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OUTLINES OF JAINA PHILOSOPHY
of motion is one and from the view-point of units (pradeśas) it is innumerable.1 The same method can be applied to the medium of rest, etc.
CAUSE AND EFFECT
In other
Whether the effect exits in the cause or is it a new outcome? Those philosophers who admit that the effect is not a new product but that it does exist in the cause, are known as 'Satkāryavadins.' Those thinkers who do not believe in this doctrine but hold that the effect is entirely a new outcome and that it does not exist in the cause, are called 'Asatkāryavādins.' The schools of Indian philosophy believing in the theory of satkaryavāda' are Sankhya, Yoga, and Vedanta. The Asatkāryavādins are Cārvāka, Buddhism, Nyaya-Vaiseṣika, and Mīmāmsă (one sect). Jainism does not regard these views as valid in their absolute forms. According to its doctrine of non-absolutism, the effect is neither absolutely identical with the cause nor absolutely different from it. The cause remains in the effect as an essence and not as a mode. The effect is new in the shape of a mode and not as the essence. words, the essential quality remains unchanged, while the mode is changed. When we say that the effect is new, we mean only that the mode is new. When we admit that the effect is not new, we mean by this that the essence is the same. That which exists can never be absolutely non-existent and that which does not exist at all can never come into existence. An existent object cannot be destroyed and a non-existent object cannot be originated. Hence, from one point of view, the effect does not exist in the cause. It is a new outcome. From another point of view, it can be maintained that the effect does exist in the cause. Both these stand-points are right so far as they are not absolute. We cannot define the theory of causation in an exclusive manner. Unless the doctrine of causation in the form of sad-asatkaryavāda' is accepted, it is not possible to have a true picture of reality.
Thus, the so-called opposites such as existence and non-existence, permanence and non-permanence, identity and difference, oneness and maniness, etc., can be attributed to an object from various points of view. These opposites should not be taken to be absolutely heterogeneous. They can remain in the same
1 Prajñāpanā-pada, III, 56.
