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exist. Similarly a sentient thing is not a thing from the standpoint of a jar.
By having recourse to Anekānta, a man knows how to analyse things. He knows how to reconcile seeming contradictions in a thing. Thus Anekānta is a sure means to arrive at the true nature of a thing. To elucidate, this point, our author cites three illustrations, yiz. that of a thing in motion, of fire and a jar.
A thing in motion is so only in one direction at a given time. It cannot be, therefore, in motion in all directions. Naturally therefore it is not in motion considering the direction in which it is not moving. The two seemingly contradictory statements that a thing is and is not in motion are thus quite true from the explanation given above and thus these statements therefore are easily reconcilable. Though apparently it seems that motion and non-motion are contradictors things. : • Fire burns: fuel and sometimes it is also a thing that does not burn, for it can never burn the sky, the soul and other incorporeal things. It, therefore, both burns and does not burn. These seemingly contradictory statements are relatively true ; thus the many sidedness of a thing as postulated by the doctrine of Anekānta is perfectly justifiable. The same argument applies to wind also."
Similarly we can say a sentient thing is a positive thing being a substance but it also does not exist from the standpoint of definite form and other concrete qualities, or in other words Jiva exists from the standpoint
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