Jaina Philosophy Historical Outline

Author(s): Narendra Nath Bhattacharya
Publisher: Munshiram Manoharlal Publisher's Pvt Ltd New Delhi

Page 214

A Comparative Study 193 Jains, and the adherents of most other schools, the Mimãmsakas admit the validity of determinate and indeterminate perception. But the Mimāmsakas do not share with the Jains the idea of transcendental perception. So far as the non-perceptual sources of knowledge are concerned, besides inference and testimony, they admit three other sources--comparison (upamāna), postulation (arthāpatti) and non-perception (anupalabdhi)--a position somewhat different from the Jain standpoint. The Mīmāmsakas depend on the validity of senseperception. They believe in the reality of the perceived world and of other objects. Here we find their agreement with the Jains. The Mimāņsakas, in accordance with their belief in the reality of the world, reject the Buddhist theories of viodness and momentariness, as well as the Advaita Vedānta theory of the unreality of the phenomenal world. The souls, according to the Mimāṁsā, are permanent eternal substances, and so also are the material elements by the combination of which the earth is made. The soul has the capacity for consciousness, but it is not the essence of soul. This is a point on which the Mimāmsakas differ from the Jains. The law of Karma guides the formation of objects. The soul survives death to be able to reap the consequences of its Karma. Repeated births are caused by Karma. It is only by disinterested performance of duties and by the knowledge of the self that the Karmas accumulated in the past are gradually worn out. Being free from all Karma-ties liberation is achieved. Conceptually these ideas about liberation are not basically different from those of the Jains.
On the question of transcendental perception, as we have remarked above, the Mimāmsā differs significantly from Jainism and other philosophical systems. While dealing with the relation between Jainism and Yoga we have seen that there developed a tendency among the adherents of different systems to defend their philosophies on the strength of the experience resulting from Yogic practices. Even Buddhist logicians like Dinnāga, Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara insisted on Yogic perception. Such claims were also put forward by representatives of other philosophies. But the Mimāmsakas deny such claim for Yogic experience or transcendental perception and hold that the so-called unique experience yielded by Yoga is nothing but a subjective
and as such quite useless in determining the validity of any philosophical view. Their sole insistence upon pure empirical perception and fiat denial of transcendental perception have been criticised by the Jain logicians like Akalanka, Abhayadēva, Hemacandra, etc.