Jaina Philosophy Historical Outline

Author(s): Narendra Nath Bhattacharya
Publisher: Munshiram Manoharlal Publisher's Pvt Ltd New Delhi

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Jain Philosophy in Historical Outline
merely assumed but not proved fact. The same also holds good in Aviddhakarna's argument. The expression “being characterised by a peculiar arrangement of their own parts” means that there exists a form of conjunction (samyoga) among their different parts and that as a result of this conjunction they become a "sumtotal of the component parts" a "whole” (avayavi). Thus the probans takes for granted the validity of the concepts of conjunction and the whole. But both of these concepts, on which stands the probans, are basically unproved, and with the help of this unproved probans the existence of God is sought to prove. This is logically fallacious. When a certain thing is definitely recognised, through affirmative and negative concomitance, as being the effect of a certain cause, the perception of that effect must prove that cause. The peculiar arrangements of parts in such diverse things as body, mountain and the like, however, is not an effect of this kind. In these cases no such peculiar arrangement of parts distinctly indicative of an intelligent maker is actually perceived. Hence an intelligent cause of all these cannot be inferred in the way in which an intelligent builder of the temple, pot, etc. is inferred. Aviddhakarna's second argument is also refuted on the same ground. The connection between the probans of this inference “being endowed with colour and other qualities" and the probandum "being controlled by an intelligent agent” is irregular, because in the cases of the yarn etc., such a connection is although present, in those of trees etc., it is clearly absent. Mere presence of colour by itself is not invariably concomitant with the probandum. Sāntarakṣita has also refuted the argument of Uddyotakara that 'the causes of the world, like the atoms etc. need a controller with superior intelligence, because their activity is intermittent' and that of Praśastamati that 'at the beginning of creation the behaviour of men must have been due to the teaching of some person and such a person could only be God,' and his final conclusions is that, things that are born consecutively cannot have God for their cause. It is impossible to prove logically that the creator of une particular thing is the same as that of another thing and hence it is not possible to establish that there is only one creator for all things. Šāntarakṣita's arguments which are by nature very technical have been elaborated, explained and illustrated by his commentator Kamalaśīla.
It is against this background that we are to understand the historical significance of Jain atheism. Besides the Syādvādamañjarī mentioned above, the Tarkarahasyadipikā of Gunaratna, which is actually