Jaina Philosophy Historical Outline

Author(s): Narendra Nath Bhattacharya
Publisher: Munshiram Manoharlal Publisher's Pvt Ltd New Delhi

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160 Jain Philosophy in Historical Outline
Theory of Knowledge
Jainism admits five kinds of knowledge: (1) Mati or ordinary congition obtained by means of sense-perception; (2) Śruti or testimony derived from scriptures, teachings, etc.; (3) Avadhi or knowledge by clairvoyance; (4) Manaḥparyaya or telepathic knowledge of other's minds; and (5) Kevala or perfect knowledge which is independent of senses. Such a classification is evedently due to dogmatic influence. The fourth and fifth kinds are characterised as pratyakṣa or direct knowledge which cannot be wrong, while the first two or three are parokṣa or indirect knowledge and hence liable to error. We have already noticed that the earlier Jain conception of parokṣa and pratyakṣa was just the reverse of the traditional Indian conception. The two manifestations of consciousness are perception (darśana) and intelligence (jñāna). In the former we have simple apprehension, perception of the generalities (sāmānya) of things, while in the latter we have conceptual knowledge. In this case relation between knowledge and object of knowledge is very intimate. The Jains believe that external objects exist and they are knowable. Cognition is a generated phenomenon which is capable of being perceived and inferred. It is self revelatory. Knowledge of a thing as it is in itself is Pramāņa and knowledge of a thing in its relation is naya. In conformity with the logical tradition of India, the Jains treat Pramāņa both as valid cognition and as instrument of valid cognition. It is the right determination of object. The effect of a Pramāņa is partly distinct and partly non-distinct. According to Siddhasena and Samantabhadra, the immediate effect of a Pramāņa is removal of ignorance but the remote effect should possibly be the decision to accept or reject or ignore the object. The doctrine or nayas or standpoints, which is divided into seven categories, is a peculiar feature of Jain logic. The Nayas are also distinguished into dravyārthika from the viewpoint of substance and paryāyārthika from that of modification or condition. The most important use of these standpoints is of course Syādvāda or Saptabhangi, the seven different ways of judgements which hold that we cannot affirm or deny absolutely of any object. Accordingly, reality is viewed not as of a permanent and unalterable nature. Its character can consist only with relative or conditional predication.
In the earlier Jain classification, as we have seen above, knowledge is divided into Mati, Śruti, etc. Although it was said that Matijñāna should come under indriya-pratyakṣa or sense-perception and śrutajñāna under verbal testimony, the Jain authors were constantly faced