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SANMATI-TARKA.
[ III. 16. 22
.
To this the reply given by the author is this :
It is true that a thing is referred to in various ways owing to various relations with other things. For, instance the same man is referred to as staff-holder if he has got a staff in his hand and book-holder if he has got a book in his hand. But how are you going to accouut for the different degrees of sweetness, blackness, etc.? True it is that black colour is a quality which becomes manifest by the contact with the sense of seeing but we can not deny that there is such a quality as black which is true' by itself. Otherwise we cannot account for the various degrees of blackness. It must, therefore, be accepted that along with the thing or substance the quality is also true and that both these are different as well identical with each other. . Now if an objection is raised against this by saying that if we regard Paryāyag 'or particulars as true, we shall be confronted with the difficulty of regarding that contrary particulars :reside in one and the same thing. For instance, the same thing would have both heat and cold (two diametrically opposite qualities) residing in it which is absurd. To this the author says that these contrary qualities reside in one thing no doubt but they can do so if there is difference of time, place and other factors. Sometimes the thing has got such an inherent nature that two contrary qualities may safely reside in it. There is, therefore, no difficulty in thinking that qualities are real and that sometimes diametrically opposite qualities reside in a thing.
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