Jaina Philosophy Historical Outline

Author(s): Narendra Nath Bhattacharya
Publisher: Munshiram Manoharlal Publisher's Pvt Ltd New Delhi

Page 140

The Sophisticated Stage 119 of its characters belonging to other objects but absent in this. But the Jain logicians insist on the conditional or relative character of both the affirmative and the negative judgements. If we consider the example an object A, we may say that it is, but it is only in a sense, viz. as A and not also as B. Thus when we say, 'May be, it is a Jar,' it is only in the sense of its existence at a particular place and time and with a particular description. But owing to the indefinite nature of reality, what is now or here A, may become B sometime hence or elsewhere. Thus when we say 'May be, the jar is red,' here A be
being conditioned by colour and other considerations. But
t remember when we posit A, that we are not stating absolutely what the nature is of the reality underlying it. May be, A is B, and not B as well, The redness or blackness of a jar depends on perception which is also conditioned by other factors like light and darkness. May be the jar is red (if observed during the day time) and not-red (when it is observed at night). Thus every object is in one sense and is not in another sense. While the opposition between the predicates is and is not is reconciled, when they are thought of as characterising an object successively, the nature of the object becomes indescribable (avaktavya). A jar is black when raw and red when it is baked. But if one asks, what is the real colour of jar always and under all conditions, the only reply would be that the colour of the jar is indescribable. In this way we come across four forms of judgements: may be, S is P; is not P; is and is not P; is and is not P and also indescribable. Three other forms of judgement can also be obtained by combining successively each of the first three standpoints with the fourth: May be S is P and indescribable; is not P and indescribable; is and is not P and indescribable. From the viewpoints of space, time, colour, shape, ingredients and so on, an indescribable existence of a jar may be affirmed, denied, and also affirmed and denied simultaneously. There may be a jar but it is indescribable, so far as its colour and shape are concerned, owing to its being observed from a distance. It may be said to be non-existing and indescribable when observed in darkness. It may also be said to be existing, non-existing and indescribable by any one whose vision is circumscribed by eyesight, distance, light or darkness. Thus, what is emphasised in Jain logic is the relative and conditional character of the judgements. An object cannot be described at all if no distinction of standpoints and aspects is made. This does not, however, mean that the different judgements about an object are merely subjective ideas of the object. They are