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III. 16, 22 )
CHAPTER III:
[ 129
From the discussion in the preceeding verses it has been finally decided that the two words Guņa 'and Paryāya, are synonyms. . But the main question still remains as to whether Guņa and Dravya that is quality and substance (as has been regarded by some) are absolutely identical. The author before giving his verdict in this matter asks the person who believes in the absolute identity of a substance and quality to refute the opinion of difference between a substance and quality. Now the Ekāntā-Abheda-vādi instead of advancing arguments against the Bhedavādi simply says that the opinion of persons who regard the nature of substance and quality as different from each other has already been refuted in the beginning of this chapter (Gatha 1-2) the only thing that now remains to be done is to give an apt illustration to show that absolute identity between substance and quality is the only right view.
The illustration has already been once given that of a person who is regarded in various capacities by various persons. One 'person regards this particular person as his uncle but that does not mean that he is uncle to every body. Another person regards him as his father but that does not mean that he is father to every body. He assumes different relations to different persons, no doubt, but is one and the same from the standpoint of 'a man;' all the different relations are but mere illusions with regard to that one persistent individuality of the person. Similarly substance is originally one general thing but when it comes in contact with different senses it assumes the different forms of colour,
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