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CHAPTER II
NATURE OF SOUL
TH
HE great problem of the existence of soul had troubled almost all the great minds of the world. There have been such philosophers who did not believe in an independent existence of soul like Carvakas of India and earlier Greek philosophers as Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, and the like. Pluralistic Greek thinkers like Democritus and others did not regard mind as a separate entity from material atoms. At the time of Lord Mahāvīra such thoughts were not altogether absent. He attempted in a successful manner to prove the independent existence of soul.
ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF SOUL
Lord Mahāvīra in the opening presents the views of those opponents who do not believe in an independent existence of soul. "O Indrabhūti! You have a doubt about the existence of soul (jiva), since it is not directly perceived by the senses as is the case with a jar (ghata). And so you argue that whatever is imperceptible does not exist in the world, e.g., a flower in the sky."
Some one may here argue that though anus (atoms) are not within the range of perception, yet, they do exist. So what about them? The answer is that no doubt they are imperceptible to us as anus, but when they are so transformed as to perform the function of a jar, etc., they no longer remain so. Such is not, however, the case with the soul. It never attains a stage when it
can be directly perceived.
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The soul is not an object of inference, because inference, too, is preceded by perception and is the outcome of the recollection of the universal concomitance. There has not been previously seen any connection between soul (major term) and its linga (middle term), the recollection of which, along with the sight of its linga, can lead us to a conviction about the existence of soul."2
1 Viseṣāvasyaka-bhāṣya, 1549.
2 ibid., 1550-1.
