Jaina Philosophy Historical Outline

Author(s): Narendra Nath Bhattacharya
Publisher: Munshiram Manoharlal Publisher's Pvt Ltd New Delhi

Page 138

The Sophisticated Stage 117 the terms Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa, used in connection with the theories and sources of knowledge, stood in the earlier Jain writtings for principles quite opposite to those denoted by the said terms in later Jain writings and also in other systems of Indian logic. We have also the occasion to refer to the syllogism of ten parts (daśāvayava-vākya), formulated by Bhadrabahu and others, which was quite different in character from the fivefold syllogism which was later accepted universally. In fact the tradition of this earlier tenfold syllogism was upheld for a long time which is indicated in the writings of Candraprabha Sūri and Ratnaprabha Sūri who had characterised the syllogism of ten parts as the best (uttama), of five parts as the mediocre (madhyama) and of two parts as the worst (jaghanya). In the case of fallacies also the earlier Jain logicians mainly insisted upon those of Naya (nayābhāsa) which were concerned with the Naigama, Samgraha, Vyavahāra. Ṛju-sūtra and Sabda moods of statements. But the most important viewpoint by which the earlier stage of Jain logic was characterised is known as Syadvāda or the doctrine of conditional proposition. The word Syad means may be which signifies that everything of the universe can be looked at from many points of view, and that each viewpoint yields a different conclusion (anekānta). Every proposition is therefore conditional, and there is nothing called absolute affirmation or absolute negation. The Jains illustrate this position by means of the story of a number of blind people examining an elephant and arriving at varying conclusions regarding its form while in truth each observer gets at only a part of it.
In the Sūtrakṛtānga-niryukti,' attributed to Bhadrabahu, it is for the first time that we come across this Syadvāda or Saptabhangi-naya presented in a completely theoretical set up. It is set forth as follows: (1) may be, it is, (2) may be, it is not, (3) may be, it is and it is not, (4) may be, it is indescribable, (5) may be, it is and yet is indescribable, (6) may be, it is not, and it is also indescribable, and (7) may be it is and it is not, and it is also indescribable.2 In defence of this sevenfold paralogism, Siddhasena Divakara says that perfect knowledge of things can be obtained only by taking into consideration all the possible standpoints. Thus a thing may be, may not be, both may or may not be, etc., if we take it from one or other standpoint. Through the employment only of the manysided Nayas may be obtained the
11, 12.
SDS, III; Cowell's tr. p. 55.