Jaina Philosophy Historical Outline

Author(s): Narendra Nath Bhattacharya
Publisher: Munshiram Manoharlal Publisher's Pvt Ltd New Delhi

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112 Jain Philosophy in Historical Outline
correct nomenclature. It is of three kinds, viz. Samprāta, the suitable, Samabhirūdha, the subtle, and Evambhūta, the such-like.1 In Siddhsena's Nyāyāvatāra this classification is maintained while in Deva Sūri's Pramāņa-nayatattvalokālankāra’ the fallacies (ābhāsas) arising out of the misapplication of each of these several kinds of Naya are elaborately discussed with the help of examples. The basis of the Jain conception of Naya is the fact that whatever judgement we pass in daily life about any object is true only in reference to the standpoint occupied and the aspect of the object considered, and in view of this the Jains insist that every Naya should be qualified by some words like 'somehow' (syäd), expressing conditionality.
Next comes the question of knowledge (Jñāna, Nāna). In the Sthānanga Sūtra, 3 knowledge is divided into Pratyakșa (direct) and Parokşa (indirect). Pratyakșa again is subdivided into Kevala-jñāna (entire knowledge) and Akevala-jñāna (defective knowledge). The Akevala-jñāna is subdivided into avadhi and manaḥ-paryāya. The Parokşa-jñāna is subdivided into abhinibodha (mati) and śruti. This classification is also found in the Nandi-sūtra. In Umāsvāti's Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra Parokşa or indirect knowledge is defined as that which is acquired by the soul through external agencies, while Pratyakşa or direct knowledge as that which is acquired without the intervention of external agencies. Parokșa includes mati,5 or of existing things acquired through the senses and the mind, and śruti, 6 or knowledge of things, of past, present and future, acquired through reasoning and study. Pratyakṣa includes avadhi, i.e. knowledge of things beyond the range of perception, manaḥparyāya, i.e. knowledge derived from reading the thoughts of others and Kevala,? i.e. knowledge which is unobstructed, unconditional and absolute, which is to be attained by Yoga or concentration. These are called Pratyakṣa or direct because these are acquired not through the medium of senses. Early Jain writers like Umāsvāti confined Pratyakṣa only to the soul's immediate knowledge without any medium. Later writers like Hemacandra extended it to ordinary sense perception as well, as most other Indian
1 For illustrations see Vidyabhusana, HIL, pp. 170-71. *YVS.
Chapter 6. "Vidyabhusana HIL, p. 161. STTDS, I, 13-14. Sibid, I, 20. 'ibid, 1,9,12, 21-29.