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Sanskrit Sahityakastra
V 5. सत्त्वादयः प्रमाणाभ्यां प्रत्यक्षमनुमा च ते ।
असाधारण- सामान्य विषयत्वं तयोः किल ॥
125
i) Naganatha Sastry translates the first quarter as follows: By Pramanas arise the ideas of Existence, etc. (p. 90)
ii) Tatacharya comments on the quarter thus:
प्रमाणाभ्यां सत्वादयः द्रव्य - गुणादयः पदार्थाः सिद्ध्यन्ति । मानाधीना हि मेयसिद्धिः । सत्त्वमिति वैयाकरणसंप्रदाय - वासनया द्रव्ये | पदार्थानां सत्यासस्यतुच्छत्यादीनि वा सत्वादय इत्युक्तानि ।
iii) The reading 'sattvädayah' deserves consideration. Bhamaha himself uses the word 'Sandha' further on in the same chapter twice:
सन्धादि साधनं सिद्ध्यै ( ? v. 32. C )
and सन्धाऽभ्युपगमाद्विना (v. 45. b)
Now, the Kalpalatāviveka (KLV) reads: 'Sandhadayab' in place of 'Sattvädayaḥ". This reading perfectly suits the context as would be seen from the following passage in KLV:
सन्धादय इति । प्रमाणमुला इति । तथाहि अग्निमान् पर्वत इति प्रतिज्ञायां निश्चीयते । अग्निसंबन्धस्तु तस्यानुमानात् प्रतीयत इति प्रतिशायाः प्रत्यक्षानुमानमूलाम् । रणानामनन्तरोदितेन न्यायेन प्रत्यक्षानुमानमूल्यादेतदुक्तम् । प्रतिशा हेतु दृष्टान्ताः प्रमाणमूला
पर्वतस्तावत् प्रत्यक्षेण ...... प्रतिशा हेतूदाह
इति । -
(p. 46 11, 1-16)
So with the indisputably genuine reading supplied by KLV, we may translate the verse as follows:
Pratijnä, etc., are established-proved to be correct (or otherwise) by means of the two proofs: the two proofs are Perception and Inference. The object (or sphere or area of operation) of Perception is asadharaṇa (Višesa Svalaksana) while samanya forms the object of Inference.
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The word 'adayah' in 'sandhädayah' obviously stands for Hetu and Drifânta as shown by KLV in the passage cited above.
The use of the word 'kila' suggests, according to Tatacharya, that the doctrine. of 'Pramana-vyavastha is not acceptable to Bhamaha (Kilety anangikäre 1). "According to the Buddhist view there are two different sources of knowledge: 1 Perception and 2 Inference. These two sources of knowledge have settled and clear limits (Pramanavyavastha), the one never acting in the sphere of the other. The opposite theory of the realists (the Vaiseṣikas and the Naiyayikas) receives the name of a mixture duplication theory (pramāņa-samplava), since according to that theory every object can be cognised in both ways either directly in sense-perception or indirectly in an inference. In other words, according to the Buddhist view, what is cognised by the senses is never subject to cognition by inference and what is cognised by inference can never be subject to cognition by the senses. Thus Sva-laksana (asadharana, višesa, kṣaṇa, paramartha-sat) or the only real object, the extreme particular, the thing in itself, is the province of perception, and samanya (class, species, genus, universal)
