Jaina Philosophy Historical Outline

Author(s): Narendra Nath Bhattacharya
Publisher: Munshiram Manoharlal Publisher's Pvt Ltd New Delhi

Page 182

The Sophisticated Stage 161
with the question as to whether anumāna (inference), upamāna (analogy), arthāpatti (implication), etc. which the other traditions accept as pramāņa should be regarded as valid or not. It was Umāsvāti who for the first time clearly suggested that anumāna etc., which were pramānas according to the other traditions, should fall under the category of Parokya or non-perceptual pramāņa. It was accepted also by Pujyapāda. The author of the Nandisūtra made a two fold classification of knowledge into Pratyakșa and Parokşa, the former being subdivided into two types, one covering the transcendental perception and the other the sense-perception. The author of the Nyāyāvatāra brought the whole problem in close relation to the logical tradition followed by the non-Jain thinkers and made a thorough analysis of inferential knowledge according to the Jain way of looking at things. The final, definite and clear-cut classification is, however, found in the Laghiyastrayaof Akalanka who maintains that parokşa-pramāņa consists of five sub-species--anumāna or inference, pratyabhijñā or recognition, smaraņa or memory, tarka or knowledge of invariable concomitance and āgama or verbal testimony.
There are various views as to the technique of presenting an inference or anumāna. According to the Buddhist logicians, two steps, viz. hetu and dụștānta, are sufficient. The Sāmkhya and Mīmāmsā are for three or four steps while the Naiyāyikas admit the necessity of five steps. The Jains are of the view that the number of steps should not be fixed and that they may be more or less according to their requirements. Some of them may require two steps, viz. pratijñā and hetu, some three, viz. pratijñā, hetu and drstānta, some four, viz. pratijñā, hetu, drsțānta and upanaya, and some five, viz. pratijñā, hetu, drsțānta, upanaya and naigamana. Regarding the aspects of the nature of a probans, the types of a probans, pseudoprobans, nature of the terms, the fallacies and other allied problems of inference, the Jain logicians hold different views from others and they have differences within themselves. The Jains hold that pratyabhijñā or recognition is a subspecies of matijñāna and an independent pramaņa Likewise smarana or memory ought to be treated as pramāņa because it is true of facts. In the section on Psychology we shall have the occasion to deal with all these more elaborately. Akalanka
1 Taltvārthabhåşya, I. 12; Sarvārthasiddhi, I, 12.
Nandi, III. SIII. 1.