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OUTLINES OF JAINA PHILOSOPHY
which there is some sort of general statement. In all such statements, there is an overlapping of paryāyāstika also. Only that statement where there is no further possibility of particularisation falls under the strict purview of pure paryayastika.1 The point is that as a rule, every statement that deals with some sort of universal statement is the legitimate province of dravyāstika. Except the
ultimate statement where there is a statement of that indivisible particularisation, all other statements gradually culminating in the statement of the highest universality fall under the purview of dravyāstika. But, at the same time, all these statements, except the statement of the highest universality, become the subject-matter of paryāyāstika as well. In other words, only one statement dealing with the highest entity without a single attribute, is covered by dravyāstika only. Only that statement which deals with ultimate particularisation beyond which there is no possibility of further particularisation, falls under the range of paryāyāstika only. All the intermediary statements are covered by paryayastika as well as dravyastika, for in every such intermediary statement there is some kind of generalisation as well as some sort of particularisation. That very object which is viewed by dravyāstika from the view-point of generalisation, is viewed by paryāyāstika from the stand-point of particularisation. This being the case, it is (perhaps) impossible to find a dravyāstika in its pure form, that is to say, absolutely unmixed with paryāyāstika. Similarly, it is equally impossible to find a paryāyāstika in its pure form totally unmixed with dravyastika. Hence, assigning a particular statement to a particular naya depends upon the volition of the speaker."2
The distinction between the proper province of these nayas is that dravyästika takes its stand excluding the positive assertion of paryāyāstika as its legitimate subject, while paryāyāstika views the same object exclusively from the stand-point of particularisation. Here, each does not consider the assertion of its rival naya as its property. Herein lies the true distinction between them and their spheres when applied to one and the same thing. The same fact is expressed in the following words: 'From the standpoint of paryāyāstika, all things are necessarily born and perish;
1 Sanmati-tarka-prakaraṇa, I, 8
2 ibid., I, 9
