Jaina Philosophy Historical Outline

Author(s): Narendra Nath Bhattacharya
Publisher: Munshiram Manoharlal Publisher's Pvt Ltd New Delhi

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The Sophisticated Stage 115
tion), drsțānta (example), aśankā (validity of the example), ăsarkāpratiședha (meeting of the question) and nigamana (conclusion). Later Jain logicians, however, consider hetu exclusively as the middle term. In a proposition the subject is the minor term (paksa) and the predicate, the major term (sadhya). The middle term or hetu is defined as that which cannot occur otherwise than in connection with the major term. Thus in the proposition, 'the hill (minor term) is full of fire (major term), because it is full of smoke,' smoke is the middle term which cannot arise from any other thing than fire which is the major term. This middle term or reason (hetu) is divided by the Jain logicians as perceptible (upalabdhi) and imperceptible (anupalabdhi). Each of these again may occur in the form of affirmation (vidhi) or negation (pratişedha). The semblance of reason or fallacy of this hetu or middle term (hetvābhāsa) arises from doubt, misconception or nonconception about it. It is of three kinds: (1) The unproved (asiddha): “This is fragrant, because it is a sky-lotus,' Here the middle-term, the sky-lotus, is unreal. (2) The contradictory (viruddha): 'This is fiery, because it is a body of water,' Here the reason alleged is opposed to what is to be established. (3) The uncertain (anaikāntika): 'Sound is eternal, because it is always audible.' Here the middle term is uncertain because audibility may or may not be a proof of eternity.
Ve have said that without an inseperable connection or invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between the major and the middle term the formation of any syllogism is impossible. If the middle term and the major term exist simultaneously, the former is called vyäpya, pervaded or contained, and the latter, vyāpaka, pervader or container. But if the middle term follows the major term, the former is called (kārya) and the latter cause (kārana). The major term is called sādhya or that which is to be proved, and the middle is called sādhana or that by which it is to be proved. Sometimes the major term is called dharma or predicate and the middle (linga) or sign. The minor term is called pakşa, the place in which the major term abides. In an inference the minor term must be explicitly set forth, otherwise the reasoning may be misunderstood. The fallacy of the minor term (pakşābhāsa) arises when one attributes to it as a proved fact what is yet to be proved. The middle term and the major term are the parts of an inference, but an example (drșțānta or udāharana) is not. Nevertheless, for the sake of explaning matters, the example (drşțānta) and even the application (upanaya) and conclusion (nigamana), are admitted as features of inference. The hill (minor) is full of fire