of ipference, the Sāmkhya adopts the Nyāya view, although in a slightly different form. Also as regards the logical forms of inference, the Sāmkhya admit, like the Naiyāyikas, that the five-membered syllogism is the most convincing form of inferential proof. In the Jain tradition, the first mention of the three types of inference found in the Anuyogadārāi and the words by which the three types are here designated are literally the same as in the Nyāya system. We have elsewhere the occasion to deal elaborately with the problems of Jain syllogisms and their bearing on the Nyāya system.
The Jain conception of Mokșa and the Buddhist conception of Nirvāņa appear to have derived their main impulses from the Sāmkhya idea of liberation. World is full of suffering and to get rid of (mukți) all suffering is the summum bonum of our life (apavarga or mukți). These two Sāmkhya ideas must have contributed something to the development of the corresponding Buddhist and Jain ideas. In the Sâmkhya the cause of suffering is attributed to ignorance, and hence freedom from suffering is to be attained through right knowledge of reality, which comes from the knowledge of distinction (vivekajñāna)
1 Anu, p. 212 A. *See Part III, Sec. 3.