Jaina Philosophy Historical Outline

Author(s): Narendra Nath Bhattacharya
Publisher: Munshiram Manoharlal Publisher's Pvt Ltd New Delhi

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Jain Philosophy in Historical Outline
effects cannot be evidences against this oneness and eternality of God. Again, if any one argues that the proof of God is not valid because nobody ever had actually observed the production of earth, etc. by an intelligent agent as their cause, the Nyāya-Vaišeșika answer is that, it is definitely established by an instrument of valid knowledge; namely inference. Non-apprehension does not prove non-existence.
Thus having laid down and explaining the Nyāya-Vaiseșika proofs of the existence of God as pūrvapakṣa or the views of the opponent, Gunaratna goes on to refute them one after another. The NyāyaVaiseșika inference, as we have seen above, is based upon the universal concomitance between 'being effect' and 'having an intelligent cause.' Gunaratna begins with the question: What is exactly meant by the term 'being effect' by which earth, etc. have been characterised? If ‘being effect' means 'being composed of parts' and is understood in the sense of (i) the presence of the effect in the component parts, there results, according to Gunaratna, the fallacy of the irregular (savyabhicāra), because here the relation between the probans, 'being effect and the probandum 'having an intelligent cause' has not been established, the former being present in spite of the absence of the latter. The presence of the component parts also implies the presence of universal partness (jätitva, avayavitva). Gunaratna argues that in the Nyāya-Vaiseșika view, the partness presupposes the jāti in the form of jātitva or partness (indicating of generic attribute common to all class, just as manușyatva or humanity is common to all mankind and hence eternal) and, as a jāti, this partness must be admitted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeșikas themselves or something eternal and therefore uncaused. If being composed of parts is understood in the sense of (ii) being produced by the component parts, there results the fallacy of the unproved (asiddha), because here the probans which rests on the view that earth etc., are produced by the component parts in the forms of the atoms remains yet to be proved. If being composed of parts is understood in the sense of (iii) having portions, there results the fallacy of the irregular, because here the relation between the probans and the probandum has not been established. In the case of the vacuum (ākāśa), the probans, namely, 'having portions' is present, but the probandum, namely, 'having an intelligent cause' is absent because according to the Nyāya-Vaišeşikas the vacuum is eternal and hence without any cause. If being composed of parts is understood in the sense of (iv) being the object of the knowledge in the form: 'It is composed of parts,' there also results the same fallacy of the irregular.