Jaina Philosophy Historical Outline

Author(s): Narendra Nath Bhattacharya
Publisher: Munshiram Manoharlal Publisher's Pvt Ltd New Delhi

Page 127

106 Jain Philosophy in Historical Outline ting the world to be an effect in the special sense in which the jar is an effect, we cannot infer any disembodied intelligent cause thereof. According to Gunaratna, the Nyāya-Vaiseșikas overlook the basic difference between the two types of their supposed effects. Effects like the jar presuppose an intelligent cause but effects like the wild trees do not presuppose any such intelligent cause. Neglecting this difference between the two types of effects, the Nyāya-Vaišeșikas want us to look at all effects as belonging to the first type. This viewpoint is fallacious.
According to Gunaratna, the very logic of the Nyāya Vaiseșikas inevitably lead us to the theory that the knowledge, will, etc., of God are also to be considered as effects. But are they prepared to admit that these qualities of God, being effects, presuppose an intelligent cause in the sense in which a jar does? To suggest that God himself is the intelligent cause of his knowledge etc., it virtually amounts to the surrender of the Nyāya-Vaiseșika position itself. This means that the probans of the inference of God is 'irregular.' In order to avoid this fallacy if it is argued that the knowledge, etc. of God presuppose an intelligent cause other than God himself, such an assumption would require infinite intelligent causes of God's knowledge, will, etc. Again, what will be in the cases of such things as wild trees, plants, etc., which, inspite of being effects, are devoid of any intelligent cause, as is proved by perception? Against this if it is argued that God being intrinsically imperceptible there is no question of perceiving him as causing the wild trees etc., Gunaratna says that in order to stick of this defence it is necessary to establish the alleged imperceptibility of God, which is not possible. The same inference which seeks to establish the existence of God cannot prove also his imperceptibility. The possibility of using the same inference for this dual purpose results in the fallacy of arguing in a circle (cakrakadosa). On the other hand if it is required to be proved by another inference, it is not possible, because any proof of his imperceptibility presupposes the proof of his existence. Even admitting for the sake of argument that God is actually imperceptible, the following questions may be raised: Why does God remain imperceptible? Is it because of the absence of his body? Or, is it because of the influence of some supernatural power? Or, is it because of the universal 'imperceptibleness' possessed by him? Gunaratna claims that these are only possible explanations of the alleged imperceptibility of God, but none of these can be logically satisfactory.
Gunaratna says that for the sake of argument the controversy con