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II. 23, 24 ) CHAPTER II
[ 89 (23) If you say that all Avagraha is Darśana and comprehending the particulars of a thing is Jñāna (knowledge) then it follows that Mati-jñāna alone is Darśana (perception.)
(24) The same must be said of all the rest of the senses as regards Darśana. But this is absurd. Now if in the case of objects of other senses, only knowledge is accepted the same must be accepted in the case of the objects of sight.
The Siddhānti agrees with this partial objector as regards identity but the Siddbānti does not agree with the illustration given by the Ekadesi. He therefore subjects the illustration to a searching analysis and in order to show his disapproval of the illustration shows to what absurdity the acceptance of the illustration will land the Ekadesi.
The Siddhānti points to the objector his absurdity. He says “If you regard the portion of Mati namely Avagraha as Darsana and regard the comprehension of particulars as Jñāna, it would follow that the case of the sight Cakşaşāvagrabā-mati will have to be regarded as sight-perception. The same will be the case as regards other senses. That is to say Avagraba Mati with regard to the sense of hearing will have to be regarded as ear-perception and Avagraba-mati with regard to the sense of smell will have to be regarded as smell-perception, But in Šāstra there is no such thing as ear-perception or smell.
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