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III. 23, 24 )
CHAPTER 11
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him Sat is that which has the double aspect of a substance and its quality that is, which has the characteristics of birth, stability and decay. None of the above two definitions apply to Sat for they are based on the view of absolute difference.
After showing that the above two definitions of Bhedavādi do not cover the whole truth our author proceeds to show the hollowness of the view of absolute difference in another way. He asks his opponent whether qualities (Guņas) are in his opinion corporeal or incorporeal. If qualities are corporeal then the substance which is the repo-, sitory of qualities and which is separate from the qualities must also be regarded as corporeal and if it is corporeal there is no possibility of its being Atīndriya (beyond the reach of senses). Not only that but in that a substance will never be of the nature of an atom. If on the other hand qualities are incorporeal then they will never be perceived by senses but in the case of jar and other things contrary is our experience. Thus qualities cannot be regarded as corporeal or incorporeal in its independent capacity. Qualities, therefore, must be considered as identical with the substance. Then alone the double nature of qualities would be accounted for by saying that where the substance is corporeal, its qualities are also corporeal and where the substance is incorporeal, its qualities are also incorporeal. The qualities of an atom, for instance, are beyond perception for atom is Atīndriya and the qualities of a jar, a piece of cloth etc., are per. ceivable by senses since the things in themselves are perceivable by senses. 23, 24
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